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Factors in the calculation of the 
annual adjustment of the remuneration of 
officials of the European Communities, 
as provided for by the Staff Regulations· 
Reference period: 
year to 1 July 1996 
Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Division 83 
Luxembourg · 
October 1996 
En-alum: Due to a co"ection of the Austrian figures, announced by the Austrian goven1ment 
after the Eurostat report was completed, the following tables have to be corrected in the 
Eurostat report "Factors in the calculation of the annual adjustment of the remuneration of· 
officials of the European Communities, 1996". 
The Correct figures are: 
Table1.1 
Table 1.3.A 
The Community index is equal to 99.9 (1.7.95 = 100.0) 
Real change in the net remuneration of central government civil servants in 
the twelve months to 1st July 1996 
Country Index 
A 101.2 
EUR15 99.9 
Nominal (current-price) changes in the remuneration of national civil 
servants in the twelve-month period to 1st July 1996 (1.7.1995 = 100) 
Country Category 
A 
EUR15 
Table 1.3.8 
A B c 0 Total 
Gross 101.2 103.4 104.2 107.3 102.7 
Net 101.2 103.4 104.2 107.3 102.8 
Gross 102.4 102.4 103.3 103.4 102.7 
Net 101.7 102.1 102.6 103.3 102.2 
Real (constant-price) changes in the remuneration of national civil servants 
in the twelve-month period to 1st July 1996 (1.7.1995 = 100) 
. . 
Country Category 
A B c D Total 
A Gross 99.6 101.8 102.6 1(1).6 101.1 
Net 99.6 101.8 102.6 1(1).6 101.2 
EUR1& Gross 100.2 100.4 100.5 100.9 100.4 
Net 99.6 100.1 99.9 100.9 99.9 
Table 1.3.C Weighting of the European ·union specific indicator 
Country Real net specific Indicator Weighting Effect on the total 
A 
EUR15 
Table 111.1 
Table IV.1.A 
Table IV.3 
101.2 2.06 0.02 
99.9 100.00 ..0.1 
The change in real per capita remuneration in different sectors (1996=10Q) 
and 
Comparison of the gross specific indicator and the control indicator in real 
terms 
Country Specific Indicator, gross 
A 101.1 
EUR15 100.4 
Comparison of changes in gross and net remuneration for the twelve-month 
period to 1st July 1996 
Country Gross remuneration Net remuneration 
A 102.7 102.8 
EUR15 102.7 102.2 
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JNTRODUCI'ION 
. In accordance with Article 65 of the Staff Regulations applicable to qfficials and other 
servants of the European Communities, Eurostat hereby presents its report for the twelve 
months to 1st July 1996 . 
Council Regulation No 3830/91 of 19 December 1991 amended the Staff Regulations, 
adding Annex XI (Rules for implementing Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations), 
which defines the method for the annual adjustment of the remuneration of Community 
officials. Annex XI stipulates that adjustments ·shall be determined by the following 
factors: 
• changes in the purchasing power of salaries of national civil servants in central' 
government (specific indicator); 
• changes in the cost ofliving in Brussels (joint index and Brussels index); 
• economic parities between Brussels and the other places of employment in the 
Member States. 
The value of the adjustment is equal to the product of the specific indicator and the joint 
index, with a 25% weighting for the Belgian index (Brussels component). 
Changes in the cost of living in places of employment other than Brussels and Luxembourg 
are derived indirectly from the value of the adjustment for Brussels and changes in the 
economic parities between Brussels and those other places. 
Chapters I, B and m of this report examine respectively: 
• the changes in the purchasing power of salaries of central government civil 
servants in Member States (specific indicator); 
• the changes in the cost of living for Brussels, the economic parities and the 
correction coefficients; 
• the change in the real per capita emoluments in general government and in central 
government {control indicator). · 
Chapter IV makes a number of technical points relating to the data reported in the 
preceding chapters. More detailed information on chapters I to m is available in the 
ANNEX to the Eurostat Report. Where necessary, Eurostat has provided technical 
explanations of the methods of calculation. 
All figures and calculations contained in this report are based on data supplied by the 
competent services in the Member States. 
Data supplied by Member States about the changes in the remuneration of central 
government civil servants are collected in a volume available on request. To obtain this 
volume, please contact Eurostat in Luxembourg: 
EUROSTAT 
Division B3 Secretary 
C5/02- APC 
Bitiment Jean Monnet 
L-2920 Luxembourg 
tel.: (352) 4301-32130 
Eurostat 
CHAPTER 1: Changes in the remuneration of central 
government civil servants In the Member States 
Ll Summary or the results (specific indicator) 
The following table sets out the changes, at constant prices, in the net remuneration of 
central government civil servants in the Member States in the twelve months to 1st July 
1996. 
The Community index is equal to 100.0 (1.7.95 = 100.0). 
Table 1.1 Real change in the net remuneration of central government 
civil servants in the twelve months to 1st July 1996 
Country Index (1.7.9&•100) 
8 99.8 
OK 101.4 
0 99.5 
GR 98.0 
E 100.4 
F 98.0 
IRL 102.4 
I 101.2 
L 100.2 
NL 100.5 
A 104.3 
p 100.9 
FIN 103.2 
s 101.9 
UK 102.8 
EUR11 
The method of calculating the specific indicator is described below. The calculations 
performed for each Member State are s~t out in detail in five tables in the ANNEX. All 
values were calculated without intermediate rounding, although the final figures have been 
rounded for greater clarity. 
1.2 General remarks on the calculation or the specific indicator 
For some years now, the procedure for calculating the specific indicator has remaint\1 
practically unchanged. Essentially, it is based on Council decisions. The rules governing its 
practical implementation are defined in part by Eurostat and in part by the "Working Party 
on Article 65 of the Staff Regulations". 
Eurostat provides a report on the trend of the purchasing power of civil servants in 
central government in Member States. In principle the change in the purchasing power of 
civil servants under constant circumstances is considered. 
The reference period is defined as the twelve-month period preceding 1st July of the year 
in which the review provided for in Article 65 is carried out. The method is based on the 
comparison of a snapshot of a national remuneration system at 1 July of the current year 
with the equivalent snapshot at 1 July of the previous year. A snapshot of the system does 
not simply mean the remuneration grid at a date but the remuneration level of the 
reference population employees at that date, including 1/12 of all the annually paid 
elements, like Christmas bonuses, annual holiday pay, lump-sum payments etc. 
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The reference population is taken as the following. Only staff executing central 
governments tasks is included. Furthermore, the reference population comprises only the 
permanent statutory staff of the central administrations of Member States. The fonowing 
categories are in any case excluded: _ _ · 
• the armed forces, comprising those who have enlisted for long and short 
engagements and also conscripts; 
• security forces, mobile police units, frontier guards, etc.; 
• teachers; _ , 
• ministers of religion, if directly paid by central government; 
• medical and assimilated staff of national health services. 
Eurostat provides a specific indicator for the four staff categories A, B, C, and D. Out of 
the reference population the Member States may have selected a- sample. The sample 
should be representative of the reference population. Out of this sample Member States 
report only on: single persons and married persons with two dependent children; data that 
relate to the remuneration paid on the first, a middle, and the final step of the selected 
grades. In special cases representative steps are selected. 
For the transition from gross to net pay, account is taken of statutory deductions and 
general taxation factors. 
The nominal changes in the remuneration of civil servants in the Member States are 
deflated with the following national consumer price indices. 
Table 1.2 Consumer price indices (June 1996- June 1996). 
Country June 1881 (1881•100) June 1888 (1881•100) 12 Month Index 
8 125.0 127.3 101.8 
DK 133.8 136.5 102.0 
D 125.2 128.8 101.4 
GR 431.9 8.9 108.8 
E 178.0 182.2 103.8 
F 129.8 132.9 102.3 
IRL1 133.5 135.4 101.4 
12 100.2 104.2 103.8 
L 125.1 126.7 101.2 
NL3 113.8 115.8 101.8 
A 130.7 132.8 101.8 
p 240.~ 249.2 103.8 
FIN 143.1 143.8 100.4 
s 185.9 168.7 100.8 
UK 158.3 181.7 1102.1 
1 (Ireland) Average between May and August 
2 (Italy) •Jndice dci prczzi al consumo perle famiglie di operai e impiegati•. Base 1995=~00 
3 (Netherlands) •Reeks voor werknernersgezinnen met laag inkomen, totaat•. Base 1990 • 100 (CBS 
maandstatistiek van de prijzen • Tabel 1.2 C) 
Performance pay has in recent years become a component of civil service remuneration in 
some Member States. The practical procedure was adapted in the following way to make 
sure that the principles of Art.65 and Annex XI could be applied in the same way in all 
Member States. Performance pay that is granted to civil servants in a Member State is not 
in every case included in the basic pay. If the performance pay could be regarded as being 
equivalent to a promotion it is not included. Likewise, if the performance pay could be 
regarded as being equivalent to a step increase it is not included. However, if at least part 
of the performance pay could be regarded as being equivalent to a 'normal' pay increase it 
is taken into account. 
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All calculations are based on data relating to the remuneration of central government civil 
servants as transmitted to Eurostat by the competent authorities in the Member States. 
The data supplied by the Member States are collected in a separate volume. 
L3 Specific indicator - results for the Union 
Table 1.3.A sets out the changes in nominal remuneration (at current prices) in each 
Member State and the average for the Union. It also sets out the indices for each of the 
four categories and for staff as a whole. 
The corresponding indices of real salaries (at constant prices) are set out in Table 1.3.B. 
The indices for the various Member States in the two tables are derived from Tables 1.3 .E 
of the ANNEX, while the Union indices are the result of an aggregation obtained using 
the weightings set out in Table 1.3.C (for converting national indices to the Union 
average) and in Tables 1.3.D of the ANNEX (for converting the indices for each grade to 
the average for the personnel as a whole). It can be seen that the changes vary from one 
Member State to another. Moreover, in most Member States, the changes in remuneration 
vary from one category to another. 
Table 1.3.A 
Country 
B 
OK 
0 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
~ 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR11 
4 
Nominal (current-price} changes in the remuneration of 
national civil servants in the twelve-month period to 1st July 
1996 (1.7.1995 = 100} 
category 
A B c D Total 
Grou 102.0 102.0 102.0 102.0 102.0 
Nat 101.4 101.6 101.6 101.6 101.6 
Grou 103.1 101.8 102.1 103.2 102.6 
N-.t 103.8 102.8 102.7 103.4 103.4 
Gross 101.3 101.9 102.2 102.7 101.7 
Net 100.3 100.8 102.1 103.5 100.Q 
Grosa 108.4 108.5 108.4 108.6 108.4 
Net 106.6 106.6 106.5 106.6 106.6 
Gross 104.1 103.6 103.7 104.8 103.8 
Net 104.3 103.8 103.9 104.9 104.0 
Gross 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 101.4 
Net 100.5 100.5 99.8 100.3 100.2 
Grou 101.9 106.2 102.2 102.2 103.3 
Net 102.9 106.2 102.9 103.1 103.8 
Gross 105.8 106.1 105.9 105.8 105.9 
Net 105.0 105.4 105.2 104.9 105.1 
Gross 104.1 104.1 104.1 104.0 104.1 
Net 101.4 101.3 101.4 101.4 101.4 
Gross 100.2 100.2 1Q0.2 100.3 100.2 
Nat 102.2 102.3 102.3 102.4 102.3 
Grass 106.0 106.2 104.2 107.3 105.Q 
Nat 106.1 106.2 104.2 107.3 106.0 
Gross 104.3 104.1 104.0 104.4 104.3 
Net 104.7 104.4 104.3 104.8 104.8 
Grass 102.7 103.3 103.6 103.8 103.0 
Net 103.6 103.6 103.8 103.9 103.6 
Gross 104.1 104.1 105.2 105.5 104.4 
Net 102.5 102.5 103.5 103.8 102.7 
Gross 104.5 103.6 103.7 103.7 103.7 
Net 105.7 104.9 104.8 104.8 104.9 
Gross 102.5 102.5 103.3 103.4 102.8 
Net 101.8 102.2 102.6 103.3 102.3 
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Table 1.3.8 
Country 
8 
.. OK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
~ 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR11 
• 
Real (constant-price) changes in the remuneration of 
national civil servants in the twelve-month period to 1st July 
1996 (1.7.1995 •100) 
category 
A 8 c D Tobit 
Grou 100.2 100.2 100.2 100.2 100.2 
Net 89.8 99.8 89.8 99.8 98.8 
Grass 101.0 89.8 100.1 101.1 100.6 
Net 101.8 100.7 100.7 101.4 101.4 
Groa 89.9 100.5 100.8 101.2 100.3 
Net 98.9 99.4 100.7 102.1 99.5 
Grass 89.7 99.7 99.8 99.8 99.7 
Net 98.0 97.9 97.9 98.0 98.0 
Grass 100.5 100.0 100.1 101.1 100.2 
Net 100.6 100.2 100.3 101.3 100.4 
Grou 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 
Net 98.2 98.3 97.6 88.0 98.0 
Groea 100.5 104.8 100.8 100.8 101.9 
Net 101.5 104.7 101.5 . 101.8 102.4 
Gross 101.8 102.1 101.9 101.8 101.9 
Nat 101.1 101.4 101.2 101.0 101.2 
Gross 102.9 102.9 102.8 102.8 102.9 
Net 100.2 100.1 100.2 100.2 100.2 
Gross 98.4 98.4 98.5 98.5 98.5 
Net 100.4 100.5 100.5 100.6 100.5 
Gross 104.3 104.6 102.6 105.6 104.3 
Net 104.4 104.5 102.8 105.6 104.3 
Gross 100.7 100.5 100.4 100.8 100.6 
Net 101.1 100.7 100.7 100.9 100.9 
Groea 102.3 102.8 103.2 103.3 102.8 
Net 103.2 103.2 103.3 103.4 103.2 
Gross 103.3 103.3 104.3 104.7 103.5 
Nat 101.6 101.7 102.8 103.0 101.9 
Gross 102,4 101.5 101.5 101.5 101.6 
Nat 103.6 102.7 102.6 102.6 102.8 
Gross 100.3 100.5 100.5 100.9 100.5 
Nat 99.7 100.2 99.9 100.9 100.0 
Eurostat 
Table 1.3.C Weighting of the European Union specifi~ indicator 
Country Real net specific Weighting' Effect on the total Indicator 
B 99.8 3~73 -0.01 
OK 101.4 1.53 0.02 
D 99.5 34.42 -0.17 
GR 98.0 1.77 -0.04 
E 100.4 4.39 0.02 
F 
c 
98.0 21.85 -0.45 
IRL 102.4 0.63 0.01 
I 101.2 12.53 0.14 
L 100.2 0.21 0.00 
NL 100.5' 2.91 0.01 
A 104.3 2.06 0.09 
p 100.9 2.23 0.02 
FIN 103.2 0.72 0.02 
s 101.9 1.27 ; 0.02 
UK 102.8 9.77 0.27 
EUR11 100.0 100.00 0.0 
* Basis: Total emoluments of central government officials (%). 
•6 Eurostat 
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CHAPTER II: Changes In the ~ost .of living for Brussels and 
equivalence of purchasing power of EC officials In the Member 
Sm~s · 
D.l .Joint index for Brussels and Bel1ian index (Brussels capital component). 
The EC Staff Regulations state, in Article 64 and Annex XI, that Eurostat in agreement 
with the national statistical institutes shall draw up a joint index to measure changes- in the 
cost of living for EC officials in Brussels. 
Annex XI states that the joint index has to be weighted with the Belgian index (Brussels 
capital component) by 25%. Multiplying that result by the specific indicator gives the 
amount of the adjustment. 
The joint index is compiled by Eurostat in co-operation with the Belgian :Ministry of 
Economic AtTairs, whereas the Belgian index is calculated by the Ministry ftom the 429 
detailed indices that they produce for Brussels. These detailed indices are then agpegated 
by Eurostat into 173 basic headings, which (excluding housing costs) are used to calculate 
the joint index . 
The figures for the basic headings for accommodation costs for tenants (rents index) and 
owner-occupiers (imputed rents index) are replaced in the joini index by an index 
calculated by Eurostat based on the results of an annual survey canied out among EC 
staff employed in Brussels. 
In addition to the rents indices, another relevant difference between the two indices are 
the weighting structures. 
The weightings used to aggregate the 173 basic headings of the joint index are derived 
fro~ ifiunily budget surveys (FBS) carried out through EC and Co-ordinated 
Organisations officials in Brussels. Results from the 1995 Brussels FBS have been 
introduced this year. The weightings used for the Belgian in~ex are based on the PBS 
carried out by the Belgian National Statistical Institute on a sample ofBelgian households. 
The details of the calculation of the two indices corresponding to this annual review are 
set out in Table U l.B. 
Table ll.l.A shows the result of the weighting required by Annex XI. 
Table 11.1.A Changes in the Brussels cost of living in the twelve months 
to 1st July 1996 
Weight (~) Index 
75 101.4 
25 101.7 
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Table 11.1.8 Changes In the consumer price indices for Brussels for the 
twelve-month period to 1st July 1996 
Table 11.1.81 Joint index (Brussels) 
Clroupa of ........ Weighting Indices 
1. Food, and tobacco 113.3 101.2 
2. Clall*w and foaltwa' 50.1 100.8 
3. Houllna. e.tfna. lighting 248.8 100.1 
... Fwnlure, ct.anlng, houlehold articles, household a 111.2 101.1 
5. Health care coats 24.8 107.2 
8. Tf'lniPOit and communfcatJonl 199.8 101.7 
7. Enteltalnment, leisure, education and culture 87.8 101.1 
8. Other goods and services 154.8 101.7 
Globlllndex without rents 799.7 101.7 
Rem. Index 200.3 100.8 
Globlllndex 1000.0 101.4 
Table 11.1.82 Belgian capital index 
Groups of consumption Weighting Indices 
1. Food,_~es and tobacco 201.1 100.8 
2. Clothing and footwear 85.8 101.0 
3. Hauling, Mating, lghting 195.3 102.0 
4. Furniture, cleaning, household articles, household appliances 72.5 101.3 
5. Hellh care costa 41.1 103.8 
8. Tf'lniPOit and communlcatlona 184.5 102.5 
7. Entertalrvnent.leiaure, education and culture 85.1 100.1 
8. Olhw aooda and MrVfcee 153.1 101.8 
Globlllndex without rents 921.2 101.7 
Rentalndex 71.8 101.8 
Global Index 1000.0 101.7 
ll.2 Economic parities and correction coefficients 
The object of the economic parities is to compare the relative costs of living of European 
institution officials in Brussels (reference city) and in each of the capitals and other places 
of employment for which a weighting has been set. The method used is to compare the 
price of a "basket" of goods and services purchased by the average official in Brussels 
with the price of the same basket in each of the other places of employment. The prices of 
certain products are recorded in Belgian francs in Brussels and, say, in lire in Rome. The 
average of all the price ratios is the "economic parity". 
The economic parity is therefore a real exchange rate and, as salaries are fixed in Belgian 
francs and converted into national currencies using the exchange rate at 1st July, a 
weighting is applied to convert the official exchange rate to the economic parity. 
The system is as follows: the total range of goods and services constituting the 
c;onsumption of the average European institution official is divided into 173 basic headings 
(such as cheese, footwear, petro~ train fares). A price ratio between the place of 
employment and Brussels is established for each of these headings; this is called the basic 
parity. Price surveys are conducted on products selected to represent the basic heading 
and specified in the necessary detail to enable prices in a sufficiently narrow range to be 
collected. 
8 . Eurostat 
The Staff Regulations require each basic parity to be checked by dir~ survey at least, 
once every five years. In practice checks are carried out at shorter intervals u part of the 
· European Comparison Programme (ECP). At each annual salary review around one third 
of the basic price parities are replaced by new parities produced by the latest price surVey. 
The 173 basic parities are then updated using the price index ratio between the. place of 
employment and Brussels. 
Housing is dealt with differently. Special rent surveys of estate agents are carried out am . 
xar at each place of employment, including Brussels, to calculate an economic parity for 
the basic heading "accommodation costs for tenants". The calculation follows a 
methodology that has been developed by Eurostat in collaboration with the national 
statistical institutes of the Member States, based on the principle that the parity used 
should be calculated in such a way to allow a European institution official outside Brussels 
to live in a dwelling of comparable quality to the ones occupied by European institution 
officials in Brussels. The basic parity "accommodation costs of owner-occupiers" is 
calculated by reference to the rent the owner-occupiers would pay if they were tenants 
(imputed rents). · 
In order to calculate the overall economic parities weights have to be applied to each basic 
heading according to its relative importance in the consumption basket These weights are 
calculated directly from the results of the special family budget surveys conducted among 
European and international civil servants every five years. The resulting structure reflects 
the cOnsumption of the average international civil servant in Brussels and in each country 
or place of employment. New weights for Brussels from the 1995 FBS. have been 
introduced this year. 
Using the 173 basic·parities and the specific weights the overall parity is calculated in two 
ways: the first uses the consumption pattern for the reference city (Brussels) (this is a type 
ofLaspeyres index); the second uses the consumption pattern for the place of employment 
(this is a type of Paasche index). In accordance with standard practice for intema~onal 
comparisons both types of index are calculated and the geometric mean of the results (a 
Fisher index) is the one actually used. 
The correction coefficients applicable to the salaries of the European institution officials 
working in the capitals and places of employment other than Brussels and Luxembourg, 
which are calculated for the 1st of July,. are determined on the basis of the relationships 
between the economic parities and the exchange rates fixed by the Commission and 
specified in the Staff Regulations for the relevant countries. 
Table ll.2.A shows the calculation of the correction coefficients on 1st July 1996 for 
places of employment situated in the European Union territory. 
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Table 11.2.A Calculation of correction coefficients at 1st July 1996 
~try/Pl.-of•ployiMnt Parity ExcMn ...... CGrNctlan CMtlldent 
[ 1 J [2J 100•[1]/(2] 
IlL 1 1 100.0 . 
DK 0.23483 0.11733 125.4 
D 8erln 0.054169 0.048511 111.5 
Bonn 0.041967 0.041581 100.1 
Karllruhl 0.041101 0.048588 •.o 
Munich 0.053857 0.048SI 110.4 
GR 8.8570 7.8970 •.s 
E 3.7311 4.0881 81.3 
F 0.19132 0.16443 118.4 
RL 0.011532 0.020113 12.1 
I Rome 47.517 .... 17.0 
v .... 45.408 .... 12.7 
NL 0.057131 0.054417 104.8 
A 0.38219 0.34202 114.7 
p 4.2001 5.0010 &4.0 
FIN 0.17305 0.14719 117.0 
s 0.24924 0.21111 117.8 
UK L.onllon 0.023172 0.020710 115.3 
eun.m 0.011950 0.020710 81.5 
. The details of the economic parities calculation, at the 8 main consumption groups level, 
are shown in table U.2.B for all capitals and other places apart from Brussels and 
Luxembourg. The weightings used to establish the Laspeyres and the Paascbe parities are 
also set out in the same table. The global results are presented with and without rents. For 
some countries some basic headings elementary parities have not been estimated; thus the 
weights for Belgium and the specific country do not add to 1000. 
Table 11.2.8 Economic parities and weights of the eight expenditure 
groups for each country 1st July 1996 
11.2.81 Denmark 
Weights 
.......... groups ...., Denmuk lllglutn 
1. Food. drinkl toblcco 0.24HI 171.1 113.3 
2. ClcttW1g and foatww 0.11112 72.0 10.1 
3. Hauling, hellltJrV, llgtCfng 0.11421 117.3 241.1 
4. F&.mlunt, c11erina. hrMehold articlel, houlehCIId ..,P. 0.21107 111.1 111.2 
~- Hlallh .. COlla 0.24417 11.1 24.1 
8. T,.rwport end COI1'IIU1icltlo 0.21101 111.2 111.7 
7. erart.lllmll't, llil\n, educltion •nd cUtunt 0.21353 13.1 17.8 
8. Oltw goodllnd..W. 0.29117 127.1 124.1 
Olal renta 0.24154 111.1 7H.O 
Renli-"Y 0.11013 110.5 200.3 ' 
Global plrily 0.23413 170.3 181.3 
1.2.82 F.R. Gennany- Bertin 
Wllghts 
.................. 
,.., ..... .......... 
1. Food drinlca, toblcco 0.050017 113.2 113.3 
2. Clotting end,..., 0.044717 13.1 10.1 
3. Houlina. heltlnD. llgftlna 0.014011 201.1 241.1 
4. FLmlbn, cllar*ta. hDuHhald Mlclel, houlehclld .,..:JI. 0.041021 114.7 111.2 
5. Hlellh.aGOIIa 0.011017 17.1 24.1 
e. T,_part_ Mel CGI'IInlri:ltiO 0.014511 111.0 111.1 
7. Ertlrtlll•awt. lllltn, education and c~ 0.010111 17.0 17.8 
8. Olhlrgaodllnd..W. 0.013374 111.1 114.1 
GlcDI rll1tS 0.061101 127.2 711.1 
Reraplrily 0.011111 172.4 aoo.a 
Gfoblf pertty 0.014111 Ill. I Hl.2 
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11.2.83 F.R. Gennany - Bonn 
Wllght8 
Expenclltan.....,. Pdy lenn lelgl&am. 
1. Food drlnlcs, tablcoo 0.060966 163.2 113.3 
2. ClolhN ... ,.... 0.044642 83.8 50.1 
~- Houlina. hlllna.lghling 0.048028 206.8 248.8 
t.t Fwnllln, ..,._ houNhold lllticiH, houlehaldappl. 0.047985 114.7 111.2 
5. ......... _. 0.086800 17.8 24.8 
•. 
• TrMIDCI't llld OOIIIIIU1Icllon 0.061518 191.4 198.7 7. Elltlrtiii...C. ....... lducllion lnd culln 0.046803 87.0 97.8 
a.- Ollw goadlllld ..... 0.060790 188.6 164.8 
Olobll--~-·..,.. 0.049826 827.8 788.7 
Rtnlapdy 0.046382 172.4 20o.3 
Globii-'Y 0.048887 1000.0 1000.0 
11.2.84 F.R. Gennany - Karlsruhe 
w.lght8 
ExpMCIIture gn»Up8 Pdy J<Msruhe lhlglum 
1. Food, drinks, tobKc:o 0.061902 153.2 113.3 
2. ctcti1a .nd footWIII' 0.048588 83.8 50.1 
3. Houllna. hlllina.lahllna 0.039827 205.8 248.8 
... Fwnlbn, clla'*'a, hculhold articles, household appl. 0.047812 114.7 111.2 
5. ..._lh en CCIIII 0.089198 17.8 24.8 
8. TransDOrt end c:omrrKI1Icallo 0.052788 181.4 188.7 
7. Entll111nmn, ..._,.,lducation and cube 0.048138 87.0 97.8 
8. Olhlr goodland ..W:.S 0.062307 188.6 154.8 
OlobiiDarlY a:ludlna renll 0.060839 827.8 788.7 
Rlntlpdy 0.037808 172.4 200.3 
OlobiiDarlv 0.048101 1000.0 1000.0 
11.2.85 F .R. Gennany - Munich 
We11ht8 
Expenclltur. group• ......., Munich lhlglum 
1. Food. drinks. tacoo 0.068614 163.2 113.3 
2. ClotHna ... footWIII' 0.048496 83.8 50.1 
3. Houlhl, hlllna,lahlina 0.065804 206.8 248.8 
4. Fwnlln, cfllnhl. household articles, household appl. 0.049488 114.7 111.2 
5. Hldh en COlts 0.087806 17.8 24.8 
8. TraMPart and comrnuniclltion 0.063397 191.0 198.9 
7. Entertlirnert. ...,., lducatlan lnd cul&n 0.0&0800 87.0 97.8 
I. Olhlr goadl and ..... 0.054152 188.5 154.8 
GlobiiDartty a:ludlna l8ntl 0.063097 827.2 798.8 
Rtnla DaritY 0.058378 172.4 200.3 
GlobiiDariY 0.053857 999.8 999.2 
11.2.86 Greece 
Weights 
ExpendituNIRMIP8 Priy o ..... Belgium 
1. Food, drinks tacoo 8.8743 178.8 113.3 
~. .Cicti1a .nd footwNr 8.0389 74.2 50.1 
3. Hculra, hilling, lghllng 6.8418 183.4 241.8 
14. Fwnllln. ....... houHhold articiM, houMholc:IIPPI. 8.8355 123.1 111.2 
5 . ..._lhcnooats 8.2317 17.4 24.8 
.. r.....-and OOII'InU1Ic:lti 8.2857 188.5 199.7 
7. Enltrtllumn, ..... education n cube 8.8938 98.7 87~8 
8. Olhlr goodl anciHrvicea 7.5588 158.2 124.1 
Globii-IIY --·rents 8.8172 888.8 789.0 
Renllpdy 6.9880 126.4 200.3 
Globlla.rlv 8.8670 994.0 989.3 
• 
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11.2.87 Spain 
w.lghta 
Explndlture group8 Pwtty ...... a.lglum . 
1. Food. drlnkl tobllcco 3.4728 189.1 113.3 
2. Clolftln,__ 3.1971 71.4 60.1 
3. Houllna. --.-...a. IaNing 4.1141 195.0 248.8 
4 Fwnlln ........ household' alticlls, household appl. 3.4307 118.5 111.2 
5. .......... caats 5.7333 18.8 24.8 
I. TIWIIIIQit MdaamriUIIc:llllo 3.8220 178.6 111.7 
7. Entlrtllnmem, ...,.., educllion n culln 3.9045 83.0 87.8 
& at.~---- 3.4084 158.0 164.8 
Globll-·• ....;.;...;::;., IWilS 3.5878 841.8 788.7 
RIID-'tv 4.4805 158.5 200.3 
GlobiiDdV 3.7318 1000.0 1000.0 
11.2.88 France 
Welghta 
Exp~ndlture grouiNI Pwtty FIWIC8 lelgluln 
1. Food, drinlca. tabllcco 0.17198 133.8 113.3 
2. Clcti'la Md foatwMr 0.17285 102.5 60.1 
13. HouUta, hllllil'll.lahtinS'I 0.25533 228.8 248.8 
4. Fwnll&n, .,._, houHhold articles, household 1111'1. 0.15872 110.2 111.2 
5. .......,cncaats 0.18854 30.7 24.8 
8. Transport and c:omnudcation 0.18972 183.2 188.7 
7. Eutlrtalnm.,., ..,.., educalion and culbn 0.18851 108.8 87.8 
8. Oltw goodland ...... 0.18844 120.2 154.8 
Globall*lva:ld'la...,.. 0.17472 811.2 719.7 
Ralllllllv 0.27788 188.8 200.3 
GlobiiiDirlv 0.18132 1000.0 1000.0 
11.2.89 Ireland 
w.lght:l 
EJCpendlture group• Pwtty Ireland a.lglum 
1. Food, drinks. tobecco 0.020391 174.5· 113.3 
2. aOitn andfoatwur 0.018040 73.3 60.1 
3. HouUta, ....... -lahiina 0.017381 173.2 248.8 
4. Fumlbn, cllarlina, houHhold articles, household appl. 0.018475 121.8 111.2 
5. HMih care caats 0.022780 17.2 24.8 
8. TraniPCIII and cornrn&ncllllon 0.021053 184.4 188.7 
7. EntertliiiiMd. ...... educllllon Md culln 0.014230 85.5 87.8 
8. Ollw~andMNices 0.018853 121.8 124.1 
Globll .. rttvuciUdfna IWilS 0.018785 825.7 789.0 
Renta DlllitY 0.017423 135.7 200.3 
Global DillY 0.018532 881.4 888.3 
11.2.810 Italy - Rome 
Wel~hta 
Expenditure grouiNI Parity Rome a.lglum 
1. Food, drinks, lobeco 50.828 172.8 113.3 
i Clothhl Md ,._. 31.490 74.4 60.1 
i HollaN. hllllina. IIHna 51.454 188.8 248.8 
4. Fwnlbn, cllar*1g, hcuehold articles, household appl. 48.039 117.0 111.2 
5. HMIIh care cost1 80.840 18.8 24.8 
8. Traruort and COfi'I1U1Icallo 48.407 173.& 189.7 
7. El~ ...,., educ8lion and culture 43.387 88.2 87.8 
8. at. goods lind ...... 45.474 155.8 154.8 
Global ,.,.. 48.375 843.8 788.7 
Rall*llY 53.723 1&8.4 200.3 
Globll DlrlY 47.&17 1000.0 
.. 
1000.0 
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11.2.811 Italy - Varese 
w.lghta 
~gfOUpa ....., v ... Belgium . 
1. Food. clrinlcs. tat.cco 62.838 178.6 113.3 
• ~ Clcllttta nrooew.r 42.034 80.8 10.1 
3. . ...................... 38.840 172.2 248.1 
~. , .............. houMhGid 8ltlclle, hauMhold appl. 47.088 127.1 111.2 
~ ............. 84.081 18.4 24.8 
• I. ,....,... and comnricllon 48.881 178.2 188.7 
7. ......tcb:llion ... culan 47.211 . 88.8 87.8 
.. Olhlrgoaand ..... 47.036 167.8 164.8 
Globll .... 47.788 876.8 . 789.7 
ReiD llllllY 34.726 124.2 200.3 
Globiii*IY 46.408 1000.0 1000.0 
IL2.812 Netherlands 
Welghtll· 
....., Netherlancle EWglum 
1. Food drinks. tllbecco · 0.061878 152.1 113.3 
0.043825 88.2 50.1 
0.073809 191.9 248.8 
4. Fumllan. clllnna. houMhold articles, household appl. 0.048035 123.4 111.2 
0.080285 11.3 24.8 
0.057154 208.4 199.7 
7. Emlftllrvnert. ...,.,lduc:.uanlnd cul\n 0.048867 98.6 87.8 
0.080128 150.2 164.8 
0.052935 843.8 799.7 
0.081177 158.1 200.3 
0.057138 1000.0 1000.0 
11.2.813 Austria 
w.lghtll 
Expendltu,.grvupa Pdy Aultrta a.tglum 
1. Food. dltnkl. tab1cco 0.35848 188.1 113.3 
2. ClotHna lnd fOGMir 0.29701 88.8 50.1 
3. ......... hMIIna.llahllr1l 0.50973 209.3 246.8 
~ Fwnlan, clllnna. household articles, houMhold appl. 0.34010 108.4 110.5 
5. ........ coM~ 0.48802 18.4 24.8 
8. TIMIIIOit and comnuicllllon 0.39145 143.1 177.6 
7. Erd11111nm1N.I*n. eduCIIIian lnd cul\n 0.36048 ' 80.9 97.8 
~ Olhlr gooda and ...... 0.38284 130.1 124.1 
Qlobll-- _.........._ ... 0.38284 767.8 743.4 
Rlnla . ....., 0.63858 177.6 200.3 
Globiii*IY 0.38219 835.1 843.7 
IL2.B14 Portugal 
w.l~h· 
Expenditure groups Pdy ....,_.. Belgium 
1. Food. dltnlas. lobllcco 4.1484 189.6 113.3 
2. -Ciothhi lnd footwur 3.8803 71.2 50.1 
'3. -~ hllllna.llahllr1l 5.0004 185.2 238.8 
14. Fumllan. ce.rina. houMhold articiM, houHholcl IIppi. 3.8210 118.2 111.2 
5. HlalhCW'eCOits 8.3488 13.4 18.8 
8. 7........-c and comnuicllllon 4.8315 178.1 188.7 
7. Erdll1llnmiN. 118uN, ectuc8tion n cul\n 3.8183 81.8 84.2 
~ Ollwgoodl and ...... 3.2523 142.7 113.7 
Globii-O::r -·· -"'- ..,. 3.8879 820.8 738.2 
Rents Pll1lY 5.3388 180.3 200.3 
Globii'DIIrlv 4.2001 980.8 938.6 
• 
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IL2.B15 Finland 
Weighta 
.................. ....., Plna..d ........ 
t. Food. drinks. eoblcco 0.18734 173.1 113.3 
~I CloiHna lnll foatwllr 0.15718 73.0 10.1 
3. HauUw. hllllina. lahllna 0.1334& 178.3 248.8 
~. F ........ cllriv. houMhold Midis, hcluNhold •• 0.20148 89.3 74.4 
5. ......,~-- 0.20112 17.2 24.8 
I. T~ IIIII OOIIII'IIRcllli 0.18110 174.2 111.1 
7. ........... ..,.., educltion 8ftd CUllan 0.19143 86.2 87.8 
.. Oltwgoodland ..... 0.1780& 140.0 124.1 
Globll_.,. _., ... 0.18287 800.1 723.8 
.... pll'lty 0.13616 138.9 200.3 
Globiii*IY 0.17306 838.0 124.0 
11.2.818 Sweden 
w.lghta 
&xp.ndlture groupa ,..., SWICfen Belglunt 
t. Food. drinks, labKco 0.28&69 172.6 113.1 
a. Clolhi1a ... foatwllr 0.20772 72.6 10.1 
~ .......... hellina.lahllna 0.23182 182.& 248.8 
... F ........ c:lllnhl. houMhold Midis, houNhold •• 0.21188 110.8 72.3 
5. .......... _ .. 0.3&882 17.0 24.8 
I. T~ and oomnut1c111on 0.26004 18&.2 111.1 
7. ll....,.iiill't, .._,,.,education and cube 0.2870& 84.& 17.8 
8. Oltw goods-...-. 0.23820 121.3 124.1 
Globll~~"''""' -~~~..a 0.26&90 790.8 721.3 
.... pll'lty 0.22248 14&.& 200.3 
Globll.-rllY 0.24923 138.0 121.7 
IL2.B17 United Kingdom- London 
Wei~hta 
&xpendltu .. GfOUP8 ,..., London 
--t. Food, drinks, tot.cco 0.020188 170.7 113.3 
2. Clothila and foalwllr . 0.014298 67.8 60.t 
3. Houlhg, hllllna.lahllna 0.044788 206.7 248.8 
~. F""*'-, cleaning, hOUMhold articles, household appl. 0.018787 104.2 111.2 
5. ..... lh~-· 0.018371 8.8 24.8 
8. T,.niPCII't and COIII'IU1icatlo 0.020312 186.4 199.7 
7. ~ ....... educlltion and culture 0.018947 111.0 17.8 
8. OlhergoodlandMNica 0.018881 147.3 164.8 
Globll ..... .... ... 0.018770 831.8 789.7 
Rtnta..,tty 0.068147 188.1 200.3 
GDbltDirlly 0.023872 1000.0 1000.0 
11.2.818 United Kingdom - Culham 
w.lghta 
Expenditure grou.,. Parity Culham Belgium 
1. Food, drinks tot.cco 0.020887 170.7 113.3 
2. Clothila and footwMr 0.014088 67.1 60.1 
3. Hclug, hMIIna. lahtina 0.019010 206.7 248.8 
~. Fwnllln, cllanlng, houMhold ~. houslhold appl. 0.018481 104.2 111.2 
5. ..._lhcncosta 0.027205 8.8 24.8 
8. T,.nsport and comrruiclllion 0.011301 186.4 111.7 
7. Eldertlli~ .. u,., educllllon and cull.n 0.018434 118.0 87.8 
•• 
Oltw goods and MNic:es 0.018738 ;47.3 164.8 
Globll _._ ...... ,..,.. 0.018788 831.8 788.7 
Rtntlpdy 0.018764 188.1 200.3 
Globii11811Y 0.018860 1000.0 1000.0 • 
• 
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CHAPTER Ill: Total emoluments In the central governments of 
the Member States and other economic and social Indicators 
DI.l The evolution of the Control Indica ton 
According to Art. 1.4 (d) of Annex XI of the Staff Regulations, Eurostat submits data 
concerning the real per capita emoluments in general government and. in central 
· government. These data serve as control indicators. The detailed tables are found in the 
ANNEX. In table m.l in each case the changes in the last 12 months is shown, as weD as 
the change in per capita emoluments, for the total economy. 
Tablelll.1 The change in real per capita remuneration in different 
sectors (1995=1 00) 
Country Speclftc Indicator, grou. 
B 100.2 
OK 100.6 
D 100.3 
GR 99.7 
E 100.2 
F 99.1 
IRL 101.9 
I 101.9 
L 102.9 
NL 98.5 
~ 104.3 
p 100.6 
FIN 102.6 
s 103.5 
UK 101.6 
EUR11 100.1 
: Defined as S60 in the National Accounts 
Defined as S61 in the National Accounts 
Per capita aalaries ol Per capU. alarles ot Per capita....,._ ot 
theTotal Economy general government1 central government' 
99.7 100.2 100.2 
102.1 101.4 101.2 
100.8 100.5 100.5 
102.5 103.2 102.6 
100.2 e&.9 97.9 
100.3 99.5 99.5 
101.7 104.3 88.5 
101.9 102.9 102.1 
101.7 101.8 101.8 
99.3 101.0 101.0 
100.9 99.0 88.1 
101.4 103.7 102.7 
103.1 103.5 103.5 
103.9 103.9 103.8 
100.8 100.5 100.5 
100.8 100.8 100.8 
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CHAPTER IV: Statistical commentary 
IV.l Comparison or changes in the gross specific indicator and iD the ccpntrol 
indicator 
Eurostat calculates a control indicator every year: this shows the variation, at constant 
prices, in the per capita wage bill in sector S61 of the national accounts (national central 
government). As this indicator is expressed in gross tenns, it is not compared with the 
actual specific indicator which is expressed in net terms, but with the gross specific 
indicator. 
The gross specific indicator and the control indicator are different by definition and it is 
natural to expect them to show short term differences. 
Indeed, changes in the control indicator are not determined solely by variations in 
collective labour agreements but also by intrinsic factors (changes in the average age of 
the population, promotion to higher categories, etc.) and by changes in incidental salary 
components such as overtime payments, productivity incentives, and early retirement 
compensation . 
. Furthermore, there are certain factors which distort the statistical comparability of the two 
indices (the quality of the sample used to calculate the specific indicator, differences in the 
reference populations, part-time work, employers' social contributions, etc.). 
The deflator used for the control indicator is the consumers' expenditure deflator in the 
national accounts; the deflator for the specific indicator is the national consumer price 
index. 
In addition control indicator values for the reference period are usually estimates. 
Column [ 1] in table IV.l.A shows the ratio betWeen the 1996 wage bill and the 1995 one 
(IV.l.A1), the 1990 one (IV.l.A2) and the 1980 one (IV.l.A3); in the same manner 
column [2] gives the ratio between remuneration at 1st July 1996 and remuneration at 1st 
July 1995, 1990 and 1980. 
The trends in the gross specific indicator and in the control indicator are shown in graphs 
in the ANNEX. In these graphs the bars show, year by year, the divergences between the 
indices (scale on the left), while the lines give an outlook on the cumulated indices (base 
1980 = 1 00) trend (scale on the right). 
However, over a long period, some parallelism could be legitimately expected, and indeed 
this is the case in most Member States. For this reason Eurostat identifies differences 
between the two indicators during the reference period, but puts a greater emphasis on the 
medium-term and long-term trend analysis. For some Member States there is in fact a 
divergence, at least for a short period of time. Therefore, Eurostat launched a study for a 
more detailed examination covering France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. It 
was shown that if the conceptual and statistical differences between the gross specific 
indicator and in the control indicator are netted out, they show in fact a parallel 
development. 
This report by Dr. Dominique Meurs ofthe University ofParis, is reproduced as an Annex 
to this Report, together with an evaluation by Eurostat. 
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Table IV.1.A Comparison of the gross specific indicator and the control 
Indicator In real terms 
IV.1.A1 Current reference period (base 1995=100) 
Country Control Indicator Groll specific Indicator 1-2 
[1) [2) PJ 
B 100.2 100.2 0.0 
OK 101.2 100.6 0.6 
0 100.5 100.3 0.2 
GR 102.6 99.7 2.9 
E 97.9 100.2 -2.3 
F 99,5 99.1 0.4' 
IRL 99.5 101.9 -2.4 
I 102.9 101.9 1.0 
L 101.8 102.9 -1.1 
NL 101.0 98.5 2.5 
A 99.1 104.3 -5.2 
p 102.7 100.6 2.1 
FIN 103.5 102.6 0.9 
s 103.8 103.5 0.3 
UK 100.5 101.6 -1.1 
EUR11 100.8 ' 100.1 0.1 
IV.1.A2 Medium-term trend (base 1990=1 00) 
Country Control Indicator Gross specific Indicator 1-2 
(1) [2) PJ 
B 128.1 106.7 22.4 
OK 110.6 99.5 11.1 
0 102.1 101.6 0.5 
GR 96.8 78.3 18.5 
E 98.6 95.1 3.5 
F 102.5 101.1 1.4 
IRL 116.9 111.7 5.2 
I 97.6 89.6 8.0 
L 106.5 116.0 -9.5 
NL 111.2 96.1 15.1 
p. 120.9 106.1 14.8 
UK 149.0 103.9 45.1 
EUR11 101.0 •••• ••• 
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IV.1.A3 Long period trend (base 1980=1 00) 
Country Control Indicator Grou specific lncfacator 1.Z 
11) (2J PI 
B 123.8 95.6 28.2 
OK 108.5 86.0 13.5 
D 107.0 100.4 8.1 
GR 105.7 81.0 24.7 
E 88.2 98.7 0.5 
F 101.4 90.0 11.4 
IRL 147.7 116.8 30.9 
I 132.1 99.0 33.1 
L 126.4 123.3 3.1 
NL 100.4 91.1 9.3 
p 182.5 151.5 31.0 
UK 188.1 105.9 82.2 
EUR11 111.0 17.7 17.3 
IV .2 Cost of living 
The June on June changes in the consumer price index instead of the change between the 
average of two consecutive months (June and July) and the same average for the previous 
year have been used since 1995 as agreed by the Working Party on Article 65 of the Staff 
Regulations. The national price indices used to deflate the nominal specific indicators have 
been presented in chapter I (Table 1.2). 
For the fourth consecutive year the joint index (101.4) is lower than both the Belgian 
consumer price indices calculated for the same period: the national index was 101.8 and 
the Brussels capital index was 101.7. 
Table IV.2 shows the trend of the Brussels indices Ooint index, Brussels capital index and 
the weighted average of the two) from the first application of Annex XI in 1991. The 
weighted index is equal to 0. 75 times the joint index plus 0.25 times the Brussels index. 
The period is too short to risk a conclusion on the comparison between the Brussels 
indices, even if for the moment it seems that the effect of the introduction· of the weighted 
index instead of' the joint index in the . calculations of the annual adjustments of the 
remuneration of officials of the European Communities is quite neutral. 
Table IV.2 Trend in the Weighted Indices from 1991 
Joint Index Brussels Index Weighted Index 
1991 104.2 103.9 104.1 
1992 103.6 103.3 103.5 
1993 102.1 102.4 102.2 
1994 102.3 102.7 102.4 
1995 100.8 101.3 100.9 
1998 101.4 101.7 101.5 
IV.3 Remuneration and taxes 
An analysis of the changes in the nominal gross and nominal net specific indicatorS in 
relation to the rate of inflation makes it possible to follow changes in statutory deductions 
and general tax items over the reference period. This year there is no unique development 
to be seen in the Union (see Table IV.J). 
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TableN.3 Comparison of changes in gross and net remuneration for 
the twelve-month period to 1st July 1996 
Country Groa ,.....,..,..._ Net NIIIIIIMnllon lnftlltlan 
8 102.0 101.8 101.1 
OK 102.1 103.4 102.0 
0 ' 101.7 100.8 101.4 
GR 108.4 106.6. 108.8 
E 103.8 104.0 103.8 
F 101.4 100.2 102.3 
IRL 103.3 103.8 101.4 
I 105.8 105.1 103.8 
L_ 104.1 101.4 101.2 
NL 100.2 102.3 101.8 
A' 105.8 108.0 101.8 
p 104.3 104.8 103.8 
FIN 103.0 103.8 100.4 
s 104.4 102.7 100.8 
UK 103.7 104.8 102.1 
EUR11 102.1 102.3 
IV.4 Study on Remuneration 
A first part of a study that deals with the development of the remuneration systems in 
Member States was completed. Up to now four Member States have been under review. 
France, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the next step Belgium, Germany, Spain 
and Austria will be reviewed. It is planned that all the IS Member States ·should be 
included in the study. 
The aim of the study, by Professor R Elliott of the University of Aberdeen. and Dr. C. 
Lucifora of the· University of Milan, was to observe in detail recent changes in .national 
remuneration systems and to evaluate their impact on the application of Art.6S and Annex: 
XI of the Staff Regulations, i.e. on the procedure of calculating the necessary adjustment 
of the salaries ofEC officials. The studies give evidence of remuneration systems that can 
be well included in the procedure of applying Art.6S and Annex XI. Their first reports are 
included as an Annex to this Report, toget~er with Eurostat's evaluation. 
IV.S The 1995 Brussels Family Budaet Sunrey (FBS) 
The 1995 Brussels FBS weights have been used for the first time in this report for the 
calculation of the 1996 Joint Index and parities. The comparison with the 1989 FBS 
survey shows a decrease in the weight for the group Food, beverages and tobacco and an 
increase for the group Housing, heating and lighting. These changes follow the trend also 
experienced for national populations. The improvement in the design of the 1995 survey 
has led to an increase in the response rate in more than 6()0/o, thus providing more reliable 
weights. 
The effects due to the introduction of the new weights in the calculations for this year are 
considered to be neutral. Simulations done with the 1995 data has shown that the Joint 
Index, based on the 1995 new weights lead to the same figure {100.8) obtained last year 
using the 1989 weights. The effect on the parities calculation is also neutral; the ·1995 
Community average correCtion coefficient was 86,4 o/o (1995 weights) instead of 86,6% 
(1989 weights). 
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IV.6 Improvements in the Rent Parity Methodology 
The rent parities are calculated from ratios of rents as reported from the estate agency 
rent surveys. In practice, an average parity is calculated, using weighted rent ratio.s for 
each of the separate housing types (1-bed flat etc). The weights used for this breakdown 
are derived from the annual Staff Housing Sutvey (SHS). The method used tll11995 had 
some limitations: 
• For all places except Italy, the Brussels housing-type weights were used rather than 
weights specific to the duty-station. (In Italy, the V arese housing-type weights were 
used both for Varese and for Rome). This is because the numbers of SHS returned 
was, in all duty-stations except V arese, too small to pennit such a fine breakdown of 
housing types. . 
• For all places, the housing-type weights were those relating only to tenants; it his 
always been assumed that owner-occupiers housing types are similar to those of 
tenants, though this is not necessarily the case. 
The Article 64 Working Party approved the following Eurostat . proposals, which have 
been implemented in the 1996 annual review: 
• to use all the reliable occupancy pattern data obtained from the 1996 SHS and from 
comparable sutveys conducted by the OECD; 
• to calculate housing-type weights based on the total rentfunputed rent of tenants and 
owner-occupiers for the different duty stations. 
IV. 7 :FoUow-up to the 1994 Review of Correction coefficient Methodology 
In 1994, the Commission made a report to Council following a joint Council/Commission 
review of methodologies used in calculating correction coefficients. Three reports 
detailing the follow-up action in three areas, housing, weights, and price SUtveys, are 
included as annexes to this report. 
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Factors In the calculation of the 
annual adjustment of the remuneration of 
.officials of the European Communities, 
as provided for by the Staff Regulations 
Reference period: 
,year to 1 July 1996 
Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Division B3 
Luxembourg 
September 1996 
.. 
. . 
p 
. -
1.3.A1 
1.3.A2 
Belgium 
Central government personnel in the sample broken down by cat~gory 
and by grade 
CaL Grade Staff1111 
111 J2) 131 
A Secr*aire aeneral 17A 17/1 13 
Directeur a6nnl 18A 1611 101 
Conselller 13A 1312 1032 
Conseiller adjoint 108 1113 2932 
Conseiller adioint 10A 10/1 •10S 4114 
8 Chef administratif 22A2411 ~ 
Assistant administratif 20E2214 5852 
Alllstant Administratif 20A2011 8766 
c Commls 30H3411 4386 
Commis 30C32/1 6814 
Commis 30A 30/1 8291 
0 Ment administratif 4204411 825 
Aaent administratif 4284213 1158 
Ageot administratif 42A4012 5012 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Redo 
Cenualad~etlon Sample/Population 
Cat. NumbeN 
" 
NumbeN 
" " (1) {2) {3) (4) 161 (8) 
A 8192 15.5 9853 16.6 83.1 
8 20098 38.1 22409 37.7 89.7 
c 17491 33.1 18759 31.6 93.2 
D 6995 13.3 8411 14.2 83.2 
Total 62776 100.0 59432 100.0 88.8 
Eurostat 
t: 
~ . 
• 
• 
Belgium 
1.3.81.1 Ye~uly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Unmarried official 
. Qrou Nat 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
m (2) (3) 14) 161 161 171 
A Secr6taire aeneral 17A 1711 2519939 0 3351449 1232383 0 
Directeur a6n6ral 16A 1611 2278773 0 2991506 1137622 0 
Conseiller 13A 13/2 1395161 0 2107894 785876 0 
Conseiller adjoint 108 11/3 1132349 0 1733853 668105 0 
Conseiller adjoint 10A 10/1 • 1045526 0 1733853 835512 0 
105 
B Chef administratif 22A 24/1 914027 0 1358471 &80252 0 
Assistant administratif 20E 22/4 821809 0 1227255 537441· 0 
Assistant Administratif 20A 20/1 716219 0 1139616 490467 0 
c Commis 30H 34/1 752199 0 987121 &06906 0 
Commis 30C 32/1 681376 0 865657 474158 0 
Commie 30A 3011 672644 0 865657 471143 0 
D Aaent administratif 420 44/1 737689 0 837603 500748 0 
Aaent administratif 428 42/3 683068 0 765056 476496 0 
Aaent administratif 42A 40/2 657662 0 765056 4634&9 0 
1.3.81.2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Married official with two children · 
Grou Nat 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(11 121 131' 141 1&1 (81 171 
A Secr6taire aeneral 17A 1711 2849187 0 3480877 147&323 0 
Direotaur a6n6ral 18A 16/1 2408001 0 3120734 1380262 0 
Conseiller 13A 13/2 1524389 0 2237122 1012084 0 
Coneeilter adioint 108 11/3 1261577 0 1863081 894281 0 
Conteiller adjoint 10A 10/1 1174754 0 1883081 881788 0 
105 
B Chef adminittratif 22A 2411 1043255 0 1487899 806118 0 
Atsittant administratif 20E 22/4 959843 0 1356483 7&9835 0· 
Assistant Administratif 20A 20/1 863059 0 1288844 710281 0 
c Commit 30H 34/1 899039 0 1118349 728684 0 
Commit 30C 32/1 828215 0 1003891 690928 0 
Commie 30A 30/1 819484 0 1003691 687354 0 
D Aaent adminittratif 420 44/1 884528 0 975638 722353 0 
Aaent administratif 428 42/3 812296 0 911898 683280 0 
Agent administratif 42A 40/2 804502 0 911898 678888 0 
Eurostat 
·2 
Max. 
181 
1532019 
1402311 
1073411 
923177 
123177 
768477 
712577 
671081 
627514 
555900 
555900 
542722 
511451 
511451 
Max. 
181 
1780807 
1648331 
1312159 
1160&25 
116052& 
9948&3 
938753 
8972&7 
835563 
784773 
784773 
769184 
735439 
735439 
Belgium 
1.3.82.1 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1995 
Unmarried official 
Graa Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. 
111 121 (31 (4J 151 (8) (71 
A Secr6taire aenerel 17A 1711 2470627 0 3285815 1217803 0 
Oirecteur a6n6rel HSA 16/1 2234196 0 2932938 1121272 0 
ConseiHer 13A 13/2 1367929 0 2066671 775685 0 
Conseiller adioint 1081113 1110276 0 1699172 611038 0 
Conaeiller adjoint 10A 10/1 • 1025157 0 1688172 123646 0 
10S 
8 Chef admlnietratif 22A 24/1 896240 0 13318&8 66i772 0 
Assistant administratif 20! 22/4 806842 0 1203318 528641 0 
Assistant Administratif 20A 20/1 702323 0 1117400 483332 0 
c Commie 30H 3411 737597 0 967888 499043 0 
Commis 30C 3211 668164 0 848830 486539 0 
Commie 30A 30/1 669604 0 848830 464499 0 
0 Aaent administratif 420 44/1 723372 0 821328 493256 0 
Aaent administratif 428 42/3 689820 0 760202 481837 0 
Aaent edminietretif 42A 40/2 644818 0 760202 451570 0 
1.3.82.2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 995 
Married official with two children 
Qroa Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. 
(1) 121 (3) (41 [51 (8) [7) 
A Secr6taire aeneral 17A 1711 2597311 0 3412491 1457347 0 
Directeur a6n6ral 16A 1611 2360880 0 3069822 1369688 0 
Coneeiller 13A 13/2 1414813 0 2193366 198485 0 
Coneeiller adjoint 108 11/3 1238960 0 1828866 883818 0 
Coneeiller adjoint 10A 10/1 · 1151841 0 1826658 846437 0 
105 
B Chef administratif 22A 2411 1022924 0 1458643 791268 0 
Assistant administratif 20E 22/4 941168 0 1330002 748423 0 
Assistant Administratif 20A 2011 846270 0 1244084 698186 0 
c Commie 30H 3411 881644 0 1094682 716015 0 
Comrnis 30C 32/1 812111 0 184146 881268 0 
Commie 30A 3011 803661 0 884145 876898 0 
0 Aaent administratif 420 4411 867311 0 966641 701908 0 
Aaent administratif 428 42/3 798604 0 884148 872037 0 
Aaent administratif 42A 40/2 788883 0 884149 887&28 0 
Mu. 
(81 
1512202 
1383936 
1054121 
912110 
912110 
758608 
700566 
658617 
618059 
549112 
649112 
636406 
603607 
503507 
Mu. 
Ill 
1757326 
1623481 
1289413 
1 1461&4 
11481&4 
981300 
823347 
882408 
8233&9 
770382 
770382 
756.2_44 
722&58 
722&18 
Eurostat. 
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1.3.C. 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
8 
c 
0 
1.3.0 
Cet. 
111 
A 
8 
c 
D 
Total 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official In· central 
government 
Price index = 101.8 
Groa Net 
a .aery Index 8al8ry Index 
Gracia 1998 1996 nomln. ..... 1998 191& nomh\. real 
121 r:u (4) (6) (8) (71 _lll Ill 1101 
Secr6teire aeneral 17A 1711 3000308 2941663 102.0 100.2 1506103 1486170 101.3 99.6 
Directeur a6n6ral 16A 16/1 2699754 2646909 102.0 100.2 1391632 1372067 101.4 99.6 
Conseiller 13A 13/2 ~816142 1780642 ·102.0 100.2 1045898 1029821 101.8 "99.8 
Contailler· adjoint 108 11/3 1497715 1488468 102.0 100.2 811&22 900800 101.2 98.4 
Contailler adjoint 10A 10/1 · 1454304 1425907 102.0 100.2 89&268 882107 101.& 89.7 
105 
Chef edminittretif 22A 24/1 1200883 1177442 102.0 100.2 787375 775209 101.6 89.8 
Allistant administratif 20E 22/4 1091348 1070080 102.0 100.2 737152 725217 101.6 99.8 
A11ittent Adrninittratif 20A 20/1 996935 977519 102.0 100.2 892267 880888 101.7 98.9 
Commie 30H 34/1 938677 920405 102.0 100.2 874882 884119 101.8 99.8 
Commit 30C 32/1 844735 828313 102.0 100.2 828440 818820 101.8 99.8 
Commit 30A 30/1 840389 824033 102.0 100.2 824793 814993 101.8 99.8 
Aaent administratif 420 44/1 858884 842185 102.0 100.2 833752 823704 101.8 99.8 
Aaent administratif 428 42/3 793079 777689 102.0 100.2 801887 591984 101.8 99.8 
Aaent administratif 42A 40/2 784779 789533 102.0 100.2 597259 587541 101.7 19.9 
Total emoluments in central government in 1995 (in thousands) 
Groea Nat 
Sample Population Sample Population 
v.aua % Value % v.aua 
" 
Value 
" [21 (31 (41 (51 [81 171 (8) [11 
12314920 22.9 14811880 24.3 7490600 20.2 9009384 21.8 
21104970 39.3 23531780 38.7 14378430 38.9 18029630 38.3 
14885010 27.7 15942840 26.2 10984780 29.7 11781090 28.2 
5452223 10.1 8555918 10.8 4144826 11.2 4983884 11.9 
&3737120 100.0 60842190 100.0 38998820 100.0 41803880 100.0. 
1.3.E .tr Changes in average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government 
Price index = 101.8 
GrOM Nat 
Cat. 1998 199& Nominal Real 1998 1996 Nominal Real 
Index Index Index Index 
(1] 121 [31 141 151 181 (7] 181 (11 
A 1533233 1503286 102.0 100.2 927148 914380 101.4 99.8 
8 1070972 1050103 102.0 100.2 727038 715317 101.6 11.8 
c 888721 849886 102.0 100.2 637939 828023 101.8 99.8 
D 794891 779446 102.0 100.2 802292 592541 101.8 99.8 
Total 1044087 1023728 102.0 100.2 71443& 703390 101.8 ::\)j!;\:\l\l\\[\[:}1,~\))~j\~\:\; 
Eurostat 
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1.3.A 1 
1.3.A2 
Osnmsrk 
Central government personnel In the sample broken down by catego.ry 
and by grade 
Cat. Grade Stalf11H 
f11 121 131 
A Departementachef, dirllcUr, 223 
afdalinalchef 
Kantorchef konsulent 562 
EksDedltionnekratlll' 1"11 
Juristlekonom 3150 
B Bogholder, ·'~· 516 
Tjlnlatlmandunl ovnulstent, 178 
lalncellilt 
EDB-medarbelder kontarfuldrneatla 773 
OVerassistent 915 
c Tjenestemandsansat assistant 12 
Faalert arbejder, asaistent m.v. 1219 
D Betjentf~nd. ministerial- og 350 
sl 
lkke-faglat arbejder, elev, 9n 
rena•rlnasassistent 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Central adrnlnlatration Sample/Population 
Cat. Numbara % Numbera % %· 
(1] (2] [3] (4] [6] 181 
A 4046 45.0 40.48 45.0 100.0 
B 2382 26.5 2382 26.5 100.0 
c 1231 13.7 1231 13.7 100.0 
D 1327 14.8 1327 14.8 100.0 
Total 8986 100.0 8986 100.0 100.0 
Eurostat 
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1.3.81.1 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1996 
Unmarried official 
Groa Net 
Cat. Gncle Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. 
(1) [2) (3) (41 161 (81 (7) 
A Depanernanblchef, direcwr, 0 488425 0 0 218637 
afdelinaschef 
Kontorchef. konsulent 0 384799 0 0 187890 
Ekapeditionaaekretllr, 0 298287 0 0 157811 
fuldmeatia 
Jurist/-"onom 0 259977 0 0 141813 
B Bogholder, afdelingaleder, 0 248858 0 0 138450 
kontorfuldmeatia 
Tjenestemandsanaat 0 210248 0 0 120515 
overassistent, kancellist 
EDB-medarbejder, 0 233858 0 0 131584 
kontorfuldmeatia 
Overassistent 0 207138 0 0 119027 
c Tienestemandsanaat assistant 0 193158 0 0 112343 
Faal•rt arbejder, assistant m.v. 0 192209 0 0 111822 
D Betjantformand, ministerial- og 0 205413 0 0 118133 
slotsbetJent 
lkke-faglllrt arbejder, elev, 0 157178 0 0 84718 
rena•rinasasslstent 
1.3.81.2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Married official with two children 
Groea Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
f1 I (2) (3) (4) (51 (6) (71 
A Departementschef, direct•r, 0 484558 0 0 252744 
afdelinaschef 
Kontorchef, konsulent 0 400933 0 0 223797 
Ekspeditionasekretllr, 0 314431 0 0 183448 
fuldmeatia 
Jurist/8konom 0 278111 0 0 178238 
B Bogholder, afdelingsleder, 0 285092 0 0 172673 
kontorfuldmeatia 
Tjenestemendsansat 0 226382 0 0 152948 
overassistent, kancellist 
EDB-medarbejder, 0 248783 0 0 165088 
kontorfuldmeatia 
Overaaaistent 0 223270 0 0 151318 
c Tienestemendsansat assistant 0 -208292 0 0 143882 
Faal•rt erbeJder assistant m. v. 0 208343 0 0 143488 
D Betjentformand, ministerial· og 0 221547 0 0 150341 
slotsbetjent 
lkke-fagllln arbejder, elev, 0 173313 0 0 125103 
rena•ringsassistent 
Eurostat 
·6 
Max. 
(81 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max. 
(8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Danmark 
1.3.82., Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 995 
Unmarried official 
... Nat 
cat. ... Min. Avg. Max. Min. Ayt. 
(1) [2) (31 (41 (6) (8) (7) 
A Dapertamanteohef, direct8r, 0 437258 0 0 111481 
afdelinaechef 
Kontorchef, koneulent 0 387307 0 0 175907 
Ekepaditioneeakratllr, 0 282318 0 0 150842 
tuldrneatla 
Juriet/llkonom 0 254824 0 0 131348 
B Bogholdar, afdalingelader, 0 243878 0 0 133070 
kontortuldmeatla 
Tjenaetarnandeaneat 0 205288 0 0 116478 
overeeeietent, kencelliat 
EDB-madarbejder, 0 221817 0 0 127320 
kontorfuldmeatla 
Over•liatent 0 204946 0 0 116324 
c Tienestemendaenaet easistent 0 186488 0 0 108058 
Fealen erbejder, eeaietent m.v. 0 188600 0 0 108810 
D Betjentformend, ministerial- og 0 200234 0 0 114158 
elotebetient 
lkke-feglaln arbejder, elev, 0 152342 0 0 81482 
renaerinaeeeeietent 
1.3.82.2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1995 
Married official with two children 
Groaa Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(1} [2) (3} 141 (6) (8) (71 
A Depanementechef, directer, 0 452358 0 0 231538 
efdelinaechef 
Kontorchef, koneulent 0 382407 0 0 215728 
Ekapeditioneeekretllr, 0 307418 0 0 188281 
fuldmeatia 
Juriat/llkonom 0 289924 0 0 171880 
8 Bogholder, afdelingaleder, 0 251076 0 0 187808 
kontorfuldmeatia 
Tjenaetemandeeneat 0 220388 0 0 148438 
overe~eiatent, kancelliat 
EDB-mederbejder, 0 245017 0 0 181131 
kontorfuldmeatla 
Overusietent 0 220048 0 0 148257 
c Tienaatemendeeneet eseistent 0 201588 0 0 138842 
Faaltln artMtjder.. ulil&ent m.v. -0 203700 0 -o 138728 
D Betjentfonnand, minilterial- og 0 215334 0 0 145753 
elotebetient 
lkke-faglen arbejder, elev, 0 187442 0 0 120854 
renaerinasaeeietent 
EW'OStat 
Max • 
[8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max. 
(8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
.-
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Danmark 
1.3.C. Changes in average remuneration by grade of official In central 
government 
Cat. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.0 
Cat. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Totel 
1.3.E 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
Price Index •102.0 
Qroa Net 
Salary ..... .... ry Index 
Grade 1998 1991 nomin. , ... 1996 1991 nomin. ,. .. 
121 131 (4] 161 (8) (7] (8] 111 1101 
Depanementechef, direct•r, 478492 444801 107.1 10&.0 234891 219&04 108.8 104.8 
efdelinaechef 
Kontorchef koneulent 382888 .. 374857- 104.8 102.7 ·20&744 19&817 105.1 103.0 
Ekepeditioneeekretllr, 308364 219868 102.2 100.2 17&530 189482 103.6 101.& 
fuldmeatia 
Juritt/ekonom 268044 282374 102.2 100.2 1&9026 154014 103.3 101.2 
Bogholder, afdelingeleder, 257025 251526 102.2 100.2 1&5582 1&0488 103.4 101.3 
kontorfuldmeatia 
Tjeneetemendeaneet 218315 212838 102.6 100.6 136732 132456 103.2 101.2 
overueietent, kancellitt 
EDB-medarbaider, 241726 237487 101.8 89.8 148325 144226 102.8 100.8 
kontorfuldmeatia 
Overal8ittent 215203 212486 101.3 89.3 135172 132291 102.2 100.2 
Tieneetemandeaneat ntittent 201225 194038 103.7 101.7 128183 123350 103.8 101.1 
Faalert erbejder uaietent m.v. 200276 -1961&0 102.1 100.1 127844 124270 102.7 100.7 
Betjendonnand, minieterial- og 213480 207784 102.7 100.7 134237 129855 103.3 101.3 
tlottbat]lnt 
lkke-feglllrt •rbejder, elev, 185246 151812 103.3 101.3 101111 106173 103.5 101.6 
renaerinaenlietent 
Total emoluments In central government in 1995 (in thousands) 
8 
Qroee Net 
Sample Population Sample Population 
Valua 
(2] 
1189828 
545869 
241435 
228939 
2186888 
1981 
(2] 
297922 
233102 
200285 
177968 
249860 
" 
Value 
" 
Valua 
" 
Valua 
131 (41 161 [81 (71 181 
5_1.5 1169625 53.5 882953 51.0 882952 
25.0 545688 25.0 333761 25.7 333761 
11.0 241435 11 .. 0 152985 11.8 152964 
10.5 228938 10.5 149215 11.5 149215 
100.0 2185888 100.0 1298894 100.0 1298882 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government 
Price index = 102.0 
Qroee 
199& 
(31 
289082 
229080 
196129 
172524 
243230 
~omlnal 
Index 
141 
103.1 
101.8 
102.1 
103.2 
102.8 
Real 
Index 
161 
101.0 
99.8 
100.1 
101.1 
100.8 
Eurostat 
Net 
1898 199& 
181 (71 
170138 183854 103.8 
143974 140118 102.8 
127849 124261 102.7 
116327 112445 103.5 
149435 144548 
" [tl_ 
51.0 
25.7 
11.8 
11.6 
100.0 
... 
Index 
(8] 
101.8 
100.7 
100.7 
101.4 
1.3.A1 
1.3.A2 
Germany 
Central government personnel in the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
CIIL ..... Statf1111 
H1 121 IJl 
A • 125 
• 287 B3 1158 
A16 612 
A15 2485 
A131A14 1654 
B A13 3148 
A12 1268 
A11 882 
c A9 1068 
A8 753 
A7 559 
D AS 871 
A4 528 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
....... Population Rado 
Cantral admlnletration lamplaiPopulatlon 
Cat. Number~~ 
" 
NumbeN .. .. 
111 (2] (3] [4] 161 USJ 
A 8319 42.1 8358 38,8 99.4 
8 5097 34.0 5398 32.9 94.4 
c 2381 15.9 2984 18.2 79.8 
D 1197 . 8.0 1859 10.1 72.2 
Total 14994 100.0 16397 100.0 91.4 
Eurostat 
It ' 
1.. 
\. 
"· 
Germany 
1.3.81. 1 
Cat. 
(1)_ 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.81 .2 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
I 
B 
c 
D 
·10 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 996 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
... Min • Mid. Mu. Min. Mid. 
121 131 (41 111 181 [7) 
88 16482 0 0 82S4 0 
Bl 14021 0 0 8235 0 
B3 11777 0 0 721S 0 
A11 8715 S431 10718 4828 5758 
A15 109S 7581 8510 441S 5313 
A13/A14 &S44 1584 8518 4318 4117 
A13 5487 1538 7752 4107' 4728 
A12 4833 0 7021 3755 0 
A11 4855 5483 1407 3578 4086 
AI 3S11 4406 5040 3035 341S 
AS 3520 0 4674 2S38 0 
A7 3421 3804 4306 2772 3092 
A& 3114 3411 370S 2561 2767 
A4 3091 0 3682 2552 0 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 996 
Married official with two children 
·-
Net 
••• Min. Mid. Mu. Min. Mid. 121 (3) (4) (&J (8) [7) 
Bl 16994 0 0 12059 0 
B6 14553 0 0 10728 0 
B3 12710 0 0 8417 0 
A18 7647 9363 11651 1184 7327 
A15 7030 S474 10483 5777 1744 
A13/A14 6778 8528 9450 5807 5434 
A13 6429 7470 S6S4 5388 8074 
A12 ~ &S85 0 7953 48S7 0 
A11 55S7 6385 7338 4717 5347 
AI 4748 5338 582S 4233 4125 
AS 4443 0 5517 4015 0 
A7 4344 4827 5228 3844 4288 
AS 40SO 4377 4874 3753 3887 
A4 4067 0 4648 3738 0 
Eurostat 
... 
~ 
Mu. 
181 
0 
0 
0 
IS13 
1303 
5S01 
5404 
5003 
4652 
3S23 
3591 
3354 
2964 
2879 
Mu. 
(8) 
0 
0 
0 
S780 
SO&I 
7382 
8SS4 
1399 
58S7 
5030 
4804 
4651 
41SO 
4080 
1.3.82.1 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.82.2 
c.t. 
(1) 
A 
8 
c 
D 
Germany 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1995 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
..... Min • Mid. Mu. Min. Mid. 
121 (3] (4J 161 (8) _(7) 
88 18482 0 0 8302 0 
88 14021 0 0 8264 0 
83 11777 0 0 7288 0 
A18 8716 8431 10718 4862 6778 
A16 8098 7681 8680 4492 5333 
A13/A14 6844 5584 8518 4340 4188 
A13 5497 8538 7752 4127 4750 
A12 4933 0 7021 3770 0 
A11 4655 5463 6407 3591 4104 
At 3816 4406 6041 3030 3424 
AI 3520 0 4674 2824 0 
A7 3421 3904 4308 2766 3087 
AS 3114 3411 3708 2537 2748 
A4 3091 0 3582 2522 0 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1995 
Married official with two children 
Graa ,., 
... Min. Mid. Mu • Min. Mid. 
(2) (3) (4) Ill (8] m 
B9 17134 0 0 12034 0 
88 14693 0 0 10735 0 
B3 12460 0 0 8416 0 
A18 7387 8103 11381 8109 7285 
A15 8770 8214 10233 5870 8882 
A13/A14 8516 8288 8180 5488 5308 
A13 1189 7210 8424 5237 5881 
A12 6804 0 7883 4823 0 
A11 5387 8195 7078 4878 5271 
AS 4648 5138 5727 4048 4488 
AI 4243 0 5387 3813 0 
A7 4144 4827 5021 3738 4104 
A& 3880 4177 4474 3534 3711 
A4 3867 0 4348 3511 0 
Mu. 
liJ 
0 
0 
0 
8829 
8320 
5818 
5423 
5024 
4671 
3835 
3601 
3357 
2963 
2865 
Mu. 
(I] 
0 
0 
0 
8786 
8028 
7340 
8826 
8322 
5888 
4828 
4883 
4408 
3187 
3881 
Eurostat lA 11 
L 
Germany 
1.3.C. 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.0 
. Changes In average remuneration by grade of official in central 
government 
Price index • 101.4 
Groa Net 
Sal8ry Index .... ry Index 
..... 1898 1816 nomm. .. .. 1898 1816 nomln. .... 
121 131 141 I& I 181 (7) 181 111 l10l 
Bl 18728 18798 89.8 98.2 10872 10887 100.0 88.7 
86 14287 14357 89.5 88.1 1482 1483 11.9 88.5 
B3 12244 12114 101.1 11.7 8343 8350 11.1 88.5 
A18 8088 8958 101.5 100.1 8817 8603 100.2 18.8 
A15 8208 8078 101.8 100.2 8110 8088 100.4 19.0 
A13/A14 7118 8988 101.9 100.5 5452 5414 100.7 88.3 
A13 7062 8932 101.9 100.5 5428 5311 100.7 19.3 
A12 8443 8313 102.1 100.7 5038 4885 101.0 18.8 
A11 5974 5864 101.9 100.5 4741 4700 100.1 88.5 
AI 4879 4779 102.1 100.7 4027 3958 101.7 100.3 
AS 4559 4459 102.2 100.8 3812 3730 102.2 100.8 
A7 4339 4239 102.4 100.9 3868 3575 102.8 101.2 
AS 3884 3794 102.8 101.2 3318 3253 103.6 102.0 
A4 3820 3720 102.7 101.3 3315 3118 103.8 102.2 
Total emoluments In central government In 1995 (in thousands) 
Gran N•t 
....... Population . ..,.., .. Popul•tlon 
Cat. v.a. 
(1) (2) 
A 57333 
B 33818 
c 10838 
D 4502 
Tot.a 108410 
1.3.E 
Cat. 1198 
(1) (2) 
A 9190 
B 8783 
c 4861 
D 3861 
Toul 7028 
12 
.. V81ue .. v.au. .. v.au. 
(3) (4) I& I 181 (7) tel 
53.8 57668 50.9 41833 61.6 42078 
31.8 35818 31.6 28491 32.6 28055 
10.2 13571 12.0 1038 11.1 11327 
4.2 8238 5.5 3865 4.8 5357 
100.0 113302 100.0 81228 100.0 88817 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government 
Price index = 101 .4 
Groa Net 
1816 Nomin•l Re•l 1888 1816 Nomln.a 
Index Index Index 
(3) 141 161 (8) (7) (8] 
9073 101.3 99.9 8839 8620 100.3 
6835 101.9 100.5 5238 5197 100.8 
4551 102.2 100.8 3875 3798 102.1 
3761 102.7 101.2 3344 3229 103.6 
.. 
til 
48.5 
32.3 
13.0 
8.2 
100.0 
Rul 
Index 
Ill 
88.8 
99.4 
100.7 
102.1 
8810 101.7 100.3 5341 &28& 100.1 :l~!!j!l~il!l~!~1!l!ll\l!~1!~~il~1~1 
Eurostat 
II 
l. 
.... 
.Greece 
. 
1.3.A 1 Central government personnel In the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
~ . 
I.. 
cat. Grade 8taff1111 
111 121 131 
A 3 2530 
4 1113 
7 6524 
10 2758 
12 5818 
13 2517 
15 888 
B 4 154 
5 479 L. 6 3258 
9 860 
12 1415 
16 s.18 
17 817 
18 349 
c 9 3434 
12 3175 
14 7598 
17 5308 
20 5358 
22 3031 
23 2852 
D 18 51 
19 1894 
22 921 
23 975 
25 621 
26 6510 
27 889 
1.3.A2 Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Central admlnletratlon SampleiPopulailon 
Cat. Numbera % Numbera % % 
(1) 121 (31 (4) 161 181 .• ~ . 
A 21929 30.4 ·28424 25.1 77.1 
B 7878 10.9 10816 8.6 72.8 
c 30555 42.3 57555 50.8 53.1 
D 11861 16.4 16413 14.5 72.3 
Total 72223 100.0 113208 100.0 83.8 
Eurostat A 13 
Greece 
1.3.81., 
Cat. 
111 
A 
8 
c 
0 
14 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1996 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
Gra• Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(21 (31 (4) (SJ (81 [7) 
3 0 314092 0 0 242358 
4 0 306380 0 0 238474 
7 0 283364 0 0 222279 
10 0 280828 0 0 204858 
12 0 245375 0 0 115795 
13 0 237510 0 0 188828 
15 0 217704 0 0 173413 
4 0 308348 0 0 237402 
5 0 300678 0 0 234953 
6 0 293101 0 0 221247 
9 0 270893 0 0 211185 
12 0 248118 0 0 187388 
18 0 213090 0 0 169497 
17 0 205223 0 0 183519 
18 0 197382 0 0 158782 
9 0 211146 0 0 227410 
12 0 289302 0 0 210835 
14 0 254742 0 0 199786 
17 0 232285 0 0 184924 
20 0 209641 0 0 187452 
22 0 190481 0 0 153213 
23 0 182894 0 0 147083 
18 0 238884 0 0 188579 
19 0 228189 ·0 0 178307 
22 0 204032 0 0 182442 
23 0 193384 0 0 154271 
25 0 178488 0 0 142881 
26 0 170888 0 0 138710 
21 0 158830 0 0 130281 
Eurostat 
... 
Max. 
(8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 r 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
·o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.3.81 .2 
C•t. 
(1] 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Greece 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 996 
Married official with two children 
... Net 
Gr.- Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Ava. 
(2) (3) (.t) 1&1 (81 (7) 
3 0 338082 0 0 285341 
4 0 328488 0 0 259470 
7 0 308188 0 0 242580 
10 0 284390 0 0 227891 
12 .0. -270193 0 0 217018 
13 0 282988 0 0 211454 
15 0 244402 0 0 188174 
4 0 330435 0 0 280384 
5 0 323028 0 0 254983 
6 0 315835 0 0 249280 
9 0 293848 0 0 234780 
12 0 272899 0 0 218531 
16 0 240090 0 0 184383 
17 0 232884 0 0 188706 
18 0 225818 0 0 182982 
9 0 313788 0 0 247484 
12 0 292419 0 0 233449 
14 0 278733 0 0 222752 
17 0 258130 0 0 207043 
20 0 237242 0 0 112811 
22 0 218273 0 0 177987 
23 0 212352 0 0 172587 
18 0 281556 0 0 207741 
19 0 251783 0 0 202185 
22 0 231281 0 0 188118 
23 0 221417 0 0 178415 
25 0 207915 0 0 188010 
28 0 201282 0 0 182811 
27 0 111583 0 0 158208 
M•&. 
(81 
Eurostat If 15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o· 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
L 
..... 
.a.....L .• 
Greece 
1.3.82. 1 
Cat. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
16 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 995 
Unmarried official 
Groee Net 
Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
[2) [31 (4) l&J [8) [7) 
3 0 288557 0 0 228791 
4 0 281492 0 0 223267 
7 0 260479 0 0 206834 
10 0 239885 0 o· 193563 
12 0 225787 0 0 112369 
13 0 218580 0 0 178669 
16 0 200137 0 0 112811 
4 0 283309 0 0 224126 
5 0 278300 0 0 218663 
8 0 289376 0 0 213216 
9 0 248900 0 0 200239 
12 0 228272 0 0 183919 
16 0 196920 0 0 159291 
17 0 188732 0 0 163552 
18 0 . 181687 0 0 147831 
9 0 287591 0 0 211669 
12 0 247830 0 0 198986 
14 0 234321 0 0 188472 
17 0 213805 0 0 172292 
20 0 193114 0 0 157604 
22 0 175288 0 0 142897 
23 0 118147 0 0 137029 
18 0 217127 0 0 173108 
19 0 207374 0 0 165480 
22 0 187128 0 0 151013 
23 0 177379 0 0 143296 
25 0 113784 0 0 132609 
26 0 166848 .0 0 129099 
27 0 146554 0 0 121181 
Eurostat 
! ' 
Max. 
181 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 .... 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.3.82.2 
cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Greece 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 995 
Married official with two children 
.... Net 
Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
[2) (3) (41 161 [81 (71 
3 0 310424 0 0 248082 
4 0 303455 0 0 243005 
7 0 282974 0 0 229136 
10 0 262991 0 0 213559 
12 0 . 249964 0 0 203306 
13 0 243350 0 0 199955 
15 0 225968 0 0 185471 
4 0 304527 0 0 243291 
5 0 298446 0 0 238533 
6 0 291862 0 0 235478 
9 o. 271887 0 0 225581 
12 0 252283 0 0 204702 
16 0 222011 0 0 181943 
17 0 215399 0 0 176671 
18 0 208733 0 0 171520 
9 0 289947 0 0 233108 
12 0 270432 0 0 218487 
14 0 257781 0 0 208144 
17 0 231113 0 0 185108 
20 0 218728 0 0 110572 
22 0 202810 0 0 188873 
23 0 198559 0 0 181113 
18 0 241214 0 0 185982 
19 0 232248 0 0 118881 
22 0 213435 0 0 173971 
23 0 204384 0 0 186946 
25 0 191995 0 0 158142 
26 0 185907 0 0 153281 
27 0 177007 0 0 148110 
Max. 
[8) 
Eurostat )1- 17 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
. -
Greece· 
1.3.C. 
c.t. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
18 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official In central 
government 
Price index = 108.8 
Groa Net 
S•lary Index .... ry Index 
Gr•de 1996 1996 nomkl. .... 1996 1196 nomln • .... 
121 (3] (4] (6) (6) 171 181 (9) 110] 
3 325087 299491 108.5 99.8 253850 238437 106.5 87.9 
4 317423 292474 108.5 99.8 247972 233138 106.4 97.8 
7 294765 271727 108.5 89.7 232430 217985 106.8 88.0 
10 272808 251438 108.4 99.7 216375 203581 108.3 97.7 
12 257784 237888 108.4 89.8 208408 182833 107.0 88.4 
13 250248 230985 108.3 99.8 200542 188307 106.5 97.9 
15 231053 213053 108.4 99.7 185834 174186 106.7 98.1 
4 319392 293918 108.7 89.9 248883 233708 106.5 97.9 
5 311853 287373 108.5 99.7 244958 228598 107.2 98.5 
6 304368 280519 108.5 99.7 239254 224372 106.8 98.0 
9 282270 280284 108.4 99.7 223383 212910 104.9 88.4 
12 280409 240288 108.4 99.8 207959 194311 107.0 88.4 
16 228590 208888 108.4 89.7 181840 170617 106.8· 88.0 
17 218054 202088 108.4 99.8 178113 165112 108.7 98.0 
18 211501 195150 108.4 89.8 170872 159878 107.0 98.4 
9 302456 278789 108.5 99.7 237447 222183 106.8 98.0 
12 280901 259031 108.4 99.7 222042 208716 108.4 97.8 
14 286738 246063 108.4 89.6 211259 198158 108.3 97.7 
17 245208 228349 108.3 99.8 195984 184049 108.5 87.9 
20 223442 208421 108.2 99.5 180038 189038 108.5 87.9 
22 204881 189089 108.4 98.8 165605 154785 107.0 88.3 
23 197623 182353 108.3 89.8 159840 149421 107.0 88.3 
18 248210 229171 108.7 89.8 197180 184545 108.8 88.2 
19 238988 219810 108.7 99.9 190236 177178 107.4 98.7 
22 217657 200281 108.7 88.9 174280 182498 107.3 88.8 
23 207391 190882 108.6 99.9 186343 156121 107.2 98.8 
25 193201 177890 108.6 99.8 166338 145328 106.9 88.2 
26 186089 171378 108.6 99.8 149781 141190 106.1 97.6 
27 175807 181781 108.6 99.8 143246 133678 107.2 98.6 
Eurostat 
,, 
r 
1.3.0 
Cat. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Total 
1.3.E 
Cat. 
(11 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Total 
Greece 
Total emoluments in central government in 1995 (in thousands) 
GrCMia Net 
Sample Population Sample Population 
Value 
121 
5652279 
2007958 
7013306 
2168536 
18142080 
1998 
121 
279519 
276456 
248750 
198596 
251851 
" 
v .... 
" 
v .... 
" 
Value ~ 
131 (41 (61 181 (7) 181 Ill 
33.6 7326388 27.9 4554951 33.4 5904050 27.7 
11.9 2756800 10.5 1618324 11.9 2221856 10.4 
41.6 13210630 50.2 5684670 41.7 10707940 50.3 
12.9 3000773 11.4 1774116 13.0 2454983 11.5 
100.0 28294590 -100.0 13832080 -100.0 2128U30 100.0 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official in the 
central government 
Price index = 108.8 
GrCM~a Net 
1996 Nominal Re .. 1898 1996 Nominal ..... 
Index Index Index Index 
131 141 nn (8) (7) (8) (8) 
257754 108.4 99.7 221498 207714 108.8 98.0 
254882 108.5 99.7 218886 205423 106.8 97.9 
229531 108.4 99.6 198204 186047 106.5 97.9 
182829 108.6 99.8 159498 149578 108.6 98.0 
232288 108.4 89.7 200417 1880&1 108.8 i:~:{~\;;~:~;);;:~!;:,::\\\ 
Eurostat 
;4 19 
,.. 
.... 
Spain 
1.3.A 1 
1.3.A2 
.. 
• 
20 
Central government personnel In the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
Cat. Grade .... ,. .. 
111 121 131 
A SUbdir'ector aeneral A30 1788 
tecnico A28 4373 
Jefe de urvlclo A A26 Gi3 
8 Jete de urvlcio 8 826 3037 
Jete de 8eCCion 824 8871 
Jefede 8C20 1013 
Adminlstrativo C16 2816 
c Auxlliar ADTVO. 16 016 10935 
Auxlllar AOTV0.14 014 11727 
Auxllillr AOTVO. 12 012 8356 
D Conductor E10 5588 
Portero E9 1485 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Central admlnil1ratlon 8ample1Populatlon 
Cat. Numban 
" 
NumbeN 
" " (11 121 131 (4) I&J (81 
A 10192 15.0 21605 14.1 47.2 
B 18637 27.4 57645 37.5 32.3 
c 32018 47.1 68049 44.3 47.1 
D 7063 10.4 6455 4.2 109.4 
Total 67910 100.0 163754 100.0 44.2 
Eurostat 
. '
t 
,. 
1.3.81., Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Unmarried official 
.... Nat 
cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. ... Avt. 
(11 (21 131 (~) (5) (8) 171 
A Subdirector aeneral A30 8988488 7984833 10102148 4928301 1492851 
Con•ejero tecnico A28 4891994 8707418 8553&85 3484991 4721804 
Jefe de aervicio A A28 4180598 5804181 8113138 3088794 4111438 
8 Jete de aervicio 8 828 3709098 499520& 81157084 2814118 38H098 
Jete de ••colon 824 - 2837824. 3539380. 4879465 218&182 2878688 
Jete de neaociado IC20 237102& 2918282 3811813 1847222 22140215 
Adminietretivo C18 1992548 21518112 3318451 1807354 2012344 
c Auxilier AOTVO. 18 018 1747014 2182311 2901941 14158734 17440&2 
Auxilier AOTVO. 14 014 1872748 2034421 2823312 1423348 1874719 
Auxilier AOTVO. 12 012 1598422 1870488 2100738 1354188 1587842 
0 Conductor E10 1834420 2&55474 2133124 1552438 2073113 
PO nero E9 1372832 1858889 2158848 1181734 142&780 
1.3.81 .2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 996 
Married official with two children 
Groaa Nat 
Cat. Gracia Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(1) 121 131 1~1 I&J (8) (7) 
A Subdirector aenerel A30 8988488 7884833 10102148 4898115 5572498 
Con•eiero tecnlco A28 4891994 8707418 85&3585 31511911 4788878 
Jete de •ervicio A A26 4180598 5804111 8813138 3128400 4181478 
B Jefe de •ervioio 8 828 3709016 4195205 8157084 2888338 3708048 
Jete de ••ccion 824 2837824 3538380 4879485 2221838 2747474 
Jete de negociado BC20 2371025 2818282 3811883 1894843 2312391 
Admini•trativo C18 1992648 2518152 3318458 1847201 2114307 
c Auxilier AOTVO. 16 018 1747014 2162381 2101949 1109145 1787291 
Auxilier ADTVO. 14 014 1872746 2034429 2823312 1473531 1711408 
Auxilier ADTVO. 1 2 012 1598422 1870468 2100738 1402942 1623158 
D Conductor E10 1834420 255&474 2933124 1807471 2124723 
Ponero E9 1372832 18&8869 21&8848 1232913 147&488 
Spain 
MM. 
Ill 
8728788 
5918882 
48&2038 
4427588 
3508&615 
2111323 
21760&1 
2283040 
2114237 
1733071 
2335954 
1758070 
Max. 
JJ) 
8821819 
8002418 
4718187 
4489158 
3553380 
29111558 
2141420 
2351079 
2188703 
1775088 
2384618 
1801247 
Eurostat J4 21 
,. 
..... 
T 
Spsin 
1.3.12. 1 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1995 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
c.t. Grade Min. Ave. Max. Min. Ave • 
ftl (2) (3) ,., 111 ' 181 l7i 
A Subdiraotor aenaral A30 8709210 7848211 98&8175 4724294 5211133 
Corwaiero tecnico A28 4533308 8441788 8112342 3341471 4530717 
Jafe de HMCio A A21 4019888 &584887 1338785 2971088 3948801 
B Jefede eenAolo B 828 3583858 4817750 5818171 27·14000 3520908 
Jete de eeoolon 824 2741844 3431012 4411258 2088970 2&14413 
Jete de naaociedo BC20 2210828 2835582 3818103 1780331 2188887' 
Adminietrativo C18 1925152 2519218 3185731 1641112 1198382 
c Auxilar AOTVO. 16 018 1687922 2088802 2783210 1404433 1879781 
Auxlliar AOTVO. 14 014 1818182 1187503 2517751 1372173 1818701 
Auxlliar AOTVO. 12 012 1544378 1813153 2021582 1301131 1117141 
D Conductor E10 1751919 2438413 2787058 1478139 1173183 
Portero Ei 1328194 1597158 . 208&734 1 14883& 1372057 
1.3.82.2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 995 
Married official with two children 
... Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Ave. Max. Min. Ayt. 
f1J 121 (3) (4) I& I 181 171 
A Subdireotor~ae.neral A30 8708290 7148298 1858875 .4791377 5343418 
Corweiero tecnico A28 4533301 8448718 8192342 3388804 4&15235 
Jete de eenAcio A A28 4019881 5584887 8338715 3011217 40048&8 
B Jefe de HMcio 8 828 3583158 4817750 1898171 278&174 3519084 
Jefe de eeccion 824 2741844 3438092 4491251 2141808 288311& 
Jete de neaociedo 8C20 2290828 283&582 3888103 1828152 2243371 
Aclminietretivo C18 1925152 2&19211 318&731 158788& 2048748 
c Auxiler ADTVO. 18 018 1887922 2081102 2783280 1455071 1721&13 
Auxllier ADTVO. 14 014 1818182 1987503 2517759 1420857 18&10&1 
Auxllier ADTVO. 12 012 1544378 1813153 2021582 1352413 1&71&31 
D Conductor E10 1751118 2438413 2787058 1&31417 2021811 
Portero El 1328114 1517858 2085734 1188820 1411187 
Eurostat 
22 
..... 
raJ 
842414& 
5858845 
4450845 
4234871 
3383281 
2804217 
2417328 
2195409 
2025398 
1871331 
2215470 
1195943 
Max. 
(IJ 
8&21232 
1740511 
4&14233 
4213853 
3408244 
2877851 
2531042 
22&1074 
207&7&3 
1711127 
2271211 
17371&8 
1.3.C. 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
8 
c 
0 
1.3.0 
Cat. 
(1J 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Total 
1.3.E 
c.t. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Total 
Spain 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of. official In central 
government 
Price Index = 103.6 
... Net 
. ......, IIMMx ~- IIMMx 
Grade 1998 199& ROIIW\, ,. .. 1898 188& MIIIM • .... 
121 (3) (4) 161 (8] 171 Ill Ill 11Ql 
Subdirector aenerel A30 8351083 8005254 104.3 100.7 5768405 5511983 104.5 100.8 
Coneeiero tecnico A28 8850992 8390808 104.1 100.5 4734481 4542248 104.2 100.1 
Jete de eervicio A A26 - 6525886·· 5314508 104.0 '100.4 3177718 3818480 104.2 100.8 
Jefe de eervioio 8 826 4953789 4766528 103.1 100.3 3183684 3618732 104.1 100.1 
Jete de uccion 824 3686658 3558084 103.1 100.0 2811888 2708162 103.8 100.2 
Jete de ne_gociedo 8C20 -3033667 2931504 103.5 88.8 2370627 2281415 103.7 100.1 
Adminietretivo C16 2636386 2543388 103.7 100.1 2107847 2029718 103.8 100.2 
Auxilier AOTVO. 18 018 2270441 2185828 103.8 100.3 1858892 1784547 104.1 100.4 
Auxilier AOTVO. 14 014 2110162 2033808 103.8 100.1 1781324 1894457 103.8 100.3 
AuXt1ier AOTVO. 12 012 1858542 1795704 103.4 88.8 1678314 1621768 103.8 100.0 
Conductor E10 2441006 2325130 105.0 101.3 2014803 1116382 106.2 101.6 
Po nero E9 1729450 1889862 103.8 100.0 1480872 1427183 103.8 100.2 
Total emoluments in central government In 1995 (In millions) 
Grou Net 
....... Population Sample Population 
Value 
(2) 
83824 
83680 
14654 
15443 
207181 
1111 
121 
8498189 
3634830 
2080791 
2290384 
3269104 
% Value ')(, Value % v.a .. % 
(3) (4) {6) 181 171 181 111 
30.7 134870 27.9 45074 28.1 95647 25.7 
30.7 198593 40.7 48836 30.4 160434 40.6 
31.2 137199 28.4 53822 33.6 113886 30.7 
7.5 14113 2.9 12788 8.0 11898 3.1 
100.0 482776 100.0 180131 100.0 371842 100.0 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government 
Price index = 1 03.6 
Grou Net 
1196 MAminel . .Real -1 .. , .. ........ ... 
Index Index Index Index 
(31 (4) (6) (81 (7J 181 [81 
8242540 104.1 100.6 4610982 4422481 104.3 100.1 
3410409 103.6 100.0 2709468 2809171 103.8 100.2 
2016185 103.7 100.1 1738901 1874710 103.8 100.3 
2186432 104.8 101.1 1901787 1812031 106.0 101.3 
3139924 103.8 100.2 2&13132 241713& 104.0 ;~;~j[j~jji!~:j~~~!!j~jj~li!lll 
Eurostat 
23 
y 
France 
. 
1.3.A1 Central government personnel in the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
cat. Oracle Stall 1111 
111 121 131 
A Dlrlcteur C-E 
Directeur B·C 1..0 
Administnlteur cMI hen classe, chef d 1116 
service et aous-directeur 
Attache principal d' administration 2666 
centrale et administrateur cMl 
Attach6 d'adminlstration centrale 2966 
B Secritalre administratif de claue 828 
excePtiOnelle 
Secr6taire administratif de c1aste 739 
Secritaira administratif de claale 4225 
normale 
c Adioint administratif DrinciDal 3827 
Adioint administratif 7674 
Agent administratif de 16re clasae et de 3463 
2tmeclasse 
Chef de aaraae et maaaalnltr chef 576 
Ouvrler Df'Ofessionel DrinciDal 788 
Miaaslnler de 1tre clnH 1444 
Maaasinier de 2tme classe 1681 
1.3.A2 Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Central adminl•tration Sample/Population 
Cat. Numbant 
" 
Numbant 
" 
.. 
(1) 121 (3) 14] (6} 181 
A 6888 21.4 6888 21.4 100.0 
B 5792 18.0 5792 18.0 100.0 
,c 16328 50.8 . 16328 50.8 100.0 
o• 3125 9.7 3125 9.7 100.0 
Total 32133 100.0 32133 100.0 100.0 
a 
1 Eurostat classification. 
Eurostat 
24 
France 
1.3.81.1 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Unmarried official 
Gron Nat 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
[1) [2) (31 (4) [6) (61 (7) 
A Directeur C-E 43639 0 51686 27122 0 
Oirecteur B-C 37675 0 45563 24128 0 
Administrateur civil hors classe, 25705 0 35830 17519 0 
chef de service et sous-directeur 
Attache principal d' 14922 0 27006 10934 0 
administration centrale et 
administrateur civil 
Attach6 d ·administration 11970 0 22301 9074 0 
centrale 
·B Secretaire administratif de classe 12674 0 17410 9494 0 
exceptio neUe 
Secr6taire administratif de olasse 11726 0 16424 8888 0 
sup6rieure 
Secr6taire administratif de olasse 9536 0 15546 7466 0 
normale 
c Adioint administratif principal 8140 0 11732 6446 0 
Adjoint administratif 7918 0 11213 6293 0 
Agent administratif de 1ere 7761 0 10760 6193 0 
classe et de 2eme classe 
Chef de garage et magasinier 8140 0 11732 6447 0 
chef 
Ouvrier professional principal 7918 0 11213 6293 0 
Magasinier de 1 tre classe 7761 0 10760 6193 0 
Ma1)asinier de 2tme classe 7604 0 10242 6190 0 
1.3.81.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Married official with two children 
Gross Nat 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(1 J (21 (3) (4) (61 (61 171 
A Directeur C-E 43639 0 61686 33626 0 
Oirecteur B-C 37675 0 45683 29793 0 
Administrateur civil hort claste, 26706 0 35830 21583 0 
chef dt eervict et sous-directeur 
Attach6 principal d' 14922 0 27006 13350 0 
administration centrale et 
administrateur civil 
A ttach6 d • administration 11970 0 22301 11069 0 
centrale 
B Secr6taire administratif de classe 12674 0 17410 11679 0 
exceptionelle 
Secr6taire administratif de classe 11726 0 16424 10821 0 
sup6rieure 
Secr6taire administratif de classe 9636 0 16645 9304 0 
normale 
c Adjoint administratif J~rinc_ipal 8140 0 11732 8065 0 
Adloint administratif 7918 0 11213 7875 0 
Agent edminiatratif de 1 ere 7781 0 10760 7753 0 
olasse et de 2ema classe 
Chef de garage at magaainier 8140 0 11732 8085 0 
chef 
Ouvrier Drofeasionel DrinciDal 7918 0 11213 7876 0 
Maaninier de 1ere ctuse 7781 0 10780 7763 0 
Magaeinier de 2eme ctasn 7804 0 10242 7750 0 
• 
Eurostat 
Max. 
(81 
31160 
28086 
23172 
18042 
15375 
12486 
11852 
11298 
8851 
8507 
8194 
8851 
8507 
8194 
7836 
Max. 
(81 
38796 
34881 
28809 
22273 
18980 
16307 
14509 
13807 
10788 
10384 
10207 
10788 
10384 
10207 
8767 
,. 
France 
1.3.82.1 Monthly rates of pay of central government persoonel in 1995 
Unmarried official 
·-
Net 
Cet. Grade Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. 
(1) 121 13) 14l 151 (81 (7) 
A Directeur C·E 43038 0 60872 26866 0 
Oirecteur 8-C 37155 0 44835 23876 0 
Administrataur civil hora classa, 25361 0 35338 17415 0 
chef de service at sous-diracteur 
Attach6 principal d' 14717 0 26633 10878 0 
administration cantrela at 
edministretaur civil 
Attech6 d ·administration 11805 0 21883 8029 0 
centrale 
B Sacr6taira administratif de classe 12499 0 17169 8448 0 
exceptio nella 
Sacr6teire adminietratif de classe 11664 0 16197 8845 0 
suo6rieure 
Sacr6taira edrninietretif de cleese 8405 0 15331 7360 0 
normela 
c Adjoint administratif principal 8027 0 11571 6427 0 
Adjoint edminietratif 7808 0 11058 8274 0 
Agent adminietratif de 16re 7855 0 10612 8166 0 
~lassa at da 26me ctasse 
Chef de garage et magaainiar 8027 0 11571 6427 0 
chef 
Ouvrier profa11ionel principal 7808 0 11059 6274 0 
Maaasinier de 16re ctasse 7655 0 10612 6186 0 
Maaesinier de 26me cle11a 7499 0 10100 6118 0 
1.3.82.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1995 
Married official with two children / 
Gross Nat 
Cat. Grade ~in. Avg. Mex. Min. Avg. 
(1) 121 (3) (41 161 (61 (7) 
A Directaur C-E 43038 0 50972 33397 0 
Directeur 8-C 37155 0 44935 28590 0 
Administreteur civil hore cla11a, 25351 0 35338 21468 0 
chef de service et sous-directeur 
Atteoh6 principal d' 14717 0 28633 13322 0 
administration centrale et 
adminietreteur civil 
Attaoh6 d • adminietretion 11805 0 21883 11122 0 
oentrele 
B Seor6teire adminietratif de clesse 12488 0 17168 11587 0 
exoeotionelle 
Secr6taire administratif de cla11e 11584 0 18187 10918 0 
suo6rieure 
Secr6teire administratif de classe 8405 0 16331 8227 0 
normal a 
c Adioint administratif orincioal 8027 0 11571 8083 0 
Adjoint adminietratif 7809 0 11059 7896 0 
Agent edminietratif de 16re 7855 0 10812 7763 0 
clasee at de 26ma classe 
Chat de garage et magasinier 8027 0 11671 8083 0 
chef 
Ouvriar professional principal 7809 0 11059 7896 0 
MeaMinier de 1 6re classe 7855 0 10812 7763 0 
Maaesinier de 26me clesse 7499 0 10100 7703 0 
Eurostat 
26 
f' 
i 
Mu. 
(8) 
30878 
27816 
23031 
17836 
,.. 
15284 
12420 
11781 
11239 
8808 
8473 
8182 
8808 
8473 
8182 
7806 
Mu. 
181 
38533 
34825 
28413 
22134 
18847 
16229 
14443 
13765 
10877 
10518 ... 
10212 
10877 
10518 
10212 
1776 
1.3.C. 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
France 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official in central 
government. Price index == 102.3 
Qroa Net 
til Selary Index I Salary Index 
Grade 1918 1896 nomin. ,. .. 1898 1996 nomin. real 
.• (2) 13) (4) 15) (8) . 17J 181 (9] 110) 
Directeur C·E 47663 47005 101.4 89.1 32676 32466 100.6 88.4 
Directeur 8-C 41619 41045 101.4 88.1 28217 29027 100.7 88.4 
Administrateur civil hore classe, 30768 30344 101.4 99.1 22723 22578 100.6 88.4 
chef de service et sous-directeur 
Attach6 principal d' . 20864 20675· 101.4 ·88.1 ·16150 16068 100.5 88.3 
administration centrale at 
administrateur civil 
Attach6 d ·administration 17136 16899 101.4 99.1 13617 13571 100.3 88.1 
centrale 
Sacr6taire administratif de 15042 14834 .101.4 89.1 12217 12171 100.4 88.1 
classe exceptionelle 
Sacr6taira administratif de 14075 13881 101.4 89.1 11518 11488 100.2 97.9 
classe sup6rieura 
Secr6taire administratif de 12541 12368 101.4 99.1 10466 10398 100.7 98.4 
classe normale 
Adjoint administratif principal 9936 9799 101.4 99.1 8537 8549 99.9 97.6 
Adioint administratif 9566 9434 101.4 99.1 8265 8291 99.7 97.4 
Agent administratif de 16re 9261 9134 101.4 99.1 8087 8076 100.1 97.9 
classe et de 26me classe 
Chef de garage at magasinier 9936 9799 101.4 99.1 .8537 8548 99.9 97.6 
chef ·. 
Ouvrier professional principal 9566 9434 101.4 99.1 8265 8291 99.7 97.4 
Ma_llasinier de 16re classe 9261 9134 101.4 99.1 8087 8076 100.1 97.9 
Magasinier de 26me classe 8923 8800 101.4 99~1 7886 7851 100.4 98.2 
1.3.0 . Total emoluments in central government in 1995 (in thousands) 
Cat. 
{1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
1.3.E 
Cat. 
(1] 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
Grou Nat 
Sample . Population Sample Population 
Value 
121 
145269 
74795 
154605 
27981 
402849 
1998 
(2) 
21385 
13094 
9601 
9079 
12708 
" 
Value 
" 
Value 
" 
Value 
" (3) 141 (6) (6) (7) f8) (9) 
36.1 145268 36.1" 112590 33.5 112589 33.5 
18.6 74795 18.6 62506 18.6 62506 18.6 
38.4 154604 38.4 135761 40.4 135760 40.4 
6.9 27980 6.9 24858 7.4 . 24858 7.4 
100.0 402847 100.0 336716 100.0 336713 .100.0 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government. Price index = 102.3 
Groes Net 
1996 Nominal ..... 1998 1896 Nominal Real 
Index Index Index Index 
(3] (41 (5) (8) (7) (8) (8) 
21090 101.4 99.1 16425 18346 100.5 98.2 
12914 101.4 99.1 10850 10792 100.5 98.3 
9469 101.4 99.1 8300 8315 99.8 97.8 
8954 101.4 99.1 7979 7955 100.3 98.0 
12631 101.4 99.1 10470 10448 100.2 :,\;~\~j~::f;\\\.:}:~~~~:?::::\~j 
Eurostat l4 27 
,_... ., 
... . . 
l. 
,.- -
IL 
...,._ 
Ireland 
. 
1.3.A1 Central government personnel In the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
Cat. Grade 8tatr1111 
f11 121 131 
A 18 
. Aailtant Seer. • PrinciDII 338 
Assistant Prine. 842 
Admin. Offar 83 
B HEO 1730 
EO 2258 
c Staff Officer 1001 
Clertcll Off. 4281 
Clerical Aalia. 5083 
D Helld 17 
188 
527 
1.3.A2 Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Rallo 
Cenval ad,...tratlon ............. don 
Cat. NumbeN 4)(. Numb.,. ~ ~ 
,,1 (2) (3) (41 151 181 
A 1468 8.9 1468 8.9 100.0 
B 3989 24.1 3989 24.1 100.0 
c 10365 62.6 10365 62.6 100.0 
D 733 4.4 733 4.4 100.0 
Total 16555 100.0 16555 100.0 100.0 
• 
Eurostat 
Ireland 
1.3.81.1 
c.t. 
(11 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1996 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
••• Min. A VI • Mu. Min. A VI. (21 (3) (41 Ill re1 171 
Seoretarv 8348 8348 8348 3317 3317 
Assistant Seer. 3782 4138 4328 2130 2314 
Prinoioel 2948 3198 3450 1731 1854 
Aaeistant Prine. 2209 2456 2820 1381 1480 
Admin. Officer 1187 1708 2038 885 1124 
HEO 1821 1815 2039 1083 1178 
EO 785 1328 1878 838 141 
Steff Officer 1239 . 1422 1543 899 987 
Clerical Off. 891 927 1238 589 717 
Clerical Assis. 885 880 1017 585 870 
Heed messenaer 1031 1073 1105 788 817 
Peerkeeoer 890 127 1008 891 718 
Measenaer 878 141 151 882 728 
1.3.81.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 996 
Married official with two children 
Groa ·Net 
C.t. Grade Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. 
(11 121 (3) 141 (6) _181 (7) 
A Secreterv 8416 8415 8415 3728 3728 
Assi8tant Seer. 3828 4205 4383 2481 2846 
Prineioel 3015 3285 3518 2082 2185 
Assi8tant Prine. 2278 2522 2888 1700 182.1 
Admin. Officer 1234 1773 2108 1008 1375 
B HEO 1688 1881 2108 1317 1450 
EO 852 1383 1745 810 1114 
c Steff Officer 1305 1489 1809 1064 1180 
Clerical Off. 758 994 1305 742 872 
Clerical As1i1. 739 914 1071 723 828 
D Heed mestenaar 1085 1127 1158 822 141 
Paoerkeeoer 944 881 1080 843 114 
Mettenaer 132 895 1005 838 872 
Eurostat 
Max. 
(IJ 
3317 
2408 
1177 
1570 
1288 
1288 
1111 
1048 
899 
778 
836 
771 
733 
Mu. 
181 
3728 
2737 
2308 
1101 
1805 
1805 
1358 
1283 
1053 
811 
183 
108 
878 
a.,..L .. 
• 
Ireland 
1.3.82., 
cat. 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 995 
Unmarried official 
.... Net 
... Min • Ave. Mu. Min. Avg. Mu. 
rn (2) (3) (4) Ill (8) nJ . 111 
A Secreterv 8264 8264 8264 3337 3337 
Aeeilltent Seer. 3708 4077 4282 2088 2270 
PrtnaiDel 2904 3111 3399 1881 1817 
Aeeilltent Prine. 2177 2418 21581 1338 1458 
Admin. Officer 1160 11588 18158 842 1044 
8 HEO 1687 1729 1872 1062_ 1121 
EO 774 1244 1548 124 888 
c Steff Officer 1220 1401 1520 878 113 
Clertcel OH. 881 914 1220 &58 704 
Clerical Aeeit. 876 847 1002 164 868 
D Heed meeeenaer 1018 1067 1088 774 798 
PeDerkeeoer 877 913 992 878 704 
Meeeenaer 885 927 937 170 713 
1.3.82.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 996 
Married official with two children 
GlOM Net 
cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
111 (21 (3) 14i I&J Ill ni 
A Seoreterv 8307 8307 8307 3838 3138 
AeeilltentSecr. 3769 4128 4311 2381 2572 
PrinciDel 2867 3204 3411 1888 2111 
Aui8tent Prine. 2229 2472 2834 1841 1780 
Admin. Officer 1202 1122 1811 872 1281 
8 HEO 1840 1782 1821 1273 1370 
EO 828 1287 1801 771 1037 
c Steff Officer 1273 1464 1573 1020 1141 
Clerioel OH. 734 987 1273 718 837 
Clerioel Anie. 711 887 1042 889 782 
D Heed meeeenaer 1068 1097 1128 887 810 
P.,.rkeeoer 817 853 1032 808 828 
Meeeenaer 106 887 877 802 837 
Eurostat 
30 
3337 
2381 
1838 
11537 
1183 
1110 
1034 
1020 
871 
781 
813 
718 
721 
Mu. 
111 
3838 
2883 
2240 
1838 
1480 
1488 
1248 
1228 
1020 
871 
827 
873 
843 
Ireland 
1.3.C. Changes ·in average remuneration by grade of official In central 
government 
c.t. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.0 
Cat. 
[1] 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
1.3.E 
Cat. 
(11 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
Price Index • 101 ~4' 
ar .. Net 
S.lary .... X .., .... 
Grade 1998 1996 nomln. .... 1881 11. nom. ,.., 
[2) [3) [4] [61 181 (7J (8) Ill (10) 
Secretarv 6381 6280 101.8 100.2 3662 3488 102.1 100.7 
Ae8ietent Seer. 4108 4041 101.7 100.3 2449 2391 102.4 101.0 
Princi_M 3232 3178 101.7 100.3 ·2018 1888 102.6 101.2 
Aeeietent Prine. 2461 2418 101.8 100.4 1842 1588 102.9 101.5 
Admin. Officer 1671 1562 107.8 108.1 1210 1127 107.4 106.8 
HEO 1858 1766 106.8 104.4 1320 1246 106.8 104.5 
EO 1296 1215 106.7 106.2 994 834 106.6 105.0 
Steff Officer 1434 1407 102.0 100.8 1071 1042 102.8 101.4 
Clerical Off. 986 965 102.2 100.8 809 788 102.9 101.5 
Clerical Aeaie. 881 861 102.3 100.9 748 725 103.0 101.5 
Heed meaeenaer 1096 1074 102.1 100.7 878 851 103.2 101.7 
Peperkeeper 968 947 102.2 100.8 798 776 103.0 101.8 
Meaeenoer 950 830 102.2 100.8 788 784 103.1 101.1 
Total emoluments in central government In 1 99& (In thousands) 
Qro.a Net 
S.mple Population Semple Population 
v.au. 
(21 
3948 
5782 
9816 
887 
20333 
1181 
(21 
2741 
1640 
978 
858 
1288 
t)(t Velue t)(t Velue ~ Value 
(3) [4) [61 [8) {71 (8)_ 
19.4 3947 19.4 2534 18.4 2533 
28.4 5782 28.4 4285 27.8 4265 
48.8 9915 48.8 8089 52.4 8089 
3.4 687 3.4 564 3.6 583 
100.0 20331 100.0 16462 100.0 1&460 
Changes in average remunera1ions by category of official in the 
central government 
Price index = 101 .41 
Groec Net 
1896 Nominal Reel 1818 1116 NOINMI 
Index Index Index 
(3) (4) [6) (8) [7) [81 
2689 101.9 100.5 1778 1728 102.9 
1450 106.2 104.8 1135 1089 106.2 
957 102.2 100.8 803 780 102.8 
938 102.2 100.8 783 789 103.1 
" (11 
18.4 
27.8 
52.4 
3.8 
100.0 
..... 
.... 
(I) 
101.1 
104.7 
101.1 
101.1 
1228 103.3 101.9 ... 133 103.1 ·;i1lii!il~\lilii!i'$:,llll~~~ 
1 Averaae between May and August. 
Eurostat J4 31 
,. 
Italy 
. 
1.3.A1 Central government personnel In the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
cat. Gl'llde Statr11M 
(1] 121 131 
A Olrlaente aenerale 412 
Oirtalnte ..... 1877 
Primo Dil1aentt 2884 
IX Quallfica 18218 
VIII Quallficl 7218 
VII Qualiftca 58380 
B , prtnc. VI Qualfica D85 
c Coadlutcn Drinc. V Qualifica 88270 r 
Coadiutore Drinc. IV Qualifica 53481 
0 Commesso Caoo Ill Qualifica 25758 
Commesao CaDO II Quallfica 700 
1.3.A2 Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Central adminlatratlon aamplaJPopulatlon 
cat. Nurnbara 
" 
Numbera 
" " 111 121 (31 141 161 (81 
A 87887 31.6 89538 32.0 88.2 
a 20985 7.5 20985 7.5 100.0 
c 142751 51.3 142751 51.0 100.0 
D 26458 9.6 26458 8.6 100.0 
Total 278081 100.0 279732 100.0 18.4 
• 
Eurostat 
3l 
-Italy 
1.3.81.1 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1996 
Unmarried official 
Grou Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. Mu. 
IU 12) 131 {41 nn 111 171 181 
A Diriaente aenerale 6091844 0· 6870997 3888327 0 4288079 
Diriaente super. 4945890 0 5710237 3258182 0 3873153 
Primo Diriaente 3668414. 0 4509891 2513528 0 2981230 
IX Qualifice 3529763 0 3828581 2435220 0 2810988 
VIII Ouelifice 3205227 .. 0 3504048. 2248121 0 2421988 
VII Quelifice 2921992 0 3185803 2081118 0 2234181 
B Seareterio Drinc. VI Quelifice 2658357 0 2808797 1917340 0 2004919 
c Coediutore Drinc. V Quelifice 2489983 0 2830110 1808711 0 1888953 
Coediutore Drinc. IV Ouellfice 2352390 0 2483871· 1719945 0 1793998 
D Commesso CeDo Ill Quelifice 2223814 0 2333031 1838957 0 1895131 
Commn•o CeDo II Ouellfice 2074159 0 2179242 1540270 0 1595385 
1.3.81.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1996 
Married offi~ial wi~h two children 
Grou Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Mu. Min. .,.. Max. 
111 121 {31 141 (6) (8) (7) (8) 
A Diriaente aenerele 6091844 0 8870997 3987935 0 4387887 
Diriaente suDer. 4945890 0 5710237 3355770 0 3772781 
Primo Diriaente 3688414 0 4509891 2813134 0 3080838 
IX Qualifice 3529763 0 3828581 2534828 0 2710574 
VIII Oualifice 3205227 0 3504048 2345721 0 2521574 
VII Qualifica 2921992 0 3185803 2180721 0 2333789 
B Seareterio Drinc. VI Qualifice 2658357 0 2808797 2018948 0 2104527 
c Coadiutore princ. V Quelifice 2489963 0 2830110 1908319 0 1988581 
Coediutore Drinc. IV Ouelifice 2352390 0 2483871 1819553 0 1893804 
D Commu•o CIDo Ill Qualifice 2223814 0 2333031 1738585 0 1714731 
Comme11o Cepo II Qualifice 2074159 0 2179242 1839878 0 1894873 
Eurostat 
14 33 
,. 
.&... -· 
Italy 
1.3.82., 
c.t. 
rn 
A 
8 
c 
D 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 995 
Unmarried official 
Grou Net 
... Min. Avg • Max. Min. Ave. Max. 
l21 (3) (4J I&J Ill 171 raJ 
Diriaente aenerele 5970280 0 1727528 3815111 0 4178448 
Diriaente euDer. 4945890 0 5710237 3251978 0 3112123 
Primo Dlriaente 3668414 0 4508891 2511112 0 2971827 
IX Quelifice 3307678 0 3801497 2310483 0 2481583 
VIII Quellfice 3007143 0 3305912 213554& 0 2288754 
VII Quellfice 2742742 0 3008353 117741& 0 2113012 
Seareterio Drinc. VI Quelifice 2501107 0 2851547 1821320 0 1895181 
Coediutore Drinc. V Quelifice 2346211 0 2486444 1721158 0 1788818 
Coediutore Drinc. IV Qualifice 2218140 0 2341821 1838084 0 1700125 
Commee•o CIDO Ill Quelifice 2097697 0 2207114 1580545 0 1608741 
Commee•o CeDo II Quellfice 1975659 0 2080742 1481352 0 1528884 
1.3.82.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 995 
Married official with two children 
Grou Net 
c.t. ••• Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. Max. (1) 12) 13) (4) I&J 181 nJ [8) 
A Dlr.iaente aenerale 5970280 0 8727528 3815224 0 4278057 
Dirlaente euDer. 4845890 0 5710237 3351588 0 3712231 
Primo Dlriaente 3888414 0 4508811 12810720 0 3071&35 
IX Quellfice 3307878 o· 3108487 2410011 0 2511202 
VIII Quellfioe 3007143 0 3305182 2235153 0 2388382 
VII Queliflce 2742742 0 3008353 2077023 0 2212870 
8 Seareterio Drinc. VI Quelifice 2501107 0 2851547 1120127 0 1994781 
c Colldiutore Drinc. V Quelifice 2346298 0 2488444 1820784 0 1888228 
Coediutore Drinc. IV Quelifice 2218140 0 2341821 1737872 0 1718733 
D Ccmme••o CeDo Ill Quelifice 2097697 0 2207114 1880153 0 1708348 
Commee•o CeDo II Qualifice 1975859 0 2080742 1580980 0 1828472 
Eurostat 
34 
It sly 
1.3.C. Changes in average remuneration by grade of official In central 
government 
c~. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.0 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
1.3.E 
Cat. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
Price Index = 103.9 
Grou Net 
Salary Index Salary Index 
Grade 1996 1996 nomin. .,. .. 1998 1196 noiNn. ,. .. 
(2) (31 (4] I&J 181 (71 (8] {IJ (10) 
Diriaente aenerele 6481421 6348894 102.1 98.3 4128007 4048837 102.0 98.2 
Diriaente euper. 5328064 5328084 100.0 98.2 3514482 3607105 100.2 98.4 
Primo Diriaente . 4089153· 4089153 100.0 98.2 2797182 2791324 100.2 18.4 
IX Quellfica 3879172 3457088 108.4 102.4 2672897 2435842 106.8 101.7 
VIII Quallflca 3354837 3158553 108.3 102.3 2383848 2280954 105.4 101.6 
VII Queliflca 3053798 2874548 108.2 102.2 2207462 2095043 105.4 101.4 
Searetario Drinc. VI Qualifica 2733577 2578327 108.1 102.1 2010934 1908064 105.4 101.4 
Coediutore Drinc. V Quelifice 2560037 2418370 105.9 102.0 1898838 1804891 106.2 101.3 
Coediutore Drinc. JV Quelifica 2418131 2283881 105.9 101.9 1808776 1718899 105.1 101.2 
Commeaao CeDO Ill Quelifice 2278323 2152406 105.9 101.9 1715848 1834447 106.0 101.0 
Comme110 Capo II Quelifica 2126701 2028201 104.9 100.9 1817822 1553912 104.1 100.2 
Total emoluments In central government In 1995 (In millions) 
Grou Net 
sa,. .. Population Sample Population 
Value 
(2] 
273288 
64084 
337854 
56881 
722017 
1198 
12) 
3288617 
2733577 
2508872 
2274311 
2712071 
')C. Value ')C. Value ')C. Velue ')C. 
(3) (4] 161 (8) 171 [8) Ill 
37.8 278422 38.3 198101 38.8 199785 37.3 
7.6 54084 7.4 40041 7.5 40040 7.6 
48.8 337853 46.5 253033 47.5 253033 47.2 
7.9 56861 7.8 43188 8.1 43187 8.1 
100.0 727200 100.0 632383 100.0 638046 100.0 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government 
Price Index = 103.9 
Grou Nat 
1996 Nominal Real 1998 1196 NOINnal ... 
Index Index Index Index 
[3) 141 151 [8) 171 (8) (I) 
3109542 105.8 101.8 2343337 2231288 105.0 101.1 
2578327 106.1 102.1 2010934 1908054 106.4· 101.4 
2388734 105.9 101.9 1884221 1772548 105.2 101.2 
2149120 105.8 101.9 1713249 1832318 105.0 101.0 
2699838 106.9 101.9 2014306 1918288 106.1 ·:)1~Ii!~;~!~ili~~~i:~i~;iii~ 
Eurostat 
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Luxembourg 
. 
1.3.A1 Central government personnel In the sample broken down by category 
arid by grade 
• .. CaL Grade ltltr1HI 
111 121 131 
A 18 5 
17 18 
1f5bll f5 
16 34 
15 10 
14 3 
13 8 
12 38 r 
8 13bil 37 
13 15 
12 5f5 
11 32 
10 4 
8 26 
8 38 
7 45 
c Iter 13 
8bil f5 
8 11 
7 8 
8 18 
4 12 
D 7guater 5 
7 1 
8 11 
5 13 
4 3 
3 8 
2 5 
1.3.A2. Central government personnel, broken down by category 
••mple Popul8tion l\8tlo 
Centr81 ....... tlon S.mple1Popul8tlon 
c.t. Numbere .. Numb•re .. .. 
_1_1) (2] (31 141 f&l (8) 
A 123 24.9 123 .24.9 100.0 
8 253 51.3 253 51.3 100.0 
c 70 14.2 70 14.2 100.0 
D 47 9.5 47 8.5 100.0 
Tot81 413 100.0 413 100.0 100.0 
36 Eurostat 
1.3.81.1 
Cat. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Luxembourg 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Unmarried official 
Grou Net 
Grade Min. Avo. Max. Min. Avo. Mex. 
(21 (31 141 161 (61 {71 181 
18 218606 0 306049 133132 0 173728 
17 200390 0 284644 124903 0 163799 
16bis 198113 0 281911 123859 0 162519 
16 186727 0 270525 118719 0 157225 
15 173063 0 241379 112536 0 143721 
14 163954 0 234547 108398 0 140543 
13 145738 0 234547 100189 0 140543 
12 145738 0 186727 100169 0 118719 
13bis 154847 0 221339 104306 0 134409 
13 145738 0 212231 100189 0 130251 
12 132075 0 193558 93985 0 121810 
11 121144 0 179895 88767 0 115627 
10 110214 0 164866 83187 0 108817 
9 99284 0 164866 77212 0 108817 
8 92452 0 136173 73298 0 95865 
7 88353 0 117046 70908 0 86690 
Iter 103383 0 161222 79506 0 107188 
Ibis 96551 0 154391 75884 0 104097 
8 92452 0 141638 73298 0 98331 
7 80158 0 125243 85905 0 90783 
8 74235 0 111125 82182 0 83638 
4 72888 0 102016 81300 0 78751 
7aueter 84710 0 128431 88891 0 92282 
7 80158 0 123876 85905 0 80084 
6 74235 0 115223 82182 0 85788 
5 70138 0 111125 58558 0 83838 
4 88314 0 102016 58351 0 78751 
3 83304 0 81888 55034 0 73030 
2 84671 0 78333 55953 0 64781 
Eurostat 
37 
• 
Luxembourg 
1.3.81.2 
cat. 
ru 
A 
B 
c 
D 
38 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1996 
Married official with two children 
... Net 
••• Min. Avg. Mu. . Min. Avg. Max. (21 131 r•1 lll ltll 171 Ill 
18 240898 0 328141 181028 0 227314 
17 222482 0 308738 178476 0 217384 
18bil 220205 0 304003 175210 0 211104 
18 208819 0 292817 189121 0 210810 
16 .:195156 0 283471 111480 0 117288 
14 181048 0 258839 151211 0 183978 
13 188427 0 258838 144508 0 183878 
12 186427 0 208818 . 144508 0 168121 
13bil 176274 0 243431 150450 0 187410 
13 166427 0 234323 144608 0 182706 
12 152346 0 215650 135681 0 172880 
11 141416 0 201987 128684 0 186351 
10 130484 0 188958 121442 0 158750 
8 119664 0 188958 1.13698 0 158750 
8 112722 0 158444 107782 0 138281 
7 108624 0 137318 103880 0 125883 
Iter 123654 0 183185 118710 0 154522 
Ibis 118822 0 175781 111641 0 150187 
8 112722 0 181988 107782 0 141738 
7 100428 0 145514 88378 0 131291 
8 94608 0 131381 80883 0 122048 
4 93138 0 122287 88814 0 115873 
7aueter 104980 0 148702 100800 0 133351 
7 100421 0 144147 81371 0 130433 
8 94508 0 135494 80883 0 124760 
5 90407 0 131386 87080 0 122048 
4 88585 0 122287 85311 0 115173 
3 83575 0 112267 80743 0 107358 
2 84941 0 88804 82010 0 84885 
r 
1.3.82., 
c.t. 
111 
A 
8 
c 
D 
Luxembourg 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 995 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
... Min. A VI • Mu. Min. .,.. Mu. 
(2) (31 (4) 1&1 181 17) (IJ 
18 209722 0 293810 131036 0 170141 
17 192245 0 273075 122943 0 110107 
18bis 190080 0 270454 121944 0 158893 
18 179138 0 251530 118899 0 154488 
16 186029 0 -231568 110854 0 141274 
14 157291 0 226014 106860 0 138183 
13 139815 0 225014 98769 0 138183 
12 139816 0 179138 98789 0 118819 
13bis 148553 0 212343 102816 0 132233 
13 131815 0 20380$ 18789 0 128188 
12 128708 0 185891 92844 0 111944 
11 118221 0 172583 87453 0 113904 
10 105734 0 168185 81129 0 107261 
9 85248 0 158166 78007 0 107269 
a 88895 0 130631 72150 0 94498 
7 84783 0 112289 89791 0 85446 
Iter 99180 0 154870 78214 0 105813 
Ibis 92827 0 148111 74606 0 102114 
a 88896 0 136882 72160 0 98975 
7 78898 0 120153 14887 0 89407 
8 71218 0 108808 11152 0 82352 
4 89907 0 97870 10313 0 77541 
7auater 81287 0 123211 87588 0 80810 
7 78888 0 118842 84887 0 88802 
8 71218 0 110541 11152 0 84508 
5 87285 0 108808 58588 0 82352 
4 85538 0 17870 57310 0 77541 
3 80731 0 88257 54120 0 71882 
2 82043 0 75150 55029 0 83728 
Eurostat 
39 
.. -
Luxembourg 
1.3.82.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 996 
Married official with two children · 
... Net 
cat. . , .• Min • Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. Mu. 
111 (2) (31 (4l (IJ (I) (7) fiJ 
A 18 231277 0 315185 183788 0 224091 
17 213800 0 294630 174381 0 214358 
18bil 211616 0 292009 173124 0 213147. 
18 200892 0 281086 187026 0 208153 
15 187584 0 253122 119488 0 184889 
14 178845 0 248588 154228 0 181883 
13 180024 0 248&18 142832 0 181883 
12 180024 0 200882 142832 0 187025 
B 13bil 168470 0 233887 148&53 0 185183 
13 160024 0 225110 142832 0 180464 
12 1465.14 0 207245 134185 0 170758 
11 136028 0 184138 128207 0 183303 
10 125542 0 178718 120735 0 154785 
8 115056 0 179718 111812 0, 154785 
8 108503 0 -150448 105711 0 138480 
7 104570 0 132088 101881 0 12&618 
c Iter 118988 0 178083 115833 0 162586 
8bil 112435 0 188887 108431 0 148241 
8 108503 0 165774 105711 0 138941 
7 98708 0 138981 84548 0 130128 
8 81028 0 128583 88174 0 121414 
4 88715 0 117878 87934 0 114382 
D 7gu_eter 101075 0 143018 88881 0 132228 
7 98708 0 138850 84548 0 128795 
8 81028 0 130348 88174 0 124282 
5 87083 0 128418 85463 0 121414 
4 85345 0 117878 83788 0 114382 
3 80539 0 108081 78212 0 101217 
2 81851 0 84858 80483 0 82881 
Eurostat 
40 
1.3.C. 
Cat. 
r11 
A 
B 
I 
c 
D 
Luxembourg 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official In central 
government 
Price index = 101.2 
Groa Net 
~ Index ...., Index 
Grade 1888 1886 nomln. ,... 1888 188& nomln • .... 
[2] (3) (4) 151 (81 [7) (81 (IJ [101 
18 273374 262444 104.2 102.8 180050 177384 101.5 100.3 
17 253563 243438 104.2 102.8 170640 188147 101.5 100.3 
18bil ·251058 241035· •104.2 102.8 189438 188977 101.5 100.3 
18 239872 230111 104.2 102.9 183888 181841 101.4 100.2 
15 218267 209578 104.1 102.9 153758 151822 101.4 100.2 
14 210297 201930 104.1 102.9 148782 147734 101.4 100.2 
13 200838 192855 104.1 102.8 144788 142812 101.4 100.2 
12 176928 169917 104.1 102.9 133128 131331 101.4 100.2 
13bil 188973 191068 104.1 102.9 144144 142181 101.4 100.2 
13 189680 182151 104.1 102.8 139408 137511 101.4 100.2 
12 173407 188539 104.1 102.9 131084 128383 101.3 100.1 
11 161110 154743 104.1 102.9 124602 123217 101.1 88.8 
10 148131 142290 104.1 102.8 117541 118172 101.2 100.0 
9 142668 137047 104.1 102.9 114085 112488 101.4 100.2 
8 124448 119571 104.1 102.8 103807 102212 101.8 100.4 
7 112835 108430 104.1 102.8 88885 85688 101.3 100.1 
Iter 142858 137230 104.1 102.9 114482 113031 101.3 100.1 
8bil 135886 130544 104.1 102.9 110372 108688 101.5 100.3 
8 127202 122214 104.1 102.8 105287 103884 101.5 100.3 
7 112835 108430 104.1 102.8 98084 84738 101.4 100.2 
6 102816 98859 104.0 102.8 88688 88523 101.3 100.1 
4 97578 93793 104.0 102.8 86336 85045 101.5 100.3 
7auater 116706 112143 104.1 102.8 88734 87364 101.4 100.2 
7 112151 107774 104.1 102.8 85700 84503 101.3 100.1' 
., 8 104865 100784 104.0 102.8 80901 88782 101.2 100.0 
5 100786 96851 104.0 102.8 88081 88948 101.3 100.1 
4 95301 91808 104.0 102.8 84542 83281 101.5 100.3 
3 87788 84388 104.0 102.8 78042 77838 101.8 100.6 
2 81637 78501 104.0 102.8 74352 73038 101.8 100.8 
Eurostat 
41 
.... 
Luxembo.urg 
1.3.0 
Cat. 
1n 
A 
a 
c 
D 
Total 
1.3.E 
Cet. 
111 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Totel 
42 
Total emoluments in central government in 1995 (in thousands) 
Grou Net 
....... Populetlon Semple ~tlon 
Velue 
121 
25908 
37836 
7881 
4483 
7&888 
1111 
121 
218378 
164888 
117309 
98794 
180284 
" 
Velue 
" 
Velue 
" 
Velue 
(3) r•1 I& I Ill 171 JJJ 
34.1 25808 34.1 18872 31.3 18871 
48.8 37835 48.8 30091 50.6 30091 
10.4 7881 10.4 881·7 11.4 8817 
6.9 4483 5.9 4013 8.7 4012 
100.0 76897 100.0 61684 100.0 &1611 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official in the 
central government 
Price index = 101.2 
Grou Net 
1116 Nominal Reel 1118 111& NOIIINI 
Index Index lndu 
(3) (4] 161 111 171 111 
210840 104.1 102.9 163989 161804 101.4 
148766 104.1 102.9 120628 118938 101.3 
112733 104.1 102.8 98784 97391 101.4 
94959 104.0 102.8 88819 85383 101.4 
" Ill 
31.3 
50.& 
11.4 
8.7 
100.0 
RHI 
lnclu 
(IJ 
100.2 
100.1 
100.2 
100.2 
163162 104.1 102.1 122648 120871 101.4 ,~;~\1l~~~~liY!~~:=::::;j:\ll 
Eurostat 
1.3.A 1 
1.3.A2 
The Netherlands 
Central government personnel in the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
cat. Gr .. Statf1111 
111 121 m 
A 18 100 
17 272 
16 5«) 
15 1124 
14 2785 
13 3485 
12 5811 
11 10480 
B 10 7. 
8 12113 
8 8044 
7 18457 
6 10554 
c 5 13755 
4 7179 
3 1827 
D 3 1827 
2 385 
1 109 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Popul•tion Ratio 
C.n••l•dnmn.••tion S•mpleiPopulation 
C•t. Numbere % Numbere % % 
[11 (21 [31 [41 151 [8) 
A 24707 23.2 24707 23.2 100.0 
B 56652 53.2 56652 53.2 100.0 
c 22761 21.4 22761 21.4 100.0 
D 2331 2.2 2331 2.2 100.0 
Total 106461 100.0 106451 100.0 100.0 
Eurostat !I 43 
.. 
) ', 
... 
The Netherlands 
1.3.81. 1 
cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.81 .2 
Cat. 
(1J 
A 
B 
c 
D 
44 
Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Unmarried official 
Gro. Net 
Qra• Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(21 131 I•J (5) (6] 171 
18 136801 0 182046 74319 0 
17 124367 0 165497 89535 0 
18 114815 0 150472 85784 0 
15 105618 0 138801 82332 0 
14 97246 0 124387 58488 0 
13 92546 0 113086 58228 0 
12 80633 0 104108 50125 0 
11 86363 0 91348 43209 0 
10 49281 0 78133 34471 0 
9 51624 0 71258 35854 0 
8 46898 0 62965 33064 0 
7 41000 0 55595 29584 0 
6 36296 0 50400 26807 0 
5 34053 0 48109 25484 0 
4 32883 0 45752 24794 0 
3 32244 0 43409 24420 0 
3· 32244 0 43409 24420 0 
2 31617 0 39763 24052 0 
1 31001 0 38298 23892 0 
Yearly rates of pay of central government -personnel In 1 996 
Married official with two . children 
Grou Net. 
••• Min • Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 121 131 (4) (6) 181 171 
18 136801 0 182048 82405 0 
17 124367 0 185497 77821 0 
16 114815 0 150472 73889 0 
15 105818 0 138801 89898 0 
14 97246 0 124387 85872 0 
13 92546 0 113086 83612 0 
12 80633 0 104108 57510 0 
11 86363 0 91348 50594 0 
10 49281 0 78133 40981 0 
9 51824 0 71258 42384 0 
8 48898 0 82985 39574 0 
7 41000 0 55595 38094 0 
6 38296 0 50400 33317 0 
5 ·a4053 0 ·48109 31994 0 
4 32883 0 45752 31304 0 
3 32244 0 43409 30930 0 
3 32244 0 43409 30930 0 
2 31817 0 39783 30583 0 
1 31001 0 38296 30202 0 
Eurostat 
Max. 
(8) 
91728 
85359 
79579 
74319 
89535 
. 85188 
61741 
55850 
48802 
45520 
41604 
38125 
3$131 
33779 
32388 
31005 
31005 
28854 
28807 
Max. 
(8) 
99811 
93445 
87884 
82405 
77821 
73273 
89172 
83031 
11188 
52805 
48990 
44707 
41841 
40288 
38888 
37515 
37511 
35384 
33317 
1.3.82.1 
c.t. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1.3.82.2 
c.t. 
(11 
A 
B 
c 
D 
The Netherlands 
Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1995 
Unmarried official 
Groa Net 
••• Min • Avg. M•x. Min. Ayt. (21 (31 141 151 (81 (71 
18 136500 0 181635 72937 0 
17 124097 0 165132 88156 0 
18 114358 0 150131 84401 0 
15 105375 0 136500 80398 0 
14 97032 0 124097 67842 0 
13 82345 0 112817 65384 0 
12 80451 0 103887 49222 0 
11 66220 0 91144 42278 0 
10 49169 0 77957 33901 0 
9 51506 0 71103 35266 0 
8 46793 0 82825 32513 0 
7 40904 0 55475 29072 0 
6 36194 0 50292 26320 0 
5 33968 0 48007 25020 0 
4 32795 0 45657 24334 0 
3 32141 0 43307 23953 0 
3 32141 0 43307 23953 0 
2 31525 0 39677 23592 0 
1 30908 0 36194 23232 0 
Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1995 
Married official with two children 
Groa Net 
Gr•de Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. 
121 131 141 ~~ j_8) _l7J 
18 136500 0 181835 80375 0 
17 124097 0 186132 76593 0 
16 114358. 0 150131 71838 0 
15 105375 0 138500 88376 0 
14 97032 0 124097 84472 0 
13 92345 0 112817 82214 0 
12 80451 0 103887 68062 0 
11 66220 0 81144 48108 0 
10 49169 0 77957 39981 0 
8 51506 0 71103 41348 0 
8 48793 0 82826 38592 0 
7 40904 0 65476 36162 0 
8 38194 0 50292 32400 0 
5 ..23H8 0 . ·48007 31098 0 
4 32795 0 45857 30414 0 
3 32141 0 43307 30033 0 
3 32141 0 43307 30033 0 
2 31525 0 39877 29872 0 
1 30908 0 . 38194 29312 0 
M•x. 
(81 
80338 
83978 
78182 
72837 
88168 
83807 
80384 
54805 
47879 
44588 
40688 
37244 
34557 
33222 
31849 
30478 
30478 
28355 
26320 
Mu. 
(I) 
87776 
81413 
85830 
80376 
76593 
71244 
87778 
81835 
54708 
61398 
47618 
43886 
40837 
31302 
37929 
38&&8 
386&8 
'3443& 
32400 
Eurostat /4 45 
~ . 
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The Netherlands 
1.3.C. 
Cat. 
111 
A 
8 
c 
D 
1.3.0 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official in central 
government. Price index = 101.8 
Graa Net 
Salery Index Salary .... 
Grade 1188 199& nomln. real 1818 189& nomin. real 
(21 (3] (41 [61 181 (7) 181 (I] (10] 
18 159424 159088 100.2 98.5 87085 85358 102.0 100.2 
17 144932 144815 100.2 98.4 81490 79785 102.1 100.3 
16 132544 132245 100.2 18.5 78724 75015 102.3 100.5 
16 121210 120138 100.2 18.6 72231 70521 102.4 100.8 
14 110807 110585 100.2 18.4 17871 18488 102.1 100.3 
13 102808 102581 100.2 18.4 84&78 83182 102.2 100.4 
12 92371 92189 100.2 88.4 58837 58364 102.2 100.4 
11 78858 78882 100.2 88.4 53122 51857 102.2 100.4 
10 83707 83583 100.2 88.5 45111 44118 102.3 100.4 
9 81441 81305 100.2 98.5 44181 43144 102.4 100.5 
8 54932 54809 100.2 98.5 40808 39828 102.5 100.8 
7 48298 48190 100.2 98.5 37128 38283 102.3 100.5 
6 43348 43243 100.2 88.5 34224 33479 102.2 100.4 
5 41081 40988 100.2 88.5 32887 32181 102.3 100.4 
4 39318 39228 100.2 88.6 31848 31132 102.3 100.6 
3 37827 37724 100.3 88.5' 30988 30255 102.4 100.5 
3 37827 37724 100.3 98.6 30818 30255 102.4 100.& 
2 35890 35801 100.2 88.& 28708 29014 102.4 100.8 
1 33849 33551 100.3 88.5 28505 27818 102.5 100.7 
Total emoluments in central government in 1996 (in thousands) 
Gra.e Net 
8a""la Population Sample Population 
Cat. ·Value 
(1] (2] 
A 2298429 
B 3004991 
c 914308 
D 88841 
Total 8304388 
1.3.E 
Cat. 1888 
111 (2) 
A 83232 
B &3183 
c 40284 
D 37288 
Total &13&7 
·46 
% Value % Value 
" 
Value 
(3) (41 161 18] (7) (81 
36.5 2298428 38.5 1445302 32.8 1445302 
47.7 3004990 47 .. 7 2198159 49.5 2118151 
14.5 914308 14.5 721139 16.3 721139 
1.4 88841 1.4 89787 1.8 89787 
100.0 8304387 100.0 4432387 100.0 4432387 
Changes In average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government. Price index = 101 .8 
Gra.e Net 
1196 Nominal Real 1188 1896 Nominal 
Index Index Index 
(3) 141 161 181 171 rat 
83027 100.2 18.4 59789 58488 102.2 
53043 100.2 98.5 39888 38788 102.3 
40170 100.2 88.5 32404 31883 102.3 
37169 100.3 98.5 30839 28830 102.4 
" Ill 32.8 
48.& 
18.3 
1.8 
100.0 
... 
Index 
Ill 
100.4 
100.5 
100.5 
100.1 
68223 100.2 98.6 42&D 41838 102.3 :~jj)j\~~;;~1;~]~10§;!;::::\~;\~~: 
Eurostat 
L. 
1.3.A1 
1.3.A2 
Austria 
Central government personnel in the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
Cat. Grade Staff 1881 
11l 121 (3) 
A A1/8 u.9 76 
A1/6 u.7 401 
A1/4u.5 865 
A1/2u.3 1620 
A1/G u.1 89 
B A2/7u.8 106 
A215u.6 872 
A213u.4 980 
A2/G 1 u.2 237 
c A3f7u.8 18 
A315u.6 93 
A313u.4 452 
A3/G 12 A412 12n 
0 A4/G u.1 A5 1059 
A6A7 387 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Central adminietratlon Sample/Population 
Cat. NumbeN 
" 
NumbeN 
" " [1) (2] [3) [4) [6) (6) 
A 3051 35.8 3051 35.8 100.0 
B 2195 25.7 2195 25.7 100.0 
c 1840 21.6 1840 21.6 100.0 
0 1446 16.9 1446 16.9 100.0 
Total 8532 100.0 8532 100.0 100.0 
Eurostat 
,, 
, . 
........ 
.. 
• 
Austria 
1.3.81.1 
Cat. 
[1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Unmarried official 
Groe• Net 
Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
[2) (3) [4) [5) [6) (7] 
A1/8 u.9 0 952796 0 0 627512 
A1/6 u.7 0 598644 0 0 444973 
A1/4 u.S 0 472928 0 0 316200 
A 1/2 u.3 0 322307 0 0 235247 
A1/G u.1 0 375594 0 0 274184 
A2n u.S 0 338564 0 0 247253 
A215 u.8 0 278898 0 0 203707 
A2/3 u.4 0 293608 0 0 21445.1 
A2/G.1 u.2 0 272070 0 0 198720 
A3n u.S 0 0 0 0 0 
A315 u.6 0 260748 0 0 190554 
A3/3 u.4 0 241733 0 0 17S617 
A3/G.1 2. A4/2 0 228018 0 0 171219 
A4/G u.1.A5 0 213252 0 0 160174 
A6,A7 0 202513 0 0 152432 
1.3.81.2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Married official with two children 
Groa• Net 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(1) (2) [3) [4) 15) [6) [7) 
A A1/Su.9 0 1082822 0 0 755996 
A1/8 u.7 0 833203 0 0 589991 
A1/4 u.S 0 6S7770 0 0 48S211 
A1/2 u.3 0 495140 0 0 331248 
A1/G u.1 0 484142 0 0 359766 
B A2n u.S 0 416348 or 0 303976 
A215 u.6 0 359030 0 0 26212S 
A2/3 u.4 0 33S320 0 0 247041 
A2/G.1 u.2 0 286018 0 0 20S036 
c A3n u.S 0 346329 0 0 253028 
A315 u.6 0 283802 0 0 207403 
A3/3 u.4 0 251286 0 0 1S8213 
A3/G,, .2, A4/2 0 243715 0 0 182518 
D A4/G u.1,A5 0 226134 0 0 170346 
A6,A7 0 199747 0 0 150629 
Eurostat 
!• 
Max. 
(8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max. 
(8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Austria 
1.3.82.1 
Cat. 
(1] 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1995 
Unmarried official 
Grose Net 
Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(2] (3] (4] (6] (6] (7) 
A1/S u.9 0 946796 0 0 623660 
A1/6u.7 0 692644 0 0 440613 
A1/4 u.S 0 46692S 0 0 3121SS 
A1/2 u.3 0 316307 0 0 23096S 
A1/G u.1 0 369694 0 0 269S04 
A2n u.S 0 332664 0 0 242S71 
A2/6 u.8 0 272S9S 0 0 199326 
A2/3 u.4 0 278614 0 0 201966 
A2/G.1 u.2 0 2341S6 0 0 171049 
A3n u.S 0 0 0 0 0 
A3/6 u.6 0 236312 0 0 172697 
A3/3 u.4 0 233201 0 0 172312 
A3/G 1.2. A4/2 0 209621 0 0 167330 
A4/G u.1.A6 0 1SS2SS 0 0 141423 
A6,A7 0 1S2168 0 0 137118 
1.3.82.2 Yearly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1995 
Married official with two children 
Groea Net 
Cat. Grede Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(1] (2] (3] (4) (6] (6] (7] 
A A1/S u.9 0 1076622 0 0 751S06 
A1/6u.7 0 S27203 0 0 6S5742 
A1/4 u.S 0 6S1770 0 0 483S52 
A1/2 u.3 0 489140 0 0 327234 
A1/G u.1 0 47S142 0 0 365307 
B A2n u.S 0 410348 0 0 299695 
A216 u.8 0 363030 0 0 267747 
A2/3 u.4 0 328266 0 0 239692 
A2/G.1 u.2 0 293072 0 0 214089 
c A3n u.S 0 309576 0 0 226175 
A3/6 u.6 0 269165 0 0 1S9397 
A3/3 u.4 0 254972 0 0 1S8960 
A3/G. 1,2, A4/2 0 240176 0 0 179867 
0 A4/G u.1.A6 0 222554 0 0 167650 
A6,A7 0 1S9563 0 0 142942 
Eurostat 
Max. 
(8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0' 
0 
0 
Max. 
[8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
... 
-, I 
.•. 
Austria 
1.3.C. 
Cat. 
11 J 
A 
B 
c 
0 
1.3.0 
Cat. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Total 
1.3.E 
Cat. 
11 J 
A 
B 
c 
0 
Total 
A1/S u.9 
A1/6 u.7 
A1/4 u.S 
A1/2 u.3 
A1/G u.1 
A2n u.S 
A215 u.6 
A2/3 u.4 
A2/G.1 u.2 
A3n u.S 
A3/5 u.6 
A3/3 u.4 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official in central 
government 
Price index = 101.6 
Groa Net 
Salary Index Salary Index 
Grade 1998 1996 nomln. real 1988 1986 nornln. real 
(2) l3J 141 16) [8) (7) (8) (8) (10) 
1017709 1011709 100.6 99.0 691754 6S78'S3 100.8 89.0 
715924 709924 100.S 99.3 5174S2 51312S 100.S 99.3 
SS0349 . 574349 101.0 99.5 402206 39S020 101.1 99.5 
40S724 402724 101.5 99.9 28324S 278101 101.5 99.9 
429S6S 423868 101.4 99.S 316975 312556 101.4 99.S 
377456 371456 101.6 100.0 275615 271233 101.6 100.0 
31S964 312964 101.9 100.3 232918 228536 101.9 100.3 
315964 3023S5 104.5 102.8 230746 220S29 104.5 102.8 
279044 263629 105.S 104.2 20337S 192568 105.6 103.9 
173165 1547SS 111.9 110.1 126514 113088 111.9 110.1 
272275 247739 109.9 108.2 198979 1S1047 109.9 10S.2 
246510 2440S7 101.0 99.4 1S2415 1S0636 101.0 99.4 
A3/G,1,2, A4/2 235S67 224S49 104.9 103.2 176S69 16S599 104.9 103.3 
A4/G u.1,AS 219693 205421 106.9 105.3 165260 154537 106.9 106.3 
A6,A7 201130 185860 108.2 106.5 151631 140029 108.2 106.5 
Total emoluments in central government in 1995 (in thousands) 
Gra.a Net 
Sample Population Sample Population 
Value 
(2) 
1548517 
671096 
4232SS 
2S946S 
2932367 
1996 
(2) 
513544 
316139 
23970S 
214725 
363069 
" 
Value 
" 
Value 
" 
Value 
(3) (4) {6) (6) (7) {8) 
52.S 154S517' 52.S 1082276 51.4' 10S2276 
22.9 671096 22.9 490085 23.3 490085 
14.4 4232S4 14.4 315S21 15.0 315820 
9.9 289468 9.9 217845 10.3 217S45 
100.0 2932366 100.0 2106028 100.0 2106026 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official In the 
central government 
Price index = 101.6 
Gra.a Net 
1995 Nominal Real 1996 1996 Nominal 
Index Index Index 
(3) (4) (6) {6) (71 (8) 
507544 101.2 99.6 35S919 354728 101.2 
305739 103.4 101.S 230820 223274 103.4 
230046 104.2 102.6 17SS58 171142 ·104.2 
2001S6 107.3 105.6 1615S6 150654 107.3 
" (9) 
51.4 
23.3 
15.0 
10.3 
100.0 
Real 
Index 
(9) 
99.6 
101.8 
102.6 
105.6 
343690 102.7 101.1 253887 248839 102.8 =~il1i~[1!!=:~~i!i!l!!ll\~::i:!llll: 
Eurostat 
~~ 
'• 
....... 
~--· 
1.3.A1 
1.3.A2 
Portugal 
. 
Central government personnel in the sample broken down by category 
and by _grade 
cat. Grade 
111 121 
A Director..geral 
Director de NVi(:oe 
Chefe de dlvislo 
Tecnico auDerior 11 claae 
Tecnico de 11 C1n1e 
T ecnico de 2a cllsse 
B T ecnico adl. 8SD8Cilliatll 
Tecnico adjunto princiDBI 
Technlco auxililr principal 
T ecnico adlunto 11 cllue 
Tecnico auxililr 11 cllue 
T ecnico 1uxililr 2a clale 
C Chefe de Secclo 
Prirneiro oficill 
Segundo oficial 
T erce1ro oficill 
0 ODerlrio QUIIIf. IH'ineiPII 
0Derario semlauallficado 
Auxililr admlnistnltivo 
Serwnte 
Statf1111 
131 
85 
418 
590 
512 
1195 
2450 
417 
1180 
1298 
515 
640 
1081 
281 
·1555 
1301 
595 
1471 
1995 
1798 
145 
152 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
C.nvalad~ation SampleiPopulatlon 
Cat. Numbere % Numbere % .. 
(1) 121 (3} r4J (6) 18) 
A 10249 35.5 13488 33.1 78.0 
B 5373 18.8 5985 14.7 89.8 
c 5859 20.3 8979 22.0 85.3 
D 7381 25.5 12334 30.2 59.7 
Total 28842 100.0 40784 100.0 70.7 
Eurostat 
/4 51 
... 
! 
,. 
Portugal 
1.3.81. 1 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 996 
Unmarried official 
Gron Nat 
Cet. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. Max. 
(1) 121 (3) (41 161 (8) 171 181 
A Director-aaral 674225 0 674225 421747 0 421747 
Director de aevico• 541691 0 541891 349814 0 349614 
Chafe de divitlo 475308 0 475308 311378 0 311378 
Atee110r 376958 0 450108 254730 0 296862 
T ecnico IUPerior orincioal 315941 0 401341 221553 0 268774 
Tecnico IUPerior 1a classe 279425 0 337291 201901 0 233043 
Tecnico principal 242791 0 294591 181239 0. 210063 
Tecnico suDerior 2a classe 242791 0 282458 181239 0 203533 
Tecnico de 1a classe 206275 0 258075 157953 0 190410 
T ecnico de 2e classe 172675 0 206275 136527 0 157953 
B T ecnico adJ. especialista 175708 0 200091 138462 0 154010 
T acnioo adiunto principal 154358 0 187958 124847 0 146273 
T echnico auxiliar principal 145258 0 175708 119044 0 138482 
T ecnico adiunto 1a classe 136158 0 169641 112796 0 134593 
T eonico euxlliar 1a classe 133125 0 163575 110560 0 130724• 
T ecnioo auxiliar 2a clatse 120875 0 148291 101530 0 120979 
c Chafe de Seoclo 194025 0 224475 150142 0 189658 
Primairo ofioial 145258 0 175708 118044 0 138482 
Seaundo oficial 133125 0 183576 110580 0 130724 
T aroeiro ofioial 120875 0 148291 101530 0 120978 
D 0Parario aualif. Principal 120875 0 148281 101530 0 120978 
Qparario aamiauallficado 84358 0 138158 74810 0 112798 
Auxiliar administrative 78175 0 133125 70052 0 110580 
Servants 75725 0 114808 88384 0 97057 
1.3.81 .2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Married official with two children 
Grou Nat 
Cat. Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. Max. 
[1) (2} 131 (4) (61 (8] (7) (8) 
A Director-aaral 879825 0 879825 480801 0 480801 
Director de savicos 547091 0 547091 385518 0 385518 
Chafe de dlvislo · 480708 0 480708 347811 0 347811 
Assessor 382358 0 455508 284902 0 333107 
Teonico IUParior orincioal 321341 0 408741 246134 0 300870 
T acnioo suPerior 1a clatse 284825 0 342891 223011 0 268529 
T eonioo Drincioal 248181 0 298881 199814 0 232855 
Teonico suPerior 2a cletse 248191 0 287858 189964 0 224988 
Tecnioo de 1a clesse 211875 0 283475 174780 0 209802 
Tecnico da 2a clesse 178075 0 211875 150119 0 174780 
B Tacnico adJ. e8Decialiste 181108 0 205411 152344 0 170225 
Tecnico adiunto princiPal 169768 0 193358 138887 0 181327 
Technico auxiliar principal 150658 0 181108 130013 0 152344 
T ecnico adiuntc 1a classe 141558 0 175041 123340 0 147815 
Tecnico auxiliar 1 e cluae 138525 0 188976 121115 0 143448 
Tecnico auxilier 2a classe 128275 0 153891 112131 0 132238 
c Chafe de Secclo 199425 0 229875 186778 0 188107 
Primeiro ofioial 150858 0 181108 130013 0 152344 
Seaundo oficial 138525 0 188975 121115 0 143448 
Terceiro oficial 128275 0 153891 112131 0 132238 
D Operario auelif. principal 128275 0 153891 112131 0 132238 
Operario semiaualificado 89758 0 141558 81437 0 123340 
Auxiliar administrativo 83576 0 138525 75958 0 121115 
Servente 81125 0 120208 73784 0 107882 
Eurostat 
Portugal 
t3.B2.1 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 995 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
Cat. ..... Min. Ayg. Mu. Min. Ayg. Mu • 
(11 (21 (31 l41 J51 (8) (7j (81 
A Director-a.NI 646670 0 641670 404700 0 404700 
Director de tevioM 519386 0 518386 335277 0 335277 
Chefe de divitio 455803 0 455803 298654 0 298654 
A•••••or 361448 0 431525 244306 0 284870 
T acnico euperior principal 302876 0 384807 212284 0 267781 
T ecnico auoerior 1e ciHee 287781 0 "323388 193398 0 223323 
Tecnico orincipal 232802 0 282483 173885 0 201301 
T acnico euperior 2e cle11e 232802 0 270744 173865 0 194891 
T ecnico de 1e cl•••• 197706 0 247387 151286 0 182421 
T acnico de 2e cluee 165457 0 197706 130721 0 151288 
a T acnioo adj. eep_ecieliste 168420 0 191779 132811 0 147506 
T ecnioo ediunto orincioel 147908 0 180157 119630 0 140095 
T achnico euxilier principal 141855 0 170940 116643 0 134218 
Tecnico adiunto 1e cia•• 130361 0 182810 107839 0 128908 
T acnioo euxillar 1 1 clesse 127326 0 166541 106701 0 125038 
Teonico auxiliar 2a classe 115589 0 141882 97049 0 115875 
c Chafe de Secolo 185967 0 2152&3 143800 0 1824715 
Primelro oflcial 141855 0 170140 115543 0 134218 
Seaundo ofloial 127328 0 158541 105701 0 125038 
Terceiro ofioial 115589 0 141862 87048 0 116875 
D Operario gualif • ..Drincipel 115778 0 142098 97187 0 115826 
Ooererio semiaualiflcedo 80880 0 130312 71315 0 107803 
Auxilier administrative 74870 0 127512 87032 0 105831 
Servante 72441 0 109881 85406 0 92804 
1.3.82.2 Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1995 
Married official with two children 
Grou Net 
Cat. Grede Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. Mu. 
[1) (2] (3] (4] (6] (6) (7] (8] 
A Direotor-aerel 851i30 0 851830 438837 0 438837 
Director de sevioos 524548 0 524548 385803 0 365803 
Chafe de divislo 480983 0 480983 332773 0 332773 
Assessor 386808 0 438886 271168 0 318431 
· Tecnioo superior principal 308038 0 381187 234118 0 288411 
T aonico eYPerior 1 • classa 272141 0 328641 212278 0 247010 
T acnioo orinoipel 237962 0 287843 110431 0 221481 
T acnico euperior 2a cl•••• 237882 0 27&904 110431 0 214121 
Tecnico de 1 • claese 202888 0 252547 188848 0 181541 
T eonioo de 2a ol•••• 170817 0 202888 143321 0 188841 
a T ecnico edi. especieliste 173580 0 188139 145490 0 182628 
Tecnioo ad.iutlto.principel .163068 0 ~86317 130580 0 164060 
Technioo euxilier orincioal 148815 0 178100 126988 0 147328 
Tecnioo .::liunto 1a ciHse 135521 0 187770 117733 0 141263 
T aonico auxilier 1e clatse 132486 0 161701 115519 0 138828 
T acnico euxiliar 2a cletae 120741 0 147022 106961 0 128121 
c Chafe de SeQoJo 191127 0 220413 158287 0 171470 
Primeiro oflcial 146815 0 176100 125161 0 147328 
Seaundo ofioiel 132486 0 181701 116611 0 138828 
T aroeiro oficiel 120749 0 147022 108868 0 128121 
D Ooerario auelif. orincioel 120936 0 147258 107016 0 128293 
ODererio temiaualificado 85840 0 135472 77888 0 117817 
Auxilier adminittrativo 80030 0 132672 72718 0 115855 
Servente 77601 0 116128 70566 0 102858 
Eurostat /1 53 
or· 
l 
,. 
Portugal 
1.3.C. Changes in average remuneration by grade of official in central 
government Price index = 103.6 
GroM Net 
• 
.... ry Index 8elery Index 
cat. Grade 1888 1991 no min. reel 1998 189& nomln. reel 
111 (2) (3) 141 (51 (8] (71 (8] [8) J101 
A Direotor-ae_rel 676926 649260 104.3 100.6 441274 420769 104.9 101.2 
Director de ••vicoe 544391 621966 104.3 100.7 367567 360440 104.9 101.2 
Chafe de divieio 478008 468383 104.3 100.7 329596 315714 104.4 100.8 
A•••••or 416233 399067 104.3 100.7 292400 279141 104.7 101.1 
T ecnioo euperior ~trinc~el 361341 . "346422 104.3 100.7 258368 247664 104.7 101.1 
T eonico euDerior 1e claeee 311068 298166 104.3 100.7 229389 ·219002 104.7 101.1 
Tecnico Drincipel 271391 260223 104.3 100.7 206978 196716 104.7 101.1 
T ecnico eupttrior 2e cleeee 265325 254353 104.3 100.7 202431 193304 104.7 101.1 
T ecnioo de 1a oleeee 234875 225127 104.3 100.7 183181 176024 104.7 101.0 
T eonico de 2e oleeee 192176 184162 104.4 100.7 154840 148046 104.6 101.0 
B Tecnico edi. eepeciellete 190600 182680 104.3 100.7 163760 147033 104.8 100.9 
T ecnioo ad junto principal 173858 166613 104.3 100.7 142284 136061 104.6 100.9 
Technico euxilier llrinci_pel 163183 168878 102.7 89.1 134966 130765 103.2 98.6 
T ecnico ed_N_nto 1e cleeee 156600 149066 104.4 100.8 128666 123968 104.6 101.0 
T eonico euxilier 1e cleeee 161060 144614 104.5 100.9 126481 120771 104.7 101.1 
Tecnico euxiliar 2e cleeee · 137283 131306 104.6 100.8 116720 111451 104.7 101.1 
c Chafe de Secolo 211950 203180 104.3 100.7 188395 161008 104.8 101.0 
Primeiro oficlel 163183 158878 102.7 98.1 134866 130785 103.2 89.6 
Seaundo ofiolel 151050 144514 104.5 100.8 126461 120771 104.7 101.1 
T erceiro oficiel 137283 131308 104.8 100.8 118720 111451 104.7 101.1 
D ODererio auelif. DrinciDel 137283 131517 104.4 100.8 118720 111600 104.8 101.0 
0Dererio eerniauallficedo 112968 108076 104.5 100.8 88048 93696 104.8 101.0 
Auxilier edrninietrltivo ' 108350 103771 104.4 100.8 94421 90311 104.8 100.8 
Servente 97987 93784 104.5 100.8 86727 82933 104.8 100.8 
1.3.0 Total emoluments in central government In 1995 (in thousands) 
Grou Net 
Sample Population Sample Population 
Cat. Value 
" 
Value 
" 
Value 
" 
Value 
" m 121 (31 141 16). 181 J7] (8) (8) A 3014263 66.1 3966276 62.9 2214880 51.7 2914154 49.4 
B 809893 14.8 802141 12.0 671779 15.7 748296 12.7 
c 878998 16.1 1347077 18.0 729480 17.0 1117938 19.0 
D 765889 14.0 1283314 17.1 886428 15.8 1118854 18.8 
Total &489044 100.0 7498807 100.0 4282388 100.0 6887042 100.0 
1.3.E Changes in average remunerations by category of official in the 
central government Price index =. 103.6 
Groa Net 
Cat. 1898 1886 No,.....l ..... 1988 199& Nominal Real 
Index Index Indo .... a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (8) [7) (81 (8) 
A 308791 294103 104.3 100.7 228227 216087 104.7 101.1 
B 158903 150734 104.1 100.5 130482 125029 104.4 100.7 
c 1·58066 150025 104.0 100.4 129885 124606 10 •• 3 100.7 
D 108841 104047 104.4 100.8 94858 90636 104.8 100.1 
Total 181884 183888 104.3 100.8 161172 144682 104.8 ::;~~lj\~~~:j:j~~:1,!l~1jlll!!ili 
Eurostat 
·54 
1.3.A1 
1.3.A2 
Finland 
Central government personnel in the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
cat. Grade 8tatf1111 
111 121 l3l 
A A2B 153 
ATT 191 
A26 241 
AZ 277 
A24 323 
AZl 254 
A22 185 
B A20 78 
A19 87 
A18 135 
A17 138 
A16 140 
A15 108 
c A15 80 
A14 210 
A13 241 
A12 131 
D A13 33 
A12 418 
A11 42 
A10 41 
A09 27 
A08 26 
Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Can•aladnnn.•ation Sample/Population 
Cat. NumbeN % NumbaN % % 
(1) (21 (31 (41 (61 f61 
A 1624 50.9 '1950 52.0 83.3 
B 185 21.5 745 18.1 11.8 
c 182 20.8 798 21.2 83.2 
D 217 8.8 257 8.8 84.4 
Totel 3188 100.0 3748 100.0 85.1 
Eurostat 
r 
Finland 
1.3.81.1 
Cat. 
(1) 
A A28 
A27 
A26 
A26 
A24 
A23 
A22 
8 A20 
A19 
A18 
A17 
A16 
A16 
c A15 
A14 
A13 
A12 
D A13 
A12 
A11 
A10 
A09 
A08 
1.3.81 .2 
Cat. 
(1) 
A A28 
A27 
A28 
A25 
A24 
A23 
A22 
a A20 
A11 
A18 
A17 
A18 
A15 
c A16 
A14 
A13 
A12 
D A13 
A12 
A11 
A10 
AOI 
A08 
S6 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 996 
Unmarried official 
GrOH Net 
Gr•• Min. Avg. Mu. Min. Avg. 
tU [3) [4) (6} (6) (71 
18391 0 23488 10279 0 
16759 0 21403 9623 0 
15255 0 19482 9019 0 
13990 0 17867 8471 0 
13011 0 16619 8013 0 
12189 0 15666 7621 0 
11681 0 14791 7331 0 
9768 0 12474 6468 0 
9257 0 11823 6218 0 
8770 0 11200 6960 0 
8322 0 10626 5721 0 
7960 0 10166 5529 0 
7658 0 9780 6368 0 
7658 0 9780 5368 0 
7431 0 9492 6246 0 
7232 0 9238 6138 0 
7076 0 9039 6052 0 
7232 0 9238 6138 0 
7076 0 9039 6062 0 
6917 0 8833 . 4985 0 
8775 0 8852 4888 0 
8860 0 8507 4822 0 
8538 0 8350 4750 0 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 996 
Married official with two children 
GrOH Net 
Gra• Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
[2) (3) [4) [6) [6) (7] 
19881 0 24778 11689 0 
18049 0 22813 10913 0 
18545 0 20772 10309 0 
15280 0 11167 9781 0 
14301 0 17909 9303 0 
13479 0 18868 8911 0 
12871 0 18081 8821 0 
11058 0 13784 7768 0 
10547 0 13113 7508 0 
10010 0 12490 7250 0 
9812 0 11918 7011 0 
9250 0 11458 8819 0 
8948 0 11070 8858 0 
8948 0 11070 8858 0 
8721 0 10782 8538 0 
8522 0 10528 8428 0 
8386 0 10329 8342 0 
8522 0 10528 8428 0 
8388 0 10329 8342 0 
8207 0 10123 8255 0 
8085 0 9942 8178 0 
7950 0 1787 8112 0 
7828 0 9840 8040 0 
Eurostat 
Max. 
(8} 
12327 
11489 
10717 
10068 
9667 
9144 
8833 r 
7757 
7446 
7149 
6876 
6656 
6474 
6474 
6339 
6208 
6103 
6208 
6103 
5994 
5897 
5820 
5738 
Max. 
[81 
13817 
12779 
12007 
11351 
10857 
10434 
10123 
9047 
8738 
8439 
8185 
7946 
7784 
7784 
..l.. 
7829 
7498 
7393 
7498 
7393 
7284 
7187 
7110 
7028 
1.3.82.1 
Cat. 
(1) 
A A28 
A27 
A26 
A25 
A24 
A23 
A22 
B A20 
A19 
A18 
A17 
A16 
A15 
c A15 
A14 
A13 
A12 
D A13 
A12 
A11 
A10 
A09 
A08 
1.3.82.2 
'Cat. 
(1) 
A A28 
A27 
A26 
A25 
A24 
A23 
A22 
B A20 
A19 
A18 
A17 
A16 
A15 
c A15 
A14 
A13 
A12 
D A13 
A12 
A11 
A10 
A09 
A08 
Finland 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1 995 
Unmarried official 
Grou Net 
Grade Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
121 131 (4) (5) 161 (71 
17886 0 22845 9892 0 
16300 0 20818 9270 0 
14836 0 18948 8697 0 
13605 0 17375 8167 0 
12655 0 18181 7724 0 
11855 0 15141 7351 0 
11265 0 14386 7075 0 
9469 0 12094 6245 0 
8963 0 11445 5990 0 
8480 0 10830 5738 0 
8038 0 10265 5507 0 
7679 0 9807 5320 0 
7380 0 9425 5162 0 
7380 0 9425 5162 0 
7154 0 9138 5040 0 
6959 0 8888 4934 0 
8803 0 8690 4850 0 
8959 0 8888 4934 0 
8803 0 8890 4850 0 
8847 0 8489 4765 0 
8505 0 8306 4682 0 
6393 0 8165 4616 0 
8270 .o 8008 4544 0 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1995 
Married official with two children 
Gro.a Net 
Grade Min: Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(2) (31 (4) (6) 181 C7J 
19176 0 241315 11182 0 
17590 0 22108 10560 0 
16126 0 20238 9987 0 
14895 0 186615 9457 0 
13945 0 17451 8014 0 
13145 0 16431 8841 0 
125155 0 15676 8365 0 
10759 0 13384 75315 0 
10253 0 12735 7280 0 
~770 0 12120 7028 0 
9328 0 115155 6797 0 
8969 0 11097 8810 0 
8670 0 10715 84152 0 
8670 0 10715 8452 0 
8444 0 10428 6330 0 
8249 0 10178 8224 0 
8093 0 9980 6140 0 
8249 0 10178 8224 0 
• 8093 0 9980 8140 0 
7937 0 9779 8055 0 
. 7795 0 9598 5972 0 
7883 0 941515 5908 0 
7580 0 9298 5834 0 
Max. 
(8) 
11836 
11042 
10309 
9692 
9216 
8816 
8518 
7470 
7159 
6872 
6807 
8396 
6221 
6221 
6081 
5951 
5848 
15951 
15848 
15743 
15847 
15574 
15492 
Max. 
fiJ 
13126 
12332 
11599 
10982 
10506 
10106 
8808 
8760 
8449 
8182 
'7897 
7888 
7511 
7511 
7371 
7241 
7138 
7241 
7138 
7033 
6937 
8884 
8782 
Eurostat A s1 
... 
..... 
Finland 
1.3.C. 
C.t. 
(11 
A A28 
A27 
A26 
A25 
A24 
A23 
A22 
B A20 
A19 
A18 
A17 
A16 
A15 
c A15 
A14 
A13 
A12 
D A13 
A12 
A11 
A10 
A09 
A08 
1.3.0 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official In central 
government. Price index = 100.4 
Grau Net 
Salary Index a.lary Index 
Grade 1998 1996 nomin. real 1998 1996 nomin. real 
(2) 131 141 151 (81 (7) (8) Ill 1101 
21585 21011 102.7 102.3 11948 11509 103.8 103.4 
19726 19204 102.7 102.3 11201 10801 103.7 103.3 
18014 17537 102.7 102.3 10513 10148 103.6 103.2 
16574 16135 102.7 102.3 9915 9575 103.8 103.1 
154eo 15053 102.7 102.3 9435 9115 103.5 103.1 
14523 14143 102.7 102.3 9028 8729 103.4 103.0 
13831 13471 102.7 102.3 8727 8442 103.4 103.0 
11788 11427 103.0 102.8 7758 7503 103.4 103.0 
11185 10849 103.1 102.7 7477 7220 103.8 103.2 
10630 10300 103.2 102.8 7200 8950 103.8 103.2 
10119 9797 103.3 102.9 6943 8702. 103.8 103.2 
9708 9388 103.4 103.0 8737 8503 103.6 103.2 
9364 9048 103.5 103.1 6566 6337 103.8 103.2 
9364 9048 103.5 103.1 8568 6337 103.6 103.2 
9107 8791 103.6 103.2 6438 6206 103.7 103.3 
8880 8569 103.6 103.2 6318 6088 103.8 103.4 
8703 8392 103.7 103.3 8223 5994 103.8 103.4 
8880 8569 103.8 103.2 6318 6088 103.8 103.4 
8703 8392 103.7 103.3 6223 5994 103.8 103.4 
8520 8213 103.7 103.3 6126 6899 103.8 103.4 
8359 8051 103.8 103.4 6038 6810 103.1 103.6 
8229 7924 103.8 103.4 5966 5740 103.1 103.5 
8089 7784 103.9 103.5 5888 5883 104.0 103.6 
Total emoluments in central government in 1995 (In thousands) 
Grosa Net 
s.mple Population Sample Population 
Cat. Value 
111 (2) 
A 26525 
B 6855 
c 5734 
D 1777 
Total 40891 
1.3.E 
C.t. 1998 
111 (2) 
A 16775 
B 10334 
c 8975 
D 8497 
Total 13271 
.58 
% Value % Value 
" 
Value 
(31 (4) 151 161 (7) (81 
64.9 31849 85.9 15645 61.0 18785 
16.8 7455 15.4 4863 18.2 5070 
14.0 6894 14.3 4062 15.8 4884 
4.3 2104 4.4 1277 5.0 1512 
100.0 48302 100.0 25848 100.0 302&1 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official- In the 
central government. Price index = 100.4 
Grot~• Net 
1996 Nominal Real "1998 1996 NomiMI 
Index. lndax Index 
(31 f41 (6) (6) [7) (8) 
16333 102.7 102.3 9977 9633 103.6 
10008 103.3 102.8 7050 6807 103.8 
8662 103.6 103.2 8387 8137 103.8 
8188 103.8 103.4 6111 5884 103.9 
" (8) 
62.1 
18.8 
16.1 
&.0 
100.0 
... 
Index 
fl) 
103.2 
103.2 
103.3 
103.5 
12888 103.0 102.8 8383 8072 103.8 ·:i1!l11lljiii~:[~~~~li:~[~):;:): 
Eurostat 
,. 
Sweden 
. 
1.3.A1 Central government personnel in the sample broken down by category 
and by grade 
Cat. Gnlde atatl1111 
11] 121 1'31 
A A 15496 
B B 3132 
c c 571-4 
D D 2099 
r 
1.3.A2 Central government personnel, broken down by category 
Sample Population Ratio 
Central admlniatration 8ampleJPopulation 
Cat. NumbaN 
" 
NumbeN 
" " (1) [2) (3) [41 (61 (8) 
A 15496 58.6 15496 58.6 100.0 
B 3132 11.8 3132 11.8 100.0 
c 5714 21.8 5714 21.8 100.0 
D 2099 7.8 2099 7.9 100.0 
Total 28441 100.0 28441 100.0 100.0 
Eurostat 
Sweden 
1.3.81.1 
cat. 
rn 
A A 
B B 
c c 
D D 
1.3.81.2 
c.t. 
[1) 
A A 
B B 
c c 
D D 
1.3.82., 
Cat. 
111 
A A 
B B 
e c 
0 D 
1.3.82.2 
c.t. 
111 
A A 
a· 8 
c c 
D D 
60 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1996 
Unmarried official 
... Net 
... Min • Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
(2) [31 (41 [6) 181 (7) 
0 21801 0 0 13744 
/ 0 18801 0 0 11012 
0 15580 0 0 10384 
0 15271 0 0 10203 
Max. 
181 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1 996 
Married official with two children , 
Qrau Nat 
••• Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg • (2) [3) (4) 1&1 (81 [7) 
0 21808 0 0 13744 
0 18801 0 0 11012 
0 15580 0 '0 10384 
0 15278 0 0 10203 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel in 1995 
Unmarried official 
... Nat 
Gra• Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
121 131 141 1&1 181 171 
0 20151 0 0 13414 
0 15144 0 0 10743 
0 14815 0 0 10038 
0 14477 0 0 8825 
Monthly rates of pay of central government personnel In 1995 
Married official with two children 
... Nat 
... Min • Avg. Max. Min. Avg. 
[2) 131 141 Ill 181 171 
0 20951 0 0 13414 
0 '15944 0 0 10743 
0 14815 0 0 10038 
0 14477 0 0 1825 
Eurostat 
Max. 
[81 
Max. 
181 
Max. 
fiJ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
r 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.3.C. 
Cet. 
.fU 
A A 
B B 
c c 
D D 
1.3.0 
Cet. 
(1) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
1.3.E 
Cat. 
(11 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
Sweden 
Changes in average remuneration by grade of official In central 
government 
Price Index • 100.8 
·-
Net 
.., Index ... M\' Index 
..... 1198 1 .. ........ ..... 18M 1896 nomin • ..... 
121 131 (4] (5} (8) (7) (8) ttl 11Ql 
21809 20951 104.1 103.3 13744 13414 102.5 101.8 
18601 15944 104.1 103.3 11012 10743 102.5 101.7 
. ·11580 14811 105.2 104.3 10384 10038 103.5 102.8 
15278 14477 101.5 104.7 10203 8821 103.8 103.0 
·Total emoluments In central government In 1 995 (in thousands) 
GrON N•t 
....... Popua.tlon •• mp .. Population 
Valua 
(21 
3248&7 
49837 
84853 
30387 
489833 
1888 
(2} 
21808 
18601 
15580 
15279 
18328 
'I' Value 'I' Value 'I' Value 
(31 (4) flU (8) (7) (8) 
88.3 324858 88.3 207883 8&.1 207813 
10.2 49936 10.2 33847 10.& 33847 
17.3 84652 17.3 67348 17.8 5734& 
8.2 30387 8.2 20623 8.5 20822 
100.0 488831 100.0 318471 100.0 318477 
Changes in average remunerations by category of official in the 
central government 
Price index = 100.8 
... N•t 
188& Nominal Real 1888 188& Nonn.l 
Index Index Index 
(31 (4) (6} (8) (7) (8) 
20951 104.1 103.3 13744 13414 102.15 
115944 104.1 103.3 11012 10743 102.1 
14815 105.2 104.3 10384 10038 103.& 
14477 101.1 104.7 10203 8821 103.8 
"' fl) 
85.1 
10.5 
17.9 
8.5 
100.0 
... 
Index 
(8) 
101.8 
101.7 
102.8 
103.0 
18&18 104.4 103.1 12413 12083 102.7 i~~~~t!t~llll!~i~l~ 
r 
.. 
United Kingdom 
1.3.A1 
1.3.A2 
1.3.81 
Cat. , ... 
(11 121 
A 31982 
8 18808 
c 11352 
D 11352 
1.3.82 
c.t. 1881 
(1) (2) 
A 32980 
I 18891 
c 11200 
D 11200 
Central government personnel broken down by category 
C& Grade 8td1111 
(11 121 131 
A A 24775 
8 8 387053 
c C· 77861 
D D 38458 
Central government personnel In the sample 
t Total Employeu of Hlected depertmen• 
Changes in remunerations by category of officials In the selected 
central government departments. Price Index ~ 1 02. 1. Unmarried 
Officials. Department I. 
Gron Net 
189& Nomin.a ... 1881 1- NomiMI ... 
Index Index Index Index 
131 141 151 let 171 181 111 
27890 114.8 112.2 22888 19958 114.7 112.3 
18187 104.0 101.8 12480 11848 105.2 103.0 
10901 104.1 102.0 8824 8387 105.2 103.0 
10901 104.1 102.0 8824 8387 105.2 103.0 
Changes in remunerations by category of officials In the selected 
central government departments. Price index • 102. 1. Unmarried 
Officials. Department II. 
Qron Net 
189& Nominal Real 1898 189& Nomin81 ..... 
Index Index lnclu Index 
131 141 151 18) ·171 181 (11 
31835 103.8 101.5 23490 22340 105.2 .103.0 
I 
18237 104.0 101.9 12518 11892 '105.3 103.1 
10782 103.9 101.7 8722 8310 105.0 102.8 
10782 103.9 101.7 8722 8310 105.0 102.8 
Eurostat 
p• 
t 
,. 
• 
1.3.83 
c.t. 1811 
[1) 121 
A 37171 
8 11024 
c 11117 
0 11117 
1.3.C1 
Cet. 1188 
(1J (2J 
A 31182 
B 18808 
c 11352 
0 11352 
1.3.C2 
Cat. 11H 
(1) 121 
A 32980 
B 11811 
c 11200 
0 11200 
United Kingdom 
Changes In remunerations by category of officials In the selected 
central government depanments. Price Index •102.1. Unmarried 
Officials. Department IlL 
GrOM Net 
118& Nomlnel Rnl 1881 118& No-... ... 
Index Index Index Index 
131 (41 (61 (81 (7) Ill (I) 
31270 102.5 100.4 25170 24112 104.0 101.1 
18525 102.7 100.1 13138 13314 104.1 101.1 
11282 102.8 100.7 8987 8837 104.1 101.1 
11282 102.8 100.7 8187 8137 104.1 101.1 
Changes in remuneration~ by category of officials in the selected 
central government departments. Price index = 102. 1. Married 
Officials with two children. Department I. 
Grou Net 
189& Nominal Reel 1188 1886 NomiMI ... 
Index Index Index Index 
131 (4} 16) (8} (7J Ill (8) 
27890 114.8 112.2 23157 20214 114.8 112.2 
18187 104.0 101.8 12729 12104 105.2 103.0 
10101 104.1 102.0 1012 8845 105.2 103.0 
10101 104.1 102.0 1012 8845 105.2 103.0 
Changes In remunerations by category of officials In the selected 
central government departments. Price index • 1 02.1. Married 
Officials with two children .• Department II. 
Grou Net 
118& Nominal Real 1881 1815 Nominal ... 
Index Index Index Index 
(3) 141 (6) (81 171 Ill IIJ 
31835 103.8 101.5 23758 22518 105.1 103.0 
11237 104.0 101.1 12785 12150 10&.2 103.1 
10782 103.1 101.7 8111 8588 104.1 102.8 
10782 103.9 101.7 8991 8588 104.1 102.8 
Eurosw 
A 63 
f. 
l 
... 
United Kingdom 
1.3.C3 
Cat. 1118 
(11 121 
A 37171 
B 11024 
c 11187 
D 11587 
1.3.D 
1.3.E 
64 
. 
Changes in remunerations by category of officials In the selected 
central government departments. Price Index • 102.1. Married 
·Officials with two children. Department 1ll. 
GroM Net 
1186 NomiMI Real 1181 1186 N..-.. 
Index Index Index 
(3] (4) (6) 181 (71 Ill 
36270 102.5 100.4 26238 25220 104.0 
18526 102.7 100.6 14206 13152 104.1 
11282 102.8 100.7 8251 8885 104.1 
11282 102.8 100.7 8256 8881 104.1 
I 
... 
Index 
Ill 
101.8 
101.8 
101.8 
101.8 
Changes in average remunerations of senior A-grade officials In the 
central government. Price index = 102. 1. 
Senior Grou Net 
Steff NomiMI Real NorNMI ... 
Index Index Index ........ 
A 103.8 101.8 104.8 102.7 
Changes in average remunerations by category of officials In the 
central government. Price index = 102. 1. 
Grou Net 
Cat. Nomlnel Real Nominal .Real 
Index Index Index Index 
[1] 141 (6] (8] Ill 
A 104.5 102.4 105.7 103.6 
B 103.6 101.5 104.8 102.7 
c 103.7 101.6 104.8 102.1 
D 103.7 101.5 104.8 102.8 
Total 103.7 101.8 104.1 ·:i;j:~:i~t~~~~;\il1.:~~~~;~::tt!:; 
Eurostat 
..... 
Trends in working hou.rs in 
central government in the 
Member States 
Eurostat - ANNEX 
)t 65 
-• 
Table 111.2.A 
Country 
B 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
Table 111.2.8 
Country 
a 
DK 
D 
I 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
66 
Statutory or contractual weekly working hours in central 
government in Member States 
Weekly wurtdng houri REMARKS 
Jul.al JuJ.II 
38 38 
37 37 
38.5 38.5 
37.5 37.5 DlffereiiCeS for mothers 
37.5 37.5 
39 38 
41 41 
36 38 
410 410 
38 38 
410 410 
35 35 410 hcxn for manual and auxiliary staff 
36.25 38.25 
410 410 
41 41 42 hours el8ewhere than in the London .,... 
Number of days annual leave 
Number of daya REMARKS 
Jul.ll Jul-81 
24-31 24-31 Difference on age 
25 25 
26-30 26-30 26 days tll30 yen old; 2e days tiU 410 yeara old; 
30 days after 410 years old 
20-26 20-26 If 5 dayalweek: 20 - 22 days depending on seniority 
lf6 24-26daya on seniority 
30 30 
25 25 
18-31 18-31 Difference depending on grade and, for certain grades. 
on lengthes of service In grade 
32 32 
25-28 25-28 25 daya til 50 yeara old; 'Z1 dlya til 55 yura old; 
28 dlya after 55~-old 
23·24 23-24 23 daya before gra D. 24 dlya If equal or higher 
thin grade D. Bonuael on age 
25-30 25-30 Differences _.. on age 
22 '22 
30-36 30-36 First year 24, week • 6daya 
30-38 30-38 
from4weeks from-4 weeks Difference depending on grade and, for certain 
and 2 clay8 to and2dlysto grades, on length of service in grade 
6Meka &weeks 
Eurostat - ANNEX 
•I 
~ 
Table 111.2.C 
Country 
8 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
Number of public holidays per year (statutory, 
contractual, etc.) 
Number of daya REMARKS 
Jul.ll Jua.H 
13.5 13.5 Time orr 1n lieu when the public holiday 111111 on 
or SUI'ICtay 
8 10 
11 10 
12 12 
14 14 
10-11 10-11 Non4yltemiiUc time off in lieu when the public holiday 
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Report of Eurostat Studies on Remuneration 1995/1996 
November 1996 
A. Introduction 
I. The annual adjustment of the remuneration of officials of the European Communities is 
determined by the principle of parallel development of their purchasing power with national 
central government civil servants. 
2. To determine the purchasing power of national officials, the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities is providing an annual report. The legal basis for this report are Article 
64 and 65 and Annex XI of the Staff Regulations for the European Communities. 
3. According to Annex XI of the Staff Regulations the Statistical Office is authorised to carry 
out any study concerning remuneration issues, if necessary. 
"It shall be the task of the Statistical Office ·of the European Communities to 
monitor the quality of basic data and statistical methods used to work out the 
factors .taken into account for the adjustment of remuneration. In particular, it 
shall make any assessments or to carry out any studies required for such 
monitoring." (Annex XI, Article 11) 
4. On the basis of this obligation Eurostat launched two studies in 1995. Study Nol: 
Examination of national systems of remunerating civil servants. The aim of this study is to 
examine in detail the recent evolution of national systems of remunerating civil servants. Study 
No2: Divergence between specific indicator and control indicator. The aim of this study is to 
assess and quantify the causes of the divergence between the specific indicator and the control 
indicator. 
B. Study No1: Examination of national systems of remunerating civil servants 
5. Recently the remuneration systems of civil servants in Member States go through a period 
of reform. To be able to maintain the principle of parallel development between the purchasing ~ 
power of civil servants in Member States and EC officials, Eurostat needs detailed information 
of these changes. 
6. The aim of the study was to observe in detail recent changes in national remuneration 
systems and to evaluate their impact on the application of Article 65 and Annex XI of the Staff 
Regulations. The principal conclusions for the countries under consideration can be 
summarised as follows: 
7. For France before 1983 salary negotiations were finalised towards a strict maintenance of 
the purchasing power of earnings. After that date the notion of wage-bill change includes the 
effects of the career advancements, the maintenance of real purchasing power is granted (on 
average) only to the individuals who progress in the occupational ladder. After 1989 the 
composition of pay has gone through a significant change. In the late 80's and in the 90's the 
evolution of the 'additional' components of pay progressively gained in importance. The 
average rate for the premia, in 1992, was 18 percent of net pay. In recent years Eurostat too~ 
Eurostat 1 
into account the premiums that are paid in the French civil service. Therefore, the specific 
indicator is able to record correctly the change in the development of the purchasing power in 
the French civil service. 
8. For Italy in the 80's the existence of a mechanism of indexation has determined a fast 
increase in total remuneration of public sector employees. Recent changes in pay 
determination practices have significantly altered the composition of pay, eliminating almost all 
automatic components of pay increases. Indemnities still represent ari important component .of 
pay and can vary a lot across sectors and occupations. The indemnities, that are now published 
officially, are taken into account by Eurostat in the calculation of the specific indicator. 
Therefore, the specific indicator is representing correctly the change in the purchasing power 
for Italian civil servants. 
9. In Sweden agencies have been an administrative feature for several hundred years, but only 
recently they have gained powers over budgets and pay, which we now associate with this 
administrative form. In 1989 the highly centralised system of wage determination in the 
Swedish public sector was abandoned. Today in fact it is local negotiations which set pay 
levels. Local negotiations also determine the scope for any pay increases beyond the general 
scope identified in the central agreements. Although there exist local negotiations, the 
outcome is still followed centrally by the Ministry of Finance and Statistics Sweden. Eurostat 
makes use of these central data, and therefore the decentralisation poses no problems to 
Eurostat. 
10. Pay reform in the United Kingdom civil service has taken two main forms, 
decentralisation and individualisation. Under decentralisation decisions over pay and grading 
have been progressively delegated to newly formed agencies and to existing government 
departments. Under individualisation, the procedures for adjusting pay have been changed to 
produce a closer link between increases in pay and improvements in performance. In a first 
step executive agencies, more commonly known as 'Next Steps' agencies, were created and 
from April 1996 the principles governing pay in these agencies were to be extended to the rest 
of the civil service. In April 1995 executive Agencies covered just over 50 per cent of all full-
time staff in the civil service. Departments~ like agencies, will be free to construct pay and 
grading structures to fit the needs of their organisation and in consequence the common 
grading structure will disappear. The most recent performance pay agreements have two 
distinguishing features. Firstly, satisfactory performance is regarded as a necessary condition 
for the receipt of any general pay increase. Secondly, the old pay scales have been replaced by 
pay spines, within which different pay bands are identified for each grade of civil servants and 
progress up the band is determined solely by performance. In the UK there exists no longer a 
central data base due to the decentralisation efforts. Therefore, Eurostat approached directly 
some of the big agencies and governmental departments to be able to monitor the development 
of pay in the UK civil service. With respect to the individualisation of pay, Eurostat calculated 
the specific indicator (whenever possible) on a matched pairs basis to avoid structural effects. 
With respect to performance pay Eurostat excluded all components that are considered .to be 
equivalent to the former step. increases and promotions. With this adjustment of the practical 
procedure, Eurostat is able to record the development of the purchasing power as requested in 
the StaffRegulations. 
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11. The conclusion for the countries that were examined is that the current 'method; is able 
to record the change in the purchasing power of national civil servants. Eurostat is planning to 
continue the studies for the rest of the Member States. 
C. Study No2: Divergence between specific indicator and control indicator 
12. For the purpose of measuring the percentage change in the purchasing power of salaries . 
in the national civil services, the Statistical Office calculates specific indicators reflecting those 
changes in the remuneration of civil servants. 
13. Annex XI of the Staff Regulations states: 
"Besides the specific indicators, the Statistical Office shall submit control 
indicators in the form of data on real per capita emoluments in general 
government and in central government, drawn up in accordance with national 
accounts definitions. The Statistical Office report on the specific indicators shall 
be accompanied by explanations of the differences between these indicators and 
the abovementioned control indicators."(Annex XI, Article I, 4(d)) 
14. In recent years it turned out that in some Member States there was a difference between 
the specific indicator and the control indicator for central government. 
15. Eurostat identified the reasons for this divergence, since there are conceptual differences 
between the two indicators: (i) social contributions of the employers are included in the 
control indicator, but not in the specific indicator; (ii) there is a structural effect. If e.g. the 
average age of the reference population changes, the specific indicator must not change, if it 
should reflect properly the principle of parallelism, but the control indicator will change. 
Further, the specific indicator is excluding some elements of pay, e.g. regional allowances, 
because it should be avoided that the specific indicator will change, if people simply move in 
· or out London. But the control indicator is including such elements; (iii) control indicator and 
specific indicator refer to a different reference population. 
16. The control indicator has the function of a check indicator. If the conceptual differences 
between the both indicators would be netted out, they should develop in the same way. For 
four countries (Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) Eurostat conducted the 
exercise of netting out numerically the conceptual differences between the two indicators. It 
turned out that the different reasons for the divergence are different between Member States 
and even differ over time. But if the conceptual differences are netted out, the two indicators 
are developing in the same way. 
17. For the practical purpose of annually checking the specific indicator, the control 
indicator is not very convenient, since there are conceptual differences. Data on the various 
components of these differences become available with a considerable time-lag. On the other 
hand, there is no EC-wide alternative for the control indicator. 
18. For some Member States, however, specific solutions for the checking procedure might 
be found. For example in the case of France, where the 'l'indice INSEE des traitements' may 
be an additional indicator for checking. 
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19. For the following years Eurostat will continue to publish the control indicator and 
explain the development of it, and the differences between the control indicator and the 
specific indicator. Eurostat will elaborate different possibilities of checking and will make 
proposals , if it turns out that a valuable alternative to the control indicator is svailable. This is 
at present not the case. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The annual adjustment of Commissions salaries results from the application of rules set 
out in staff regulations (a legal document). Eurostat's task is to interpret these rules in 
a practical and appropriate manner and thereby identify the annual adjustment that is 
warranted. The method they employ to achieve this is set out in the construction of 
the specific indicator. 
1.2 The basic aim of the method employed to construct the specific indicator is enshrined 
in the concept of parallelism. EC salaries are supposed to change in line with changes 
in the average remuneration of civil servants in the fifteen member states. At present 
this is achieved by comparing 'snapshot' values of remuneration for each of the 
principal grades of civil servants at the 1st July each year. 
1.3. For the most part member states provide details of gross remuneration at various scale 
points for each of the selected grades, although some countries, the UK among them, 
have recently supplied data which more directly measures the average size of the 
change in the remuneration per grade. Details of net remuneration or the change in net 
remuneration are also supplied where the gross has been adjusted by the deduction of 
tax, social security and pension contributions and any other statutory deductions. 
These calculations are made separately for those civil servants who are single and 
those who are married with two children. 
1. 4 The several figures that emerge from these calculations are then combined, for the 
most part using employment numbers as weights, compared to previous year values 
and deflated using the national consumer price index to .Produce measures of changes 
in the average gross real remuneration and the average net remuneration of civil 
servants in each member state. Of these two figures it is the one measuring the change 
in the average net real remuneration of civil servants which is the most significant. 
These figures from each member state are then weighted together using as weights the 
share of each country in the total central government remuneration in the European 
Union. This produces a single overall figure, the specific indicator, which can then 
serve as the basis for adjusting conunissions salaries. 
1. 5 However the simple comparison of remuneration at different points on the salary scales 
on which civil servants are paid is no .longer possible in Sweden and the UK. In the 
former country salary scales have been replaced by a system of individual and 
differentiated pay while in the latter country salary scales have been replaced by pay 
bands. Significantly the maximum and minimum points on these pay bands can now be 
changed without such changes having any immediate impact on the average 
remuneration of civil servants in that grade. 
1.6 Both Sweden and the UK have decentralised the process of determining the pay of 
civil servants and as a result there is no longer a comprehensive grading structure for 
civil servants in either country. Although central negotiations between representatives 
of government employers and employees continue in Sweden these now result in the 
conclusion of a framework agreement, and it is subsequent negotiations at the level of 
each government agency which determine both the level of pay and the size of any 
increase in pay. From April 1996 government departments and executive agencies 
which employ the civil servants in the UK will assume delegated responsibility for pay 
and grading. Over the next few years those which have not already done so, are likely 
• 
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. 
to introduce pay and grading structures specific to their needs and which may well 
therefore be different from those of other departments and agencies. 
1. 7 These change in the procedures for determining the pay of civil servants in Sweden 
and the UK mean that the data supplied by these countries to inform the construction 
of the specific indicator must take a different form to that supplied by the other 
member states. The report which follows details the appropriate procedures for 
obtaining the data which most accurately measures changes in the real remuneration of 
civil servants in the central governments of the two countries. It details both the 
information necessary to identify the percentage changes in the purchasing power of 
salaries in the national civil , services and how this may be obtained and most 
appropriately processed. While the information provided to Eurostat may take a 
different form to that provided by other member states it does not represent a 
departure from the principles that inform the construction of the specific indicator. 
Indeed the procedures recommended are likely to more accurately capture changes in 
the real remuneration of civil servants in the central governments of the two countries. 
1. 8 The second part of the report summarises the method used to construct the specific 
indicator prior to commenting upon particular aspects of this method. The third part 
details recent changes in the procedures for determining the pay of civil servants in 
Sweden before proceeding to discuss the implications of these changes for the data 
they will supply to Eurostat. The fourth part of the report focuses on the UK. Again 
it discusses the nature of the innovations that have occurred in recent years in the 
procedures for determining the pay of civil servants prior to identifying the necessary 
changes in the nature and sources of,data supplied to Eurostat by the UK which are a 
consequence of these innovations. The fifth and concluding ,part contains some more 
general remarks about the method used to construct the specific indicator. 
l. CONSTRUCTION OF THE SPECIFIC INDICATOR 
The Method 
2.1 The basic aim of the method used in the annual adjustment of commission salaries is 
enshrined in the concept of parallelism. EC salaries are supposed to change in line 
with the average salaries of civil servants in member states. The method that Eurostat 
use at present may briefly be described as follows: 
(i) Eurostat request data on the remuneration of all permanent central 
government employees as at 1 st July each year from all member states. 
(ii) Each country sends this data for two representative types of central 
government employees, those who are married with two children and 
those who are single. The data are requested for each of the main 
grades of central government employees, s,o that the returns are 
representative of the remuneration of central government employees in 
each country. Details of the remuneration on the first step on the salary 
scale and the last step on the salary scale (and where possible the 
middle step) are requested for each grade. 
(iii) Eurostat request that the returns distinguish between gross and net 
remuneration. Gross remuneration is defined as basic salary plus 
3 
bonuses plus allowances plus increases affecting the maxima, the final 
step, of any pay scale. Net remuneration is defined as gross 
remuneration after deducting employee's national social security 
contributions, employee's occupational pension scheme contributions, 
taxes on income deducted at source and other statutory deductions. · 
(iv) Eurostat request details of the gross and net remuneration for each of 
four categories of employees, A to D, where staff are assigned to these 
categories according to the nature and importance of the duties they 
undertake. The categories in descending order of rank are defined as 
follows: 
A Staff engaged in administrative and advisory duties which 
require university education or equivalent professional 
experience. 
B Staff engaged in executive duties which require an advanced 
level of secondary education or equivalent professional 
experience. 
C Staff engaged in clerical duties which require secondary 
education or equivalent professional experience. 
D Staff engaged in manual or service duties which require primary 
education, if necessary supplemented by some technical training. 
It is anticipated that each of these categories will comprise several 
grades. 
(v) Eurostat also request the number of employees in each of the above 
grades on the 1st July or as close to that date as possible, for these 
serve as the weights in their subsequent calculations. 
(vi) Eurostat then calculates the aventge gross remuneration per grade by 
adding gross remuneration at the minimum and maximum (and where 
supplied, middle) and dividing by 2(3). This exercise is conducted for 
both single and married employees, and the average of these then 
calculated to give a single figure for the average gross semuneration of 
each grade. The grades are then weighted together, using the number 
of employees in each grade to give a single figure for the gross 
r~muneration in each of the categories A, B, C and D. 
(vii) Eurostat also calculate the net remuneration for each of the categories, 
A, B, C and Dusing exactly the same procedure as in (vi) above, but 
using the data on net remuneration for each grade as defined at (iii) 
above. 
(viii) Having thus calculated both gross and net remuneration in the current 
year for each of the categories A, B, C and D, Eurostat then compare 
this data with the data for these same categories in the previous year 
and calculate the annual changes in gross and net remu~eration .. They 
then deflate these figures by the change in the consumer price index 
over the same interval, July to July, in order to distinguish the real 
changes in gross and net remuneration. The most important of the two 
figures thus calculated is the change in real net remuneration, the 
'national net real specific indicator'. 
c 
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At the final step the 'net real specific indicators' for each of the member 
countries are weighted together according to each countries share qf 
the total community central government wage bill as reported in sector 
S61 of the published national accounts within the European System of 
Integrated National Accounts (ESA). The resulting figure is the 'net 
real specific indicator' used to adjust commission salaries. 
Comments on the Method 
2.2 An assumption implicit in the method described above is that changes in the weighted 
average of remuneration, either gross or net. at the top and bottom of the salary scale 
for each grade (and where included middle point) accurately capture changes in the 
average remuneration of central government employees in that grade. This will only 
be true either when in any year the percentage changes in remuneration are the same at 
each point on the salary scale for a particular grade or where the weights applied to the 
two, or three, points on the scale included in the calculation, accurately reflect the 
distribution of employees receiving the increases recorded at these points. In fact 
neither of these conditions is likely to be met. The percentage changes in remuneration 
often vary at different points on the scale: this will be true where either flat rate 
increases are awarded or the number of scale points are changed in such a way that 
they change remuneration at either or both the top and bottom of the scale. Also the 
proportion of employees on the max, typically substantially exceeds the proportion on 
any other scale point including the minimum. In the UK, for example over half of all 
employees in most of the grades recorded by Eurostat in earlier years, were 'on the 
max' and less than 10 per cent were at the minimum. 
2.3 Thus the method employed by Eurostat measures only approximately the average 
changes in remuneration in each of categories A to D · for it captures only 
approximately the average change in remuneration in each of the underpinning grades. 
The adjustments to this method which will be proposed later for Sweden and the UK, 
capture more accurately changes in average remuneration in categories A to D than 
does the existing method. 
2.4 The method described above takes no account of incremental progression, pay 
progression related to 'years-of-service', where a pay increase is triggered by a further~ 
year of service and the employee advances to a higher point. on the salary scale. Until 
recently such progression was a feature of the pay systems in the UK civil service and, 
although the Swedish system allowed less scope for such progression it was also a 
feature of their system during the nineteen eighties. 
2.5 Incremental progression is no longer a feature of either the Swedish or the UK 
payment systems for civil servants. However in the UK, aside from the annual. pay 
settlement negotiated between the appropriate employers and trade unions, there now 
exists the opportunity for most civil seavants to achieve some additional pay 
progression as a consequence of their annual performance appraisal. On one view the 
automatic pay progression once enjoyed by many civil servants as a result of the 
operation of incremental scales has now been replaced by discretionary pay 
progression although it should be noted that these new arrangements still provide 
many civil servants with a source of pay progression. Nonetheless because this aspect 
s 
of performance related pay progression has effectively replaced the old incremental 
pay progression (and it should be noted the consequences of both for the pay bill are 
treated as broadly similar - both are regarded as self financing) and the old incremental 
progression was and still is ignored by the Eurostat method, this aspect of the new UK 
pay system will not be captured by the procedures recommended for the UK. 
• 
• 
• 
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PAY DETERMINATION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN SWEDEN 
The Size of the Civil Senrice 
3.1 In February 1995 the state sector, c,entral government, employed just over 250,000 
people in Sweden. They were employed in more than 206 agencies which are directly 
responsible to government and which vary substantially in size: the largest employing 
several thousand and the smallest less than ten. 
3.2 The state sector includes the police, armed forces and universities but once these are 
excluded from the total, the reference population for construction of the specific 
indicator is approximately 100,000. The distribution of this number across the main 
ministries and departments is shown in Table 1. · 
Table 1 
Employment in the Swedi$h Civil Service in 1995 
Maio Ministries and Departments 
Justice(Justitiedepartementet)* 
Social (Socialdepartementet) 
Transport (Kommunikationsdepartementet) 
Finance (Finansdepartementet) 
Education# (Utbildningsdepartementet) 
Agriculture (Jordbruksdeparte~entet) 
Labour (Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet) 
Culture (Kulturdepartementet) 
Trade (Niringsdepartementet) 
Home (Civildepartementet) 
Environment (MiljO-o-naturesurdepartementet) 
Total · 
Notes: 
*excludes the police and prisons 
# excludes Universities 
Recent Pay Reforms in the Civil Service 
Numbers Employed 
16,023 
6,091 
15,652 
21,878 
3,087 
9,472 
14,225 
5,429 
2,087 
6,227 
2,207 
102,378 
3.3 Agencies have been an administrative feature of the Swedish state for several hundred 
years, but only recently have they assumed the devolved powers over budgets and pay 
which we now associate with this administrative form.. Decentralised negotiations 
started on a small scale in 1977 when the central agreement for the first time included 
provision for small reserves which could be distributed following local negotiations 
with trade unions. 
3.4 In 1989 the highly centralised system of wage determination in the Swedish public 
sector was abandoned. Central negotiations between the National Agency for 
Government Employers (SA V) and employees representatives continue but these now 
result in the conclusion of framework agreements which identify the scope for pay 
increases and the period over which the formal agreement and therefore the agreed 
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increase is to operate. The framework agreements to date have also specified a 
minimum size of increase that is guaranteed to all employees, but ·the size of this 
minimum can be modified in local negotiations. In fact it is local negotiations, 
negotiations at the level of the separate agencies and gove~ent departments - which 
for bargaining purpose are also known as agencies - which set pay levels. 
3.5 Negotiations at the level of the agency between lncal management and local trade 
unions, determine both the level of pay and the size of any ·increase in pay for every 
individual in an agency. An employees' pay is now set by reference to the difficulty of· 
the work they are performing, the level of responsibility and other work demands, and 
the results obtained in relation to organisational goals. This system of 'individual and 
differentiated' pay has replaced the previous system under which employees were paid 
under a tariff or incremental pay system. These previous incremental scales were 
relatively short, typically four, at the most eight points, and as a result, under the 
previous system, the vast majority of employees, over seventy-five per cent in most 
cases, were already on the maximum. 
3.6 The introduction of the new system of fixed salary points in 1990 was accompanied by 
the guarantee that existing employees would be moved to a salary no less than that 
they received before and therefore in almost all cases the starting point for the system 
of individual pay was the previous grade maximum. Transitional arrangements, 
stretching in some cases over a number of years, were agreed to move those below the 
old grade maximum on to the appropriate salary point. Subsequent adjustments of 
individual salaries are the subject of negotiations at the agency level. 
3. 7 Local negotiations also determine the scope for any pay increases beyond the general 
scope identified in the central agreements; they identify opportunities for increasing 
individual salaries or for promotion, where this does not increase the pay bill of the 
agency. Such opportunities may arise from efficiency savings and staff turnover. Thus 
for example although the most recently completed agreement, the one introduced in 
1993, identified scope for an average increase of 3.1% for the central government 
sector as a whole, this is likely to understate the average size of salary increase because 
agency agreements will have identified further scope for increasing salaries which did 
not increase agency salary bills. 
3.8 Each agencies running costs (salary bill and other variable costs) are controlled by a 
system of 'frame grants'. These are marked-up, the frame grant is increased, according 
to a formula based on the recorded pay increases in the private sector but they contain 
no guarantee that the calculated costs of the central agreement for government 
employees will be centrally financed. The introduction of these frame grants in 1993 
effectively meant that the Government and the Financial Committee of Parliament no 
longer had to endorse the central agreement. 
The Implications of the Reforms for the Returns to Eurostat 
3. 9 The recent pay reforms in Sweden have important implications for the data that can be 
provided to Eurostat to inform the method of adjusting Commission salaries. These 
are that: 
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(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
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Because of the absence of salary scales for each main grade it will not 
be possible to provide details of salaries at the maximum and the 
minimum of scales. 
Because ~the average size of settlement identified .in the central 
agreement is likely to understate the average size of the settlements 
individuals receive it will be necess~.ry to obtain data at a level which 
captures the outcome of local negotiations. 
Because there is no longer any uniform grading structure across the 
whole of the Swedish civil service it is unlikely to be practical to report 
pay by grade within categories A, B, C and D. 
Swedish Data on the Salaries of Civil Servants 
, 3 .1 0 Statistics Sweden, the central statistical office for Sweden, reports the remuneration of 
salaried employees in central government four times a year (for the middle month of 
each quarter of the year). The report is divided into two parts, one part concerns 
salaries and the other employment. It is based on monthly data from administrative 
registers obtained by SA V and the registers include individual data on monthly salaries 
plus other allowances, working hours (per cent of hours worked), sex, educational 
levels, job description, and area of public service. 
3.11 The statistics are based on data reporting the remuneration of all civil servants in 
Sweden, they are not obtained from a sample. Once the armed forces, police, higher 
education and clergy are excluded this leaves a population of aro~nd 100,000. These 
groups excepted coverage is complete. A minority of this number, around 25,000 
work in Stockholm but if only data for Stockholm is recorded the numbers in some of 
the categories A to D may be too small. For this reason and because there are no rules 
requiring that civil servants in Stockholm be paid differently from those in other parts 
of the country it is proposed to include data on pay for civil servants throughout 
Sweden. 
3 .12 With the assistance of the SA V it should be possible to classify the population of civil 
servants· into four categories A to D, but it will not be possible to divide the employees 
in the register into single officials and those who are married with two dependent 
children; indeed marital status and the number of dependent children have no impact 
on gross salary in Sweden and therefore the same data will be delivered for both these 
groups. Gross basic salary is recorded for all individuals on the register and to this can 
be added allowances excluding overtime pay to obtain gross remuneration. 
3.13 The Swedish tax system is relatively straight forward~ marital status and the number of 
dependent children have no effect on tax liability. Data on net earnings can be supplied 
by Statistics Sweden. Net salary will comprise gross salary plus allowances (excluding 
overtime pay) minus social security payments, statutory pension contributions, 
contributions to. the health insurance scheme and tax payments. Again the sam~ data 
will be delivered for both single officials and those married with two dependent 
children. 
3.14 If should be noted that at present the Swedish tax system does offer some additional 
individual allowances which can be offset against tax (interest payments on housing 
loans and contributions to pension schemes are examples) and which therefore reduce 
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some individuals tax liabilities. However any change in an individuals tax liability as a 
result of the application of such alJowances is determined through a separate system of 
self assessment, the outcome of which is unknown to the employer. No adjustment for 
changes in tax deductions due to such individual and household characteristics can be 
made, nor indeed should be made for. these are not statutory compulsory contributions 
for which tax allowance is given. 
3.15 Any changes in the occupational or grade composition of the four categories A to D 
are likely to affect the average level of salaries (gross and net) reported by Statistics 
Sweden. It is therefore desirable, that Statistics Sweden. report where possible the 
average salaries and number of employees by grade within category. 
3.16 Salary statistics are available four times a year. The quarters surrounding the 1st July 
are May and August and an average of these two figures could therefore be taken. 
However the August figures would not be available until November and it is therefore 
proposed to report the May figures only. Even so there is often a significant delay 
after the central agreement has been reached before local negotiations are complete 
and therefore the figures for May may still not capture all settlements consequent upon 
the most recent central negotiations. 
3.17 Applying the above method to data for civil servants in the Stockholm area only 
Statistics Sweden have produced the data in Tables 2 and 3 for November 1993 and 
November 1994. A number of points are worth making about these preliminary 
results. 
(i) 
(ii) 
The change in gross salaries over the twelve months to November 1994 
exceeds the change in net salaries over the same period. This is in 
large part because in 1994 individuals were for the first time required to 
make compulsory payments towards the unemployment insurance 
scheme. 
Category A contains the largest share of employees over 45 per cent in 
both 1993 and 1994. This is surprising but is explained by the fact that 
the registers from which the salary data is obtained record only the 
individual's educational qualifications, not those required for the job 
they occupy. The Swedish civil service employs a high proportion of 
university graduates, many of whom are not working in jobs which 
require university education or equivalent professional experience. 
However because in this exercise individuals were assigned to 
categories A, B, C and D according to the qualifications they possess 
all graduates were allocated to Category· A. Statistics Sweden 
recognise that this is not appropriate and further analysis by Statistics 
Sweden in conjunction with the SA V will produce a more appropriate 
allocation of employees to categories A, B and C. 
• 
• 
.. 
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Table 2 
Average Salaries of Civil Servants in Sweden in 1993 and 1994 
Cat Gross Salary (SEK) Net Salary (SEK) 
1993 1994 0/o change 1993 1994 0/o change 
A 20,538 21,192 3.2 13,903 14,028 0.9 
B 16,065 16,472 2.5 11,487 11,602 1.0 
c 14,102 14,757 4.6 10,172 10,465 2.9 
D 14,329 14,738 2.9 10,325 10,451 1.2 
Av 17,425 18,124 4.0 12,345 12,505 1.3 
Net sa1aJy 1994 = Gross salary minus income tax, individual contributions to the health insurance scheme and 
individual contributions to the unemployment insurance scheme (introduced in 1994).Net salary 1993 =Gross 
sa1aJy minus income tax and individual contributions to the health insurance scheme. 
Cat 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Total 
Table 3 
Number of Civil Servants in Stockholm 
1993 
11,767 
3,812 
5,331 
4,432 
25,342 
Share 
46.4 
15,0 
21.0 
17.5 
100.0 
1993 
11,810 
3,737 
4,862 
4,045 
24,454 
Share 
48.3 
15.3 
19.9 
16.5 
100.0 
The categories A-D are not based on ISCO codes because of problems with the ISCO standard. The ISCO 
classification system has not yet been introduced. By autumn 1995 this should be accomplished and the ISCO 
codes can then be used. This should help resolve problems associated with allocating employees to these 
categories. 
Conclusions 
3 .18 A number of details reinain to be clarified but it would appear that Statistics Sweden in 
conjunction with the Finance Ministry, who retain ultimate responsibility for the 
returns to Eurostat, will be able to supply data appropriate for the construction of the 
specific indicator. The data will accurately reflect changes in the gross and net 
remuneration of civil servants throughout Sweden, and will do so with greater 
accuracy than the procedures adopted for other member states which record changes 
at only certain points on the scales under which civil servants are paid . 
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PAY DETERMINATION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE UK 
The Size of the Civil Service 
4.1 On the 1st April 1995 there were 516,893 permanent civil servants in the UK. Two-
thirds of this number, 345,342, were employed in 'Agencies' while the remaining staff 
were employed in government departments. 1 The number of staff employed in each of 
the main government departments at this date are detailed in Table 4. From this it can 
be seen that four of the largest departments employing staff based predominantly in 
the UK are the Ministry of Defence employing 83,736, the Home Office employing 
9,566, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food at 6,403, and the Employment 
Department employing 4,886. Subsequent to the compilation of these statistics the 
Employment Department and Department for Education have been merged to form the 
Department for Education and Employment which seems likely to employ around 
6,500 staff and become the third largest department. After this amalgamation the four 
largest departments listed above account for 62 per cent of the total civil service not 
employed in agencies, or government departt)lents operating along next step lines. 
4.2 Associated with each department are, in most cases, a number of Agencies. These 
Agencies and the number of staff they employ are detailed in Table 5. It can be seen 
from this table that the four largest agencies which employ civil servants are the 
Benefits Agency employing 66,650 permanent staff, the Inland Revenue 54,562, the 
Employment Service 39,852 and Customs and Excise employing 24,132. Together 
these four account for 54 per cent of all civil servants employed by 'Agencies' in the 
UK. 
Table 4 
Number of Civil Servants in Main Government Departments in the UK at 1st April 1995 
Government Department 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
Cabinet Office (excl. OPSS) 
OPSS 
Treaswy 
Ministry of Defence 
Department for Education 
~plo)"nentDepartment 
Department of the Environment 
Foreign and Commonwealth 
Department of Health 
Home Office 
Lord Chancellors 
National Heritage 
Northern Ireland Office 
Scottish Office 
Total Staff in ·Post 
Full-time equivalent 
6,403 
640 
890 
1,127 
83,736 
/,635 . 
4,886 
4,513 
5,948 
3,437 
9,566 
1,222 
369 
210 
4,268 
Two of the organisations called 'agencies' in this report are strictly speaking 'departments operating 
along next step lines'. These are HM Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue. 
c 
4 
Department of Social Services 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Trade 
Welsh Office 
Total in ALL Departments 
2.793 
5.144 
2,300 
1,997 
171,551 
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Note: These Numbers exclude those employed in associated Agenci~ and organisation operating along next 
steps lines and the smaller departments. 
Source Civil Service Statistics, 1995. 
Table 5 
Number of Civil Servants in Agencies in the UK at 1st April1995 
Agency 
ADASAgency 
Central Science Laboratory 
Central Veterinary Laboratory 
Meat Hygiene Service 
Chessington Computer Centre 
Civil Service College 
Occupational Health and Safety Agency 
Recruitment & Assessment Services Agency 
Central Office of Information 
HMSO 
Central Statistical Office 
Customs & Excise 
Inland Revenue 
Valuation Office 
Royal Mint 
Paymaster 
Army Base Repair Organisation 
Defence Animal Centre 
Defence Clothing & Textile Agency 
Defence Evaluation Postal & Courier Services 
Defence Analytical Services Agency 
Defence Accounts Agency 
Defence Evaluation & Research Agency 
Disposal Sales Agency 
Duke of York's Royal Military School 
Flag Officer Naval Training/Reserves 
Hydrographic Office 
Logistic Information Systems Agency 
Maintenance Group Defence Agency 
Meteorological Office 
Military Survey 
Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation 
Queen Victoria School 
RAF Signals Engineering Establishment 
RAF Training Group Defence Agency 
Service Children's School (NW.Eur) 
Total Staff in Post 
Full-time equivalent 
1,851 
607 
635 
813 
397 
259 
99 
132 
507 
2,913 
1,274 
24,132 
54,562 
4,531 
972 
600 
3,257 
41 
494 
251 
101 
1,790 
11,248 
67 
95 
1,474 
786 
314 
4,486 
2,194 
773 
1,528 
69 
720 
2,077 
638 
Teachers Pension Agency 
Employment Service Agency 
Building Research Establishment 
Planning Inspector 
QEII Conference Centre 
Security Facilities Executive (2) 
The Buying Agency 
Natural Resources Institute 
NHSEstates 
NHS Pensions Agency 
Medical Devices ,f\gency 
Medicines Control Agency 
Fire Service College 
Forensic Science Service 
UK Passport Agency 
HM Prisons Service 
Court Service (3) 
HM Land Registty 
Public Record Office 
Historic Scotland 
Scottish Fish Protection Agency 
Scottish Office Pensions AJency 
Student Awards Agency for Scotland 
Scottish Prison Service 
Scottish Court Service 
Registers of Scotland 
Scottish Record Office 
Benefits Agency 
Child Support Agency 
Contributions Agency 
IT Services Agency 
Resettlement Agency 
War Pensions Agency 
Companies House 
Insolvency Service 
Laboratozy of the Government Chemist 
National Engineering Laboratory 
National Physical Laboratory 
National Weights & Measures Laboratory 
Patent Office 
Radiocommunications Agency 
Driver & Vehicle Licensing Agency 
Driving Standards Agency 
Marine Safety Agency , 
Coast guard 
Highways Agency 
Transport Research Laboratory 
Vehicle Certification Agency 
Vehicle Inspectorate 
Welsh Histozy Monuments 
Source: Civil Service Statistics, 1995 
391 
39,852 
667 
584 
60 
1,117 
113 
380 
103 
450 
162 
343 
258 
665 
1,463 
38,936 
538 
8,508 
437 
634 
238 
161 
135 
4,233 
831 
1,076 
121 
66,6SO 
5,984 
8,899 
3,535 
91 
1,296 
946 
1,500 
267 
249 
670 
46 
884 
541 
3,779 
1,679 
383 
535 
2,129 
423 
76 
1,483 
227 
13 
'f 
( 
4.3 
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The system of delegated pay bargaining to be described in the next section, means that 
initially there will be no central source of information on the remuneration of civil 
seJVants in th~ UK. Accordingly the procedure outlined later in this part of the report 
proposes gathering the information directly from the four largest government 
departments and agencies which cover 62 and 54 per cent of civil seJVants working in 
departments and 'agencies' respectively. 
Recent Pay Reform in the-Civil Service 
4.4 Pay reform in the UK civil service has taken two main fonns, decentralisation and 
individualisation. Under decentralisation decisions over pay and grading have been 
progressively delegated_ to newly fonned agencies and to existing government 
departments. Under individualisation, the procedures for adjusting pay have been 
changed to produce a closer link between increases in pay and improvements in 
performance. 
Decentralisation 
4.5 The first steps down the road to the decentralisation of bargaining in the UK Civil 
Service began with the -award of different sized pay settlements to groups of workers 
who had previously been covered by the same negotiating machinery. During 1987 
five separate agreements were implemented for clerical and secretarial grades, 
exeeutive grades, senior Civil Servants (Grades 5-7), tax inspectors and scientists and 
engineers. Subsequently decentralisation of pay determination in the UK has 
proceeded in two main ways. First executive agencies were. created2 and second from 
April 1996 the principles governing pay in these agencies are to be extended to the rest 
of the civil service. 
4.6 In April 1995 executive Agencies covered just over 50 per cent of all full-time staff in 
the civil service. These agencies are set key financial and quality of seJVice targets, 
and have greater financial and management freedom than government departlt\ents. 
On the 1st April 1994 twenty three of these, covering the vast majority of civil 
seJVants employed in agencies assumed formal responsibility for the pay and conditions 
of their employees, and in 1994 conducted their own pay negotiations. In 1995 a 
further eight agencies joined the list of those who conducted their own pay 
negotiations. The largest of those which assumed delegated responsibility for pay 
were the Social Security Benefits Agency. Customs and Excise, the Employment 
SeJVice and Inland Revenue. Full details of those who conducted their own pay 
negotiations in 1994 and 1995 are shown in Table 6 while Table 7 reveals that by 
March 1995 fifteen of the twenty three agencies recorded in Table 6 had introduced 
new pay and grading arrangements, for the civil servants they employed. 
2 
. More commonly known as 'Ne>.1 Steps' Agencies after the report "Improving Management in 
Government: The Next Steps" which led to the establishment of these agencies. See Goldsworthy, D. 
(1991) Setting Up Next Steps, HMSO, London. 
:" 
Table 6 
Agencies Which Conducted Their Own Pay Negotiations 
Agency In 1994 No. of Employees 
Social Security Benefits Agency 
Social Security Contributions Agency 
HM Land Registry 
Customs and Excise 
Defence Research Agency 
Meteorological Office 
Social Security Information Technology Services Agency 
Royal Mint 
Agricultural & Development Advisory Services 
Valuation Office 
Scottish Prison Service 
Ordnance Survey 
Employment Service 
Health and Safety Executive 
HM Prison Service 
Inland Revenue 
Driver & Vehicle Licensing Agency 
Vehicle Inspectorate 
Driving Standards Agency 
HM Stationeey Office 
Fire Service College 
Forensic Science Service 
Child Support Agency 
Highways Agency , 
Historic Scotland 
Intervention Board 
Meat Hygiene Service 
PAYMASTER 
SeiVice Children Schools (North West Europe) 
War Pensions Agency 
Table 7 
66,650 
8,899 
8,508 
24,132 
11,248 
2,194 
3,535 
972 
1,851· 
4,531 
4,233 
1,989 
39,85Z 
4,233 
38,936 
54,562 
3,779 
1,479 
'1,679 
2,913 
258 
665 
287,098 
Ia 1995 
5,984 
2,129 
634 
813 
600 
638 
1,296 
299,192 
Agencies Which Bad Introduced New Pay and Grading Arranpments by March 1995 
Agency 
Inland Revenue 
Employment Service 
Customs and Excise 
HMSO 
ADAS 
No of Employees 
54,562 
39,852 
24,132 
2,913 
1,851 
15 
't 
·Royal Mint 
HM Land Registry 
Meteorological Office 
Information Technology Services Agency 
Ordnance Survey . 
Health and Safety Executive 
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
QED Conference Centre 
Forensic Science SelVice 
Scottish Prison SelVice 
972 
8.508 
2,194 
3,535 
1,989 
4,233 
3,779 
60 
665 
4,233 
153,478 
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4.7 The principles of New Step agencies are now to be extended throughout the Civil 
Service. From April 1996 the pay and grading of all middle and junior level civil 
servants, all those below grade 5, will be delegated to departments and the four 
national agreements that presently cover these staff will be scrapped. 3 Departments, 
like agencies, will be free to construct pay and grading structures to fit the needs of 
their organisation and in consequence the common grading structure will disappear. 
CiVil Servants pay and grading will now be determined by the agency or. department 
for which they work. 
lndividu.alisation 
4.8 The individualisation of pay was a prominent element of the central agreements 
negotiated for the different grades of civil servants in the early nineteen nineties, 
although those covering the Inland Revenue staff and the senior civil setvants, grades 
5-7 have since 1988, made provision for performance payments. However the most 
recent performance agreements which now cover all civil servants have two 
distinguishing features. First satisfactory performance is regarded as a necessary 
condition for the receipt of any general pay increase. Second the old incremental, 
service related pay scales have been replaced by pay spines, within which different pay 
bands are identified for each grade of civil seJVant and progress up the band is 
determined solely by performance. The performance of each civil setvant is assessed 
at an annual appraisal. 
The Implications of the Reforms for the Returns to Eurostat 
Decentral~ation 
4.9 Under the present proposals for delegated pay and grading there will no longer be any 
central source of information on pay settlements or salary levels in the various agencies 
and government departments which constitute the UK Civil Service. It is possible that 
in the future, if HM: Treasury decides to monitor in a systematic manner the outcome 
of negotiatio~s in each agency and government department, such a central sourc~ may 
emerge. In the meantime, there is little alternative but to gather the required 
information on pay and employment from the agencies and departments themselves. It 
will clearly be impractical to approach all departments and agencies in the UK, a 
representative sample will therefore need to be constructed. 
3 The Civil SelVice: Continuity and Change, (CM 2627), HMSO, 1994, pp 25-27. 
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4.10 The delegation of decisions over grading to each agency and department, means the 
end of the uniform grading structure that was until the last few years a prominent 
feature of the UK civil service. It will as a result not be possible to select a few key 
grades which cover most of the civil service nor to expect that changes in the pay of a 
few grades will necessarily be representative of changes in the real remuneration of the 
whole of the civil service. Each agency or department providing information to 
Eurostat will need to select those grades which most appropriately represent their own 
pay and grading structure, in line with the principles outlined by Eurostat in 
ART65/19, and supply pay and employment data for each of these. 
lndividualisation 
4.11 The abolition of the traditional service, or experience, related incremental scales means 
that there are no longer identifiable maximum salaries for each grade of civil servant · 
which all staff in that grade can expect to receive provided they achieve the required 
length of service. Changes in the grade maximum will from now on frequently result 
from changes in the number of points in the pay band where such changes reflect 
further modifications to the performance pay scheme. Thus the addition of points to 
the pay band may occur when it is considered desirable to afford the opportunity for 
those toward the top of the band to earn additional performance payments. However 
the addition of such points need have little immediate impact on the average salaries of 
employees paid within this band, because it may take some years before staff will be 
able to access all the new points. It follows that the change in salary calculated by a 
comparison of payments at the top point of any pay band in any two consecutive years 
may bear little relation to the average change in salaries experienced by that grade 
during the same period. 
4.12 It can be claimed that there is no longer any automatic enti~lement to an annual pay 
increase for UK civil servants and that all increases in salaries are condjtional on 
performance. While this is strictly speaking correct, it is still the case that under these 
new arrangements the vast majority of UK civil servants continue to receive an annual 
increase in their pay because the performance of the vast majority has been judged to 
be at least 'satisfactory'. The specific indicator for the UK should capture such across 
the board increases. 
4.13 In addition to any general pay increase, some civil servants will under the new 
arrangements enjoy additional pay progression as a result of their annual performance 
appraisal. In the past, under the old incremental pay scales, some civil servants also 
enjoyed additional pay progression as they progressed up the incremental scale. The 
difference between the old and the new arrangements in this respect is that under the 
old arrangements such pay progression was automatic for those below the maximum, 
· while under the new arrangements this additional source of pay progression is 
discretionary, it depends on 'above average' performance. Under both the new and the 
old system this additional pay progression was and still is enjoyed by a minoa:ity of 
each grade (a majority of all the grades reported in the UK returns to Eurostat were on 
the maximum scale point) and it was ignored by the procedures for reporting salary 
changes developed by Eurostat. This additional source of pay progression has not 
been captured in the 1994 and 1995 UK returns to Eurostat nor is it proposed to 
c 
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capture this source in the revised procedures for developing the specific indicator for 
the UK outlined in the following section. 
4.14 The new central pay agreements, which introduced performance pay for all grades of 
civil servants included in the UK's returns to Eurostat, were negotiated in 1992 and 
implemented in the latter part of 1993 and' early 1994. As a result of these changes in 
the nature of the central agreements HM Treasury, which has until now supplied the 
data to Eurostat, changed the nature of the data they reported in 1994 and 1995. In 
1994 they reported the size of the overall pay settlement awarded under each of the 
main central agreements and spelt out in some detail the several separate elements that 
accounted for the overall settlement size. Thus for example the settlement for 
executive and support staff was reported to be worth 2.2 per cent on average. This 
2.2 per cent resulted from 
a one-off non-consolidated non-pensionable payment of 1. 6 per cent of 
basic pay for all staff who were in post on 1st April 1994; 
an- increase in the band minima of 1 step for the SGB 2 grade from 1 
April1994; 
a 2.2 per cent increase in ADP and accountancy allowances from 1 
Aprill994; 
a revised performance progression chart for 12 months from September 
1994 which gave an additional step to all Box I and Box 2 performers. 
There were also larger payn1ents for all Box 1, 2 and 3 performers 
towards the top of the band maxima; 
four steps were added to the current band maxima for all grades from 
September '1994. 
4.1 S The settlement for grades 5-7 was reported to be worth 1.5 per cent and that for 
clerical and secretarial staff to be worth 2.2 per cent in the same year. Similar detail to 
that provided for the executive and support staff was supplied to support these 
statements. Eurostat then indexed the average salaries for each of the main grades of 
civil servants as reported in the previous year by the size of these settlements to obtain 
the average gross salary levels for each grade in 1994. 
4.16 Where the calculation of the average size of settlement awarded to any grade is 
sufficiently detailed and the different elements of the award weighted by the number 
receiving each element, the settlement should measure accurately the change in the ). 
average level of remuneration of that grade as required for the method employed by 
Eurostat to construct the specific indicator. Indeed it will be superior in some respects 
to the previous procedures. Thus, for example, the 1994 return included an estimate 
of the impact on average salaries of the addition of four steps tQ the band maxima. 
The earlier procedures would have overstated the impact of such changes in the band 
maxima on average salaries. Where only the maximum and minimum points were 
being compared they would have weighted changes at the maximum by 0.5 although 
when several new points are being added to the top of a scale no staff in the grade 
would be likely to enjoy an immediate increase in salary of the magnitude of four 
points. Transitional arrangements would typically have been made to allow the steady, 
though automatic, progression of staff already on the maximum toward the new higher 
maximum only over a number of years. 
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4.18 The I 994 return contained an estimate of the impact on average salaries of changes in 
some allowances as required for construction of the specific indicator. .It is possible 
that under the old procedure where such changes in allowances or the allowances 
themselves applied to a minority of staff they went unrecorded. There was no clear 
instruction to weight allowances by the proportion of the grade receiving them and 
where this proportion was a minority some respond~nts may have chosen to disregard 
them rather than substantially overstate the size of increase. 
4.19 Therefore in several respects the I 994 return, and any other precisely calculated pay 
settlement, provides a more accurate measure of the change in the average salary of 
civil servants than does the procedure currently recommended by Eurostat. Clearly the 
accurate calculation of the impact of such changes on average salaries relies on 
sophisticated pay information systems. These now exist in all government departments 
and agencies in the UK and similar calculations to those reported above can therefore 
be made in the future. 
UK Data on the Salaries of Civil Servants 
4.20 The absence of any central source of information on either salaries or pay settlements 
·in the UK civil service means that the required information will have to be gathered 
directly from the departments and agencies. It would be impractical to ask all agencies 
and departments to supply the required data and thus a sample will need to be 
constructed. The four largest government departments and four largest agencies have 
been approached. All have expressed their willingness to supply appropriate data to 
Eurostat if a relatively simple procedure can be developed. Those departments and 
agencies agreeing to participate when taken together employ approximately 56 per 
cent of all civil servants in the UK4 •. They are: 
4.21 
4 
Government Departments 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
Ministry of Defence · · 
Department for Education and Employment 
Home Office 
Agencies 
Customs and Excise 
Inland Revenue 
Employment Service Agency 
Benefits Agency 
Total 
Staff 
S,S90 
83,736 
6,SOO app 
9,S66 
24,132 
S4,S62 
39,8S2 
66,6SO 
290,580 
Each of these eight agencies and departments will allocate their employees, all 
employees, to the four categories A to D according to the specification contained in 
Note from Tables 4 and S that after the Prison Service, the next largest agency employs 11,248 and 
the next largest department, the Department of Trade and IndusUy, employs S,l44. If these are 
included in the sample they would increase the share of UK civil servants covered by a mere 2 and I 
per cent respectively. 
... 
.. 
c 
4.22 
. 
4.23 
4.24 
4.25 
4.26 
4.27 
4.28 
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ART 65/19. Some may identify the specific grades in each of these categories, but 
.these are anyway likely to change over the next few years as agencies and departments 
undertake regrading. 
Eacfi of the eight will supply Eurostat with details of the average, size of settlement 
that has been implemented, for employees in each of the four categories A to D, over 
the twelve months preceding July 1st each year. The settlement details will take full 
account of any general increase, such as for example might be awarded to all 
satisfactory performers, and will also include the impact on average salary levels within 
each category of changes in the length of the pay bands, and the rate at which the 
average employee might be expected to progress within that band and changes in the 
average level of allowances and other additional payments. It'will measure changes in 
the pay of employees in each category net of those elements of their pay which are 
equivalent to incremental progression and promotion. Some of the agencies and 
departments may provide these details at the level of the separate grades within each of 
categories A to D, but this is not really necessary. 
In order that changes in net pay may be distinguished it will be necessary for each of \ 
the eight departments and agencies to supply Eurostat with details of the average gross 
salary level in each of categories A to D in either 1995 or 1996. (If the former the 
1995 can be indexed by the settlement size to obtain the average salary level for 1996). 
Note that because marital status and dependent children have no effect on gross 
earnings-no distinction between such household types will be made in the eight returns. 
Each of the eight will also supply Eurostat with details of the number of permanent 
employees in each of categories A to D. 
The calculation of net salaries can be achieved by taking the tax and national insurance 
schedules for the UK each year, id~ntifying ·the different tax and national insurance 
liability of employees in each pay range an~ deducting the appropriate amount from the 
gross salary in _each of the four categories A to D. The same tax and national 
insurance schedules and the same procedures for calculating the n~t of tax salaries will 
be appropriate for each one of the eight departments and agencies. It would therefore 
be most appropriate if Eurostat developed a routine whereby the calculations could be 
performed by Eurostat 011: receipt of the appropriate information. 
Eurostat anyway calculates changes in real gross and net pay using data on the change 
in retail prices obtained from the statistical authorities in the UK. Eurostat could also 
make arrangements to obtain, on an annual basis, details of the tax and national · 
insurance schedules from the taXation authorities. · . 
The procedure recommended above minimises the burden on the agencies and 
, departments which have agreed to supply the necessary data to inform the construction 
of the specific indicator for the UK. They will also inform Eurostat of changes in 
standard hours 'of work, holiday, pension and sick pay leave entitlements where it is 
made clear for what purpose these will be used. Changes in these other conditions of 
employment are increasingly likely under devolved pay bargaining and reque~ts for 
information on these aspects 'Yill need to be kept simple. 
The pay of senior civil servants, grades 2-5 seems likely to be centrally determined. 
Although the system has yet to be finally agreed it seems clear that information on the 
size of pay increases arising under these arrangements will be collated by the Office of 
Public Service (OPS) within the Cabinet Office.. At this early stage they appear to be 
'\ 
. 
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willing to provide the. information Eurostat will nee~ although it is impossible to say 
just what form this will take. An alternative is to seek to obtain the appropriate data 
for these employees directly from the eight departments and agencies . 
. t'' ' 
Conclusions 
4.29 The decentralisation of pay bargaining in the UK public sector . means that the 
arrangements for supplying data for the construction of the specific indicator will be 
more complicated than in the past. But a practical solution has been identified and 
&though thi$ still requires some further 'fine tuning' it should allow Eurostat to adhere 
to the principles underpinning the.construction of the specific indicator. 
4.30 As a next step Eurostat will need to enter into a dialogue with those responsible for 
pay and grading in the eight organisations. A questionnaire will need to be devised , 
and a pilot study, a 'dry run', should be undertaken, before the system begins operation 
in 1996. Eu~ostat may also wish to consider whether it would be more efficient to have 
the data from the eight organisations colJected and collated in the UK by some 
organisation contracted for this purpose. 
'. 
r 
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UK 
Malcolm Rennard, Emplovment Service, Pav Strategv Unit 
Karen French, Emoloyment Service. Pav Strategy Unit 
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1. Introduetion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the conditions governing the 
adjustment of the remunerations of officials and other servants of the European 
Community. When a· Single Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Communities were established, it was initially decided to introduce a common method 
for the adjustment of the purchasing power of salaries for civil servants and other 
officials of the Communities. This procedure was intended, firstly, to favour and 
maintain co-operation between European institutions and their officials; secondly, to 
avoid any disputes on salary adjustments. In 1991 a new agreement was reached 
setting the rules for the period 1991-2001, with a possible (marginal) revision after five 
years. The annexation of new Member States in the Communities and some major 
institutional ~hanges experienced by several countries in the organisation of the public 
sector, call for a reflection on the methodology and principles underlying the current 
procedure of salary adjustment. 
The main principle retained in the methodology currently in use is that of 
"parallelism", according to which any change (both upwards and downwards) in the 
purchasing power of salaries of national central government civil servants should 
translate into an equivalent change for officials of the European Communities (EC). 
The implementation of the principle of "parallelism" consists in the calculation - by the 
Statistical Office of the EC - of a Specific Indicator (SI), for each member state, 
reflecting changes in the real purchasing power of salaries during the reference period. 
Different types of SI are calculated (by occupational category, marital status, etc.) both 
in gross and net terms (after deduction of direct taxation). Finally, to determine the 
overall change of remunerations for all Member States together, the results obtained by 
the IS for each country are weighted by the total wage-bill of central government civil 
servants (as shown in National Account statistics}. 
In order to assess the ability of the IS to keep track of the actual evolution of 
civil servants pay and to check the statistical accuracy of the data used, the EC 
Statistical Office also computes a so-called Control Indicator (CI) in the form of per 
capita total wage-bill in Central Administratic;m (as defined in National Accounts). The 
two indicators (IS and CI) are then .compared by the Statistical Office and - under the 
presumption that their behaviour should be similar (at least in the long run) - some . 
considerations as to why they differ have to be drawn. In particular, the EC Statistical 
Office has the obligation to report and, eventually, explain the existence of a different 
evolution over time i~ the behaviour of the two indicators. Hence, it can be concluded 
that the monitoring of the evolution of national civil service (real) purchasing power of 
salaries - as to accomplish the principle of "parallelism" among Member States - is 
done essentially using the methodology described above and by comparing the Specific 
and the Control Indicator. 
In a number of countries, in the last decade ( 1985-1995), the performance of 
the Specific and the Control Indicator have shown an increasing tendency to diverge, 
with the former showing a flatter profile and the latter shooting up quite substantially. 
Since there is no reason a priori of why the Control Indicator should necessarily 
exhibit a. faster dynamic than the Specific Indicator, the simple observation that this 
occurs in a similar way and at the same time in different countries must tell us 
something (for this evidence see, Figure 1 ). In particular, there must be some 
systematic factors that have led the two indicators to diverge in such a way. Among 
'the countries which have shown an increasing divergence between the SI and the CI 
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we find: France, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Belgium and 
Portugal. This evidence has generated preoccupation among EC (and other Co-
ordinated Organisations) civil servants whose purchasing power (of salaries) is 
attached to the performance of the SI. In this respect, it might be useful to assess 
whether the divergence observed has to be mainly ascribed to a "bad" performance of 
the SI which (under particular circumstances) is not well suited to follow closely the 
actual changes of civil servant remunerations, or if it has to be interpreted in the light 
of the intrinsic differences which underlie the composition and the calculation of the 
two indicators. If the first hypothesis proves to be correct then it might be useful to 
· amend the SI so as to provide a better description of the evolution of civil servant 
purchasing power; alternatively, if the second hypothesis is true then a finer definition 
for the CI might be desirable. 
A number of studies have already analysed - for some countries .. the observed 
divergence between the two indicators (i.e. SI and CI) shedding light on various 
factors which might have contributed to their different behaviour. The main conclusion 
that can be drawn from these studies is that even if we can explain part of the 
divergence between the two indicators, an unexplained residual still exists. 
This study intends to contribute to this line of research - with particular 
reference to the recent experience of France and Italy .. both providing some insights 
on the potential reasons for the divergence of the SI and CI (a parallel study will focus 
more closely on this aspect), and also suggesting possible amendments to the 
methodology of calculation currently in use. The structure of the study is as follow. In 
section two some general remarks are set out as to how the two indicators (SI and CI) 
differ (both statistically and conceptually) and why they might diverge. Also, the role 
of the institutional differences across countries is discussed, and the likely impact it 
might have on the behaviour of the two indicators analysed. Section three-and four 
describe the recent experience, with respect to the remuneration of central government 
· civil servants, and future prospects for France and Italy, respectively. The concept of 
"parallelism" and the notion of change in purchasing power are presented and the main 
issues discussed. Some proposals for different ways of revising the methodology for 
the calculation of the Specific and the. Control Indicator are set out in section five. 
Section six contains some concluding remarks. 
2. General Remarks 
In the analysis of the evolution of the remunerations for civil servants, it is 
important to note that the role and the size of the public sector differ significantly both 
across countries and over time. In some countries, for example, public sector pay 
policy is considered as an important macroeconomic instrument for the success of 
incomes policies; further to this, the State might use public employment as a policy 
instrument. In particular, countries faced with high unemployment, might have a 
significant role to play in creating employment opportunities. 
In the 80's most European countries experienced a sharp increase in public 
sector spending, part otwhich was imputable to both increasing employment (i.e. net 
job creation was essentially imputable to the expansion of the public sector) and raising 
pay - as well as compensation costs. In recent years, however, the need to exercise 
control over public expenditure has led many countries to modify their pay systems or 
introduce new management procedures for public sector employees. Some countries 
• 
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have implemented programs to cut public employment, moderate pay growth and 
decentralise the pay-setting process. Other countries have implemented a pay 
detennination system in the context of devolved management of running-cost budgets 
to single Agencies or Departments. In general these reforms have been introduced with 
the intention of reducing the public sector pay bill and to improve the efficiency of 
public sector spending. 
Therefore, when cOnsidering the evolution of the purchasing power of civil 
servants across countries it should not be forgotten the fact that there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity in the structure and the behaviour of the public sector. In the present 
study the focus of analysis is confined to national Central Administrations (CA), which 
represent the "core" of the State and thus can be reasonably expected to be more 
homogeneous than the public sector as a whole. However, it should be stressed that 
major differences exist even comparing the composition of the CA, as some countries 
include in the CA sectors like Education or Health (or both) while many others don't. 
Also, the pay determination system in force in the public sector in each country 
may significantly influence the evolution of earnings for public employees. In countries 
where centralised collective bargaining sets the level of pay for civil servants, the 
evolution might heavily depend on the scheduling of collective negotiations, union 
strength, etc.; alternatively, in countries where a highly decentralised system is in force 
. and trade unions do not have a significant role in pay determination, the actual 
evolution might simply follow inflation or use private sector wages (on a local basis) as 
the reference. 
In the private sector, the working of the market mechanism plays an important 
role in determining the structure and the evolution of pay. Conversely, when 
considering pay determination in the public sector the reference to the market 
mechanism is rather loose and institutional factors might play .a central role. The view 
conventionally held describes pay setting in the public sector as being characterised by 
an extremely rigid structure, by the lack of effort enhancing incentives and an almost 
automatic progression of earnings with accumulated seniority. However, for the 
purposes of the present study, adhering to this picture, with the purpose of providing 
an adequate description of the pay setting process for civil servants, could prove rather 
misleading for two main reasons: first, in general, the actual evolution of earnings is . 
rather different from what can be inferred from the analysis of simple pay scales, as the 
joint effects of legislative intervention, collective bargaining and career advancements 
have a pervasive and a significant impact on pay; second, the situation, as already 
mentioned above, is changing rapidly in most countries and the constraints imposed by 
the market mechanism are starting to become binding also for public sector employees. 
The purpose of this overview was to underline the existence of a great deal of 
heterogeneity in both the structure and the practice of pay and employment 
determination in the public sector. It might also suggest that particular care is needed 
in the analysis of the different factors that contribute to the evolution of civil servants 
earnings. We devote the next section to the analysis of some of these factors and the 
role they might play in the divergeoce between the SI and the CI. 
2.1. The divergence between the Specific and the Control Indicator 
In order,to compare the performance of the Specific and the Control Indicator 
it is necessary first to identify the main features which might contribute to their 
J) 
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different evolution1. These features can be grouped so as to distinguish whether· the 
observed differences have to be imputed to either 'conceptual differences' .. i.e. due to 
their different intrinsic nature - or to 'statistical differences' - i.e. differences in the 
type of data used. Since most of the studies which have already analysed the 
differences between the two indicators have concentrated on the statistical aspects 
rather than focusing on the different economic concepts lying behind them, we shall 
briefly review the main findings concerned with the statistical incomparability and then 
discuss the differences in their nature. 
- Statistical differences: sectoral aggregation and pay definition 
One important reason why the SI and the CI may not be directly comparable 
lies in what we have defined 'statistical difference'. That is the data which is used in 
the calculation of the indicators differ substantially both in the definition of the pay 
variable - which is used as a reference for each one of the indicators - and in the 
underlying population considered (i.e. for the SI and the CI respectively). As far as the 
former is concerned it should be noted that the SI indicator is based on grQH 
remunerations (i.e. gross here refers to the inclusion of direct taxation and social 
charges paid by the employee), while the CI is mainly a rough proxy for· averaae labour 
~ paid by the State to civil servants employed in the Central Administration (i.e. as 
defined in National Accounts and inclusive of various types of social charges paid by 
the employer). The two aggregates usually differ a lot both in the levels and in the 
evolution2• 
A second important element of 'statistical' incomparability is concerned with 
the population of reference which is used in the calculation of the SI and the CI 
respectively. In the first case (i.e. the SI) the sample is arbitrarily selected by National 
officials as to be representative of 7 5 per cent of the total population of Central 
Government (restricted to those resident in metropolitan areas and excluding vanous 
types of occupations); while in the second case (i.e. the CI) the sample refers to the 
definition of Central Government retained in National Accounts. The difference 
between the two sample populations may be striking both in terms of occupational and 
sectoral composition3. · 
Further differences in the 'statistical' contents of the two indicators may 
concern: 
(i) the number of hours worked; 
(ii) overtime wage premia and pay for shift-work~ 
(iii) the proportion of part-time workers; 
(iv) the extent of temporary contracts; 
(v) paid leave of absence, etc. 
Most of the problems of statistical incomparability have received careful 
attention in recent years and various analyses concerning the _effects of these 'statistical 
1 Since, the standard methodology used by Eurostat to compute the SI is presented and discussed in 
several official documents, it shall not be discussed in detail here. Interested readers may refer to the 
following document: Eurostat, Specific Indicator: methodology and definition, Art 6S/19, February 
1994. 
2 Note that in Italy, for example, the average difference between net pay and total labour cost may 
reach 100 per cent. Also, in recent years, the amount of social charges in total compensation paid by 
the employer has proportionaly increased both in Italy and in France. _, 
3 Note that in France, for example, the sample used to compute the SI is approximately equal to 3.7 
per cent of the sample used as reference in National Accounts. 
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differences' on the behaviour of the SI and the CI are now available (Ferrari, 1992; 
Eurostat-Bl, 1994 (Art.65/17, 65/18)). Firstly, in order to deal with some of the issues 
mentioned above Eurostat has conducted a survey among Member States gathering 
information on several dimensions of the employment relationship, such as: 
composition of pay, hours of work, social charges, part-time, etc. Secondly, different 
types of "adjusted" Control Indicators ( ACI) · have been calculated as to account for 
some of the major 'statistical' differences which exists with respect to the SI, namely: 
(a) correcting National Accounts data for the presence of social charges paid by the 
employer (ACII), (b) accounting for the differences in terms of occupational and 
sectoral composition of the sample populations (ACI2). 
The main results obtained by the studies which have tried to explain the 
increasing divergence between the SI and the CI - observed in several countries in 
recent years- focusing on the sources of incomparability originating from 'statistical' 
aspects can be summarised as follows: first, there seems to be no significant difference 
in the evolution of the CI and the ACI 1 for most of the period in most countries; 
second, if a finer definition of Central Administration is derived by National Accounts 
(ACI2), so as to match more closely the definition retained in the calculation of the SI, 
still no valuable differences emerge between the evolution of the standard CI and the 
evolution of the Adjusted Control Indicator (ACI2t. (see Figure 2 for the empirical 
evidence) 
Hence, if the 'statistical' aspects concerning the definition of the SI and the CI 
are not helpful in explaining a significant part of the accumulated and increasing 
divergence between the two standard indicators (i.e. SI and CI), there is scope to 
investigate further the conceptual differences that might exist among them. 
- Conceptual differences: pay levels versus career profiles 
The analysis of the evolution of earnings involves various aspects. On the one 
hand, remunerations increase to keep up with the general rise in price level, such as to 
maintain the real purchasing power of earnings. On the other hand, workers during 
their lifetime career accumulate seniority and are promoted to higher positions in the 
occupational hierarchy, both of which are usually associated with higher pay levels. 
Other important factors which can further contribute to the .evolution of earnings are 
connected to the fluctuations induced by the business cycle, the presence and the 
power of trade unions in collective negotiations, macroeconomic policy objectives and, . 
last but not least, legislative intervention directed to the improvement of working 
conditions (pecuniary and non-pecuniary). 
Now, if we consider the lifetime career of a 'stylised' individual employed in 
the Central Administration of a Member State - bearing in mind all the caveats 
previously mentioned as to the • 
4 For an application to the case of Italy, see Ferrari . 1992. 
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Table 1 - Taxonomy of factors contributing to the evolution of pay 
(A) As far as total pay is concerned the year-to-year change will depend ~ ceteris paribus -
on the evolution of the different wage components: 
(1) standard rates of pay: 
- set either by the government or negotiated by the unions, these pay levels are 
usually attached to the occupational grade of the worker and are adjusted over time 
to maintain the real purchasing power of earnings - i.e. reference is made to the rate 
of inflation (actual, forecasted, programmed. etc.) 
(l) wage premia, indemnities, overtime and shift-work pay, etc. 
- set either by the government or negotiated by the unions, these might include 
seniority wage premia, other fixed premia (i.e. not strictly linked to the actual 
performance of the individual), several indemnities for particular tasks required by 
the occupational position, overtime and shift-work pay rates 
(3) performance related pay 
-criteria and conditions for the distribution of these pay premia might be set either 
directly by the government or negotiated by the unions. However, these elements of 
pay should include only the true discretionary payment made by managers, for 
exceptional performance. to a limited number of individuals. 
(B) As far as the occupational status is concerned the year-to-year change in pay 
will also depend - ceteris paribus - on the advancement made 
by the worker in the occupational hierarchy: 
(4) genenlised revaluation of occupational positions: 
- set either by the government or negotiated by the unions, the practice of 
generalised revaluation of occupational positions has been used very often in past 
years as a mean of raising the occupational status of a particular group of workers 
(but. more than that, as a mean of raising their pay levels). Usually it involves a 
shifting up of the grade-categocy-etc. in which certain groups of workers used to be 
classified. 
(5) specific promotion of individual workers: 
- These should include only the true advancement made by individuals as a result of 
particular skills or specific merits accumulated in previous periods. In most 
countries, this type of advancement in grade-category-etc. can only be made through 
public open competitions and not by discretional)' decisions made by manag~rs. 
• 
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differences existing across countries in pay determination practices - the evolution of 
his total gross earnings between period t and t-1 will depend on the role played by 
different factors: for example, the change occurred both in total compensation and in 
the occupational status. For the purposes of the present analysis in table 1 we propose 
a taxonomy ofthe vario"s factors that might contribute to the actual evolution of pay. 
There are some interesting questions emerging from table 1 that require some 
considerations. In the light of the above taxonomy, explicitly designed for the analysis 
of the evolution of earnings, it might be interesting to investigate in which way the SI 
and the CI differ conceptually, and also which are the factors that mainly contribute to 
the evolution of the two indicators. Furthermore, and more interesting, it should be 
discussed which elements of pay and occupational status have to be considered in the 
calculation of the SI so as to satisfy · the principle of "parallelism", that is « ... the 
principle of parallel development ensures that the same consideration is given to the 
economic and social situation as in Member States' decisions regarding salary 
adjustments of national civil servants» (ART. 65 Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities - amended in 1991 ). 
In what follows we shall briefly .sketch the general issues that are at stake, 
leaving to the following sections - after the presentation of the French and the Italian 
case - a more detailed discussion of the topics and some propositions for possible 
amendments. 
The different nature of the SI and the CI can be immediately evaluated simply looking 
at table 1. As an example consider the following points: 
(i) It is important to note that since the SI is a 'fixed weight' indicator (a 
sort of Laspeyres index) all factors concerned with section (B) of table 1 
do not enter in the calculation of the year-to-year salary changes. 
(ii) As far as the calculation of the SI is conce~ed, the main components 
of total compensation (if not the only ones) which are taken into account in 
order to measure the year-to.;.year changes in salaries of EC officials are 
those included in point (1). In recent years, for some countries, a rough 
estimate of some of. the elements contained in (2) has been added to 
standard rates. · 
(iii) Focusing on the CI, it is clear that all the factors mentioned in table 1, 
both in section (A) and (B), do contribute significantly to the evolution of 
the Cl. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the CI also includes social 
charges paid by the employer (both for health, pensions, etc. 
contributions). Hence the CI appears more as an indicator of the evolution 
of labour costs rather than remunerations. 
We want to conclude this section with few remarks. 
First, there should be no doubts that the SI and the CI are significantly different not 
only for 'statistical' reasons but ~so 'conceptually'. They measure different 
components of pay and labour cost which in general can have - and have had in most 
countries - a very different dynamics. Indeed, their evolution could be similar only 
· under very restrictive conditions which are not normally. met in rapidly changing or 
turbulent economies' . 
5 Note that only in an ideal world where: social charges evolve as a fix proportion of total 
compensation, where the different premia are costantly growing over time, where the effects of 
turnover are 'neutral, on average pay and where unions do not bargain for grade advances as well as 
pay rise, the two (SI and CI) indicator would indeed exhibit the same dynamics. 
j) 
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Second, it might. not be surprising to find out that in recent years, on average, 
following the persistent deflationary trend which has characterised most European 
economies the evolution of the SI (with fixed weights) has been constant or slightly 
declining in real terms (see Figure 3 for the empirical evidence). 
Third, it seems that in order to satisfy the criterium of 'parallelism' -stated in ART.65 
(and further amendments)- the simple reference to some ofthe elements of pay, as it is 
done in the calculation of the SI (see points (A) 1 and 2, in table 1), might not be 
sufficient to fully describe the actual evolution of earnings for EC civil servants. It 
should be stressed that the SI is certainly appropriate to capture (though with some 
lags) the evolution of pay experienced by each country in adjusting wage levels (of 
each given category-grade) to the changing rate of inflation, however in most cases 
this might be only a very small part of the evolution of pay of a worker during his 
lifetime career. In particular, in countries where pay setting in the public sector is used 
as a macroeconomic instrument for the success of incomes policies and, more 
generally, for overall wage moderation, the evolution of pay might take different 
forms. A clear example of these practices is the payment to large groups of workers of 
special premia or indemnities and the generalised revaluation of occupational positions, 
both used as a substitute for increases in standard rates of pay. Although this picture 
cannot be generalised to all European countries, it certainly mirrors closely enough the 
experience of the two countries under investigation. 
In sums, before analysing in more detail the recent experience of France and 
Italy, we can draw some conclusions: 
(i) If the interpretation which should be given to ART.65 in terms of salary adjustment 
is rather restrictive - i.e. so as to concern only changes in standard rates of pay - then 
the SI can be considered an adequate indicator for adjusting (partially) remunerations 
to the rate of inflation; 
(ii) If, alternatively, the interpretation has to be considered in a broader sense, that is so 
as to ' consider the actual changes in the real purchasing power of earnings, as 
previously described, then neither of the two indicator SI or Cl-is really appropriate. In 
this case, the 'true' evolution is likely. to fall in between those captured by the above 
·indicators - i.e. some convex combination of the two could be a close proxy -; 
(iii) In order to avoid ambiguities, it should be clear from the outset is that neither true 
merit payments (for exceptional individual performance, see point (A) 3 in table 1), nor 
specific promotions of individual workers (see point (B) 5 in table 1} should ever enter 
in the calculation of the Sl. In other words, only 'general' measures (even if 'general' 
refers to a given occupational category-grade) taken to improve the levels of pay, 
either through additional components of pay or through a revision of the job 
classification system, should be accounted for in the calculation of the Sl. Note, 
however, that individual performance related pay will always affect the evolution of the 
CI, and thus contribute to· its different dynamics. 
Since the institutional context and the rules governing both the pay 
determination process and career advancement in the public sector play a crucial role 
in the evolution of pay in each country, in the next paragraphs we shall describe the 
French and Italian cases. 
• 
• 
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3. The case of France 
The pay determination process in the public sector in France follows rules that 
differs substantially from those operating in the private sector. On the one hand, the 
salary of each employee (in particular considering the standard rates of pay) is 
determined very precisely by means of fix set of statutory rules. On the other hand, the 
adjustment of pay levels is done through the revaluation of the whole pay structure · 
applicable to all civil servants. Traditionally, in the adjustment process reference to the 
inflation rate, though not explicitly stated, was considered the main objective of the 
wage determination process. The growth of public spending coupled with high 
inflation rates, experienced in France in the 80's, pushed the Government to adopt a 
radically different attitude towards salary-price adjustments: namely, in the 90's, the 
de-indexation of salaries vis-il-vis prices became the main objective. Trade Unions play 
an important role in wage determination, as collective negotiations take place each 
year and set the guidelines for salary adjustme-nts. Note that in France, even if the 
Government is not obliged to reach an agreement with the Unions (i.e. as it has been 
the case in some years), in practice the influence of Unions on pay is very relevant. 
In the following sections, we shall try to keep separate (as much as possible) 
the effects on the overall evolution of pay, which are due to changes in the 
occupational structure as opposed to those due to changes in pay determination issues. 
3 .1. Career profiles 
The French statute for civil servants fixes principles, rights and obligations for 
career advancement of all employees employed in the public sector. The main points 
are: the requirement of public competitions for all recruitments in each grade-category 
(for permanent positions, titulaires) and existence of a career path that allows workers, 
according to their ability, to progress in the occupational hierarchy. There are four 
main categories in which workers are classed (A, B, C, D) depending on the 
educational level attained and the a.ccumulated experience. The career profile is 
precisely defined by rather rigid rules that set the number of grades, the average time 
necessary to move from one position to another, and the rules governing career 
advancements. Each grade is characterised by a point index, the whole structure of 
indices defines the grid of possible positions and thereby uniquely determines the pay 
structure. The latter point is very important as it implies that any occupational change 
will automatically modify the 'value' attributed to the job and thereby to the associated 
salary. 
3 .2. Pay determination 
The make up of pay for French public sector employees is rather complex, as 
the various components follow different rules. The main components are: 
(i) traitement de base - standard rate of pay, which follows ~ hierarchical point index 
structure 
(ii) indemnite de residence - additional component of pay, paid according to local 
living standards 
(iii) supplement familial de traitement - paid to families according to theN. of children 
(iv) primes - pay premia, usually paid to group of workers or, less frequently, to 
individual workers 
]J 
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for exceptional performance . 
. (v) indemnites - indemnities, usually attached to a certain occupation in reason of 
particularly difficult 
tasks, responsibilities, etc. 
Since 1989, it has become more difficult to follow the evolution of pay in the public 
sector as the number of ad hoc measures introduced to the benefit of a particular 
occupational category-grade have increased and have become more complex. 
Furthermore, the proportion of public sector employees concerned by these ad hoc 
measures has progressively increased, leading to a significant rise in the relevance of 
the 'additional' components of pay over total compensation (CERC, 1989). These 
'additional' components of pay can differ significantly between bodies of the Central 
Administration. 
In sum, the remuneration of a French civil servant employed in the Central 
Administration can change as a consequences of various factors, we shall consider 
some of them and see how the French institutional setting compares with the general 
taxonomy set out in table 1: 
( 1) The pay level changes following. the revaluation of the point index attached to the 
position (grade-category) or due to the granting of additional points which add up to . 
the current position (i.e these measures can be uniformly distributed or be very 
differentiated across occupations). 
(2) The salary level changes following the introduction or the increase of pay premia. 
These might be either temporary (i.e. the lump sum growth premium granted to all civil 
servants in 1989) or permanent (i.e. revaluation of certain indemnities for performing 
specific tasks). Pay premia and the various type of indemnities can var; a lot across 
ministries. 
(3) The salary level can change due to general measures taken to modify the career 
progression of all public sector employees, as well as of particular group of workers. 
These interventions imply a general re-definition of the point index occupational grid 
(with respect to the previous period). and translate directly onto the pay structure. 
From 1976 up until 1989 these measures were rather exceptional (i.e. after the "pause 
categorielle" declared by R. Barre) but after that date they have been used more 
frequently as a mean to change pay relativities across occupations or in order to 
protect low paid workers. 
(4) Finally, the pay level can change due to the advancement of the individual in the 
occupational ladder. For all openings a public competition is announced and only 
successful candidates obtain the post. In this case, the change in pay is simply due to 
the application of the point index associated to the new position. 
It should be stressed that, with the only exception of the factors influencing pay 
changes in point (4) and some of point (2), all the measures are subject to 
consultations with the unions. As previously discussed, these interventions could, in 
principle, be determined unilaterally by the Government, leaving to the practice of 
concertation with the unions only the role of fixing a point of reference. In practice, the 
measures taken often embody the outcome of negotiations. 
• 
• 
13 
3.2. Recent evolution of pay in Central administration and future prospects 
For the purposes of the present analysis, the evolution of pay in the public 
sector in France can be roughly divided into different periods which are characterised 
either by different institutional rules or by different macroeconomic conditions. In the 
beginning of the 80's high inflation rates determined a change in the objectives of 
Government's economic policy. The fight against inflation became the target and the 
de-indexation of salaries, of public sector employees, vis-d-vis prices became the main 
instrument chosen to implement that policy. In particular two measures introduced 
after 1983 are of particular relevance: first, the adjustment of salaries is done with 
respect to some forecasted change in prices with a possible catching-up at the end of 
the year; second, the traditional "comparison in levels" mechanism used to evaluate the 
change in salaries for civil servants, is being substituted by a "comparison in volumes" 
(i.e. total wage-billt. 
Therefore, whilst before 1983 salary negotiations were finalised towards a strict 
maintenance of the purchasing power of earnings, after that date reference to the 
growth of the wage-bill did not guarantee anymore that earnings levels would be 
preserved in real terms 7• The basic idea is that since the notion of wage-bill change 
includes the effects of the career advancements, the maintenance of real purchasing 
power is granted (on average) only to the individuals who progress in the occupational 
ladder. In other words, it has to be emphasised that the pay rise effects generated by 
career advancement are determinant in the maintenance of the purchasing power of 
earnings (Meurs, 1991). · 
More recently that is after 1989, as already discussed, the composition of pay 
has gone through a significant change with respect to previous periods. While, in the 
early 80's the structure of the pay package for public sector employees was relatively 
stable and the various components (standard rates, premia, indemnities, etc.) were 
evolving at the same pace of standard rates of pay, in the late 80's and in the 90's the 
evolution of the different components has become rather more complex. In particular, 
the weight of the 'additional' components of pay, as opposed to standard rates of pay, 
have progressively gained in importance, up to the point that the evolution of salaries 
of civil servants cannot be described anymore by an index of the changes in standard 
rates (CERC, 1991)8• The average rate for the premia, in 1992, was 18 percent of net 
pay (12 percent of gross pay); however, for more than 20 percent of civil servants 
(mainly ministries) premia may represent over 30 percent ,of gross salary. In particular, 
the evolution of premia after 1989 has represented the largest contribution to the 
increase in gross pay: between 1991-1993 the average annual percentage increase has 
been of9.5 (CERC, 1992). 
6 In the case of"comparison in levels" the· mechanism consists in comparing at different point in time 
(for a given structure) the changes in salaries and prices. Conversely, when the "comparison in 
volumes" is used the change in the total wage-bill is compared with the change in prices. Obviously 
the latter does not involve any direct reference to the maintainance of the purchasing power of 
earnings. 
7 In particular, given that this was a period of employment cuts in the French public sector, the 
reduced turnover determines an autonomous component of growth in the total wage-bill as the 
average age increases and, with no inflows, the whole occupational structure shifts up over time. 
8 One example of index which considers only the basic components of pay and is calculated at a fixed 
,structure {both for occupations and seniority) is the ·indicc INSEE des traitements'. See Appendix 3 
for an example. 
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In the same period, several measures have been taken in order to modify the career 
progression of public sector employees. These interventions, before 1989 were rather 
exceptional but after since they have become more frequent as a mean to change pay 
relativities across occupations and to protect low paid workers (see Figure 4). On 
avera~, between 1990-1993, the overall impact of specific occupational measures and 
career progression (the so called positive ·GVT') of civil servants has been 
approximately of2.5 percent. 
In the light of the recent French experience, several conclusions can be drawn 
at this point as to the descriptive power of the SI for monitoring earnings change: 
(i) the de-indexation process of salaries and the change in the reference 
method, from 'levels' to 'volumes', for wage negotiations has meant that 
there is no direct protection of purchasing power of earnings levels for any 
given grade-category of the public sector occupational structure; -
(ii) the maintenance of the purchasing power of earilings has been obtained 
also through pay rise due to career advancement. It is important to note 
that this is probably linked to the fact that the French statute for civil 
servants is designed so as to grant 'a career' to most workers. In the 
absence of career (or seniority) advancements there might be some officials 
suffering real earnings losses; 
(iii) the composition of pay has changed. The evolution of the different 
components has become rather more complex and the 'additional' 
components of pay (premia, indemnities) have progressively become more 
important. Hence, the evolution of salaries of civil servants cannot be 
simply described by an index of the changes in standard rates; 
(iv) the impact on the age structure, due to the slower turnover induced by 
the cut in public sector employment, and the special measures taken to 
modify the career progression of particular groups of public sector 
employees have significantly influenced the evolution of pay. The former 
has meant a faster growth for the total wage-bill, the latter has given the 
impression that the maintenance· of the purchasing power of pay is not 
achieved simply by the revaluation of the point index but also with general 
interventions on the classification of occupations. 
The above discussion can be useful to shed light, for the specific case of France, both 
on some of the reasons that can explain the divergence between the CI and the SI, and 
on the potential inadequacies of the SI to satisfactorily describe the actual evolution of 
earnings. The latter involves two elements: the importance of premia and indemnities 
on the evolution of salaries, and the role of job classification as to protect the real 
purchasing power of salaries. We shall return these points to next sections. 
4. The case of Italy 
In Italy the set of rules that governs the status of civil servants and the practice 
of pay determination is the result of a series of legislative interventions which 
proliferated over time and contributed to the complexity of public sector human 
resource management. This situation, . in certain cases, made it particularly difficult to 
distinguish between the public and private status of public sector employees. The so-
• 
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called "Legge Quadro" (L.n.93/1983) marks the first significant eff'~rt to reorgamse 
both pay determination procedures and the occupational classification of workers. 
Only very recently ("Accordo sui costo del lavoro", D.L.n.29/1993), both the status 
and the practices of pay determination have been deeply reformed and most standard 
private sector labour market practices have been introduced in the public sector. 
· The growth of public spending and the huge debt accumulated over the years 
have influenced most of. the measures taken, particularly in the last decade, by . the 
Italian Government with respect to the evolution of pay for civil servants. However, 
only starting with the beginning of the 90's the measures taken proved to be really 
effective in reducing the total wage-bill of the public sector. 
4.1. Career profiles . 
The system regulating the classification of occupations and the career 
advancement for civil servants is regulated by the "Legge Quadro". The main points 
are: the requirement of public competitions for all recruitments and the existence of 8 
main levels (grade category) in which workers can be classified according to the 
educational level attained and accumulated experi~nce. Workers can advance in the 
hierarchical ladder by seniority and public competition. In general, a proportion 
between 30 to 50 percent of new . openings is reserved to workers which have 
accumulated at least 5 years of seniority in the level immediately below. The 
occupational structure (8-11 levels according to the sector) is associated to a range of 
pay levels (minimo retributivo - basic pay) which are set through collective 
negotiations. A complete revision of the job classification system is currently under the 
study of a Parliamentary commission. 
4. 2. Pay determination 
In the present situation, public sector pay determination in Italy is characterised 
by collective negotiations which take .place between the unions and an independent 
Agency (ARAN - Agenzia per Ia rappresentanza sindacale nel pubblico impiego ). 
Several levels ofbargaining exists which may take place nationally or be decentralised: 
inter-sectoral .and sectoral (i.e. as defined by the "Legge quadro") are negotiated at 
national level while further agreements can be negotiated at the level of single 
Agencies (i.e. single Ministries, local Government). The main level for negotiations is 
the national level and involves 8 sectors of the State (both central and local). Th~ 
salaries of senior executives and managers (i.e. dirigenti), magistrates and University 
professors are not subject to negotiations, their pay levels are directly fixed by the 
Parliament The length of contracts used to be three years (as it was in the private 
sector), however after the 1993 reform its lenbrth is two years for the remuneration 
aspects and four ye~s for the normative aspects. 
Before the 90's a system of indexation of salaries over price increases was in 
force, however it was reformed several times during the 80's and definitively abolished 
in 1992-93. Now the protection of the purchasing power of earnings is pursued 
through collective negotiations with reference to the Government 'programmed' 
inflation rate. 
The composition of pay for Italian public sector employees is: 
(i) minimo retributivo - standard rate of pay, which are set through sectoral national 
negotiations 
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(ii) indennita integrativa speciale - (abolished in 1992-93) additional component of 
remunerations, used to be paid to adjust salaries to the cost of living 
(iii) retribuzione d•anzianita - (abolished in 1995) used to be paid according to 
accumulated seniority 
(iv) primes - pay premia, were usually paid to (almost all) workers or to specific 
groups. The criterion for the distribution of the incentive pay fund, for example, was to 
reward the presence at the workplace so that (almost) everybody would receive it. 
After the 1993 reform, pay premia are assigned to a limited number of workers for 
exceptional performance. Hence now they can account for a significant proportion 
oftotal pay. · 
(v) indennitd varie ~indemnities, usually attached to a certain occupation in reason of 
particularly difficult tasks, responsabilities, etc. Particularly in the past, they were often 
granted to bypass the stringent budgetary constraints imposed by financial law on the 
outcomes of negotiations and to assure wage increases. Even after the reform a large 
number of pecuniary advantages of this type still exists, however - in the spirit of the 
reform - they should progressively disappear. 
Hence starting from 1995, it will be more difficult to follow the evolution of pay in the 
public sector as the introduction of merit pay mechanisms and significant pecuniary 
premia will increase the individualisation of pay (Dragonetti, Stancanelli, 1995). 
As much as it is the case for France, the remuneration of an Italian civil servant in 
Central Administration can change, after the reform of 1993, as a consequences of 
various factors (see also table 1): 
( 1) The pay levels of civil servants is determined, for its principal component (minimo 
retributivo) through collective negotiations (two years contract). 
(2) Salaries might change also due to the increase of pay premia and indemnities. 
These might be either general (i.e. granted to all civil servants) or specific (i.e. 
individual merit pay). Pay premia and the various type of indemnities can now vary a 
lot across ministries and occupations. 
(3) The salary level can change due to general revisions of the job classification system 
of public sector employees, as well as of particular group of workers. These 
interventions are negotiated with the unions each four years. These measures have 
been also negotiated at the decentralised level (i.e. by single Agencies) as a mean to 
increase pay levels of particular occupational groups. 
(4) Finally, the pay level can change due to the advancement of the individual in the 
occupational ladder. For all openings a public competition is announced and only 
successful candidates obtain the post. In this case, the change in pay is simply due· to 
the application of the wage level associated to the new position. 
4.3. Recent evolution of pay in Central administration and future prospects 
In Italy, during the 1980s and early 1990s Governments have adopted various 
policies focused to the objective of reducing budget deficit and the growth of public 
spending. In this context, the main instrument has been the imposition of constraints on 
the rate of growth of salaries of public employees. One of the first intervention has 
·been the so-called "Legge Quadro" (L.n.93/1983) which reorganised pay 
detennination procedures and set out the general context for all future measures taken 
to contain the growth of public sector pay. The "Legge Quadro" introduced several 
new features in the pay setting process: first, with few exceptions, established the 
• 
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exclusive role for collective negotiations in pay formation; second, in order to lCeep 
under. control public sector pay expenses, the outcome of the negotiations had to be 
approved by a decree of the President and be included in the annual budget to be 
approved by the Parliament. 
Despite these strict regulations, ·the total wage-bill for public sector employees 
has continued to grow much faster than what forecasted by the government in 
preparing the financial law accompanying the budget and, more important, faster than 
inflation. Only starting with the beginning of the 90's the measures taken proved to be 
- really effective in reducing the total wage-bill of the public sector (Ambrosanio, 1995). 
In particular, the two waves of negotiations 1985-1987 and 1988-1990 are of 
particular relevance in order to understand the evolution of pay in the public sector (i.e 
between 1986-1989 the annual percentage growth of gross remunerations in the 
Central Administration has been equal to 12 percent, when consumer prices were· 
growing at 5.5 percent). First, in those years, the ceiling on pay growth fixed by the 
government was determined with reference to the negotiated pay levels (i.e. the so-
called minimi retributivi), however most of the increases in actual remuneration were 
obtained through the concession of indemnities and premia (paid to almost all workers 
in the sector'}. Second, in the same period, several measures have been taken in order 
to modify the career progression of public sector employees. In particular, in 1988 the 
so..:called ricompattamento of job classification concerned a generalised advancement 
of almost all levels higher up in the job classification hierarchy (i.e. the overall effect on 
the evolution of the pay bill of the ricdmputtamento has been estimated to be 
approximately 31% over the period 1988.:.1991, nearly 7. 5% per year). Other sectoral 
measures have also been negotiated as a mean to change pay relativities across 
occupations and grant further pay increases. 
More recently, that is after the creation of the Agency (ARAN) for negotiations 
in the public sector in 1993, several changes have occurred in the practice of pay 
detennination and in the composition of pay. Whilst, in the early 80's the structure of 
the ·pay package for public sector employees was relatively stable and the various 
components (basic pay, premia, indemnities, etc.) were evolving at the same pace of 
basic pay (minima retributivo), in the late 80's and in the 90's the evolution of the 
different components has become rather more complex. In particular, the weight of the 
'additional' components of pay, as opposed to standard rates of pay, have 
progresSively gained importance, up to the point that the evolution of salaries of civil 
servants cannot be described anymore by an index of the changes in basic pay10• (see 
Figure 5) 
In the light of the recent Italian experience, several conclusions can be drawn at 
this point as to the descriptive power of the SI for monitoring earnings change: 
(i) in the 80's the existence of a mechanism of indexation and the practice 
of monitoring negotiated pay 'levels' rather than the effective wage-bill, 
that is 'volume' pay, has determined a fast increase in total remunerations 
(also in real terms) of public sector employees. Increases have been 
granted mainly through the practice of generalised distribution of premia 
~iagioli and Santi ( 1988) report that merit and other incentivating premia were paid to over 90 
percent of the employed workorce in the Central Administration. 
10 The Italian National Institute of Statistics (lstat) computes an index -for the purposes of monitoring 
the evolution of pay in the public sector - only considering the basic components of pay as resulting 
from collective negotiations. See Dell'Aringa and DeLuca. (1991) for an example. 
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and indemnities. Hence, in Italy, the maintenance of the purchasing power 
of earnings has been obtained first through negotiated pay levels, second 
by an automatic mechanism of indexation and also by the payment of other 
'additional' pay elements. The latter, even if were originally thought as a 
mean to foster productivity and improve the efficiency of the public sector, 
in fact were largely used to grant additional pay increases, either at the 
centralised or decentralised level; 
(ii) seniority is, still, an important factor for career advancement in the 
public sector, even though (very recently) seniority indemnities have been 
abolished; 
(iii) the main emphasis for salary determination is placed on negotiations 
(centralised and decentralised), also normative issues are dealt with the 
practice of bargaining. 
(iv) Recent changes in pay determination practices have significantly 
altered the composition of pay, eliminating almost all automatic 
components of pay increases (indexation, seniority), and introducing 
effectively merit pay to improve efficiency. Indemnities (other than 
seniority), still represent an important component of pay and can vary a lot 
across sectors and occupations. Hence, since the evolution of the different 
make-up of pay has become rather more complex, basic pay (minima 
retributivo) is unlikely to be fully representative of the changes in the 
purchasing power of earnings of civil servants; 
( v) the impact on the age structure, due to the slower turnover induced by 
the cut in public sector employment, and the special measures taken to 
modify the career progression of particular groups of public sector 
employees (the so-called ricompattamento) have significantly influenced 
the evolution of pay. In particular, it has meant a faster growth for the total 
wage-bill. 
(vi) The outcome of recent negotiations for the Central Administration (i.e. 
1995) has shown a clear depart~re from previous standards, with wage 
moderation being at the forefront of the measure taken. 
The above discussion can be useful to shed light, for the specific case of Italy, on the 
observed divergence between the CI and the SI, and on the potential inadequacies of 
the SI to satisfactorily describe the actual evolution of earnings. As it was the case for 
France, the importance of the 'additional' components of pay, and the role played by 
job re-classification measures to protect real purchasing power of salaries can be 
identified as the main factors for the different performance of the indicators. 
5. Proposals for amendments 
In this section, we shall review the main points that have emerged from the 
analysis of the experience of France and Italy in setting wages for civil servants 
employed in the Central Administration. With reference to the recent behaviour of the 
Sl and the CI, we intend to pursue further the discussion on the adequacy of the 
current methodology for monitoring the changes in the purchasing power of earnings 
for EC officials. In particular, we shall first recall the principle of 'parallelism' and, by 
contrasting the changes occurred over time in the pay determination systems - both ;!1 
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France and in Italy-, ask whether the SI (conceptually and statistically) is still a v"alid 
representation of the actual evolution of civil servants earnings. Second, we shall 
review the methodology currently in use in the light of the increasing divergence 
observed between the two indicators (SI and CI) in France and Italy. Third, several 
proposals will be suggested for possible 'short-term' and 'long-term' amendments to the 
standard calculation of the SI. Finally, we shall also consider alternative sources of 
data which might be useful to circumvent the problem posed by the collection of data 
and the elaboration of specific indicators. 
5.1. How to interpret the principle of"parallelism" 
The application of the principle of 'parallel' behaviour in salary adjustments 
between national civil servants and EC officials suffers from several limits: some of 
these are inherent to its (vague) definition, while others are the results of the dramatic 
changes · occurred in recent years in pay determination practices of various EC 
countries. With reference to the first point. it should be considered that the 
requirement of a 'simple' and 'universal' concept, which can encompass different 
institutional settings and different pay setting practices, inevitably suffers from some 
arbitrariness in its implementation. Hence the existing differences in the structure and 
the organisation of public sector employment and in the composition of pay across 
countries make it particularly difficult to translate the principle into an effective and 
sufficiently general (common) methodology. With reference to the second point, it 
must be said that the recent experience of most European countries - characterised by 
substantial revisions of pay determination and job classification mechanisms - has made 
the task of adhering to the principle of 'parallelism' using a simple and common 
methodology particularly difficult. The recent trend has determined a progressive 
departure of current pay setting procedures from those prevalent in previous decades -
when the current methodology for the calculation of the SI and CI was first introduced 
-and has also significantly exacerbate, ceteris puribus, the differences across countries 
in the pay determination process for pu~lic sector employees. 
The first remark that can be made, in the light of the above discussion, is that 
the evolution of pay setting systems in member countries makes it increasingly difficult 
to satisfy the principle of 'parallelism' using the simple .~ethodology designed for the 
SI. This occurs for two main reasons: the different meaning of the job classification 
and the career path of civil servants in member countries, on the one side; and the 
increasing complexity of the composition of pay, on the other side. The latter means 
that the simple monitoring of basic pay (on average) will not be sufficient to keep track 
of the evolution of pay: in this direction, more flexibility in the definition of the 
remuneration could be a useful modification to the standard methodology. For 
example, the inclusion of some 'additional' components of pay granted to a number of 
individuals and not directly related to individual performance (i.e. as it has already been 
partially done in recent years for France and Italy) could improve the performance of 
the SI. Since, the treatment of these 'additional' components of pay for fiscal and social 
contribution matters is very different across countries and for EC officials, particular 
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care should be paid in assessing the different regimes, and the major differences should 
be 'averaged out' 11 . 
With reference to the career path and the job classification system of civil 
servants, it has to be noted that EC officials already have their own career progression 
and seniority advancements, and that the adjustment method should not duplicate their 
effects by incorporating some elements of occupational progression in the revaluation 
of their earnings levels. However, in the light of the French and Italian experience, 
generalised . revisions of the job classification system have been widely used to re-
establish pay relativities, grant generalised pay increases and as a mean to protect the 
-purchasing power of earnings. In this context, the principle of 'parallelism' - intended as 
'parallel' consideration of the economic and social situation regarding salary 
adjustments (ART.65)- would require the effects of these measures to be somehow 
incorporated in the revaluation of earnings levels. Since the SI is a 'fixed weight' index, 
these effects would not be normally captured by the standard methodology. 
Furthermore, depending on how the job classification revision is done (i.e. for 
example, in France it has been done either moving up people in the grade-category 
structure, or granting additional points to a given grade-category) and on the 
institutional context in which it occurs (i.e. in Italy, occupational grade-category 
upgrading have been negotiated by the unions both centrally and locally), the outcome 
on the index might be different. Also in this case, additional flexibility should be 
allowed in the computation of the SI, as to partially account for the effects of these 
general measures. For example, detailed information (concerning the measures and the 
method adopted in each country) could be gathered and the effects of the job 
classification revision incorporated in the computation of the index either by revising 
the occupational weights or by allowing some 'occupational drift'. Of course, some 
arbitrariness as to the 'type' and the 'generality' of the measures implemented might 
create some problems of interpretation and further complicate the calculation of the SI, 
but the resulting index-value should be closer to the real evolution of earnings. 
One practical problem, which will be discussed at some length in one of the 
following section, is related to the availability of such information within the time limits 
imposed by the system currently adopted. However, considering the considerable 
improvement in the collection and elaboration of pay data in Central Administration in 
most countries (France and Italy included), good estimates of the (average) effects of 
the above measures could be easily obtained. 
5.2. How to deal with institutional change and institutional differences 
When the methodology. for the calculation of the SI was first conceived (in the 
60's and 70's) most European countries were characterised by a wage determination 
system for public sector employees which had (approximately) the following 
characteristics: 
(i) extremely centralised setting for pay levels and a rigid job classification structure; 
(ii) salary adjustment was made with reference to the previous year( s) 'levels'; 
(iii) basic pay would account for the largest part (if not the totality) of total 
compensation; 
11 A first step so as to guarantee an equal treatment would be to gather detailed information on the 
regime adopted (for fiscal and social contribution reasons) in each country and confronted with that of 
the EC officials. 
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France and in Italy-, ask whether the SI (conceptually and statistically) is still a valid 
representation of the actual evolution of civil servants earnings. Second, we shall 
review the methodology currently in use in the light of the increasing divergence 
observed between the two indicators (SI and Cl) in France and Italy. Third, several 
proposals will be suggested for possible 'short-term' and 'long-term' amendments t~ the 
standard calculation of the SI. Finally, we shall also consider alternative sources of 
data which might be useful to circumvent the problem posed by the collection of data 
and the elaboration of specific indicators. 
5.1. How to interpret the principle of"parallelism" 
The application of the principle of 'parallel' behaviour in salary adjustments 
between national civil servants and EC officials suffers from several limits: some of 
these are inherent to its (vague) definition, while others are the results of the dramatic 
changes occurred in recent years in pay determination practices of various EC 
countries. With reference to· the first point. it should be considered that the 
reqUirement of a 'simple' and 'universal' concept, which can encompass different 
institutional settings and different pay setting practices, inevitably "suffers from some 
arbitrariness in its implementation. Hence the existing differences in the structure and 
the or8anisation of public sector employment and in the composition of pay across 
countries make it particularly difficult to translate the principle into an effective and 
sufficiently general (common) methodology. With reference to the second point, it 
must be said that the recent experience of most European countries - characterised by 
substantial revisions of pay determination and job classification mechanisms - has made 
the task of adhering to the principle of 'parallelism' using a simple and common 
methodology particularly difficult. The recent trend has determined a progressive 
departure of current pay setting procedures from. those prevalent in previous decades -
when the current methodology for the calculation of the SI and CI was first introduced 
-and has also significantly exacerbate, ceteris paribus, the differences across countries 
in the pay determination process for pu~lic sector employees. 
The first remark that can be made, in the light of the above discussion, is that 
the evolution of pay setting systems in member countries makes it increasingly difficult 
to satisfy the principle of 'parallelism' using the simple .~ethodology designed for the 
SI. This occurs for two main reasons: the different meaning of the job classification 
and the career path of civil servants in member countries, on the one side; and the 
increasing complexity of the composition of pay, on the other side. The latter means 
that the simple monitoring of basic pay (on average) will not be sufficient to keep track 
of the evolution of pay: in this direction, more flexibility in the definition of the 
remuneration could be a useful modification to the standard methodology. For 
example, the inclusion of some 'additional' components of pay granted to a number of 
individuals and not directly related to individual performance (i.e. as it has already been 
partially done in recent years for. France and Italy) could improve the performance of 
the Sl. Since, the treatment of these 'additional' components of pay for fiscal and social 
contribution matters is very different across countries and for EC officials, particular 
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care should be paid in assessing the different regimes, and the major differences should 
be 'averaged out'11 . 
With reference to the career path and the job classification system of civil 
servants, it has to be noted that EC officials already have their own career progression 
and seniority advancements, and that the adjustn1ent method should not duplicate their 
effects by incorporating some elements of occupational progression in the revaluation 
of their earnings levels. However, in the light of the French and Italian experience, 
generalised revisions of the job classification system have been widely used to re-
establish pay relativities, grant generalised pay increases and as a mean to protect the 
purchasing power of earnings. In this context, the principle of 'parallelism' - intended as 
'parallel' consideration of the economic and social situation regarding salary 
adjustments (ART.65)- would require the effects of these measures to be somehow 
incorporated in the revaluation of earnings levels. Since the S~ is a 'fixed weight' index, 
these effects would not be normally captured by the standard methodology. 
Furthermore, depending on how the job classification revision is done (i.e. for 
example, in France it has been done either moving up people in the. grade-category 
structure, or granting additional points to a given grade-category) and on the 
institutional context in which it occurs (i.e. in Italy, occupational grade-category 
upgrading have been negotiated by the unions both centrally and locally), the outcome 
on the index might be different. Also in this case, additional flexibility should be 
allowed in the computation of the SI, as to partially account for the effects of these 
general measures. For example, detailed information (concerning the measures and the 
method adopted in each country) could be gathered and the effects of the job 
classification revision incorporated in the computation of the index either by revising 
the occupational weights or by allowing some 'occupational drift'. Of course, some 
arbitrariness as to the 'type' and the 'generality' of the measures implemented might 
create some problems of interpretation and further complicate the calculation of the SI, 
but the resulting index-value should be closer to the real evolution of earnings. 
One practical problem, which will be discussed at some length in one of the 
following section, is related to the avail~bility of such information within the time limits 
imposed by the system currently adopted. However, considering the considerable 
improvement in the collection and elaboration of pay data- in Central Administration in 
most countries (France and Italy included), good estimates of the (average) effects of 
the above measures could be easily obtained. · 
5.2. How to deal with institutional change and institutional differences 
When the methodology for the calculation of the SI was first conceived (in the 
60's and 70's) most European countries were characterised by a wage determination 
system for public sector employees which had (approximately) the following 
characteristics: 
(i) extremely centralised setting for pay levels and a rigid job classification structure; 
(ii) salary adjustment was made with reference to the previous year(s) 'levels'; 
(iii) basic pay would account for the largest part (if not the totality) of total 
compensation; 
11 A first step so as to guarantee an equal treatment would be to gather detailed information on the 
regime adopted (for fiscal and social contribution reasons) in each country and confronted with that' of 
the EC officials. I 
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(iv) no structured collective negotiations, as public sector unions were weak or even 
absent; 
(v) stable or growing employment (in the public sector). , 
Under these settings, the SI was very efficient in monitoring the evolution of 
pay for any given grade-category of the job classification structure. Also, no significant 
- differences would appear in the evolution of pay levels (proxied by the SI) and average 
. labour cost (proxied by the Cl). Furthermore, if any difference was to appear, given 
' the increasing size and the high inflow of employees in the public sector, this would be 
; represented by a faster dynamics of the SI with respect to the CI. 
Since then the scenario has changed dramatically. As documented in some 
detail in the previous sections, several countries (France and Italy among them)- under 
the pressure of increasing public sector spending - progressively revised their pay 
systems, cut public employment and moderate pay growth. In the new setting, for most 
countries, the characteristics listed above (from (i) to (v)) have been almost totally 
reversed. The new features can be summarised as follows: 
(i) progressive decentralisation of pay setting (not so much in France); 
(ii) a more flexible job classification structure, subject to frequent revisions; 
(iii) salary adjustment made with reference to the 'volume' of remunerations rather than 
previous year(s) 'levels'; 
· (iv) basic pay accounts for only a portion of total compensation, while 'additional' pay 
components (indemnities, pay premia, performance related pay) are increasingly 
important; 
(v) structured collective negotiations and powerful public sector unions (particularly in 
Italy); 
(vi) decreasing employment (in the public sector). ' 
Obviously, several other features and structural changes have marked a drastic 
departure from the previous settings, however, those listed above appear to be 
particularly relevant for the performance of the SI. The changes occurred in the 
institutional setting call for greater flexibility both in the collection of information and 
in the implementation of the methodology for the calculation of the Sl. There is an 
evident disparity between the simplicity and the homogeneity of the procedure 
currently applied and the increased heterogeneity in the pay determination mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, in o(der to deal with the increased complexity of the new scenario, a 
more articulated procedure might prove useful for a better performance of the SI, even 
without losing the basic structure of the methodology currently applied. 
5.3. How to amend the Specific and Control Indicators 
In this section we shall discuss, along the lines sketched in previous sections, 
some of the possible amendments that could be introduced to the current methodology 
for the calculation of the SI and the CI. In the proposal, we shall try to adhere, as 
much as possible, to the principle of 'parallelism' and keep, at the same time, the 
methodology for the calculation of the indices simple and transparent. This section will 
be divided in two parts: the former will concern some general issues, the latter will 
focus instead on few specific points. 
- General issues 
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In this section some general issues, which might not have a precise "and 
immediate application for the revision of the procedures for the calculation of the SI 
and CI, will be discussed: 
(i) More effort should be devoted to the collection of a wide range of information on 
the institutional setting governing pay determination in each country, and the changes 
occurring ·over time. Foil owing the current procedure a more active (bilateral) co-
operation between Member States and Eurostat could improve the collection of both 
(general) information and remuneration data. Additional questionnaires on specific 
topics could be distributed, at given dates, to member countries. 
Note: Something similar has already been done by Eurosta~ in order to assess exactly the statistical 
nature of the data on remunerations supplied by each country (ART. 65/17, ART. 65/18) 
(ii) A better harmonisation of the statistics which are used to compute the SI and the 
CI should be pursued further. In particular, as discussed in previous sections, both 
statistical and conceptual differences contribute to the divergence in the evolution of 
the SI and the CI. 
• huge differences exist in the sample population of reference used for the 
calculation of the SI and the CI in the various countries (in the case of France the 
SI is computed on a sample population which accounts for less than 4 per cent of 
the total employment of the Central Administration - i.e. as defined in the 
National Accounts and used in the Cl). 
• a marked difference exists between the definition of "pay" in the SI and in the Cl. 
Further efforts to homogenise the "pay" variables between the CI (which now 
includes also various types of social charges paid by the employer) and the SI 
(which does not include social charges paid by the employer) could be fruitfully 
pursued. 
• the increasing complexity and heterogeneity of the composition of pay across 
countries requires a careful analysis of the different elements which enter in the 
definition of 'gross remuneration' (used in the SI computation). In the light of 
these differences - which also exist among Agencies of the Central Administration 
within a single country - information should be collected on the various types of 
existing premia and.indemnities (see below lpecific points). 
(iii) The evolution of the CI, as previously discussed, is influenced by various factors 
which affect average labour costs but leave the gross remuneration for a given 
occupational position unchanged. These factors concern the effects on pay of the 
ageing of the employed workforce and the promotions that follow a public competition 
(general revisions of the job classification structure are of a different nature). Also the 
occupational inflows and outflows in the Central Administration can influence the Cl. 
These effects are defined as 'net drift' (or G~~r solde) and their relevance on the 
evolution of the CI coul~ be estimated. In comparing the dynamics of the SI and the CI 
these effects should be deducted from the evolution of the CI, whil~ general revisions 
of the job classification structure (unilaterally decided by the State or negotiated with 
the unions) should be accounted for by the SI. 
Note: The procedure of deducting the 'net drift' is already currently applied in some countries (for 
example by the INSEE in France) and could be easily extended to the sample population of the Cl. 
t. 
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(iv) Whilst in France pay setting is extremely centralised and only few differences in 
total compensation exist across different Agencies of the Central Administration, an 
increasing decentralisation in collective negotiation is taking place in Italy. 
Decentralised bargaining at the level of single Agencies can involve additional pay 
premia (which in principle should be matched by productivity gains) and modifications 
to the occupational classification of employees (where the guidelines are set by central 
negotiations). Some information on the relevance and the issues dealt with by 
decentralised bargaining could be collected at given dates (each 2 years for example). 
In this case, questionnaires could be filled by the various Agencies. 
(v) National Statistical Offices collect and elaborate various types of statistics besides 
those published in the National Accounts. This information could be useful to support 
and validate the data collected for the SI. In some cases, that is in those countries 
where the performance of the SI and of the CI is not particularly satisfactory reference 
to a third (Official) indicator could be added. 
Note: Examples of data and indicators elaborated by National Statistical Offices are: 
(France) 'lndice INSEE des traitements' published by the INSEE 
(Italy) 'Conto annuale' published by the Ragioneria Generate dello Stato and by Istat. 
Before turning to the next section (Specific points) we shall consider the feasibility for 
the implementation of the above proposals. All the points discussed above, require 
additional efforts and further complicate the procedure currently adopted by Eurostat 
for the calculation of the SI and the CI. A strict co-operation between Member States 
and Eurostat is essential for the collection of the information and the data. However, 
these efforts should be compensated by a better understanding on the evolution of pay 
in National Central Administrations. 
A legitimate question that may arise concerns the availability and the timing for 
the transmission of the information required. As far as the two countries under 
investigation ·are concerned there should be no serious problems: both France and Italy 
have a well developed system for a prompt updating of remuneration data (even at 
monthly frequencies) and for the necessary elaborations. 
An alternative procedure along these lines, which shall be discussed below in 
the longer-term proposals, would be to construct a stratified (according to the 
parameters required by Eurostat) random sample of remuneration data for Central 
Administration in each country and use it to compute the SI. The feasibility of this 
procedure should be verified with each country. 
- Specific points 
In this section we shall propose a number of amendments to the methodology currently 
adopted for the calculation of the Sl. These proposals are intended as a short-term 
modification and do not alter the structure of the current procedures: 
(i) In the light of the increasing complexity and heterogeneity, observed both in France 
and Italy, in the composition of pay - significant differences may also exist among 
Agencies of the Central Administration - information should be collected on the 
various types of existing premia and indemnities and, after having excluded the 
effective 'performance related pay' component, average 'additional' pay components 
24 
should be computed for 'stylised' individuals (for grade-category or Agency level). 
·Each 'stylised' pay component should then be included (using the appropriate weights) 
in the calculation of the SI. 
Although some pay premia have already been accounted for in recent years in 
the calculation of the SI, they still represent a small percentage of the effective 
'additional' pay components. Since, as discussed in previous sections, the evolution of 
total remuneration has been significantly influenced by these kind of pay components 
(even at.the expense of 'basic pay', as it has occurred in Italy) their exclusion can be 
considered an element of distortion in the evolution of the SI. 
In the past, various types of indemnities have not been considered on the 
premises that they are paid to particular employees for specific tasks or for unpleasant 
job conditions. Note, however, that the principle of 'parallelism' implies that employees 
in a given grade-category face (on average) similar job conditions, therefore also 
special indemnities (i.e. paid for specific job conditions) could be profitably included 
(using the appropriate weights). 
(ii) A more frequent revision (that is yearly, as required by the regulations ofEurostat) 
of the occupational structure and thus of the weights used to compute the SI should be 
maintained. Particularly in periods characterised by rapid changes and deep reforms of 
the job classification structure (like those experienced, in recent years, by France and 
Italy) the use of inappropriate weights can distort the evolution of the Sl. 
Also, when revisions of the 'job classification' structure are taken as a mean of 
revaluating earnings levels for certain grade-categories, or in order to shift up the 
whole wage structure these measures should be incorporated into the calculation of the 
SI (as they would not normally be captured by a fixed weight indicator, like the SI)(i). 
As discussed at some length in the previous sections, this does not mean that the career 
progression of individuals is incorporated in the SI, but simply that when increase in 
salary take the form of a higher job classification (i.e. without any public competition 
as requested by the law) then this effect should be captured somehow by the indicator 
ofthe evolution ofpay(ii). 
Note: (i) This might require, under particular circumstances (i.e. major institutional changes), the 
use of a different index (not a Laspeyres type index). 
(ii) This problem of drift is more relevant for Italy than for France, where the revision of the 
job classification structure have often been done by a revaluation of the occupational point structure or 
granting additional points to selected grade-categories. In the case of France, if the appropriate 
weights are used, these measures directly translate to the according sal81)' levels by grades. 
5.4. Alternative sources of information for remuneration data 
All the proposals discussed thus far had a short-term objective and were casted 
in the spirit of methodology currently in use. In this section, we shall outline two 
different directions for a more radical and long-term reform of the methodology. In 
one case, the proposal intends to suggest the exploitation of the rich administrative 
archives on compensation costs that National Central Administration have. In the other 
case, the data necessary to construct the SI could be drawn from the newly established 
"Structural Earnings Survey" (Eurostat) conducted in all European countries in a 
standardised way, which could be easily extended so as to cover also Central 
Administrations. 
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(i) National Archives on Compensation Costs 
Both France and Italy collect (monthly) for administrative or fiscal reasons a 
huge amount of information on the remunerations of public employees12. This data are 
currently elaborated and distributed in official publications ("Les salaires des agents de 
reta.t", INSEE Resultats- "Conti Annuali", Ragioneria Generate dello Stato). Since, 
performance related pay is often subject to a different treatment (for social security of 
fiscal reasons), pay composition is detailed and a decomposition of the 'additional' 
components of pay could be obtained. 
Hence an alternative way of constructing an index for adjusting the 
remunerations of EC officials would consist in drawing a representative stratified (i.e. 
by categories, Agencies, etc.) random sample of remuneration data for employees of 
the Central Administration (after excluding military, doctors, teachers, etc.) and 
following over time the evolution of their pay. Some care should be used in the 
extraction procedure, so as to avoid selection bias or the use of unrepresentative 
samples (in some cases also the use of the entire universe of Central Administration 
employment might be feasible) and also in the treatment of lump-sum and other kind of 
payments. The elaboration of the data (following Eurostat guidelines) could be done 
directly by Member Countries or by' Eurostat. With the collaboration of Member 
countries the data could be obtained before the official publication, so as to respect the 
deadlines imposed by ART.65. 
(ii) "Structural Earnings Survey" @lrostat) 
Recently, Eurostat has launched a yearly survey on the structure of earnings 
(the first survey after a pilot study was in 1994). This survey is conducted with a 
similar structure and an identical questionnaire in all European countries. Among the 
scopes of the project there is also the publication of a labour cost index ( disaggregated 
for major sectors of the economy). One option, tbr the purpose of disposing of reliable 
and comparable disaggregated data, might be to consider the possibility of extending 
the survey also to the public sector. 
However, two main limits of this procedure should be investigated further: 
first, in accordance with the requirements set out in Art. 65, reference to the public 
sector as a whole might not be sufficient and an oversampling of Central 
Administration to obtain statistically representative data might be necessary; second, 
the timing for the elaboration of the data may exceed the deadline imposed by the 
regulations set out in ART.65. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This report has examined the main features governing pay determination in the 
Public sector of France and Italy, in the attempt of evaluating and validating the 
procedure currently used for the adjustment of the remunerations of officials and other 
servants of the European Community. The principle of "parallelism" for the 
adjustment of remunerations to changes in the purchasing power of salaries of national 
central government civil servants - as retained in Art.65 - has been analysed and the 
implications for the calculation of the Specific Indicator discussed. 
12For a detailed description of the new data available in Italy, see Travaglione (1995). 
}) 
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In particular, the present study argues that the conventional view of pay setiing 
in the public sector which lies behind the methodology based on the Specific Indicator 
- i.e. as being characterised by an extremely rigid structure, lack of effort enhancing 
incentives and an almost automatic progression of earnings with accumulated seniority 
- is no longer entirely appropriate. Two main factors may prove useful to explain the 
changed perspective: first, the actual evolution of earnings is becoming more complex 
and, in general, rather different from the picture that emerges from the analysis of 
simple pay scales~ i.e. the joint effects of legislative intervention, collective bargaining 
and career advancements now have a pervasive and significant impact on pay; second, 
the institutional setting has changed drastically in most countries and the constraints 
imposed by the market mechanism are starting to become binding also for public sector 
employees- i.e. employment flexibility, incentive premia, labour mobility, etc. are more 
common. 
In particular, when the methodology for the calculation of the Specific 
Indicator was first conceived most countries were characterised by a wage 
determination system for public sector employees which had (approximately) the 
following characteristics: 
• extremely centralised setting for pay levels and a rigid job classification structure; 
• salary adjustment was made with reference to the previous year(s) 'levels'; 
• basic pay accounting for the largest part of total compensation; 
• no structured collective negotiations (L e. public sector unions were weak or 
absent); 
As argued in the report, under these settings, the Specific Indicator was very 
efficient in monitoring the evolution of pay for any given grade-category of the job 
classification structure. However, since then several countries (France and Italy among 
them) progressively revised their pay systems, cut public employment and moderate 
pay growth. In the new setting most of the features listed above have been reversed. 
The new features can be summarised as follows: 
• progressive decentralisation of pay setting; 
• flexible job classification structure, subject to frequent revisions; 
• salary adjustment made with reference to the 'volume' of remunerations rather than 
'levels'; 
• basic pay accounts for a portion of total compensation, while 'additional' pay 
components (indemnities, pay premia, performance related pay) are increasingly 
important; 
• structured collective negotiations and powerful public sector unions; 
In the light of the above scenario, a greater flexibility both in the collection of 
information and in the implementation of the methodology, even without losing the 
basic structure currently applied, might prove useful for a better performance of the 
Specific Indicator. Hereafter, we shall present some possible amendments (some rather 
general other very specific) that could be introduced in the current procedure: 
• collection of a wider range of infomiation on the institutional setting governing pay 
determination in each country and the changes occurring over time; 
• better harmonisation of the statistics which are used to compute the Specific 
Indicator; 
• decentralisation in collective negotiation can involve additional pay premia and 
modifications of the occupational classification of employees. Hence, information 
• 
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on the relevance and the issues dealt w-ith by decentralised bargaining could be 
collected at given dates; 
• Since each National Statistical Office collects and elaborates various types of 
statistic~, this infonnation could be useful to support and validate the data collected 
for the Specific Indicator; 
• collection of information on the various types of premia and indemnities (excluding 
effective 'performance related pay') for 'stylised' occupations; 
• more frequent and accurate revision of the occupational structure and thus_ of the 
weights used to compute the Specific Indicator~ 
In conclusion it is hoped that with the amendments proposed herein, a better 
performance of the Specific Indicator in adjusting the purchasing power of salaries for 
civil servants of the European Com!llunity might be achieved. 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of the Specific Indicator and tbe Control Indicator 
· (gross and in real terms, for the period 1980-1994) 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of the Adjusted Specific Indicators (A Cit, ACI2) 
and the Control Indicator 
(gross and in real terms, for the period 1980-1990) 
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Figure 3 
Evolution of the Index IN SEE for Remuneration of Civil Servants in 
France 
(gross and net, and by occupational categories in real terms, for the period 1970-1989) 
130 ~-----------------------------------------------; 
! 
I 
1~< r' ----------------------------------------------~ 
-i 
I 
I 
i 
t:!v '!----------------~_,.::---.::::!::::::!!!~::·:::s......._:::--"~a:---------J 
I ~r"'? . w=::::t?"-A 
t ,/ -~ 
115 ~~------------~----------------~~------------~ 
no :-j ---/-w-~------~---"!...:::c::c:::::==--...-! 
1w ~----7~'~------------------------------------~ 7 
/ 
.·· l~J ~~---------------------------------------------
_._ iru~ru t-rut _ in diu ntt 
S.:·ur<.c: J ~.s ~.c. 
Hill 
l~ r----------------------------------------------~ 
·I 
l~v r1 ------------~~----------------~,-----------~ 
_ u.diu tct .-\. 
-+- indiu t.tt B ..,.._ ir..di(..t ntt C0r D 
Source: Meurs ( 1991) 
]) 
~~- 33 
Figure 4 
Evolution of the Specific Indicator and the Control Indicator in 
· France 
· (gross and in real terms, for the period 1980-1994) 
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Figure 5 
Evolution of the Specific Indicator and the Control Indicator in Italy 
(gross and in real terms, for the perio$1 1980-1994) 
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1.1. The qeciJic indicator 
The specific indicator (SI) is used for measuring changes in the remuneration of civil 
servants in the Member States of the European Community with the aim of calculating an 
overall average of increase applicable to EU officials. This aim is reflected in two 
requirements in the construction of the index. 
The fteld of the index is limited to the established personnel working for 
central government whose place of employment is the capital of the country considered. 
This. condition is imposed in order to ensure the necessary homogeneity with the 
professional profile of the European Communities. 
The index is restricted to coverage of changes in remune~ion excluding 
increases linked with personal factors, such as promotion to a higher grade and bonuses 
paid for personal performance or for working under difficult ~nditions. The remuneration 
measured must therefore be equal to the basic salary plus all the bonuses and general 
allowances received by all officials in the reference population. 
The construction of the index for the European Communities is based on a series of 
weightings: 
Data are collected for a sample of the reference population, stratified by grade and 
category, with a representativeness of at least 75%. Within each category (A, B, C, and D) 
there are a number of grades. These grades can be interpreted as a qualification in the 
administrative framework (messenger, secretary, administrator, etc.). In those European 
civil services in which recruitment is based on competitions, that corresponds to the 
administrative corps to which the official is assigned after passing the corresponding tests. 
Within each grade, data are collected on the remuneration received at the level of the 
individual steps. The next stage consists in the calculation of a theoretical average, for each 
grade, as an average for the lower, average and higher step. Therefore this method 
implicitly assumes the existence of a "career" structure within the administration. It should 
be noted that the average calculated in this way is an average based on the salary Scale and 
is not equal to the average remuneration actually received. If that were the case, the 
indicator would record the changes in average salaries caused by demographic facton 
(recruiunent, retirements) or career patterns (progress to a higher step). 
For each category (A, B, C and D) the procedure consists in the calculation of an average 
value equal to the average value per grade weighted by the number of personnel in t-1 of 
the sample. Total average remuneration is equal to the average per category weighted by 
the breakdown of the total reference population into the four categories A, B, C and D. 
The annual rate of change calculated for the individual Member States is deflated by the 
consumer price index of the country concerned. Finally, the trend of the specific indicator 
for the 12 Member States is the average value of the national rates of increase weighted by 
the breakdown in t-1 of the total wage bill of central government (S61), expressed in 
ecus. 
f-- 2 
. 
The quality of the specific indicator, i.e. its capacity to ensure the parallelism of the 
movements of remuneration in the European civil service with those in the national civil 
services, depends on the following conditions: 
the reference population. As a result of the tendency to decentralize in certain 
Member States, some of the tasks fonnerly carried out by central government located in the 
capital can now be carried out by decentralized bodies. This raises the question of whether 
European civil servants should be compared only with the civil servants employed by 
central government, with the attendant risk of reducing the reference population and 
constituting a group which is hardly representative of the trend of salaries in the civil 
service as a whole or, on the contrary, whether the definition of the reference population 
should be broadened in order to retain a numerically consistent group, with the aim of 
ensuring that the annual increases are not solely the result of measures affecting specific 
categories which would only apply to a limited number of staff. 
the representativeness of the sample in the reference population 
the capacity of the national administrations to provide infonnation on changes in 
their salary scales and, in particular, to distinguish between the changes in remuneration 
which apply to all the civil servants in the sample on the one hand and thoSe which are 
individualized on the other. 
Whether there are any steps at all within each grade. 
More generally, the concept of parallelism should imply that the ratio of 
across-the-board increases to individual increases is more or less the same in the European 
civil service and the national civil services. But in the case of France, for example, Civil 
Service pay policy has tended since 1989 to favour the maintenance of the salary scale in 
terms of purchasing power while at the same time enabling individual rises in purchasing 
power to be obtained either in the fonn of individualized bonuses or, more frequently, by 
more rapid promotion. The specific indicator cannot rise when general rises in 
remuneration just compensate for inflation. In such cases, there cannot be an increase in the 
specific indicator. This raises the question of whether it would be a good idea to adopt a 
broader concept of parallelism transcending the strict comparison of salary scales. In other 
words, would it be a good idea to add to the comparison of changes in salary scales a 
comparison of career patterns between the European civil service and the nation civil 
services? 
1.2. The control indicator 
In application of Article 65 of the Staff Regulations applicable to officials and other 
servants .of the European Communities, an indicator, known as the control indicator, is 
calculated annually and the changes in it are compared with those in the specific indicator. 
This index, which is based on data obtained from the national accounts of each Member 
State, is equal to the increase in the total wage bill of sector S 61 (central government) 
divided by the corresponding number of staff. Numerous earlier reports have covered the 
factors explaining why this indicator increases at a higher rate than the specific indicator 
(cf. bibliography). The three main factors are: 
[-3 
.. 
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The control indicator is calculated on the basis of .a total per capita wage bill and 
consequently includes the social contributions paid by employers. In fact, the 1980s 
saw a marked increase in this element in most Member States. 
A structural effect. The resultant of arrivals and departures of civil servants is 
generally negative, because newcomers entering employment at the bottom of the 
salary scale are paid lower salaries than officials going into retirement. But this 
effect is more than offset by the impact of seniority (movement up the salary scale) 
and qualifications (the number of qualified employees increases as time goes by). 
The resultant balance between staff 'rurnover, seniority and qualification 
(glissement-vieillesse-technicite), known in French as the "GVf solde" (GVT 
balance), is positive. This effect is obviously accentuated if civil service pay policies 
consist in raising the level of their remuneration by accelerating their progression 
up the salary scale. 
All the measures affecting the components of remuneration which are not covered 
in the specific indicator. The most frequent example is that of the bonuses and allowances 
which are not always included in the elements of remuneration used for constructing the 
specific indicator. But the measures in this category also include increases in the 
remuneration of civil servants who are outside the reference population for the specific 
indicator. The greater the tendency of pay policy to differentiate pay scales within the civil 
service (e.g. uprating the pay scales for teachers or nurses), the greater this effect will be. 
In other words, there can be no guarantee that a specific indicator limited to the officials 
employed in central government is representative of the across-the-board changes affecting 
all civil servants. 
B. FRANCE 
2.1 The remuneration of officials in France. 
France is probably one of the best equipped European countries for supplying information 
on the specific indicator in view of the general philosophy which underlies the organisation 
of public sector pay. Recruitment by competition is still the main avenue of access to the 
civil -service. Each competition gives access to an administrative corps with a clearly 
defined hierarchical scale of remuneration and a relative guarantee of promotion based on 
length of service1• 
The increase in the gross remuneration of a French civil servant (single, no ·children) in a 
given category depends on the following factors: 
Promotion from one step to another is generally based on length of service. Careers 
can be accelerated, however, in the light of personal performance. Within each 
administrative corps, there are a number of classes (3 or 4) between which promotion 
is not automatic but dependent on personal performance measured either by reference 
to personal records or reports, or by professional examination, or by competition . 
4 
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1) general increase in the value of the index point ("point d'indice") used as the 
reference for calculating the basic salary or the allocation of index points; 
2) ~prating of the salary scale of the category or administrative corps to which the 
official belongs; 
3) uprating or creation of a bonus applicable to all officials in the category concerned; 
4) movement to a higher step or another administrative corps (generally as a result, in 
the latter case, of passing an internal competition); 
5) uprating or creation of a personalised bonus (e.g. the new performance-related 
bonus known as the NBI). 
The above-mentioned factors are· either general, i.e. are the result of an increase in the total 
wage bill (measures 1, 2 and 3), or personal, i.e. are quality-related (measures 4 and 5). 
Since 1980 there have been two distinct phases of pay policy in the French civil service, 
which can be summarised as follows: 
From 1980 to 1989, increases were generally across-the-board increases in the 
index point, the structure of the salary scales remaining largely unchanged, with 
two exceptions: firstly, the pay of teachers in general and of primary school 
teachers in particular was improved by uprating their salary scales and by specific 
measures. It should be noted that teachers represent approximately half of all State 
employees. Secondly, more generous treannent was given to category D employees 
throughout the French civil service. 
Since 1989 trends in remuneration have become more diversified. There have been 
increased bonus payments for certain administrative corps or at certain levels in the 
salary scale, and in certain administrative corps there have also been changes to the 
pay scales and more rapid promotion. The overall picture is one in which salary 
increases in the civil service are granted more in the form of additional bonuses or 
accelerated promotion than in the form of a rise in basic pay. 
2.2. Breakdown of the changes in per capita gross remuneration 
To analyse the difference between the specific indicator and the divergence between the 
specific indicator and the control indicator between 1980 and 1994, we have taken the 
following steps: 
construction of a control indicator which excludes the social contributions of 
employers, and verification of its pertinence; 
breakdown of this trend according to the three elements mentioned: the increase in 
pay scales, the GVT balance and the increase in bonuses. 
the ability of the specific indicator to record changes in the pay scales of civil 
servants in central government. 
2.2.1. Changes in per capita gross remuneration 
We have used series R11 (gross wages and salaries) for sector S61 published by the INSEE 
in the Accounts of the Nation. This series corresponds, with the exception of employers' 
contributions, to the figures communicated in the Eurostat documents. That enables us, 
therefore, to filter out the effect of employers' social contributions, the main factor 
underlying the divergence from the specific indicator. Table 1 gives series. R11 divided by 
the statr numbers as published by Eurostat (i.e. all staff employed· in the administration); 
we compare these data with the per capita gross remuneration of civil servants as calculated 
by the INSEE with figures obtained from wages files. niese data are not directly 
comparable: their coverage is different, since the INSEE series does not include military 
personnel; the INSEE calculates the number of staff in full-time equivalent, while the 
Eurostat figures include part-time staff. In view of this latter fact, it is normal that the 
INSEE salaries are higher than the Eurostat series. Oil, the other hand, it can be seen that 
the trend for the past twelve years is similar (series "accounts for the nation": 1982== 100; 
1994=179; series "figures obtained from wages files": 1982=100; 1994==174). We 
therefore consider that the series taken from the accounts for the nation is indeed 
representative of the trend in per capita gross remuneration in the civil service and cait be 
used to analyse the divergences from the specific indicator. 
Table 2.1: Compm;ison of the difTerent sources of data on per capita gro~ 
remuneration 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
INSEE (1) . 93360 107940 117920 125050 141380 152040 159130 
100 118 129 137 155 166 174 
IC(2) 81927 97340 103606 108169 120895 134634 147013 
100 118 126 132 147 164 179 
.. (1) Gross remunerauon m French francs. Ftgures obtamed from wages files, c1vil servants (full-time 
equivalent). 
(2) Control indicator. Series R61 of the accowtts for the nation, all government employees (i.e. 
including military personnel). · 
2.2.2. Breakdown of the increase in per capita gross remuneration between 1980 and 1994 
In line with the thinking described above, the increase in· gross remuneration can be broken 
down into three elements: 
A stmctural effect. This can be evaluated from the calculation of the GVT 
balance, which is estimated by the INSEE by analysing the wages files of civil 
servants. As Table 2 shows, this effect, which at the beginning· of the 1980s 
produced a moderate increase of approximately 0.4% in gross remuneration, 
increased considerably from 1989-1990 onwards, to the extent that it now generates 
growth of over 1% in gross remuneration. 
Table 2.2 : The GVT balance 
6 
A bonus effect. From 1989 onwards, there was a marked increase in the 
percentage of bonuses in gross remuneration (see Table 3), due in part to the pay 
reform plan in national education and to an increase in the percentage of bonuses 
for teaching staff, for whom the average bonus rate is far below that of other 
officials (see Annex 1). Figure 1, which plots the trend in gross remuneration, 
average per capita bonuses and the specific indicator with base 1980= 100, clearly 
shows that from 1989 onwards bonuses increased far more steeply than gross 
remuneration, although this growth was not so marked at the end of the period. 
(*) 1be figure for 1989 is not meaningful, since in November of that year an exceptional growth bonus 
of FF 1 200 was granted to all civil servants. 
Source: INSEE, Les salaires des agents de l'Etat en 1991 et 1992, INSEE ~sultats, No 333, September 
1994 
-The effect of increases in the pay scales 
In order to determine the increase in labour costs, the INSEE has calculated since 1970 
(with a revision in 1992) a monthly index of civil service remunerationr. This index 
currently covers a little over 90% of all civil servants, i.e. 138 administrative corps, taking 
accounts of all grades and steps (2 250 steps in all). ,The weightings are calculated .on the 
basis of data from wages files; the current base is the structure by corps and steps in 1990. 
The index measures changes in remuneration caused by general or category-related 
measures where such measures relate to the whole of a category or administrative corps, 
the structure remaining constant. 
The INSEE monthly index of civil service remuneration is used to measure changes in the 
remuneration of civil servants, i.e. the impact of changes in the wage structure applying to 
all the civil servants doing the same type of job. It therefore has similar objectives to 
Eurostat' s specific indicator, except that its coverage is virtually exhaustive. It should .be 
noted, however, that, unlike the figures supplied to Eurostat by the French Budget Ministry 
since 19933, the INSEE index relates to wages and salaries only and thus does not include 
bonuses and allowances. 
All these elements figure in Table 4. The first column gives the changes in per capita gross 
remuneration calculated on the basis of national accounts (i.e. the control indicator in 
Eurostat tenninology), the second the specific indicator (sliding avera~ from July to July), 
the third the INSEE index of pay scales (annual average), the fourth bonuses and the fifth 
2 
3 
Cf Guillaume Houriez, Les salaires des agents de l'Etat en i991 et ·1992, INSEE 
r~ultats, No 333, INSEE, 1994. 
The inclusion, from 1993 onwards, of the average bonus rates in the elements of 
remuneration on which the specific indicator is based has permitted closer alignment 
with the initial definition corresponding to Anicle 65, since it stipulates that "all the 
elements normally making up an official's remuneration .. must be recorded. 
.. 
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the GVT balance. Between 1980 and 1994, there was a difference of 53 points betweeq the 
control indicator and the specific indicator, i.e. 23%. 
T ble 2 4 Breakdo a . wno fth f: f wth in e actors o gro· per capita gross remuneration 
Gross per cap. rem. GroasSI Gross INSEE index Bonuses GVTbalance 
.1GSO 100 100 100 100 
1981 113,8 114 113 0,3 
·1982 128 123,2' 126 120,5 0,3 
·1983 140,5 135,1 137,5 0,3 
1984 152,1 141,8 148,5 143,8 0,4 
1985 159,1 181,1 154,4 0,4 
1986 161,9 150,9 160,1 159,8 0,4 
1987 165,3 151 161,9 0,4 
1988 169 154,3 166,3 173,8 0,4 
198Q 178,4 160,2 174,3 0,8 
1990 188,9 164 1n,9 251,2 0,9 
1991 198,1 164,5 182,4 271 0,8 
1992 210,4 169,5 188,4 295,7 1,3 
1993 222 175,6 193,6 300,4 1,1 
1994 229,7 1n,1 196,9 314,2 1,1 
Difference In points 52,6 32,8 
Oifference in .. 22,9 14,3 
-1 -2 
(1) Difference between tbe conttol indicator and the specdic indicator 
(2) Difference between the conttol indicator and the INSEE remuneradon index. 
The difference between the changes in per capita gross remuneration and the changes in the 
INSEE index is smaller ( 14% ). This is due to the structural effect and the bonus effect, 
since - if we disregard the cumulation of structural effects (GVT balance) - gross 
remuneration in 1994 would be FF 134 998, i.e. 210.9 in the 1980-based index. If we 
deduct the percentage of bonuses in gross remuneration (8.2% and 12.9% in 1980 and 
1994 respectively) to obtain the core remuneration, per capita remuneration then amounts 
to FF 58 752 in 1980 and FF 117 583 (FF 134 998 x (1-12.9%)) in 1994, i.e. a growth of 
101%, compared with growth of 96.9% in the pay scale as measured by the INSEE index. 
From the fact that there is consistency between the increase in gross remuneration and the 
effect of the scales as measured by the INSEE index cumulated with the effect of bonuses 
and the structural effect, we can deduce that part of the increase in the pay scales has not 
been recorded by the specific indicator. In other words, the residual difference between the 
control indicator and the specific indicator, once the structural effect and the bonus effect 
have been removed, is due to the fact that measures affecting the pay scales of the French 
civil service are not fully covered. 
The figures in the following table show the breakdown of the divergence between the 
specific indicator and the control indicator in terms of these four components . 
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Table 2.5 Breakdown of the divergence between the control indicator and the specific 
indicator. 
1980 1994 Difference I'IS in points Decomposition of difference 1M. 
(61.8 •100) 
Wage SUI 100 238.9 61,8 14,9 
GroaWagea tOO 229.7 52,6 30,4 
Groaa Wages without GVT 100 210.9 33,8 22.,7 
Gross Wages without GVT and primes (1) 100 196.9 19,8 32 
Specific Indicator 100 177.1 0 
.. (1) Measured by tbe evolution of the INSEE index of ctvil seMce salaries. 
In short, the divergence between the control indicator and the specific indicator grew to 
61.8 points between 1980 and 1994. 14.9% of this divergence was due to the rise in 
employers' social contributions, 30.4% to the structural effect (seniority and qualifications) 
22.7% to the increase in bonuses and 32% to the divergence between the evolution of 
salary scales in the civil service as a whole and that measured by the specific indicator. 
2.3. Comparison of the INSEE index and the specific indicator 
To analyse the residual divergence between the evolution of salary scales and that of the 
specific indicator, we will use the INSEE's GVT series Guly to July) to eliminate the 
distortions resulting from the difference between the annual average and the GVT and those 
which are attributable to the dates of implementation of the measures which are taken. 
In Table 2.6, we have reconstructed the changes in the INSEE gross index (in real-value 
terms) from July to .July, compared with the real annual variations of Eurostat's specific 
index. We note (Figure 2) that the two curves are very close, particularly for the last three 
years, although the INSEE index is slightly higher than the specific indicator. 
cator. Table 2.6 Comparison of the 1 ross INSEE index and the gross specific btdi 
GrossiNSEE Gross 51 Difference 
Annual change AMual change SI-INSEE 
1980 
1981 99,3 100,5 1,2 
1982 98,9 96,7 2,2 
1983 100,6 100 0,6 
1984 98,7 97,7 1 
1Q85 99,6 98,7 0,9 
1988 99,7 99,3 0,4 
1987 97,9 97 0,9 
1988 100,5 99,5 1 
1989 99,9 100,2 0,3 
1990 100,2 99 1,2 
1991 98,7 96,6 2.1 
1992 101,4 101 0,4 
1993 101,4 101,8 0,4 
1994 99 99,1 0,1 
GVf (July to July); real terms. 
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Tile differences recorded may initially result from differences in the. structure of the 
reference population. As Table 6 shows, the distribution between categories A, B, C and D 
differs between the civil service as a whole and the specific indicator reference population. 
Tile large number of civil servants in category A is explained by the fact that teachers are 
classed in this category. In order to compare these two indicators more 
thoroughly, we plotted the changes for the four categories (Figures 2a, 2b and 2c). We 
note that the specific indicator for categories A and B is systematically lower than the 
INSEE index, except in 1981. On the other hand, in the case of category C, differences 
may be either positive or negative. Lastly, for the last two years, the changes are 
practically identical in both indicators. 
T ble2 7Co a . mpansono f th structu f th ti ulf e reo e re erence pop1 a 10ns 
Central gov't 1992 1M, INSEE 1990 % 
category A 6824 17.4 30500 27.4 
category 8 5498 14.0 25600 23.1 
CategoryC 22153 56.6 45800 41.3 
CltegoryD 4701 12.0 9100 8.2 
TOTAL 39176 100 111000 100 
2.4. Cotegory-re/Qted measures and speclfr,c indicator 
In order to understand these differences, we must .look at what each indicator can record in 
the light of the way in which it is devised: 
Overall increases (increase in the value of the index point, allocation of index 
points) will be evaluated in exactly the sanie way in both cases. These measurements 
automatically affect the indices for the beginning and end of an official's career, which is 
the basis for calculating the specific indicator, and result in· an upward shift in the pay 
scales (a 1% increase in the value of the point produces a 1% increase in the INSEE index). 
We have already seen that, as long· as they involve a change in the pay scales which 
applies to an entire group of officials, category-related measures are recorded by the 
INSEE index, which covers virtually all civil servants. The larger the administrative corps 
is in numerical terms, the greater the resulting change. On the other hand, the specific 
· indicator covers only twelve grades of the French civil service (see list in Annex 2). 
Until 1988, changes in the pay scales of a given category of officials w~re yery limited. 
The main groups to have benefited from specific measures are primary school teachers 
(category B), whose pay scales were increased on 1 January of each year from 1983 to 
1988, and secondary school teachers (increase in the pay scales of secondary school 
teachers). These measures affecting teachers are estimated to represent for this period 
three-quarters of the impact of category-related increases in the INSEE index4• This could 
therefore explain why, during this period, the specific indicator is systematically lower than 
the INSEE index for categories A and B. 
4 Cere, Constat de l'~volution r~nte des revenus en France 1988-1991, No 103, 4th 
term of 1991. This results from the large number of teachers in category A (80% of 
the A range in the IN SEE index) and in category B (76% of the S range in the INSEE 
index). 
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From 1989 to 1991, teachers continued to benefit from specific measures, ~t there were 
category-related increases for other sections of the civil service without it being possible to 
isolate the effect of each of them. It is perfectly possible that the civil servants concerned 
did not come within the coverage of the Eurostat index. Furthennore, a specific indicator 
can only record a category-related increase if it affects the index at the beginning or the end 
of the career of the civil servants in tl)e reference population. Any changes to the pay scales 
which do not alter the terminal indices do not affect this index. · 
From 1990 onwards, the reform of the civil service pay scales (the 7-year Durafour plan), 
which was in addition to the category-related measures mentioned above, forms a set of 
complex measures (see Annex 3) which affected the pay scales of categories Band C and 
led to the gradual el'imination of category D. As previously, these measures cannot be 
recorded in the specific indicator unless they alter the terminal indices. However, the 
impact of the Durafour plan on the INSEE index is relatively small and cannot $erefore be 
the sole explanation for the differences between the specific indicator and the INSEE index. 
According to ~e INSEE, the second and third phases implemented in August 1991 and 
August 1992 produced an increase of 0.2% in the index expressed as a sliding average 
(December to December), compared with nominal increases of 3.1% and 2.9% 
respectively. The figures for these two years involve only the category-related increases, 
except for the measures for primary school teachers (September 1990 and September 1991) 
and the restructuring of the index for category A secondary school teachers in September 
1994. 
2.5. Pertinence of the specific indicator 
To sum up, the specific indicator seems to be a suitable instrument for recording changes in 
the pay scales of French civil servants when general measures are involved (upward 
adjustment of the value of die point). It has the advantage of being very simply structured. 
It should be noted, however, that the breakdown into four categories no longer corresponds 
to the actual situation in France, since category D has been phased out. 
COmpared with the INSEE index of remuneration, the specific indicator has included since 
1993 the bonuses of central government officialr. This enables it to be more in line with 
the initial definition of this indicator, which must cover all the nonnal elements which make 
up remuneration. In the future, this might be a source of divergence from the INSEE index 
if there is an increase in the bonus rate paid to central government officials. 
On the other hand, it is limited by its narrow field of reference. The category-related 
measures not covered by the specific indicator are the source of differences between it and 
the control indicator (per capita gross remuneration) which are added to the factors 
identified in the preceding part, i.e. the strucn.tral effect and the effect of the overall trend 
in bonuses'. For the past two years, the evolution of French civil servants' pay has been 
5 
6 
It was linked to the preceding series by recalculating the 1992/1993 increase on the 
basis of new figures for 1992 which included the bonuses paid during that year. 
More precisely, from 1993 onwards the difference between the overall rate of increase 
of bonuses in the civil service and that of central government officials. 
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shaped by general measures, but the country may well se a return to category-related 
measures in due course. One way of evaluating this drift might be to ask the INSEE to 
calculate and communicate the changes in the remuneration index in July excluding teachers 
and to compare the results with the changes in the specific indicator excluding bonuses. 
Finally, it has to be emphasised that its construction does not enable career effects to be 
taken into account in spite of the increasingly important role they play in the evolution of 
civil service salaries in France. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2b 
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Figure 2c 
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ANNEX 1· 
Average b01ws rate by socio-projessional category 
(Established officials employed .full-time in the capitlll in 1992) 
Socio-professional categories 
Maaagers and senior academics 
Managers 
Directors 
of which: Directors hors classe 
Judges 
Administrators and equivalent 
of which: Administrators hors classe 
Principal attachts and inspectors 
Attac~s and inspectors 
Engineers (of the •grands corps technique") 
of which: Project managers 
Project engineers 
Academics 
University professors and equivalent 
Senior lecturers 
Assistant lecturers (without the •agrtgation • examination) 
Lyctc teachers (with the •agrtgation •) 
Graduate lycte teachers and equivalent 
Intermediate professional levels 
Secondary school teachers (established) 
Headmasters of primary scllools with more than one class 
Specialized primary teachers 
Other primary school teachers 
Administrative assistants and controllers 
Intermediate professional levels of the police and the prison service (2) 
Technicians 
Foremen and supervising officers 
Non-manual and manual staff 
Police and prison officers (3) 
Service staff (step 4 of category C and above) 
Other category C non-manual staff 
Category D non-manual staff 
Category C maintenance staff 
Category D maintenance staff 
Skilled workers 
Category C unskilled workers 
Category D unskilled workers 
Overall average 
Source: :Enquete sur les fichiers de paie INSEE-DGAFP. 
Bonus rates 
20 
38 
39 
41 
38 
45 
37 
39 
34 
43 
46 
46 
15 
11 
14 
20 
2S 
14 
5 
15 
9 
8 
9 
27 
28 
15 
29 
20 
37 
22 
13 
10 
15 
5 
10 
4 
6 
18 
(1) The bonus rates are equal to the quotiem obtaiued by multiplying bonuses by net salary plus 
the residence allowance. These rates are calculated as ratios of average amounts and not as simple 
averages of individual rates. · 
(2) Police inspectors, prison administrators. etc. 
(3) Police officers, prison officers, etc. 
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ANNEX 2: List of grades surveyed in the speci~ic indicator for France 
Category A 
Director C-E 
Director B-C 
Civil administrator hors classe 
Principal attache 
Central government attache 
Category B 
Head administrator 
Administrator, head of section 
Administrator 
Category C 
Head of group 
Administrative assistant 
Administrative officer, first class 
Internal service inspector 
Principal worker 
Worker, first·class 
Central government worker 
CategoryD 
Messenger, clerical officer 
18 
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ANNEX3 
FONCTIONPUBUOUEDEL'ETAT 
PROTOCOL£ O'ACCORD DU 9 FEVRIER 1990 
4eme TRANCHE- 1er AOUT 1993 
EFFECTlF 
c·ONCEANE 
CATEGORIEO 
Passage de E1 en E2 32000 
(resorption de fa categorie 0) 
Aequafification des. agents de service dont 12000 
CATEGORIEC 
E3 : grade d'avancement 11 500 
NouVel Espace lndiciaire - NEI - 7600 
~ erne tranche (5%) 
Maitrise ouvriere 
Creation du Geme echelon MOP 400 
· Incidences sur Ia restructuration des filieres 3647 
Reclassement des chefs surveillants et 6 815 chefs sutVeiUants 
inspecteurs 
285 inspecteurs · 
Transposition aux grades et gardiens de Ia 
paix. enqueteurs de Ia police nationafe et 108000 surveillants de prison 
SOUS TOTAL CATEGORIE C et 0 170247 
CATEGORIES 
FUsion des 2 premiers grades 90000 
(1 ere tranche de repyramidage) 
Classement lndiciaire lntermediaire 
-lnfirmiers(eres) de rEtat 5000 
- T echniciens sanitakes 300 
Transposition aux atypiques et aux poficiers 17000 
Act::ks des instituteurs au corps de 5000 
professeurs des ecoles 
(4ime tranChe) 
SOUS TOTAL CATEGORIE B 117300 
CATEGORIEA 
Hors dasse des PEGC 1000 
Fusion des deux premiers grades des corps 33000 
d'attames et assimiles 
SOUS TOTAL CATEGORIE A 34000 
TOTAL DES CATEGORIES A+ 8 + C 32f547 
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COUT 
(millions de francs) 
112,5 
42,2 
67,4 
171.25 
4,8 
80,0 
23.8 
112.3 
614,25 
150,0 
(d'LF.91) 
3,4 
54:S 
. 
.• 
139,3 
347,2 
43,7 
373,8 
417,5. 
137~,95 
I 
FONCTION PUBUOUE DE L'ETAT 
PROTOCOL£ D'ACCORD DU 9 FEVRIER 1990 
5eme TRANCHE· 1 er AOUT l994 
EFFECTIF 
CONCERNE 
CATEGORIEC 
Revaforisation de I'Echelle E2 (2eme tranche) 268000 
lndice terminal 1M 316 
Revaforisation de I'Echelle E3 90700 (2eme tranche) 
lndice terminal IM 338 
Redassement des OP/1 en maitres ouvriers 4200 
Transposition aux grades et gardiens de Ia 
paix, enqueteurs de Ia police nationale et 
108000 surveillants de prison 
SOUS TOTAL CATEGORIE C 470900 
CATEGORIES 
Fusion des 2 premiers grades (3eme tranche 
de repyrcunidage) 
82000 Corps comportant tin saut de grade ' 
Creation de Ia categorie B type technique 
(sans saut de grade) I 8000 
- 2 premiers grades 
Creation d'un nouveau grade terminant a 
5000 riB 612 (1M 511) 
1 ere tranche pyramidage a 5% 
Creation du 2eme grade des infirmieres Cll 250 
1 ere tranche a 5% 
Transposition aux atypiques et aux poticiers 17000 
Aa:.es des instituteurs au c:orps de 5000 
professeurs des ecoles 
. (SEme tranche) 
SOUS TOTAL CATEGORIE B 117250 
CATEGORIEA 
Creation du grade terminal des ingenieurs 2000 
'des travaux et relevement a 1'18 1 015 de 
findice terminal des chefs <farrondissement 
SOUS TOTAL CATEGORIE A 2000 
TOTAL DES CATEGORIES A + 8 + C 590150 
20 
COUT 
(millions de francs) 
452.7 
102 
16.4 
53,3 
624.4 
136.6 
74,5 
219" 
. -
5,2 
·-·-
. 
109 .• 
139,3 
683,6 
41,5 
41,5 
1 349,5 
DL THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom, the 80s were marked by major structural changes in the public 
sector affecting its contours and the procedures for determining of the remuneration of civil 
servants. These reforms had a direct impact on the method of calculation of the specific 
indicator and on evolution of the control indicator. We shall start by examining the 
resultant "breaks" in the calculation of the control indicator and attempting to ascertain the 
extent to which they can explain its increasing divergence from the specific indicator. We 
can then see if the evolution of the specific indicator appears to be consistent with the trends 
observed in the public sector. 
3.1. Study of the control indiCator 
The period since 1990 has seen a striking rise in the control indicator (1990 = 100; 
1994 = 165.6 in real terms) in contrast with the stability of the specific indicator (1990 = 
100; 1994 = 105.5). The divergence between the two indicators was particularly striking 
in 1992 and 1993. 
This evolution corresponds to a period of major reductions in the numbers recorded in S61, 
mainly as a result of the transfer of a substantial number of employees from the "Health" 
(NHS) sector in connection with the establishment of NHS trusts and their reclassification, 
thenceforth, under the heading of public enterprises. This very big reduction of the 
numbers of employees has been underway since 1992. The following table plots the 
changes in numbers in sector S61, the numbers in NHS trusts and the sum of the two, and 
enables us to show that the reduction of numbers in S61 is very largely attributable to the 
exodus to the trusts, albeit in the context of a general downward trend in the numbers of 
persons employed in the Central Government sector. 
Tbi31N b f I • S61 d NHS trusts a e • um ers o empiOJ 1eesm an . . 
Staff S61 (1) NHS tr!-'st (2) S61 + NHS trusts 
1990 2305 
-
2305 
1991 2183 124 2307 
1992 2006 314 2320 
1993 1582 662 •, 2244 
1994 1215 966 2181 
(1) National Accounts 1995 (Central Government) 
(2) Amanda Hughes, Employment in the Public and Private sectors, Economic Trends, No 495, January 
1995. 
The reduction of the number of persons employed will affect the evolution of 
remunerations only if the average remuneration of those who are leaving the service is very 
different from that of those who are remaining. Two factors must be taken into acCount in 
this context. The first is part-time work. The data are supplied in the fonn of numbers 
employed and not in the fonn of full-time equivalents. If the ratio of part-time to full-time 
employees is higher for the employees who are. classified under the NHS trust heading than 
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the ratio for the remainder of S61, that will obviously bring about an automatic rise iq the 
average remuneration'. 
3.1.1. Ratio of part-time employment in NHS trusts to part-time employment in S61 ar a 
Wlole. 
In the following table, we have shown the total numbers of persons employed (head count), 
the full-time equivalents and the relationship between these two figures as an indicator of 
part-time employment over the period 1985-1994 for NHS trusts compared with the rest of 
sector S61. The figures confirm that the proportion of part-time employees is indeed higher 
in the health sector. 
Table 3.2. Evaluation of part-time employment in the Health sector, compared with 
th bU sect epu c or 
NHS Central government 
(S61) 
Staff Full time Ratio Staff Full time Ratio 
equivalence ~uivalence 
1990 
- - -
2305 2076 1,11 
1991 124 102 1,21 2183 1967 1,1 
1992 314 256 1,22 2006 1823 1,1 
1993 662 540 1,22 1582 1467 1,07 
1994 966 788 1,22 1215 1087 1,11 
Source: Amanda Hughes, op c1t. 
3.1.2. Jmpaa of the transformation of the structure of S61 on average remuneration 
" 
S61 comprises three major sectors, namely national defence (HM Forces), health (NHS), 
and central administration (Other central government), in which average per capita 
remuneration is very different and whose relative weight has undergone a considerable 
change over the period under review. In Table 3.3, we have shown the evolution of the 
numbers of employees in these three components of S61 for the years 1983-1993, in 
absolute numbers (mid-year total numbers ·of employees). 
The figures show a very considerable reduction in the proportion of employees under the 
health heading, from 51.5% to 33.3%. 
From the total wage bills in the National Accounts, we can recalculate, for each sector, the 
evolution of per capita wage costs for the total numbers of employees (Table 3.4). The 
figures show the health sector occupying a position between National Defence, with the 
highest average per capita wage bill, and Other central govenunent. It is therefore not 
certain, a priori, that the rise in average remuneration in sector S61 can be attributed to the 
relative reduction of the weight of the health sector alone. In order to have some idea of 
this impact, we have recalculated a theoretical remune!3-tion in 1993 based on the average 
remuneration observed in the three sectors in that year but using the weights for 1983 (i.e. 
the breakdown between the three sectors on that date). The theoretical average 
remuneration calculated in this way is not very different from the average observed in 1993 
(a difference of 0.05% between the two figures). The increasing weight in S61 of the 
7 It is assumed, here, that the number of hours worked is more or less the same 
before and after the change of status. 
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National Defence Sector, the one with the highest average levels of remuneration was offset 
by the increasing proportion of the total numbers of employees to be found under the Other 
central government heading, where average remuneration is lowest. · In the period under 
review, the changes in the relative weight of the three sectors in the composition of S61 did 
not give rise to any rise in remuneration connected with this particular structural effect. 
Table 3.3. Breakdown by sector of total numbers of employees in Central 
Govemment. Period 1983-1993. 
HMForces NHS Other Total HMForcesctfa NHS'Kt C>tt\eJ'% Total CMa 
1983 322 1227 835 2384 13.5 51.5 35.0 100 
1984 326 1223 810 2359 13.8 51.8 34.3 100 
1985 326 1223 811 2360 13.8 51.8 34.4 100 
1986 322 1215 BOO 2337 13.8 52.0 34.2 100 
1987 319 1212 781 2312 13.8 52.4 33.8 100 
1988 316 1228 n8 2322 13.6 52.9 33.5 100 
1989 308 1226 781 2315 13.3 53.0 33.7 100 
1990 303 1221 781 2305 13.1 53.0 33.9 100 
1991 297 1098 788 2183 13.6 50.3 36.1 100 
1992 290 916 800 2006 14.5 45.7 39.9 100 
1993 271 530 789 1590 17.0 33.3 49.6 100 
Source: nadonal accounts 
Table 3.4 Per capita wage costs in the three subsectors of Central Government. Period 
1983-1993, nominal value. 
HM Forces NHS Other Total 
1gB3 186.988 71.108 68.048 85.688 
1984 195.215 72.535 74.173 90.051 
1985 212.178 76.141 79.248 96.000 
1986 227.484 81.835 83.788 102.572 
1987 234.232 91.724 96.569 11.302 
1988 246.741 99.902 103.342 121.038 
1989 269.513 111.069 112.420 132.605 
1990 297.888 122.031 126.133 146.538 
1991 338.013 135.984 139.429 164.714 
1992 367.690 154.236 152.500 184.402 
1993 401.328 206.264 159.823 216.465 
On the other hand, the scale of the changes observed in the make-up of the labour force can 
provide an explanation of above-average rises in remuneration per capita within each 
subgroup. In fact, according to the Central Statistical Office, the remuneration of 
employees who are no longer classified in the sector S61 of the national accounts, either as 
a result of the creation of NHS trusts or as a result of decentralization and contracting out 
was lower, on average, than that of the employees who remained in that sector. 
3.1.3. Influence of dates of calculation 
The calculation of trends may be perturbed by yet another factor. Whereas the numbers of 
employees recorded in the National Accounts are the mid-year figures, the total wage bill 
corresponds to the total disbursed in the twelve-month period. So if an NHS trust is created 
before July, the total wage bill of the health sector shown in S61 will include the amounts 
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disbursed prior to its creation, but the corresponding numbers of employees wil} be 
deducted in July, and that will obviously inflate the average per capita remuneration. 
In the period since 1990, the evolution of gross per capita remuneration in these three 
subsectors, measured in terms of the data relating to S61, has been marked by a series of 
radical changes in the composition of the workforce of each subsector, and it is impossible 
to isolate their effects. That being so, the control indicator can no longer serve as a 
pertinent reference for comparison with the specific indicator as calculated for a constant 
reference population. 
3.2. The specific indicator 
The reforms in the public sector in the UK have also modified the systems for the 
determination of changes in remuneration by· decentralizing the negotiation of process and 
accentuating the individualization of rises in salaries8• To our knowledge, the UK does not 
have an indicator which is comparable with the index of civil service salaries in France, i.e. 
an index of remuneration based on a constant structure. 
To evaluate the pertinence of the specific indicator, we use an indicator of the results of 
negotiations in the Public Sector. The underlying idea is that the specific indicator, by 
recording changes on the basis of a constant structure, must give a close approximation of 
the general trend of remuneration. We have an average annual rate of negotiated upward 
adjustment of salaries in the Public Sector for 1985 to 1990, but the rate is not available for 
subsequent years. In Table 3.5, we have compared the real average annual rates with the 
trend of the specific indicator. There is a year-by-year divergence between the two 
indicators, but that may be due to time-lags between the dates of negotiations and the period 
(July) for the specific indicator. Cumulatively calculated, for the five-year period, the level 
of the specific indicator is slightly higher than that of the negotiated salary index. 
Table 3.5. Real annual change in the specific indicator and the negotiated salary index 
in the Public Sector 1985-1990 
Specific Indicator Negotiated Wages (1) . 
1985 0,982 0,995 
1986 1,041 1,025 
1987 1,008 1,021 
1988 1,025 1,009 
1989 0,981 1,007 
1990 1,027 0,997 
Cumul 1,064 1,055 
{1) Source: New Earnings Survey 
For a more extended and more recent period we only have data indicating, for the main 
professional groups, the average annual rate of increase resulting from negotiations and the 
average annual rate of increase acrually observed for the years 1980-1992. 
I Cf. Prof. Robert Elliott's report on Pay Reform in Sweden and the UK and the 
adjustment of Commission salaries for a description of these reforms. 
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T ble3 6 Real a • • annu al t fin average ra e o crease. 1980-1992 
Civil aervice Eamings Increase Settlement 
GradeS· 7 - -0,4 
EO'aHommea 1 -0,2 
E0'1 Femrnaa 0,9 -0,2 
Clarki Hommes 1,2 -0,5 
Clarka Femmes 1,3 -0,5 
Tax Inspectors H 1,3 -0,3 
Scientistl H 1,7 1,2 
Source: Treasury Occasional Paper No 3. 
One can observe a consequent divergence between negotiated rises in remuneration and real 
ri~ in remuneration which may be attributable to career-related factors or increases in 
bonuses. Generally speaking, negotiated rises in re•nuneration do not enable the recipient to 
maintain his/her purchasing power (reduction of approximately 0.3%), whereas the actual 
rate of increase in remuneration is positive, with an order of magnitude of 1%. 
These data are not directly comparable with the calculation of the specific indicator and 
merely enable a qualitative appreciation. For the period 1980-1992, the average real annual 
rise in the specific indicator is equal to 0.43%, i.e. at an intermediate level between 
negotiated increases in remuneration and actual increases. This might possibly be 
attributable, in the case of the UK, to it having become increasingly difficult to measure the 
trend of basic remuneration for a given position in the service9• 
Hence, part of the information collected for the specific indicator could include certain 
elements of the trend of actual remuneration, i.e. a more substantial rise in basic 
remuneration than the rise foreseen in the negotiated agreements, in the form of an increase 
in the average salary of the category concerned. 
3.3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, for the UK, the application of Article 65 is fraught with problems. Firstly, 
the control indicator, constructed for a reference population which has undergone a 
considerable number of changes over the period, cannot constitute a reliable means of 
measurement of the trend of per capita remuneration. It does not enable us, in particular, to 
distinguish between structural effects and salary scale effects. Secondly, the very 
construction of the specific indicator is getting more and more out of line with institutional 
reality in the United Kingdom10• The use of the specific -indicator method therefore requires 
the collection of information on a much broader front from the agencies and departments 
concerned. 
9 
10 
This difficulty will doubtless become more acute with the decentralization of 
negotiations and the disappearance of common salary scales of a given category of 
officials. 
Cf. the report by Prof. Eliott, op cit. 
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IV Italy 
4.1. The institutional context 
In Italy, as in most other European countries, the period between 1980 and 1990 was 
marked by major institutional changes affecting the remuneration of officials. The period 
was notable for the appearance of two texts in particular11 : 
1. The "Legge Quadro" (Ln. 93/1983), reforming both the system of classification of 
employees and the system of salary negotiations; 
2. The text of the "Accordo sui costo del lavoro" (D 1 n 29/1993) modifying the 
methods used for fixing salaries. But this agreement will not enter into force until 
the end of the period under review and cannot, therefore, have any impact on the 
trends of civil service remuneration which we have examined. 
There are many similarities between the Italian and French systems of organization of the 
civil service sector. Recruitment is· by competition and the civil servants of both countries 
are subdivided into 8 grades on the basis of their educational qualifications and their 
professional experience. Promotion is based on seniority or internal competitions. 
The remuneration of Italian officials is composed of several elements, each with a separate 
set of rules for its evolution: · 
• 
• 
• 
• 
11 
Firstly, there is the basic salary. Salary increases are generally negotiated on a 
collective basis and signed at different levels (inter-sectoral and sectoral). Since 
1993, the provisions relating to remuneration (which were formerly concluded for a 
three-year period) have been signed for a period of two years. In contrast with 
France, collective negotiations are held in each major sector (8 in all). This means 
in practice that the negotiations are not all conducted at the same time and that the 
increases in remuneration can differ from sector to sector. Finally, instead of being 
determined by collective bargaining, the remuneration of certain groups of officials 
("dirigenti generali", corresponding to a very small number of high-level posts 
including those of judges and university professors), are fixed by parliamentary 
decision. 
Secondly, there is a seniority bonus (discontinued in 1995) which can be re-
negotiated at the sectoral agreement level. 
Thirdly, there is an index-based bonus, directly tied to the price index (but 
discontinued in 1992-93). 
Finally, there are various bonuses and allowances linked, in theory, with the post 
occupied by the official, the particularly difficult conditions under which the official 
has to work and the possession of special qualifications. The existence of these 
Cf. the report by Dr Claudio Lucifora, "Art. 65: Examination of National Systems 
of Remunerating Civil Servants. The Case of France and Italy", September 1995. 
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bonuses has · enabled the payment of more generous increments than those 
negotiated by collective bargaining. They may differ from sector to sector. 
4.2. Study of the control indicator 
Comparison of the cumulated evolution of the Eurostat indicator with that of the control 
indicator between 1980 and 1993 shows a difference of approximately 35 points (control 
indicator 1993 = 137.7, base 100 in 1980; gross specific indicator 1993 = 99.8, base 100 
in 1980). 
Part of this difference stems from differences in definition. The specific indicator measures 
changes in gross salary; the control indicator measures changes in wage cost per capita, 
including employers' social contributions. Italy (like France) saw a substantial rise in 
employers' social contributions over the above-mentioned period, from 24.3% in 1980 to 
29.5% in 1993. Allowing for this effect (see Table 4.1), the indicator of gross salary per 
capita works out at 123 in 1993 (base 100 in 1980), thereby reducing the degree of 
divergence, vis-a-vis the specific indicator, by approximately 12 points. 
Once the effects of the employers' social contributions are filtered out, the steeper upward 
trend of the control indicator would seem to be mainly attributable in Italy (as in France) to · 
some of the individual career effects resulting in a percen~ge rise in the wages bill that is 
greater than the percentage rise in the salary scale. Italy does not have (to our knowledge) a 
system of statistical measurement of this structural effect. It is generally recognimd, 
however, that there has been massive recourse to accelerated promotions and 
reclassifications at higher levels, particularly in 1988·, to compensate for the impact of a 
more restrictive policy with regard to remuneration. 
4.3. Study of the specij&e indicator 
In view of the above-mentioned effects, ·the control indicator would not seem to be the 
correct tool for checking the pertinence of the specific indicator. As in the case of France 
we have sought to use an indicator with a constant structure 'which is representative of 
variations in the pay scale. 
Attention was drawn in an earlier report12 to the very good correlation of an indicator 
established by the !STAT and the specific indicator. The 1ST AT index is an index with a 
constant structure (Laspeyres) which plots the evolution of remuneration negotiated or 
granted, broken down by subsector in accordance with the rules for the conduct of 
negotiations. These changes are calculated on a monthly basis. The aim is therefore to 
measure the revaluations of the salary scale independently of the individual carrier effects. 
We have therefore taken the changes in this ISTAT index for the "MINISTERI" sector 
(the closest to the central administration concept) for 1982 to 1993, expressed as annual 
averages, on a nominal basis, and compared them with the changes in the specific indicator 
calculated by Eurostat. In order to eliminate the effects of differing dates (the !STAT 
12 Eurostat B3, Analysis of the trend of the specific indicator, period 1980-1992, 
February 1993. 
indicator records pay agreements as soon as it officially receives the texts emerging {rom 
the pay negotiations, whereas their implementation requires a little time (our conclusions 
are based on examination of the cumulated pay rise figures). 
In Table 4.2 we have shown in the first two columns the ISTAT index, in terms of annual 
and cumulated variation, and the next two columns covering the price index are followed 
by data on Eurostat' s specific index showing its real and nominal annual and cumulated 
variation. The diagram shows the· cumulated evolution of the ISTAT index and the specific 
indicator, both in terms of nominal value. · 
The two indices are very close. The specific indicator was slightly higher than the 1ST AT 
index up to 1988 but has fallen behind in recent years. In view of the differences in the 
reference populations of these two indices (it must not be forgotten that officials in the 
"dirigenti" category are included in the survey on which the specific indicator is based but 
not in the ISTAT "Ministerii" index, in addition to which the reference population of the 
ISTAT index is much broader than the sample used for the specific indicator), these 
divergences can be regarded as minimal. On the evidence of the comparison with this 
index, the specific indicator can be said to have provided a coherent record of the changes 
in the scale of remuneration of Italian civil servants. 
Table 4.1 Allowance for the etTect of employers' social contributions on the evolution 
of the control indicator 
NomJnal wage biU %employers Nominal per Real per Realapeclflc Real control 
per capita social capitragross capitragross Indicator, Indicator, 
contributions wa_ges wa~ cumul. cumul. 
1980 13170 100 24.3 9969.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 
. 1981 16979 128.9 
1982 19486. 148.0 
1983 22600 171.6 
1984 25118 190.7 
1985 27424 208.2 25.9 20321.2 203.8 105.2 97.9 108.2 
1986 29862 226.7 
1987 32654 247.9 
1988 36205 274.9 27.2 26357.2 264.4 115.5 98.3 120 
1989 38796 294.6 
1gg() 45511 345.6 
19D1 49307 374.4 27.9 35599.7 357.1 129.4 107.7 135 
11m 51459 390.7 
1993 53102 403.2 29.5 37436.9 375.5 123.4 99.8 134.7 
(1) Source: Italy, National Accounts 
(1) Amministrazioni pubbliche (m thousands of lire) 
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Table 4.2 Co • mpansono f th ISTAT. di e m ces wtt Uic indicator e gross spec! 1 
Indica •tatat Ministerr Gross specific indicator 
IMUII cumul annual cumul 
nominal nominal nominal nominal 
1882 100.0 100.0 
1983 113.5 113.5 116.8 116.8 
1984 112.8 128.0 115.8 135.3 
1985 107.7 137.9 106.0 143.4 
1888 104.3 143.8 108.8 155.9 
1887 108.7 156.3 107.1 166,g 
1988 110.3 172.4 101.9 170.1 
18 112.9 194.6 106.1 180.5 
1990 110.8 215.7 119.4 215.6 
1991 106.7 230.2 104.2 224.7 
1992 102.8 236.1 101.1 227.2 
1993 100.9 238.2 101.0 229.5 
As in the case of France, we can summarize the breakdown of the divergence between the 
specific and control indicators in the following table, for the period 1982-1993. 
Table 4.3. Breakdown of the divergence between the specific indicator and the control 
indicator 
1982 1993 Difference to specific ind in Decomposition of difference CMt 
POints (425 •100) 
Control indicator 100 272 42,5 42.8 
Groa Salariea 100 253,8 24,3 36,8 
Bar6me or remunerations 100 238,2 8,7 20,4 
Specific Indicator 100 229,5 0 
(1) Measured by the evolunon of the ISTAT mdex. 
The divergence between the specific indicator and the control indicator climbed to 42.5 
points between 1982 and 1993. 42.8% .of this divergence was due to the increase in 
employers' social contributions, 36.8% to the structural effect (seniority and qualifications) 
and higher bonuses, while the remaining 20.4% was. due to the divergence between the 
trend of salary scales in the civil service as a whole, as measured by the 1ST AT index and 
the specific indicator. 
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V. Germany 
We will begin by describing the main characteristics of the salary determination system for 
German civil servants and will then attempt to identify the reasons for an increasing 
divergence between the specific indicator and the control indicator. 
5.1. Cluuru:lerlsticS of the procedures for determining the remunemtion of civil servants 
m~~, -
Posts in the Gennan civil service can be occupied by three categories of employees, namely 
permanent officials ("Beamte"), who represent approximately 40% of government 
employees, staff employed under contract ("Angestellte") and workers(" Arbeiter"). 
The main characteristics of established officials ( "Beamte ") in the Gennan civil service are 
as follows: 
• guaranteed employment and pension; 
• no salary negotiations (in contrast with "Angestellte" and "Arbeiter"); the 
remuneration and conditions of employment are unilaterally fiXed by the 
government; 
• no right to strike,. 
' In practice, in spite of the inexistence of an automatic official procedure 13, the general 
upward adjustments of the salaries of established officials are closely linked with those 
negotiated for the other categories of employees in the public sector. 
These two elements are combined to determine the official's basic salary on one of four 
salary scales, one for officials in positions of high responsibility (scale B), one for the 
university sector (scale C), one for the judiciary (scale R) and one for the remainder (scale 
A). 
Scale A is subdivided into four groups, each of which consists of a set of four steps on 
which the precise position depends on qualifications; new officials are generally recruited 
on the first step. Thus, for scale A, we have the four following subdivisions: 
Al- A4: 
A5 -AS: 
A9- A12: 
A13- A16: 
lowest level ("einfacher Dienst") 
intermediate level ("mittlerer Dienst") 
higher level ("gehobener Dienst") 
highest level ( "hOherer Dienst") 
There is a ceiling on promotions from one step to the next within a group; promotion to a 
higher step within the group is restricted to a limited number of officials from immediately 
below that step. For example, the number of officials in .All is restricted to 30% of the 
numben in AlO, and the number in A12 is restricted to 12% of the numbers in All. 
Officials are very rarely promoted from one group to the next. 
13 Informal consultations are however held between officials and government 
representatives 
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In addition to individual promotions, there have occasionally been "collective promotions", 
i.e. the reclassification of a group of officials at a higher level (but without a change of 
group) to compensate for a higher workload or increased responsibility or possibly in 
response to pressure from certain groups of employees. Several groups were able to benefit 
from this type of measure in a few German "Lander" in the '70s. Such measures result in 
distortion in the structure in favour of the upper levels. In the '80s and '90s, this type of 
measure was adopted only in the case of nurses, who are not in S61 of the National 
Accounts. 
The basic salary, as described above, is supplemented by a bonus for officials employed in 
ministries (at the Federal level and at the level of the individual "Linder") ·an annual 
holiday bonus ("Urlaubsgeld"), marriage allowances and family allowances and, for several 
groups of officials, bonuses linked with the type of work they do. All these bonuses are 
collective in the sense that they apply to every member of the group concerned. The 
amount of the bonus depends on qualifications and/or the family situation of the recipient. 
This is a very uniform system, because the levels of remuneration are determined at a 
central level and apply to all officials, without any differentiation between their employers 
(Federal Government, Lander or Local Authorities). Pay rises are mainly in the form of 
general increases in salaries (revaluation of salary scales), and the same percentage rise is 
granted to all officials (the national, land or local authority levels, without regard for 
qualifications). 
The evolution of the individual civil servant's pay is therefore shaped by the following 
elements: 
Collective effects: 
•· general rises in basic salaries 
• changes in the value of bonuses 
Individual efforts: 
• age (seniority) and family situation 
• promotion to a higher step. 
5.2. Main changes since 1980 
The structure described above remained practically unchanged throughout the period 
covered by the study. In contrast with France, there were no reforms of the index positions 
(lmown in French as "positions indicieres ") which would have resulted in changes in the 
relative positions of the salaries of German civil servants. 
There has been some talk, in the past two years or so, of bringing in a system of 
individualized bonuses for "Beamte", linked with their personal performance, but no 
concrete steps have yet been taken to that effect. 
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The main change in conditions of employment over the period under review was the 
reduction of the working week on 1 April 1989 (from 40 to 39 hours) and 1 April 1990 
(from 39 to 38.5 hours). This was done without any reduction in the total compensation of 
officials; in other words, remuneration remained the same for a slightly reduced number of 
hours worked . 
. Finally, it must be noted that even if reunification has not yet had an impact on procedures 
for determining remuneration in the public sector in Germany or on the statistics collected 
by Eurostat, because the reference population is limited to the fonner Federal Republic, the 
prospects are that the trend of the S61 indicator could be affected in the future by the 
collection of the data for the whole of Germany. For the next few years, it seems desirable 
to carry on collecting the data simultaneously for the old and new reference populations 
until the aims of comparability of the annually recorded changes is actually attained. 
5.3. Compari3on of changes in the control indicoJor and the specific indicolor. 
The 1980 - 1994 period can be clearly divided, in the light of the evolution of the 
cumulated indices, into 2 subperiods: 
• from 1980 to 1989, the two indicators coincided; 
• from 1990 to 1994, the gross specific indicator recorded a slight reduction in 
purchasing power (1989 = 100; 1994 = 97.2), whereas the control indicator was 
significantly higher than the specific indicator (1989 = 100; 1994 = 108.2). 
In contrast with France, Germany has neither an index with a constant structure for 
measuring changes in the pay scales of officials nor an indicator of structural effects 
equivalent to the French GVT. It is therefore not possible to measure the structural effects 
with an impact on average remuneration and to isolate them from the effects of variations 
in salary scales. So we can only put forward qualitative hypotheses. 
Compared with France and Italy, Germany has not experienced a very striking rise in the 
proportion of the wage bill represented by employers • contributions, which rose from 
20.6% in 1980 to 22.2% in 1994. If we recalculate a control indicator without employers' 
contributions for the period 1990-1994, we obtain a cumulated index of 107.8 (real terms; 
1980 = 100), representing a 0.4 point reduction of the diversion from the gross specific 
indicator. 
• 
• 
to the extent that the numbers of employees recorded by the control indicator are 
not full-time equivalents, the reductions of the length of the working week in 1989 
and 1990 cannot affect the rate of growth of average remuneration per capita. 
if we examine the evolution of the numbers of employees (in S61) for the period 
1980-1994 (fig. 4) we can see there was a very marked change in 1989. After a 
period of more or less steady growth up to that point, the trend was reversed, and 
the numbers declined sharply over the period from 1989 to 1992 and carried on 
falling thereafter, albeit more slowly. At the end of the period under review, the 
number ·of salaried officials was more or less the same as in 1982. Sector S61, as 
counted here, corresponds to the total number of salaried officials employed at the 
level of Federal Government for the Under, whatever their status, in the territory 
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of the former Federal Germany. It includes, in particular, all military personnel and 
all persons engaged in military service or national civilian service ("Zivildienst"). It 
does not include railway or postal workers. The downtrend observed from 1989 
onwards is linked with the declining number of persons engaged in military service 
or "civil" service. 
According to the Gennan statistical services, the two main factors (in addition to the effect 
of the upward adjustments of salary scales) to which the growth of the control indicator 
could be attributed are: 
• in Germany, as in France and Italy the factors underlying the evolution of the 
remuneration of the individual civil servants are general pay rises, the adjustment of 
bonuses, seniority and promotions. This last effect corresponds to the structural 
effects, from which we must filter out, above all,in a career-based system, the 
negative effect corresponding to the net balan~ of persons entering and leaving the 
service (the former having lower salaries than the latter). In the phase when the 
number of civil servants was rising, therefore, the negative effect of newcomers on 
the average salary would have compensated for the positive effect of seniority and 
promotions. The proximity of the specific indicator and the control indicator would 
therefore correspond to a zero structural effect. In the employment contraction 
phase, the positive structural effect came fully into play. This ,effect was accentuated 
by the fact that the remuneration of the persons carrying out their military service 
or "Zivildienst" is considerably lower than the average for all other employees in 
the public sector. 
In conclusion, insofar as the 1980-1994 period is concerned, the divergence between the 
specific indicator and the control indicator which appeared in 1989 is linked with a positive 
structural effect attributable to the reduction in the number of persons under the military 
service heading. 
In the years to come, the use of the specific indicator method may well become a more 
delicate issue in view of the existence of the following two elementS: 
• the introduction, in due course, of elements of remuneration linked to individual 
performance; 
• the integration of the former Gennan Democratic Republic, where the structure of 
the workforce and the levels of remuneration in the public sector are very different from 
those observed in the former Federal Republic. 
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SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
1) In the case of France, the divergence between the specific indicator and the control 
indicator is attributable to the following four elements: 
the rise in employers' social contributions 
the structural effect (net effect of seniority and qualifications or Gvr balance). This 
effect is positive and increasing in the '90s as a result of the acceleration of civil 
service careers. 
the effect of rising bonuses 
the divergence between the revaluation of salary scales (measured in France for all 
civil servants, excluding bonuses) and increases in remuneration measured by thtr 
specific indicator. . 
The following table summarizes the evolution of these four components: 
1980 1994 Divergence from the Sl Breakcbwl of the 
in points divergence In .. 
j61.8-100) 
Total wage bll 100 238.9 618 149 
Gross salaries 100 Z29.7 52,6 304 
Gross salaries 100 210.9 33,8 22,7 
-L -"- GVT 
Graaa lllaries 100 196.9 19,8 32,0 
~GVTnl 
bcn.lses-(1) 
Specific Indicator 100 177.1 0 
(1) Measure by tbe evolution of the 1ST AT index. 
In short, the specific indicator diverged from the control indicator by 61.8 points between 
1980 and 1994. 14.9% of this div~rgence was due to the increase in employers' social 
contributions, 30.4% to the structural effect (seniority and qualifications), 22.7% to the. 
growth of bonuses and 32% to the divergence between the evolution of pay scales in the 
civil service in general and the evolution measured by the specific indicator. 
This last divergence is partly the result of differences in reference populations (with 
teachers accounting, in particular, for almost 80% of categories A and B). The latter 
benefited from upward adjustments of their salary scales between 1983 and 1991. 
In the absence of major measures affecting specific categories, the revaluation of salary 
scales is essentially in the form of general measures involving an upward adjustment of the 
value of the point. That corresponds to the situation in 1993 and 1994. And in that case,· the 
way in which the specific indicator records upward adjustments of salary scales is similar to 
the way in which they are traced by the INSEE index. But the specific indicator suffers 
from the disadvantage of a narrow reference population and the fact that it covers only a 
limited number of groups. The problem could possibly be overcome by asking the INSEE 
to calculate an index excluding teachers (an annual calculation which has hitherto not been 
made) in order to give us an evaluation of the part played by the category-oriented _ 
measures applicable to civil servants other than teachers which would not have been 
recorded in the specific indicator . 
36 
. 
2) The breakdown of the divergence between the specific and control indicators in 
Italy, for the period 1982-1993, can be summarized in the following table (which is similar 
to the table for France). 
1982 1993 DIYargence from the Sl llrlalcdcwmofthl 
In points ct.wgence In .. 
(42.5-100) 
Tdll wage bll (ccnrd 100 272 42,5 42,8 
~ 
Gralalllartes 100 2538 24L3 368 
Salary ICIIIel 100 2382 8.7 20,4 
SDeclflc lncllcltar 100 2295 0 
(1) Measured by the evolutton oftbe ISTAT index. 
The specific indicator diverged from the control indicator by 42.5 points between 1982 and 
1993. 42.8 I of this divergence was due to the increase in employers' social contributionsf 
36.8% to the structural effect (seniority and qualifications) and increases in premiums, and 
20.4% to the divergence between the evolution of pay scales in the civil service as a whole, 
as measured by the ISTAT index, and the evolution measured by the specific indicator. 
3) In the case of the United Kingdom, the application of Article 65 is fraught with 
problems. Firstly, the control indicator, constructed with a reference population which has 
changed corisiderably over the period, is not a reliable means of measurement of changes in 
remuneration per capita. It does not enable us, in particular, to differentiate between 
structural and scale effects. Secondly, the very structure of the specific indicator is 
increasingly out of line with instirutional reality in the UK. Hence the need, if the use of the 
specific indicator is to continue, to ensure that the data are collected in future on a much 
broader front from the various agencies and departments concerned. 
4) In the case of Germany, the divergence between the specific indicator and the 
control indicator· which appeared in 1989 was linked with a positive structural effect 
attributable to the reduction in the num~r of persons recorded in S61 under the military 
service heading. German civil servants' salaries were notable for the absence of structural 
changes over the period 1980-1994, for the parallelism of their evolution and the collective 
character of the upward adjusnnents of salaries or bonuses. 
In the years to come, the use of the specific indicator method may become more open to 
question for the following two reasons: 
the inclusion, in due course, of elements of remuneration linked with individual 
perfonnance; 
the integration in the method of the former German Democratic Republic where the 
structure of the workforce and the scales of remuneration in the public sector are 
very different from those observed in the former Federal Republic. 
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EUROST AT REPORT 
Luxembourg, Noven1ber 1996 
Follo\v-up of 1994 revie\v of the methodology 
EUROST AT has produc~d three reports that develop in more detail some aspects of the 1994 
review of the methodology. They concern: 
Consumption weights 
Housing weights 
Guidelines on the methodology of conducting surveys 
They have been presented to the Art.64 Working Party and have received their general 
approval. Specific comments fron1 Germany and the Netherlands are included as an annex. 
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Consumption weights 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
1 . Among the topics discussed during and after the review of correction 
coefficient methodology early in 1994 the question of consumption weights was 
among the most important, and appeared to be one of the -topics causing most 
concern. 
2. The Staff Regulations Group of the Council and Art. 64 Working Party 
delegates expressed three principal concerns: 
(a) several delegates felt that the system of calculating specific weights for 
EC officials was too complex, and that use of the national weights would 
be simpler. 
(b) There was an impression that a weighting pattern specific to international 
officials, giving more weight to the items which tended to be purchased 
more by international officials than by the average person, would be 
bound to result in a higher correction coefficient than if the weighting 
pattern appropriate to the national population were used. This would 
supposedly exert a constant upward spiral effect on EC officials' salaries. 
(c) Some concern was expressed over the treatment of response bias, and the 
general problem of sampling, in the EC officials' family budget survey 
(FBS). 
3. During 1995, Eurostat conducted a Brussels FBS to replace that of 1989. The 
results from this survey (this report has been written before final data were 
available) will provide a viable new basis for re-calculating the important 
reference-city weights .. The improvement of the FBS questionnaire design has 
led to a higher response rate and accuracy of the data. 
4. Eurostat has already raised at An. 64 WP meetings the question of how to 
conduct FBSs on small populations ofEC officials in certain duty-stations. (See 
Docs ART 64/74 (Feb. 1993), Art 64/76 (June 1993), Art 64/82 (May 1994), 
Art 64/94 (Nov 1994)). Some pragmatic solutions were adopted in the paper 
Art 64/95/5 of Feb 1995 which have been implemented for those places where 
not enough responses are obtained. 
5. This paper presents the relevant arguments and counter-arguments concerning 
the topics in paragraphs 2 to 4. 
8. SPECIFIC EC OFFICIALS' \\'EIGIITS OR NATIONAL WEIGHTS? 
6. Price indices - whether measuring changes over time (consumer price indices) 
or over space (purchasing power parities) measure the impact of price changes 
on a particular group of consumers. A national CPI might, for instance, aim to 
measure the impact of price changes on the typical household ·- those 
somewhere around the middle part of the income range. The weights for such 
an index would relate to the expenditure pattern of the typical household. 
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Such an index might give quite different results from an index aimed at 
measuring the impact of price changes on, say, lower income households, where 
the weights would relate to the typical expenditure pattern of such a household. 
Several EU member states publish a range of CPls which illustrate this point. 
Each index has its own particular use. The first type might be used for indexing 
wages, while the second type might be more suitable for indexing social security 
benefits. 
7. The essential point is that an index is constructed for a particular purpose, and 
its precise construction will depend on that purpose. In the case of the very 
specific purpose of calculating spatial indices for EC officials' cost-of-living 
adjustments, there can be no doubt that on technical grounds the weights should 
reflect the expenditure pattern of the average EC official. To use, say, the 
weighting pattern of the average national household could give a different, and 
quite inappropriate, result. The information required to calculate such an index 
would certainly be simpler to obtain, but that would not make it correct. 
C. DOES THE USE OF A SPECIAL WEIGHTING LEAD TO UPWARD BIAS? 
8. This immediately leads to the practical question of what are the differences 
between the weights used for international officials and national CPI weights. 
and could they lead to an upward spiralling effect on EC officials' salaries? 
Table 1 below shows the weights at a high level of aggregation which are used 
to calculate National CPis, together with the weights derived from the last 
Eurostat FBS on international officials in several duty stations. 
Table I - National and international weights 
Belalum Pnan Gemlllft)' ltalf·Rome ltai)'-Vanw Netherland" United Klnadom 
Group . National lntl'l'ftat. l"iltlnn•l ••• ..,..(. NaitlctnJtl lnt~f'lllll National lntfl'ftat. N•tional lntHn•t. N1tlnnal lntft'ft1l. N•Unn1l lnl~m•L 
1) Food, bevenges 201.15 153.53 117.80 133.60 163.58 153.20 199.16 172.60 199.40 178.50 151.63 152.10 17693 
and tobacco 
2) Clothing and IS.SO 6H9 61.69 IOl.SO 79.93 63.80 97.78 74.40 106.46 80.80 6797 66.::!0 S6 ::!IJ 
Footwear 
3) Housing, 19S.25 187.S2 Z0:!.91 229.80 ~3.51 20S.60 158.4S 189.10 96.69 l"r..lO 190.11 19191J 1~3: 
Heating. Ughting 
of "'hich rents 71.7!1 ua.n 140.63 1118.80 179.65 172.40 106.45 IS6.40 41.!11 1::!4.20 140.24 IS6.10 123 )IJ 
.&) Furn., Glean., 72.SO 137.10 75.61 110.20 50.24 114.70 95.SO 117.00 119.80 127.SO 61Ul 123.4l.l 6-1~ 
Hous. art. 
5) Healthcare costs 4US IS.35 107.37 30.71} K3 72 17.80 64.15 18.60 27.69 1840 1159<'> 11.30 1 ~ 1-J 
6) Transpurt and 164.4S 203~ 16:57 163.~(1 1~.53 191.40 123.12 173.SO 144.61 178.20 136 3S ::!I.IM .¥~ 1(,)1 ~·· 
Communications 
7) Entert., Leisure, IS.OS 14.34 77.10 109.80 89.07 87.00 89.69 98.20 107.42 86.60 IO.U13 96.5() 103 (II 
educ. and cult. 
8) Other goods and 153.9S 153.07 l:.-.9s 1::!0.20 175.42 166.50 171.49 155.90 197~ ISHO 165.8-a I!ICJ 20 2::!1 :!1.1 
sen·ices 
TOTAl, 1000.00 100000 J(1(1()00 IOftJO(I 101'10(1() 100000 1000.00 100000 1000f¥J HJOCJOO ICJ(J(J Of) lfJ(JO OC.I )IJ(J{J (JCJ 
SOURCES: National "'ci~hls - Eurostat cluhoration on lhc NSls' CPls. The figures should he lrcal">d with some 
caution b:canse th~ cxpcmliturc f:!roup classifications ure not fully tollltlarablc. 
lntcrnaliomtl \\CiJ!IUs ~ Eurnslnt Fmnily Budget Surveys umong~t European and intcnmtionul stan· 
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11:.1-l~(J 
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1);' ,:.· 
11911, 
I.J7 :;., 
I(J{J{J{JIJ 
Analysis of the data in table 1 through the calculation by expenditure group of· 
the average and standard deviation corresponding to national and international 
consumption structures permits the drawing of two important conclusions: 
-Firstly, national consumption patterns do differ from international ones. 
- Secondly, the set of international officials' consumption patterns for each duty 
station are more homogeneous in general than those of the national populations. 
9. Table 2 shows the average of the 7 national structures and of the 7 international 
ones. The weights used for the weighted average are national adult (over 18 
years) population and the number of international officials. 
Table 2- Average structures 
Unweighted Av~rage Weighted average 
Ntttional Internal. Diff. (•/•) National Internal. Diff. (•/e) 
1) Food, be\·erages and tobacco 182.91 159.18 -12.98 179.40 15275 -14.86 
2) Clothing and Footwear 79.40 73.03 .S.03 74.72 70.27 ·S.9S 
\ 
3) Housing, Heating, Ughting 184.46 197.SO 7.07 205.99 193.78 -5.93 
of which rents 114.79 159.61 39.10 139.10 157.11 12.99 
4) Fum., Clean., Hous. art. 711.11 119.16 52.56 69.52 130.15 87.22 
5) Healthcaa:-e costs 65.13 17.42 -73.25 70.67 1719 -756R 
6) Transport and Communications 143.40 186.23 29.86. 136.88 196 37 .:13~ 
7) Entert., Leisure, educ. and culL 93.62 97.35 3911 9031 ll!U~ ·I (,J 
8) Other goods and scn·ices 172.97 150.14 ·13.20 17l.S:! ISO<"' ·12 ()g 
10. Comparison of the averages highlights some relevant differences between the 
two kinds of structures. This is expected both from economic theory and from 
considerations of common sense. Firstly, it is a fact that the average 
international official receives a higher salary than the national average. This is 
true of expatriates generally, and of expatriate government officials in 
particular. Secondly, it is a well-known economic fact that patterns of 
expenditure vary according to ·income: a specific instance is the so-called 
Engel's law, which states that expenditure on food, relative to total expenditure, 
declines as income rises. This effect can be clearly seen in Table 2. Thirdly, it is 
self-evident that expatriates (and most of the international staff in Brussels are 
expatriates) will tend to have different patterns of expenditure from the 
domestic population, even at the same l~vel of income. For instance, they will 
tend to spend relatively more on transport and telecommunications (visits and 
calls to home country). This effect can also be seen in Table 1. 
11. Table 3 shows' the standard deviation of the 7 national structures and of the 7 
international ones. using the same weights as for the average. 
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Table 3 - Standard deviation values 
. . 
.. National InternaL Diff. (8/e) 
1) Food, beverages and tobacco 18.14 14.43 ·20.44 
2) Clothing and Foot\\·ear 17.29 13.17 ·19.79 
3) Housing. Heating, Ughting 44.30 16.93 -61.78 
of which rents 42.91 11.62 ·S6.61 
4) Fum., Clean., Hnus. art. 21.13 10.27 -51.42 
5) Healthcare costs 36.17 6.31 -82.56 
6) Transport and Communications 22.04 u.oo ·31.9S 
7) Entert., Leisure, educ. and cult. 10.48 12.0S 14.98 
8) Other goods and sen•kcs 28.48 13.48 ·S2.6S 
Average (unwelghtcd) 24.7S 12.79 -38.20 
All the groups of expenditure, with the exception of group 7, show less 
dispersion for international weights than for national ones. This is interpreted as 
.international weights are more homogeneous than the national ones. In other 
words international officials tend always to spend their money in a similar way, 
irrespective of the place where they are stationed. 
12. The fact of having a specific weighting pattern does not, and cannot in itself, 
lead to a generally upward bias in the trend of the resulting parities. For this to 
occur, it would be necessary to show that the average price ratios between the 
various duty-stations and Brussels increased more for those items where 
weights are higher than in the Belgian CPI ar:td less for those items where 
weights are lower than in the Belgian CPl. In other words, referring to Table 1, 
column I, parities would only show an upward trend if the prices of groups 4 
and 6 regularly increased in other duty stations relative to Brussels; and/or if 
the prices of groups I, 2 and 5 regularly fell in other duty-stations relative to 
Brussels. There is no reason to suppose that these specific conditions would 
occur; it is entirely unlikely that any link whatever exists between relative 
weights and relative price changes. 
The above conclusions have been tested by recalculating the correction 
coefficients for 117/1995 using the national weights from the duty stations 
shown in Table 1. 
The results in Table 4 confirm that no systematic effects up or down can be 
expected using national instead of international weights. In fact for five places, 
the correction coefficients would be lower using national weights (France, 
Rome, Netherlands, London and Culham), and also for five place~ the 
correction coefficients would be higher (Berlin, Bonn, Karlsruhe, Munich and 
Italy .. Varese. Note that in Germany and the UK a single set of weights is 
applied for all the duty stations). Furthermore, the combined effect - weighted 
averaged according to the staff in different countries- would be 1 ,3o/o ·higher if 
national weights '''ere used. 
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Table 4- Correction coefficient com(larison using national and international weight-s 
Corr. Codf. Corr. Cocff. 
Intern. National Din: (e;•) 
Weights Weights 
France 110.8 107.7 -2.8 
Berlin 110.9 113.0 1.8 
,, 
Bonn 100.8 103.7 2.9 
Karlsruhe 100.0 103.7 3.7 
Munich 110.2 113.7 3.2 
Italy-Rome 81.7 81.3 -0.53 
ltaly-Varcse 18.5 80.6 2.8 
Netherlands 103.1 101.9 ·1.1 
London 100.7 90.2 ·10.4 
Culham 84.0 82.7 ·1.6 
A\·era.:e •1. 86.1 17.1 +1.3 
Correction coefficients have been calculated as at 1/7/1995 
D. RESPONSE BIAS IN THE FAMILY BUDGET SURVEY 
13. The purpose of the family budget survey (FBS) is to determine the relative 
amounts of expenditure on different items of consumption. To obtain the data, 
respondents are asked to state their actual expenditure on the various items. 
The overall relative amounts are then calculated on the basis of replies received. 
14. Response bias could arise from 
(a) deliberate falsification by respondents in the perceived hope of influencing 
future correction coefficients in their favour; 
(b) inadequate statistical techniques. 
These two aspects are discussed in tum. 
15. The only way in which respondents in duty-stations could achieve a result 
intended to have the effect of increasing their correction coefficients would be 
to deliberately exaggerate their expenditure on those items believed to be the 
most expensive in a comparison with Brussels. (Altruistic respondents in 
Brussels might also achieve the same effect for their colleagues in duty-stations 
-but not themselves- by deliberate exaggeration in the opposite direction!). For 
such a strategy to be successful in practice, not only would the respondents 
need to be correct in their estimations of relative prices, but the relativities 
would need to remain for the five-year interval between FBSs. 
16. Though it is always possible that some respondents do behave in this way, 
Eurostat simply does not believe that, first, the majority behave in this way and, 
second, that they have the detailed knowledge of the system and the 
sophistication required to effectively falsify the returns in this way. It is not 
therefore regardecj ·as a source of bias . 
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E. STATISTICAL RESPONSE PROBLEM: BRUSSELS FBS 
J 7. Possible sources of statistical bias are both more diverse and more plausible. A 
distinction first needs to be drawn between the (large) Brussels FBS and the 
much smaller surveys in other places. The size of the EC officials population in 
Brussels is large enough to obtain a response which is statistically viable, 
provided that an appropriately stratified sampling scheme is put in place. The 
recent Brussels FBS ( 1995) provided more than 700 questionnaires for use in 
the estimation of the weights, which gives a result which is statistically sound. 
Details of the sampling techniques followed and of the questionnaire used are 
given in the following paragraphs. 
18. Eurostat invested a considerable effort into ensuring the success of the Brussels 
FBS held in 1995 in terms of response and accuracy. The main focus of 
attention was on the questionnaire itself, with the aim of simplifying it to 
improve the response rate and to yield more accurate results. 
19. The previous questionnaire was a multi-purpose document. It was used for 
FBSs in all EU places of employment, including Brussels, and also in places 
outside Europe, where the number of respondents was supplemented by 
including the staff of EU embassies. The questionnaire design was therefore 
aimed at estimating weights using results obtained from very small samples. The 
practical effect of this was that most of the estimates were obtained through 
recall: in ·other words, respondents were asked to recall their expenditures over, 
generally, the past 12 months. Exceptions were made for certain more regular 
items, where the recall period was only one month, while for food and drink 
there was a daily diary section covering aU such expenditure over a two-week 
period. 
20. This reliance on reca1J was necessary because with very (ew respondents the 
pattern of expenditure which would have been reported in a two-week period 
on the more irregular and larger items was too unreliable to be grossed up to an 
annual estin1ate. Consider the case of domestic appliances such as a washing 
machine. If the typical household purchases a new washing machine every, say, 
eight years, then on average only 1 in 208 questionnaires (8 x 52/2) would be 
likely to show such a purchase in any given 2-week period. It can be readily 
appreciated that with probabilities of this size, the resulting errors could be 
large. Suppose, for example, that by chance a particular FBS survey with 
exactly 208 respondents resulted in the reporting of 4 washing machines in a 2-
week period. The grossed-up estimates would overstate the expenditure on 
washing machines by a factor of 4. The previous questionnaire needed to rely 
on recall not only for very large items like washing machines but also for 
relatively small items. 
21. The possibility of obtaining a large number of questionnaires from the 
population of international officials in Brussels meant that a questionnaire 
designed specifically for a large sample, for use only in the Brussels survey, 
could be considered. If the questionnaire were redesigned in such a way as to 
increase the response rate from an already large population, the possibility arose 
of placing most items of expenditure in the_ daily diary section. and keeping to 
• 7-
an absolute minimum the larger items where recall was still necessary. 
22. Even so, national FBS experience has shown that the recall capabilities of 
respondents declines sharply over time. The quality of data recalled over a 
period as long as 12 months is not likely to be high. A period of no more than 3 
inonths is regarded as desirable. However, for the present type of survey, which 
is not a continuous one but is carried out only once every five years, a recall 
period covering only three months would not give viable results because of the 
seasonality of expenditure. The pattern of expenditure in summer is different 
from that of winter - and seasons such as Christmas bring their own special 
patterns. Ideally, the Brussels FBS needs to cover the whole year. The idea of 
carrying out 4 surveys, each covering a 3-month period, was considered but 
rejected as being administratively too complex. A compromise was reached in 
which a 2-stage survey would be held, covering consecutive 6-month periods. 
Careful thought was given to the type of expenditures which could safely be 
covered in the 2-week diary, and those which were considered too large and 
irregular for this treatment. 
23. In the previous FBS questionnaire, the criterion for assigning a heading to the 
diary section or to one of the recall sections was the likelihood that a purchase 
of an item might be made in the 2-week period. In other words, items of low 
purchase frequency, even when of low value, were not assigned to the diary 
section. In practice, this resulted in the diary section being limited almost 
entirely to food and drink items. 
24. But the purpose of the split method is not to distinguish between low and high 
frequency-of-purchase items, but to obtain the best estimate of annual 
expenditure at the group heading level. This implies the need to give special 
treatment to high-value (and thus, normally, infrequently purchased) items. 
This idea can best be explained by example. Consider first heading 20 - Goods 
for leisure, entenainment and culture. This covers a wide variety of anicles, 
ranging from a single audio cassette costing under SOOFB to a hi-fi system 
costing SO,OOOFB. Many people buy cassettes on several occasions during a 
year, and in a sample of 730 there are sure to besom~ r~corded purchases in a 
given 2-week period. Grossing up the survey results by 26 will give a 
reasonable estimate, though not necessarily of high accuracy. But the aim is not 
to measure the annual consumption of audio cassettes, but the total value of 
consumption of all the items in heading 20. On the other hand, the purchase of 
hi-fi systems is relatively rare: in a typical year, perhaps only 100 households 
out of 1000 will buy one. On average, perhaps 4 of those households will buy 
one in a given 2-week period. But it may happep, by chance, that the actual 
survey sample results in any number between .zero and 10 recording such a 
purchase. The etl'ect of grossing such figures up by 26 to estimate the annual 
total will clearly have. a much greater effect on the estimate for the total of 
heading 20 than any chance variability on the purchase of audio cassettes. It will 
also be clear that it is not the type of item that matters, but the value. Hence 
the criterion for recording expenditure in the diary section or the recall section 
of the new questionnaire will not be the types but their cost. 
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25. The diary section of the questionnaire covers all 29 headings~ the recall section 
covers most of the headings but excludes those where large purchases are 
virtually impossible (newspapers etc). Respondents were asked to distinguish 
between purchases of less than or greater than S,OOOFB. The latter were 
recorded in the recall section, whereas the former were recorded in the diary 
section. The estimation of annual expenditure per respondent was thus obtained 
by multiplying the totals in the diary section by 26, multiplying the totals in the 
recall section by 2, and summing the result. ·-. 
26. The resulting annual totals from the survey sample was then grossed up to the 
population total using administrative data provided by DGIX. Suppose, for 
example, there are 50 B-grade, expatriate, married-with-children survey 
respondents. If the actual number of Brussels-based officials with these 
characteristics was 500, the survey totals was grossed up by a factor of 10. 
Similar grossing for aJI the other categories provided the population estimate. 
27. A further important change was made which has significantly reduced the 
number of separate item headings for which expenditures had to be reported. 
The correction coefficient system calculates parities at a detailed level of 173 
expenditure headings. Weights for each of these headings have in the past been 
estimated directly from the FBSs; which required· respondents to state their 
expenditure on each of the 173 headings separately. Thus the questionnaire was 
very lengthy, and its sheer bulk was considered to deter response. Not only that, 
but the ability of the typical respondent to accurately classify expenditure into 
the appropriate headings must be questionable. The only advantage of having a 
long and detailed listing was that the headings themselves were detailed enough 
to act as an aide-memoire or prompt. 
28. It was therefore decided to make, the response rate and accuracy of the 
questionnaires a major reduction in the number of headings. This was intended 
to improve. Bearing in mind the need for a certain degree of homogeneity, and 
the need for respondents to be able to judge clearly to which heading any 
particular type of expenditure relates, a grouping of 29 headings was reached. 
The weights resulting from these aggregated headings was subsequently 
disaggregated to the usual 173 levels using detailed weights from national 
sources. The rationale for this is that at the level of broad expenditure groups~ 
such as those represented by the 29 headings, the consumption pattern of 
international officials differs significantly from the consumption pattern of the 
national population. But within these major groups, there is no reason to 
suppose that there will be significant differences between the two groups. 
Consider, for example, expenditure on clothing. It is already known that the 
typical international official spends a larger proportion of his e-xpenditure on 
clothing than the average national household (probably due in large part to the 
income effect). But within the heading "clothing" it is not so likely that there 
will be larger differences in the proportions spent on men's, women's, and 
children's clothing and footwear. 
29. A final important change to the FBS questionnaire was the reduction in 
supplementary questions such as household composition, household income, 
and detailed information about expenditure on housing-related services and 
domestic services. The section on out-of-area expenditure was also simplified. 
-9-
Little of this information was used · in the past, its main puq)ose being, .in· 
principle, to act as a check on the other data. But the intrusive nature of some 
of these questions must have dett~rred response. 
30. The net effect of the changes described above is to reduce the physical size of 
the questionnaire by two-thirds, from 46 pages to about 15. This in itself, it is 
believed, will encouraged response: the previous questionnaire was simply too 
daunting. 
31 To increase the accuracy of responses Eurostat felt it was desirable to identify a 
group of volunteer participants. Over 1,000 Commission staff expressed their 
willingness to participate in the first stage. To assist them in recalling their 
expenditure on large items in the 6-month period, they were provided with a 
simple diary to note down such expenditures. This was also expected to help iri 
"engaging" them in the survey, thereby reducing the likelihood of drop-out at a 
later stage. For the second stage, the population coverage was extended to the 
Brussels staff of the European Parliament , other EU institution staff, and the 
staff of the Co-ordinated Organisations (NATO etc). The actual number of 
respondents was 772 with 730 valid questionnaires finally used in the 
estimation of the weights. This figure is clearly superior to the 1989 FBS bas~d · 
on 450 valid questionnaires and gives much more reliability to the 1995 
weights. 
32 The method followed to impute rents in the 1995 Brussels FBS has been to 
associate the average rent value of predetermined classes to all the 
questionnaires belonging to the same class of owner occupied dwellings. The 
classes were built on the basis of relevant housing characteristics such as type of 
house, size and existence of garage This procedure is in line with the 
Commission decision of 18.7.1995 (JO L186 ofS.8.1995) on the estimation of 
imputed rents, which recommends using stratification characteristics closely 
connected with housing and the use-of real rents. 
Given the sample size constraints, not all the possible classes have been used 
but only those likely to have different average rent values. The cross 
classification type/garage was selected for small and medium apartments (up to 
2 bedrooms) while type/size was applied for big apartments and houses. This 
procedure takes into account the typically different housing structure between 
owners and tenants apparent from the 1995 Brussels FBS. While the majority of 
owners live in houses {detached, -semi-detached or terraced), tenants generally 
prefer to Jive in apartments. 
33. Thus there is no change to the basic methodology of calculating 173 parities 
and updating them using price indices at the same level. The only change 
introduced with the 1995 FDS survey is in the estimation of detailed weights 
which Eurostat considers to be more reliable than those from the 1989 FBS 
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F. RESPONSE PROBLEMS IN PLACES OTHER THAN BRUSSELS 
34. For places other than Brussels different considerations apply. In the places 
where there are large research centres, particularly lspra and Culham, there 
exists the possibility of obtaining reasonably large numbers of FBS respondents 
- though not on the same scale as in Brussels. In the capital cities and a few 
other places where there are relatively few officials, there are problems in 
obtaining enough completed FBS questionnaires to be statistically viable. This 
problem also exists in the separate field of correction coefficients for places 
outside the EU (See Docs Art 64/68 (Nov. 1992), Art. 64/70 (Nov. 1992), An. 
64n6 (June 1993) and Art 64/96/13 (July 1996)), and has already been 
examined by the Art. 64 ~p regarding places within the EU, as mentioned in 
para. 4. 
-35. In certain. places, the combined number of EU officials (including staff of the 
European Parliament, European Schools, and other EU institutions, as well as 
international staff belonging to the co-ordinated organisations) is large enough 
to provide a reasonably reliable estimate of average consumption patterns. But 
there are several places where there are not enough officials to provide a 
reliable estimate - even if a 1 00% response were obtained (estimates from small 
samples wiiJ not necessarily represent the target average). This is the case for 
Denmark, Spain, Greece. Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Sweden. 
36. Possible solutions to this problem were suggested in Eurostat papers An 64/74 
(Feb 1993) and Art 64/94 (Nov 1994). None ofthe suggestions met with the 
unanimous approval of delegates, but it was clear that some type of average 
weighting pattern should be sought. A firm proposal, based on the scheme 
outlined in para. 21 of Doc. Art 64/94 was presented in the document An 
64/95/S (Feb 1995) and is now given in the following paragraphs. The method 
was approved by the Working Party and is now being applied to estimate 
consumption weights for places with few officials. 
37. The new method treats housing separately from other items of expenditure. 
38. 
Considering non-housing items first, the method starts from the fact that no 
basis exists for calculating detailed weights specific to each place: there is no 
possibility of a special FBS amongst international staff, and the national weights 
are not relevant. A proxy is therefore sought. Knowing that there is a 
reasonable degree of homogeneity amongst the consumption patterns of 
international officials regardless of their place of employment. (See para. 11 ), a 
set of average weights at a high level of aggregation (the usual 8-group level) is 
calculated. These high-levd weights are then disaggregated down to the 173-
heading level. excluding housing, using national weights. This method thus has 
a close relationship with the method used for Brussels, as described earlier in 
section E of this paper. 
Housing weights are calculated based on the Brussels weight, corrected by the 
housing correction coefficient for each duty station. After introduction of the 
housing weights, the 173 basic headings are re-scaled to 1 ,000. 
The places used for the average weighting are those where FBSs have been 
conducted - a sort of European pool excluding Brussels (given that Brussels 
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represents about 90% of the population, its inclusion would dominate a 
weighted average, reflecting the numbers of officials in each place • of 
employment). Furthermore since the purpose of the exercise was to produce a 
proxy for a Paasche-type "local" weighting, it would have been perverse to 
include Brussels .. as, of course, the Laspeyres part of the final Fisher index is 
wholly Brussels-based. Thus the solution retained has been to calculate an 
·average set of weights based only on FBSs from places other than Brussels. 
39. Doc A64/95/5 provides the detailed results of applying the new method to the 8 
places concerned. Eurostat believes that it gives a more accurate reflection than 
hitherto of the real cost-of-living differences between these places and Brussels. 
40. The estimation of consumption weights for the other countries, although based 
on local FBSs, presents particular problems for those countries with more than 
one place of employment and where a separate correction coefficient is applied: 
Germany, Italy and the UK. Current practices differ according to the country. 
In the UK, the same weighting pattern is used for Culham and London, 
although (a) the number of FBS respondents from Culham exceeds that from 
London, and (b) rents in London are considerably greater than those in Culham. 
In Germany, the same pattern is used in all four places of employment. In Italy, 
however, Ispra has its own weighting pattern , while Rome has a separate one 
based on FBSs from Rome and certain other places in Italy where there are staff 
of the Co-ordinated Organisations. 
41 While the case of Italy seems reasonable, some rationalisation in the UK and 
Germany situation should be introduced in the near future. The new FBS to be 
conducted in 1997 in London will incorporate the staff of the European Agency . 
for Medicament Evaluation permitting reliable weights, independently of those 
from Culham. Weights for Karlsruhe and Munich could also be treated 
independently, the first based on the already existing large sample and the 
second incorporating for future FBS the staff of the European Patent Office. 
Bonn and Berlin could be treated either as part of the European pool or based 
on a future German pool. All· these proposals will be submitted for the opinion 
. of Art 64 Working Party delegates prior to their introduction. 
G. OTHER MATTERS 
42. Classification 
The classification of expenditure in the current FBS is a "historical" one which 
· does not correspond precisely to . any agreed international · classification of 
consumers' expenditure. In order to make comparisons and analysis easier, it 
would clearly be· better to align the various classifications. This is now 
becoming close to potential achievement. The UN System of National Accounts 
(SNA) has adopted a classification known as COICOP, also included into the 
European System of Accounts (ESA) (Council Reg~lation of 24/5/96 N° 
6699/96). There is at the same time a harmonisation of national Family Budget 
Survey methodologies in progress, which is adopting a classification 
(PROCOME) based on COICOP, and very similar to it. In addition, Council 
· Regulation N° 2494/95) on the harmonisation of national methodologies for 
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constructing consumer price indices specifies the use of a classification based on 
COICOP. The questionnaire used for the 1995 Brussels FBS has used a 
classification based on PROCOME. This will offer the opponunity o(better 
linkage to national FBS results, and will also, in the future, facilitate the 
updating of detailed parities using natio~al CPI sub-indices. 
43. Frequency ofFBSs 
The Commission's recommendation for the frequency of national FBSs seems 
almost certain to be 5-yearly. This has in fact been Eurostat's target frequency 
for its own FBSs for several years, and it is proposed that this should therefore 
remain. 
Eurostat 
Luxembourg, 
August 1996. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
1.1 The 1994 review of correction coefficient methodology (doc. SEC(94)755) showed 
that there were a number of aspects of the method of calculating housing parities that might 
be capable of improvement. The aspects identified were: 
- Alternatives to the imputed rent method for owner-occupiers 
- The use of weights for the different dwelling types in each duty-station, as well as in 
Brussels 
- The use of weights for the different dwelling types of owner-occupiers, as well as of 
tenants 
- The selection of appropriate districts for rent surveys. 
1.2 In addition to the above points, Eurostat has also given consideration to the inclusion 9f 
detached houses in the rent comparison, and has also taken steps to improve the consistency 
of approach in the annual estate agency rent surveys by providing written guidelines for the 
surveyors. 
1.3 This report summarises the progress made on each of these aspects. It should be said at 
the outset that the first point - alternatives to the imputed rent method - is potentially the 
most far-reaching, as it calls into question the most fundamental aspect of calculating 
housing parities. The examination of this point was therefore given priority. 
OWNER-OCCUPIER PARITIES 
2 THE IMPUTED RENT METHOD 
2.1 The essence of the problem in calculating housing parities for owner-occupied housing 
is the absence of a clearly-determined market price paid by the owner-occupier to obtain 
housing services - shelter costs. In the case of tenants, by contrast, shelter costs are explicit, 
namely the actual rents payable. In principle, owner-occupiers also face an equivalent cost 
because they face the alternative of letting their:- houses on the open market rather than 
occupying them themselves and obtaining, in return, the current market rent. In choosing to 
occupy their property, rather than rent it out, they forgo the rental income that could be 
obtained. This may be regarded, therefore, as the price of avoiding the rent they would 
otherwise have to pay if they themselves were tenants. Thus, in effect, the costs of shelter 
for owner-occupiers are equivalent to the market rents of similar properties. This argument 
provides the rationale for taking imputed rents as the basis of measuring the shelter costs of 
owner-occupied property. In practice, however, it is clear that costs imputed in this way 
may differ considerably from those actually pai4 by owner-occupiers, a major component of 
which is mortgage interest payments. There is, therefore, a case for considering alternative 
ways of deriving housing parities for owner-occupied. property which more closely relate to 
the actual costs incurred in different duty-stations. 
• 
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. 2.2 To examine the alternatives, Eurostat obtained the services of a consultant: Prof 
Michael Fleming of Loughborough University (UK), a well-known expert in the field of 
housing economics. His report is summarised below and available on req ... est. 
2.3 Three potential solutions to the problem may be defined, each of which embodies a 
different concept of costs and thus represents a different philosophical approach to the 
problem. The conceptual basis of the three potential solutions may be defined as covering: 
a) the actual costs of owner occupation, 
b) the opportunity costs of owner-:occupation, and 
c) the user costs of owner-occupation. 
3. ACTUAL COSTS APPROACH 
3.1 From the point of view of the staff who are occupying their own dwellings, the Actual 
Costs approach is probably the one most favoured. The argument is that correction 
coefficients are supposed to allow for differences in relative living costs, and if these include 
the costs of buying a dwelling and seJVicing any mortgage then such costs reflect the reality 
and should be included. 
3.2 Some of the costs faced by owner-occupiers are already included in the parity 
calculation. All the costs of maintenance and repairs, for example, are covered. The major 
exclusions are the capital cost of purchase and major renovation, and the interest paid on 
mortgages. This summary does not propose to repeat the arguments for and against 
including the various elements of costs: this is all well covered in Prof Fleming's report. The 
report was carefully considered by the Article 64 Working Party and its special Task Force 
on Housing Parities. They came to the unanimous conclusion that the Actual Cost approach 
was inappropriat~ for calculating housing parities, principally on the grounds that (a) capital 
expenditure of any type does not form part of the "cost of living" and (b) interest payments 
do not reflect the cost of goods or seJVices, and cannot therefore be included in the basket 
of items for which comparative prices are surveyed. The Working Party also noted that this 
approach would also require the measurement of local house prices as well as rents, which 
would introduce a further element of practical difficulty. 
4. USER COST APPROACH 
4.1 This approach attempts to make a comprehensive evaluation of all the costs associated 
with owner-occupied housing. It takes account of the opportunity costs of capital, of the 
cost of physical depreciation, and of the fact that a dwelling is a capital asset liable to give 
rise to capital gains or losses. This approach is well-founded in financial theory and cannot 
be faulted on theoretical grounds. However, it was firmly rejected by the Article 64 
Working Party, both because of conceptual and practical difficulties (particularly the 
inclusion of capital losses) and because the method was so complex that it would be 
impossible to explain to non-specialists. 
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5. OPPORTUNITY COST APPROACH 
5.1 This approach can be made at two different levels. The first, more basic level, stans 
from the point at which an individual, seeking to provide himself with shelter, makes the 
choice between using capital (either owned or borrowed) to invest in the purchase of a 
dwelling, and thereby depriving himself of interest, or to invest the capital in an income-
producing financial asset and using that income to rent a dwelling. The second level is in 
fact the imputed rent method which is the one actually used for calculating housing parities. 
This starts from the point at which the decision to invest in an owner-occupied dwelling has 
already been made; the question then is whether to let the dwelling to a tenant and to use 
the income to rent a different dwelling for occupation, or alternatively to occupy the 
dwelling and thereby forgo the rent which could otherwise have been obtained. The imputed 
rent is either the rent which could be obtained from letting the dwelling to a tenant, or the 
rent which would have to be paid for occupying an identical dwelling. In practice, both 
types of imputed rents are identical. 
5.2 The Article 64 Working Pany considered the first of these two methods, and reached 
the conclusion that because a crucial part of the calculation lies in choosing an appropriate 
notional rate of interest .. a choice which is far from obvious - such a method would have no 
advantage over the existing method. Perhaps more fundamentally, the Working Pany felt 
that an investment decision was not directly related to the place of employment of the 
investor, and thus could not form the basis for a comparison of "costs". Furthermore, as 
with the Actual Cost approach, the Working Pany noted that this method would also 
require the measurement of local house prices as well as .rents. 
6. OWNER-OCCUPIERS: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Having, after serious consideration of the different approaches, decided that there was 
no reasonable alternative to the existing imputed rents method, the Article 64 Working 
Party reached the unanimous conclusion that there were no grounds for departing from the 
present basic methodology. Moreover, the present method was widely (though not 
universally) accepted by the staff organisations. It was also noted that the imputed rent 
method was used for other international housing cost comparisons, not only for the purpose 
of calculating salary adjustments but also for the broader purpose of measuring Gross 
Domestic Product in real terms, in particular in the European Comparison. Programme and 
the International Comparison Programme. 
6.2 The Working Party nevertheless felt that, although the imputed rent method should 
remain in place, there were a number of practical improvements that could be made to 
achieve more reliable results. Some of these had already emerged from the joint 
CounciUCommission review of correction coefficient methodology referred to in para 1 .I. 
Others are currently being examined, and are also dealt with in this report. 
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7. USE OF WEIGHTS FOR DIFFERENT DWELLING TYPES IN . DUTY 
STATIONS. 
7.1 The methodology for calculating parities generally is firstly to calculate a Laspeyres-
type global parity, that is to weight each of the 173 basic heading parities according to the 
pattern of consumption by officials in Brussels, the reference city. Secondly, a Paasche-type 
global parity is calculated by using consumption weights appropriate to each separate duty 
station (Paris, London etc). Finally, a Fis~er-type index is calculated, by taking the 
geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche parities. 
, 
7.2 This methodology has been widely used in the field of international price comparisons 
and is generally accepted. 
7.3 The decision to create a basic heading for a certain grouping of expenditures is to some 
extent arbitrary, but is guided by three basic factors. Firstly, the products within a basic 
heading should be of a broadly similar type ("beef', in its various forms, is an example) .. 
This is because the source of weights is derived from surveys of household expenditure, 
where for convenience it is important to group similar items together. Secondly, the 
products within a basic heading should be reasonably homogeneous, so that the parity 
calculated for a basic heading should not depend too critically on the choice of 
"representativen items which are actually selected for pricing. (In the case of ubeef', for 
instance, it is likely that the price movements of different types of beef: steak, ribs,. etc) will 
be likely to be fairly similar. Thirdly, it is necessary to have a subgroup of the consumer 
price index in each country which relates closely to the basic heading as a whole, since it is 
such detailed price indices which are used to update the parities in the intervals between 
direct surveys. 
7.4 The weights for the 173 basic headings vary quite widely, but average about 0.5o/o. By 
contrast, the weight for housing is typically about 20% -by far the most important single 
heading. (It should be noted that although housing covers two basic headings (70 and 71) 
the use of imputed rents for owner-occupiers means that the same parity is used for both 
headings, which consequently n1ay be treated as a single heading). 
7.5 The current n1ethod used for calculating rent parities is quite complex, and is described 
in some detail in the Commission Report to Council on methodology referred to in para. 
1.1. The relevant point to note here is that the average rent is ~lculated as a weighted mean 
of several different dwelling types. The weights are obtained from the annual Staff Housing 
Survey. Till 1995 the same weights, resulting from the survey conducted in Brussels, were 
used to calculate the average rents in all the duty stations (except for Italy and Varese, 
where Varese weights were used). The effect of this procedure was thus to calculate only a 
Laspeyres-type parity for housing. No account was taken of the possibility that the mix of 
dwelling types in other duty-stations may differ from that in Brussels. 
7.6 The reason why only the Brussels weighting was used was simply that there was 
insufficient data to permit the calculation of statistically significant weights for the other 
duty stations (except Varese). In the absence of such data, it had been felt sufficient to use 
the Brussels pattern in all the other places. 
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7. 7 The Article 64 Working Party considered different solutions to the problem llnd 
approved the use of a simplified questionnaire for the Staff Housing Survey and of OECD 
results from comparable surveys. This allowed Eurostat to establish specific weights for 
different dwelling types in 4 (out of 19) duty stations in 1996. Further progress on this 
matter is expected in coming years. 
8. USE OF WEIGHTS FOR 0\\'NER-OCCUPIED DWELLINGS. 
8.1 This is a similar problem to the previous one. The weights used up to 1995 in the 
calculation of average rents were those relating to the types of dwelling occupied by 
tenants. No account was taken of the fact that the pattern of dwelling types occupied by 
owners may be different. 
8.2 The rationale for this decision was, however, different. It was based on the assumption 
that since owner-occupiers are treated as if they were tenants, their pattern of occupation 
was identical. However, this could be taken as a somewhat restrictive interpretation of the 
theory of imputed rents. The rent imputed to an owner'-occupier should be the notional rent 
. for the property which he is occupying, and not for some other property. We are, of course, 
talking about average rents, not individual ones, but the same principle should apply; it may 
well be that owner-occupiers tend to occupy, on average, different types of dwelling from 
those occupied by tenants. 
8.3 The question thus arises as to whether the data available was sufficient to allow for the 
potentially different occupation patterns of owner-occupiers and tenants. In fact, the 
situation was similar to that relating to dwelling types discussed in section 7: data available 
from the annual staff housing surveys provided a statistically viable sample in Brussels and 
in Varese, but not elsewhere. 
8.4 The Working Party approved the Eurostat proposal to calculate housing-type weights 
based on the total rent/imputed rent of tenants and owner-occupiers for the different duty 
stations. This means that for Brussels and the other places where specific weights are 
available Eurostat calculates an average rent by type of dwelling, using a stratification of 
dwellings related to housing characteristics. This method is in line with the rent imputation 
followed in the Brussels Family Budget Survey and is based on the construction of 
homogeneous classes taking into account housing characteristics such as the type of 
dwelling, surface area, the existence or not of a garage, etc. The rent imputed to each 
owner-occupied dwelling is the average of the class in which the dwelling is classified. From 
1996 these kind of patterns of occupation based on the total rent/imputed rent are used in 
the rent parities calculation. 
9. SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE DISTRICTS FOR RENT SURVEYS 
9.1 The present method of surveying rents is based on annual surveys of estate agents in 
each duty station. Over the years, the districts covered in the surveys have become generally 
agreed with the NSis and with the e~tate agents. Considerable efforts are made to ensure 
that all the appropriate districts are covered in each survey. In some cases, one agency may 
cover several districts, while in others a particular agency will uspecialise" in one or more 
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districts. One of the problems with the present arrangements in practice is that the chQice of 
agencies tends to be self-selecting: many agencies decline to co-operate, and there is thus no 
guarantee that the agencies actually surveyed will cover all the necessary districts, nor that 
they will cover them in rQughly the correct proportion. 
9.2 The lists of districts have been analysed bilaterally (Eurostat with each NSI). They will 
be revised before the start of each annual round of surveys. The surveyors have been asked 
to check these lists in the field and to point out any change or update that could be useful. 
9.3 The average rent calculated for each duty station is simply the unadjusted average of the 
results from all the agencies. Eurostat studied several possibilities to exclude extremes 
values (outliers) in order to: 
reduce, in each survey, the probability of including, by ~ccident, results which are clearly 
out of line with the nonn (possibly indicating that either the wrong districts or property 
types have been chosen); 
. ensure that the results of consecutive surveys are more comparable, given that the sample 
of agencies varies slightly from year to year. 
The Article 64 Working Party considered that it was impossible to find any uncontroversial 
test to use for the automatic exclusion of outliers. Instead the following procedure was 
decided: 
(a) rent surveyors and local NSI representatives are responsible for the quality of data; they 
will have to make a bigger effort to appreciate in the field whether extreme values are 
genuine cases or incorrect figures. They will report their opinions to Eurostat. 
(b) on the basis of the surveyors' reports, Eurostat will decide, case by case, whether 
extreme values are to be eliminated or not. 
10. GUIDELINES FOR RENT SURVEYORS. 
10.1 The annual estate agency rent surveys have now been in place for several years, and 
can be regarded as giving reasonably reliable results. An important feature of these surveys -
as with other price surveys - is consistency of approach. Eurostat has always attached great 
importance to the need to keep the number of surveyors to the minimum, so that the same 
interviewers survey many different cities. 
10.2 This work is done in close collaboration with the Inter-Organisation Section (SIO) of 
OECD. To reduce costs, surveys are done either by SIO or by Eurostat (or consultants 
acting on Eurostat's behalf), and the results are shared. In all countries, NSI representatives 
are included in the survey team. The growth in the number of places to be surveyed -
particularly with the accession of new J\1ember States - has inevitably required an increase in 
the total number of surveyors. leading to the need for a more rigorous means of ensuring a 
consistent approach. Eurostat has achieved this firstly by having meetings of surveyors. both 
before and after the annual round of surveys, and secondly by producing a set of written 
guidelines. These are also available to the NSI collaborators, and a copy of the guidelines is 
attached to this report (Annex 2 - available in English, French and Gennan only). 
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II. INCLUSION OF DETACIIEO lfOUSES IN THE HOUSING PARITIES. 
11.1 The model used until 1994 for calculating housing parities contained S basic dwelling 
types (studio flat, 1-bedroom flat, 2-bedroom flat, 3-bedroom flat, non-detached house). 
When the model was introduced in 1992 there were scarcely any data available on detached 
houses, although it is known that, in Brussels at least, around 200/o of officials are actually 
occupying detached houses. Since 1991, the annual estate agency rent surveys have been 
including data on detached houses, so that for most places a S-year run of data was 
available in 1995. 
11.2 Accordingly, the Article 64 Working Party reached the conclusion that, in principle, 
detached houses should be incorporated in the parity calculation with effect from 1995. For 
those places with some missing years, interpolation and/or extrapolation techniques may be 
used to make estimates, as was done for the other housing types when the new method was 
introduced in 1992. 
11.3 However, the Working Party accepted the fact that in some cities detached houses in 
central areas were scarcely available. In such cases, the treatment should be exactly the 
same as for other price comparisons: where· no price is available, no ratio is calculated .. 
Accordingly, Eurostat asked each NSI to state whether or not detached houses were 
generally available in the central parts of the cities in their own countries. As a result, from 
1995 parities incorporate detached houses in all places except: Amsterdam, Athens, Madrid, 
Paris, Rome and London. 
12. CONCLUSIONS 
12.1 The Commission believes that, in consideration of the improvements 'to housing parity 
. methods described in this report, the correction coefficients are even more firmly based than 
in the past, both on theoretical and practical grounds. These improvements mainly referred 
to: 
• thorough review of measures of owner-occupiers' shelter costs and confirmation of the 
imputed rent method; 
• use of more appropriate housing-type pattern for some duty stations; 
• use of weight taking into account owner-occupied dwellings; 
• inclusion of detached houses; 
• better training and instructions for rent surveyors; 
• updated lists of districts agreed bilaterally. 
Meanwhile, Eurostat and its collaborators in Member States will continue to . search for 
further improvements in this and in other areas of the correction coefficient methodology. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1. The Purchasing Power Parity Programme is organised jointly by Eurostat and the OECD. Its 
. purpose is to enable comparisons of real volume to be made for the participating countries. The 
estimation of purchasing power parities requires a set of national annual average prices from each 
country. These prices are collected in price surveys which are carried out by the national statistical 
offices and co-ordinated by Eurostat and the OECD. 
2. The theory on which the PPP Programme. is based requires as an absolute condition that the 
prices used for the estimation of the parities are fully comparable and refer to identical products. 
This condition implies an agreement on common rules for the price surveys in order to avoid that 
differences in procedures or definitions should influence the results. Hence guidelines are needed 
to supply such rules and give advice on methods that are expected to result in comparable data. 
3. Guidelines adopted by the relevant body of delegates are also an important instrument for 
establishing a minimum level of quality that is to be observed by the countries. This function is 
important for the general confidence in the surveys which is necessary to maintain a wide 
acceptance of the PPP Programme. 
4. The guidelines on the methodology of conducting surveys are intended to supply practical advice 
for the survey work. The potential readers are believed to be, in the first place, the specialists of 
the national statistical offices who are engaged in the price surveys. The guidelines should be 
particularly useful for people without fonner experience of PPP work and especially so when 
these surveys are first introduced in a country. The guidelines are intended for the consumer price 
surveys for the PPP progranune as well as for surveys delivering data for the calculation of 
correction coefficients. 
5. The overall structure of the PPP comparisons will be described in a separate document, 
Guidelines on the joint Eurostat-OECD PPP Programme. These general guidelines will also 
include accounts of the concepts and classifications decided for the PPP Programme. 
Readers interested in structural and conceptual questions should be referred to this latter 
document. 
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6. The present guidelines on the methodology of conducting surveys are not intended to cover the 
whole area of PPP \vork. They will deal only with methods and procedures related to the 
consumer price surveys needed for the PPP programme and for the correction coefficients. The 
guidelines will not treat problematic areas outside these surveys, e.g. rents, health, education, 
compensation of employees, etc. The centralised parts of the project, i.e. the works undertaken by 
Eurostat, such as the processing of data or the calculation of parities, are also beyond the scope of 
these guidelines. 
7. The first version of the guidelines will comprise a restricted number of topics. Additional chapters 
are planned to be included in l3ter editions, if possible. 
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2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
1. This chapter contain~ a summary of some important principles guiding the purchasing power 
parity calculations. The influence of these principles on the design of the price surveys is outlined 
only briefly; more c~mplete accounts can be found in the following chapters. 
Consistency or price data with national accounts 
2. Purchasing power parities are required for international economic comparisons of various kinds 
when there is a need to eliminate differences in price level between the countries or to equalise the 
purchasing power of the currencies. The two main uses of the parities calculated by Eurostat are: 
for volume comparisons of GDP aggregates; and 
for the correction coefficients used for salary adjustments. 
Other potential uses of the parities include comparisons of prices and price levels, which have an 
interest of their own, and conversion of values, other than GDP aggregates, for comparisons of 
the use of resources. 
3. The main use of the purchasing power parities for conversion of national accounts aggregates 
implies that the prices needed for the calculation of the parities must be consistent with the 
valuation of the national accounts aggregates. This is of immediate importance for some 
categories of expenditure, such as rents or health care, but it must also be kept in mind in the case 
of motor vehicles and medicines, to take just a few examples. The prices do not have to be actual 
market prices in these cases, provided they ~e consistent with the national accounts values. 
4. Prices intended for conversion of national accounts aggregates are not necessarily suitable for 
comparisons of price levels. For some basic headings the data requirements may differ between 
the two main uses. In such cases both types of prices must be collected in order to supply the 
appropriate type of data for the correction coefficients as well as for the purchasing power 
parities. 
Product identity 
5. It is obvious that meaningful price ratios cannot be established unless the products to be compared 
are comparable with respect to important characteristics. The products should indeed be identical, 
if possible. In the case of many products the price is to refer to a certain brand and model which 
has been specified in the product definition. OtheiWise the identity concerns quantity, dimensions, 
material, design, etc. and, for some products, country of origin. This is to make sure, as far as 
possible, that only products of egual quality are being compared. Also special conditions of sale 
are sometimes specified. Services coMected with the purchase as well as amenities open to the 
customer are not included in the identity conditions at present. 
6. The principle of identity or comparability is fundamental for the. product definitions and 
accordingly for the identific~tion of the articles by the enumerators when they collect the prices . 
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Equi-represen tativity 
7. The concept of equi-representativity is used to denote that the common basket of consumer 
goods and services to be priced is equally representative of the domestic consumption of each 
country. The concept refers to all levels for which parities are calallated, i.e. for basic headings 
and aggregates ofbasic headings, up to the GDP total. 
8. Products that are sold in sufficient quantities to be representative of their national market tend to 
have a relatively lower price than non-representative products; thus there is a negative 
correlation between prices and quantities. We can observe here a direct analogy with temporal 
indices, for which the base-weighted (Laspeyres') index will usually give a higher index figure 
than the current-weighted (Paasche) index, the weight structure of the latter being more 
representative of the present situation. It follows that a comparison which &ils to satisfy the 
requirement of equi-representativity will most likely result in biased price ratios. Such a biased 
result is above all to be expected for the price ratios between tbe central and the peripheral 
countrieS of a group of countries. This is because a larger number of representative products can 
normally be found in the central countries. Accordingly, for a peripheral country the price level 
would be overestimated and the volume underestimated; for a central country .it would be the 
other way round. 
9. A special calculation procedure has been elaborated for the calculation of the parities in order to 
establish equi-representativity. The procedure makes use of the ·~erisk method" together with 
the calculation of Fisher indexes. Each country indicates, by means of asterisks, which of the 
products they have priced are representative. For each basic heading and pair of countries, a 
Laspeyres' -type index is calculated based· on the "asterisk" products of the base country and, 
similarly, a Paasche-type index is calculated ~n the basis of the "asterisk" products of the partner 
country. The geometric average of these two indexes makes up the binary Fisher index for the 
country combination. The calculation procedure has the effect that the total impact of the 
representative products of the two countrie~ will be equal. 
10. The method requires, if it is to give the desired result, that representative products of each 
national market are included in every basic heading. It is not necessary for a country to price all 
products, but each representative product has to be priced by more than one country. The 
selection of articles for the list of products is extremely important and cannot be made without a 
thorough knowledge of the national markets. Clearly, it is absolutely necessary that all the 
countries participate very actively in the preparation of the list of products, as this is the only 
way to attain a satisfactory result. 
11. A second requirement is that unifonn rules are used to detennine whether a product is 
representative or not. This problem is discussed in detail in the chapter on representativity 
below. 
Graduality 
12. The concept of graduality is applicable to comparisons in space as well as to comparisons over 
time. Just as periods that are a long way apart should not be compared directly, neither should 
countries with very different consumption patterns. This rule is observed by the design. of the 
calculation procedure. If, for a pair of countries, no representative common product can be 
found, the parity will be calculated using indirect price ratios, obtained by means of all other 
possible countries serving as bridges. A conclusion supported by the graduality principle is that 
efforts should be made to co-ordinate the selection of articles in countries where the same 
products are likely to be found. 
.. 
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3 PRE-SURVEY WORK 
The need for pre-surveys 
1. It is familiar to all those in charge of or conducting statistical surveys that a thorough preparation 
of the survey will make it more efficient and successful. A carefully prepared statistical survey will 
'cause less trouble, take less time, cost less and produce results that are more timely and reliable. 
The more time and care devoted to the preparation of a survey, the greater the benefits will be. 
2. The purchasing power parity surveys are carried out simultaneously by many countries for the 
sake of international comparisons. Hence, it is essential that the surveys produce comparable 
results for the participating countries. Comparability is a basic requirement of PPP data. In order 
to meet this need for PPP data to be comparable, these surveys must be adequately prepared by 
all participating countries. The measures which all countries should take before starting on the 
PPP surveys constitute the PPP pre-surveys. 
3. The sine qua non for comparable PPP data is the existence of a revised and representative list of 
goods for all participating countries. The main contn"bution of the pre-surveys to. the 
comparability ofPPP data is the compilation of such a list 
Pre-survey timetable and stages 
4. Pre-surveys will be carried out in two stages, as follows: 
a) prior to the compilation of the definitive list of products (stage I); 
b) · prior to the commencement of the price collection, once the list of products has been 
finalised (stage II). 
Pre-surveys: stage I 
5. As indicated above, there is an urgent need to revise the list of goods for PPP surveys, and to 
include goods representative of the countries concerned. The three-yearly interval at which PPP 
surveys are carried out is a significant period of time, during which changes occur. Such changes 
may be attributable to shifts in consumer tastes or habits, or to economic trends. Account must be 
taken of these changes when compiling the lists of goods. 
6. Changes can be incorporated by adding new goods (and services) to PPP lists, or by deleting old 
goods from existing lists. Alternatively, specific definitions of old items on these lists may be 
amended or supplemented. The countries are· expected to fonnulate specific suggestions with a 
view to compiling lists of goods for ,individual PPP surveys. This work constitutes stage I of the 
pre-surveys. 
7. The countries concerned will proceed with this work in preparation for the discussions of the 
Working Party, at which decisions will be taken about compiling the definitive lists of goods for 
individual PPP surveys. See also the chapter on representativity, paragraphs 4, 13 and 15~ 
Type of proposals submitted for compiling the list of goods 
8. The above-mentioned proposals, which the countries concerned are called upon to submit at the 
PPP discussions, are of the following kind: 
a) Proposals for the addition of new goods 
These types of proposals must be submitted as part of the review of the list of PPP goods 
owing to the three-year frequency of these surveys (cf. above). However, it is imperative that 
countrie~ with inadequate or poor (lower than 30-50%) coverage of individual basic headings 
s 
b) 
in a particular survey submit proposals for the addition of new goods. In these cases, the 
country in question ought to propose that its own representative products be added. 
Pmposals for the deletion of old items 
Similarly, as part of their efforts to revise the list of PPP goods, countries must submit 
proposals for the deletion of old items that are no longer available on the domestic market or 
which are no longer deemed important from a consumer point of view. Proposals for 
deletions help trim down PPP lists, thus offsetting the constant increase in volume caused by 
the ever-swelling ranks of countries participating in PPPs. 
c) Proposals to amend or supplement eXisting specific definitions of old items 
Submission of the above type of proposals helps with the revision of existing definitions of 
PPP goods, ~ither by amending existing goods specifications or by adding other specifications · 
that are deemed important. "Sprucing up" definition in this way ensures on the one hand that 
they agree with recent product changes, on the other·that they are fully comprehensible to the 
participating countries, a principle that is of fundamental importance for the collection of 
comparable price data. However, if tbis principle is to hold, all countries must help revise the 
definitions of goods under investigation. 
9. Each type of suggestion (a, b and c) submitted by participating countries must be specific, 
documented and accompanied by all the relevant data, specific infonnation and printed matter. 
Any specific definitions of new goods that are submitted. along with improvements to existing 
definitions. must be accompanied b.y full and clear descriptions and. where amprgpriate. the 
relevant documentation. e.g. leaflets, documentation containing sketches, pictures, product 
specifications and other specialist infonnation. · 
Sources of relevant data for the submission of proposals, and the data extracted 
10. In order to formulate definitive proposals for compiling the list of goods for PPPs, participating 
countries must draw on various sources of data. 
a 1) Some of these sources are at the disposal of the national statistical services responsible for 
carrying out the PPPs. They include the following: 
the list· of definitions of goods from the last sutvey of the same kind; 
detailed (national) price data &om the last sutvey of the same kind; 
analysis of the results of the last survey of this kind. This analysis is done by Eurostat 
and is communicated to participating countries in the form of documentation during 
preparation of the surveys; 
the experience acquired by countries from the last survey of the same kind. 
a2) A great deal of basic information is extracted from the above sources and used by 
participating countries to fonnulate proposals, e.g.: 
goods and definitions of goods investigated during the last survey of the same kind, 
broken down by basic heading in the list of the last survey; 
number of price quotations by commodity priced, as collected during the last sutvey 
of the same kind~ 
goods not found on the market during the last survey of the same kind; 
coverage of goods (by basic heading) during the last survey of the same kind; 
percentages of goods classified as representative of ·individual countries, by basic 
heading, during the last survey of the same kind~ 
the types and number of pricing sources investigated during the last survey of the 
same kind. 
b 1) In addition to the sources of data owned by the national statistical services, there are a good 
number of sources beyond their control. This category includes the following: 
retail trade associations or bodies; 
trade collectives· or chambers of commerce; 
market research institutes (companies); 
large domestic manufacturers of some of the goods included in the PPP surveys 
industrial affiliations or associations; , 
import companies importing PPP survey goods; 
large enterprises (establishments) that are representative in tenns of the (retail) 
distribution of certain categories ofPPP goods. 
b2) Basic data and useful material are likewise collected from these sources for the submission of 
proposals. These include the following: 
infonnation regarding the fullness and clarity of definitions of goods from the last 
survey of the same kind; 
data on amendments or additions to definitions of certain goods from the last survey 
of the same kind; 
infonnation on the sale of goods from the last survey of this kind, whether 
domestically produced or from abroad; 
indications as to the addition of new goods to the list of goods for the next survey, 
whether domestically produced or imported. These goods are submitted as being 
representative of the country that proposes them, once the necessary research bas 
been carried out; 
recommendations regarding the characterisation of representative · goods, for 
individual countries, on the list of goods from the last survey of the same kind;. 
reconunendations regarding the advisability of deleting certain goods from the list 
used in the last survey of the same kind; 
supply of the relevant printed matter with each country's proposals (c£ above); 
indications as to the selection of suitable and representative pricing sources for the 
collection of price data during the conduct of the forthcoming PPP survey. 
11. A great deal of valuable infonnation can be obtained by observing the products in the shops. The 
statisticians in charge of the price surveys should devote time to such study visits in order to: 
increase their own general knowledge of the consumer goods; 
understand the problems of the price collectors and be able to give adequate instructions to 
the latter; 
gain such experience as is required for decisions concerning product comparability. 
Detailed information for the product definitions, e.g. data on the composition of the products, 
on quantities, packaging, etc., is perhaps obtained most easily at actual visits to relevant _shops.1 
Pre-surveys: part ll 
12. After the final list of goods for inclusion in the PPP survey has been drawn up, the participating 
countries will be asked to decide concrete measures for conducting the survey in question. 
These measures, which will be taken by countries after the list qf goods for inclusion in the PPP 
survey have been finalised and before the survey begins, constitute stage II of the pre-surveys. 
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13. There follows a more detailed description of these measures and the order in which they will be 
~aken: 
a) 
b) 
To begin with, a selection will be made of establishments (pricing sources) &om which the 
relevant price data will be collected. To do this, each country will follow the methodology 
adopted,' drawing on the experience gained from the Jut survey of the same kind and basing 
itself on a single set of data. Most of these data will be held by the national statistical service 
(pricing sources for the CPI, register of retail sales establishments, turnover data, VAT data, 
etc.). whilst other data will be passed on to the statistical service by outside bodies ( c£ 
paragraph 10 above). It is suggested that pricing sources be selected whilst the final list of 
goods for a PPP survey is being awaited from Eurostat, as this will save time starting the 
survey in question. See also the chapter on selection of outlets. 
Once the list of goods for the next PPP swvey has been received, it should be checked to 
ensure that the definitions of new goods are intelligible. If the persons in charge of 
conducting the PPP surveys and his or her assistants are unable to understand the definitions, 
Eurostat will have to be asked for additional infonnation and explanations. 
c) Next, in order to shorten the list of goods for the PPP survey and facilitate pricing work and 
the conduct of the survey as a whole, those pages containing goods that are no longer 
available on the national nwlc:et should be removed from the list. See the chapter on 
dimensions of the price collection, paragraphs' 10-16. 
d) Then the most important work in stage n is canied out, namely discussions between the 
person and persons in charge of the survey and price enumerators. During these discussions, 
account will be taken of the following: 
i. Distribution and explanation of the material used (questionnaire of goods, list or 
instroctions and other supplementaly forms, photographs of goods, forms or letters 
&om the national statistical service, Eurostat and the relevant association of retail 
sales establishments to storekeepers to facilitate the work of the price enumerators 
and of pricing in general). · 
ii. Definition of establishments to be investigated by each enumerator, the relevant 
address and other documents (e.g. town map) being provided to help locate them. 
iii. Instructions and guidelines for carrying out the survey. 
Instructions will be issued, in accordance with Eurostat guidelines, for conducting the 
survey and for dealing with questions such as prices reduced for short periods, special 
offers, sales prices, etc. 
iv. Detailed examination of the definitions of goods for a specific PPP survey, the 
necessary explanations and clarifications being given to the price enumerators, the 
object being to ensure they fully understand the definitions of goods and th':JS collect 
reliable price data. 
e) Shortly after the PPP suiVey begins, the person in charge of the survey should visit the 
establishments involved in order to check whether the priced goods correspond to the 
definitions on the survey list and, more generally, whether the instructions and guidelines 
given to the price enumerators are being followed. 
Impact of the pre-surveys 
14. The pre-surveys will improve the PPP survey results in two important respects: 
rz. a 
they will contribute significantly to the comparability of PPP data, thanks to the 
compilation of the list of products to be inv~stigated; 
: ~"•"· .. 
ii the revision of the list of products, representative goods being included for all the 
participating countries, will also have a beneficial impact on the representativeness of 
PPP data (see the chapter on representativity). 
The influence of the pre-surveys on the comparability and representativeness of PPP data, 
together with the measures taken as part of stage n to ensure that the relevant guidelines and 
definitions are fully complied with during pricing, will help ensure that pre-surveys have a 
generally positive effect on the reliability ofPPP survey data. · 
15. The pre-surveys will also help solve two additional problems which have been occupying the 
Working Party on Purchasing Power Parities in particular, namely: 
i coverage of the basic headings in the PPP list of products; and 
ii. obtaining an adequate number of price quotations for each item. 
Basic beadings will be covered by participating countries' submitting proposals for the addition 
of their own representative goods. An adequate number of prices will likewise be guaranteed for 
representative goods added by individual countries. 
16. In addition, the pre-surveys will also have a favourable effect on the actual conduct ofPPPs. It 
is demonstrably easier, more efficient and faster to carry out PPP surveys that are preceded by 
careful preliminary surveys. The total cost will be less and the results will be available much 
earlier. 
Cost of pre-surveys 
17. The cost of the pre-surveys depends on how well they are planned and how carefully they are 
carried out. For a given PPP survey, preliminaries will cost more when carried out for the first 
time, the cost decreasing when the survey is repeated. As regards the breakdown of the cost, the 
bulk is generated by stage I, which lasts longer than stage ll. This is because extensive 
investigations must be carried out before a oountry can submit the relevant proposals. However, 
the cost of carrying out pre-surveys will be out-balanced by cost reductions in the following 
survey operations. Consequently, as stated above, PPP surveys that are not preceded by 
preliminary surveys cost a country more and do not reap the benefits. 
Summary 
18. The PPP pre-surveys described above can be summed up as follows (numbers refer to 
paragraphs in this chapter): 
• formulation and submission of full and clearly worded proposals by participating 
countries for the compilation of a list ofPPP survey goods (8-9); 
• search for the necessary information for these proposals, drawing on the specified data 
sources ( 1 0-11 ); 
• selection of pricing sources based on the methods used by individual countries and on 
data (input) from bodies outside the national statistical services (13); 
• bringing the list of PPP goods under investigation into line with merchandise actually on 
sale in a given country (13}; 
• organisation of discussions between the person in charge of the PPP surveys and price 
enumerators to produce instructions and explanations of the definitions of goods ( 13 ); 
• visits by the person in charge of the PPP surveys to establishments involved to ensure 
that the relevant instructions and definitions are being followed (13). 
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19. The pre-survey work will have a very favourable impact on the PPP surveys (cf. paragraphs 14-16): 
• improved comparability of the survey results; 
• reduced bias as a consequence of a better representation of the consumer patterns of 
each country; 
• improved coverage of basic headings; 
• guarantees of an adequate number of price quotations per item; 
• reduction in the time taken to cany out the surveys and thus lower cost. 
It is clear from the above that the pre-survey work is a necessary and indispensable part of the 
PPP surveys and has to be carried out by all participating countries. 
Fl.· to 
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4 COMPARABILITY OF PRODUCTS 
Preliminary remarks 
1. It is a fundamental principle of price statistics that only the truly comparable products should be 
compared. In international price comparisons, there are two possible ways of ensuring that priced 
products tally in this way: a) the item can be clearly identified by reference to a certain brand and 
a certain model ("branded product•) (this is by far the most common case), b) the item is 
described so precisely that the price-survey interviewers in the individual countries find truly 
comparable products ("standard products•). This is the case for perhap_s one-third of all products 
for which prices are surveyed. 
2. This chapter deals exclusively with the second case, as it is a major headache for application-
oriented price statisticians in particular. This is because ~dard products tend to exhibit wider 
price dispersion than the branded variety. The Working Party on Purchasing-Power Parities is 
therefore endeavouring to keep the proportion of standard products on the low side. 
3. In the programme of international comparisons, the classification of the SNA 1968 is applied. In 
accordance with this classification, private consumption is broken down into eight commodity 
groups, which in turn are broken down further. The lowest weighted heading is the basic 
heading. This is broken down once again into items, for which prices are then surveyed. These 
items form the "product list". They have to be specified in such a way as to guarantee 
comparability between countries. The present chapter on "Rules" is concerned with this level 
only. 
4. It is primarily the task of the Delegates of the Working Party on Purchasing-Power Parities to 
draw up the product list for the comparison co-ordinated by Eurostat. The latter's B3 Secretariat 
handles organisational matters and ensures comparability of prices by way of regular visits. 
Specification of standard products, general principles 
5. The specification contains. all the price-determining characteristics of a product. On the other 
hand, properties which have no bearing on price are not included in the description, as the price 
survey would otherwise be unnecessarily complicated. 
Price-determining characteristics are generally quantity, upper and lower quantity limits, standard 
quantity (which is the reference for conversion), weight, size, shape, type, material, design, 
intended use, packaging, quality, pre-treatment or preparation, country or region of origin, 
services directly linked to the product, as well as other product-specific price-detennining 
characteristics. 
6. It i~ often appropriate to exclude explicitly certain price-detennining characteristics from the 
specification, especially where options are concerned or alternative products exist. 
7. Unfortunately, as yet there has been no systematic compilation of product data geared to . 
achieving product comparability. That is why these specifications incorporate much of the 
everyday knowledge which those involved have gained as consumers. 
8. Samples and, above all, photographs have proved to be a useful complement to written 
specifications, since factors such as fashion and design are very difficult to describe in words. 
9. Comparability assurance during the price survey 
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• At the beginning of each survey wave, a· member of staff from Eurostat's B3 Secretariat visits 
the countries ex»ncemed and takes part in the initial price surveys. Through actual visual 
inspection, the price-suavey interviewers can then identify the products sought. 
• The price-survey interviewers are required to note additional observations. 
• Before, during and after the price suaveys, meetings take place between the interviewers and 
the delegates of the Working Party on Purchasing Price Parities - and consultations may be 
held with the Eurostat B3 Secretariat. 
Ex-post plausibilisation and assurance or comparability 
10. Using the "Quaranta" table, the scatter of the prices surveyed is determined for a particular itein 
on the domestic market, internationally and in comparison with the group to which it belongs in 
the same country. If the variances that emerge are too great, it is assumed that quality differences 
exist, and such prices are eliminated. Not to be underestimated here is the influence exerted by 
the Quaranta table in tenns of motivating those involved to find really comparable products, as 
the table will highlight any price fluctuations. 
11. If the quality level has not already been adequately laid down by the specification, an item is split 
up into several items. However, this type of ex-post d.efinition is the exception rather than the 
rule and only make's sense if sufficient prices are still available and the national price structure, 
i.e. the relative proportion of distn"bution channels, is not changed. 
Specification of standard products - remarks on individual surveys 
12. In the following, mention is made only of those aspects which require particular attention. 
Aspects which derive directly as a matter of course from the general principles stated above are 
not explicitly mentioned. 
13. Foodstuffs, beverages· 
In the case ofjoodstuffs, the following characteristies in particular need to be defined: 
• upper and lower limit of the quantity to be surveyed as well as the standard quantity which is 
I the reference for conversion; 
• drained net weight in the case of cans of preserved food; 
• composition and pre-treatment of the product; , 
• meat: specification of cut; 
• Latin name of fish; 
• the following possibilities exist for detennining the quality: a) listing a number of known 
brands, so that the quality is recognisable for the price-survey interviewer; b) determination 
of quality category (e.g .. Domestic dealer's brand A"; c) differentiation between the original 
product manufactured in a panicular region and the generic product (e.g. genuine. Gouda 
from Holland and cheese of the Gouda type produced in a different country). The 'prices of 
the original product and of the generic-type product are surveyed under two different 
headings. , 
14. In the case of non-alcoholic beverages, a distinction has to be made between beverages 
contained in non-returnable bo'ttles and those contained in deposit bottles. 
The price of alcoholic be,·erages depends in particular on alcohol content, which is why the 
latter is generally already included in the specification. During the price surveys, the alcohol 
content is noted along \\ith each price. For wine, a certain quality designation is required, e.g. 
"Appellation contro/ee''. 
~. 
.. 
• 
15. 
16. 
Several foodstuffs (mainly fruit and vegetables, but also fish and other sea foods) are subject 
to seasonal fluctuations. Their prices are surveyed during their main season. Owing to 
climatic differences, however, the main season also varies from country to country. In such 
cases, parity is calculated by way of price adjustment applying the national consumer price 
index. Sometimes, the annual average price (e.g. calculated using the data on which the 
consumer price index is based) is a good alternative. 
Clothing, shoes, household textiles 
Clothing and shoes are also subject to pronounced seasonal and climatic influences: there are 
summer clothes and winter clothes. In central Europe, rubber~sole shoes are sold in the 
autumn, leather-sole shoes in the spring. If possible, the prices of these items. are surveyed 
during their "high season". Otherwise, there is a risk of price distortions occuning as a result 
of the usual range not being available in the shops. 
17. Since fashion, design and cut play a major role in this area, photographs should be enclosed 
wherever possible, as they are of greater infonnative value than verbal descriptions. Material 
samples facilitate the recording of material quality. 
18. Varying quality levels and - resultant - price level differences are typical of ,the clothing 
sector. Therefore, the quality level is laid down in the specification. 
• Good finishing is required for all items. 
• The possible range of brands is restricted in each case to one of the following two groups: 
• 
19. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
20 . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
a) well-known up-market brand names ("marques nobles") guaranteeing the same high 
quality irrespective of time or place; the brand concerned may be that of a particular 
company (e.g. Lacoste or Levi's) or a franchise brand ("marque de franchise") (e.g. 
Rodier); or 
b) distributor brand names ("marques de distributeur"), which encompass all other 
brands (always subject to the condition that they are of good quality). 
h in the case of foodstuff's, a distinction is made between the original product (e.g. "Lacoste 
poloshirt") and a generic-type product ("Lacoste-type poloshirt"). 
In the case of clothing, the following characteristics are defined in the specification (alongside 
the quality level): 
intended use, type of clothing: 
material: weave, composition (wool: with or without the Wool Seal), weight (light, medium, 
heavy); 
clothes size; 
where lined, composition of lining; 
description of cut; 
number of pockets, buttons; 
zip fastener, buttons; 
suitable for dry cleaning or machine-washing; 
particular features of finishing; 
patterned or single-colour; 
sold individually or in packages . 
In the case of materials, the following characteristics are defined: 
intended use; 
·composition (wool: with or \vithout the Wool Seal) 
weave; 
material weight per m2; 
single-colour or patterned; 
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• material \Vidth~ 
• conversion to square-metre price. 
21. In the case of yarns and knitting wool, the following characteristics are defined: 
• intended use; 
• composition of material; 
• thickness; 
• weight of ball or of the thread of an entire bobbin; 
• length; 
• finishing. 
22. ~n the case of shoes, the following characteristics are defined: 
• intended use; 
• description of shape; 
• upper material; 
• sole material; 
• lining material; 
• shoe size. 
23. Furnishings 
This is a market with few branded products, and even these are often restricted to the national 
market. The product list must therefore contain a sufficient number of standard products to provide a 
sound data base. · 
24. In the case of furnishings, the following characteristics are defined: 
• intended use (e.g. bedroom, kitchen, etc.); 
• outside measurements and tolerances; 
• materials used (whether solid or not); 
• number of struts (in the case of tables and chairs); 
• surface treatment (material and texture); 
• number of drawers, doors, shelves, etc.; 
• furniture assembled by customer or shop; 
• design (with the aid of photographs); 
• in the case of lighting: wattage; 
• in the case of floor coverings: whether self-adhesive or not, weight per m2, composition of 
material, number of loops per m2 and type of pile; 
Specification of services 
25. Setvices form a group in their own right and have to be characterised in accordance with 
their own rules. 
26. Generally speaking, price scatter for services tends to be narrow within a particular country 
but wide in country-to-country comparisons. 
27. Specifications for services comprise: 
• description of the setvice~ this must be as detailed as possible, as a service usually comprises 
a package that often differs from one country to the next; 
• training of the service provider~ 
• time requirement~ 
• hourly wage; 
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• exclusion of material costs; 
• inclusion or exclusion of travelling expenses; 
• public transport: means of transport, distance, definition of a certain fare 
• rent: price-detennining characteristics of the rented property itself: tenns and conditio~s of 
tenancy agreement. _ 
18. Qualitative influences on price which are difficult to record 
• Short product cycle that is subject to a time lag from one country to the next: 
products which are no longer in vogue on the national market often have a very low price 
and are thus unsuitable for an international comparison. This is true of hi-fi and photographic 
equipment in particular. 
• The influence of distribution channels on price is not taken into account, i.e. it is assumed 
that a particular product sold at various points of sale is always the same product. Under 
certain circumstances, this may mean that a change in the national structure of the 
distribution channels will lead to a change in price level. With clothing and furnishings in 
particular. distribution channels are a subject requiring discussion. It has to be emphasised, 
however, that there are clear specifications on this: for example, the proportion of prices per 
distribution channel in the national price structure must be. adapted. This avoids undesirable 
distortions caused by the influence of different distribution channels . 
. • It is not possible as yet to define satisfactorily the influences exerted on price by warranties, 
fashion, design, productivity and service quality. 
lS 
5 REPRESENTATIVITY 
The principle of equi-representativity 
1. A fundamental principle in the comparison project is the principle of equi-representativity of the 
basket of goods. This is a fundamental principle because if the basket of goods defined for the 
comparison is more representative of certain countries than of others this will be· reflected in 
general by an overestimation in the price relatives of the countries for which the basket is less 
representative and consequently an underestimation of their volumes. In the literature this 
phenomenon is called the Gerschenkron effect: 
the relative price is inversely correlated with the degree of representativity. 
2. In practice it is probably unavoidable that the basket of goods is more representative for the 
central countries and less for the peripheral countries. With this in mind a calculation procedure 
has been developed in such a way as to avoid a bias due to differences in rep~tativity that 
the basket of goods may have for different countries. 
3. For each binary comparison two parities are calculated, one based upon the representative goods 
of the first country, and one based upon the representative goods of the second country. The 
representative products of each country are characterised by the country by means of an 
asterisk. These Laspeyres• and Paasche type indices are averaged geometrically resulting in a 
Fisher type index. This is done for each pair of countries. In a later stage the parities are made 
transitive using the EKS method. 
4. It is the responsibility of the participating countries to e~sure that their consumption patterns 
will be well represented in the basket of goods that is used for the surveys. This means that 
countries should participate actively when the list of products is compiled. They should know 
which articles are their representative articles for a specific basic heading and they should take 
care that enough of these products are incorporated in the list. See also the chapter on pre-
survey work. · 
5. Because the Laspeyres'-type index is based only on the asterisk products the number of these 
products should be not too small. At least one is necessary if a parity is to be calculated at all. A 
recommended minimum number might be 1 or 2 for beadings with a small number of products 
and 3 or 4 for the bigger headings. A Laspeyres'-type index can only be calculated when other 
countries can find prices for the representative articles of the first country. This as well is a 
reason why the number of representative products per country should be not too small. 
6. The calculation of binary parities for the correction coefficients used for salary adjustments 
differs from the calculations for the volume comparisons described above. The correction 
coefficients are based on binary comparisons between each included city and Brussels. These 
comparisons make use of a Belgian basket of goods which has been designed to be 
representative of an international population. All products are considered equally representative 
and no asterisks are used. This means that eqiti-representativity is not a problem for the 
correction coefficients although it remains a critical question for the volume comparisons. 
Criteria of representative products 
7. Although the principles may be simple and clear, the practical elaboration is difficult and rather 
subjective. Which are the criteria to be us~d to declare an article a representative one? First, 
presence in a country's CPI can often be taken as a sign of representativity. 
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8. Another possibility to determine asterisk products are based on the experience during the price 
collection itself. When it appears to be easy to find many prices for a certain article, relative to 
the target numbers as mentioned in the chapter on numbers of price quotations, this can be an 
indication of a representative article. It may not be an automatic procedure, however. Some 
articles are commonly available but cannot be seen as representative because of their relatively 
minor share in total sales within the product group the item belongs to. See also paragraph 10. 
9. For certain products like .cars, defined by brand and model, infonnation is sometimes available 
on the market share of the different brands. The most sold brand(s) should have an asterisk. 
When the brand is representative and the chosen model is not, priority should be given to the 
brand. One should be careful, however, that the (non-representative) model is not deviating with 
respect. to the price relative.· · 
10. There is still another way of looking at the way asterisks are attnouted. It can be seen as a 
primitive weighting scheme between the products within the basic heading. The following 
example, elaborated further in the Annex, can clarify this. It has reference to the basic heading of 
cheese. Although, in Greece, foreign products are found everywhere and it is easy to find many 
prices for them, the quantities consumed of the various types of cheese are not large in 
comparison with the Greek products. If representativity was to be based on the quantities 
consumed of each product, only Greek products would be expected to be given asterisks. 
However, the total consumption of foreign cheese is large enough to be taken into account. This 
would mean that one (at least) of the foreign types of cheese should be given an asterisk to 
represent the consumption value of foreign products in this basic heading. 
11. Roughly spoken, price relatives of asterisk products will have more influence on the binary 
parity than those of non-asterisk articles. This is not a strict rule because it always depends on 
the way other countries have collected prices and distributed asterisks. 
12. These are considerations to be made before the actual survey takes place or when the prices in 
the country itself has been collected. But also at the time the preliminary results of the 
comparison are available and the analysiz:-g procedure takes place the results can be used for 
attributing asterisks or changing the attribution of asterisks. Articles having an extreme price 
level index compared with the basic heading price level of the country usually should not have 
an asterisk. 
13. So, there are several ways of looking at asterisk products. The problem is that combining these 
viewpoints can give rise to difficulties. For the really representative products, like the products 
the country has proposed itself, there should be no problem. The only problem that may arise is 
caused by the time-lag which exists between the preparation phase of the survey and the time of 
the survey itself. It can happen in fast-changing markets, like the durables, that a proposed 
model is not representative any more at the time of the survey, but in that case the brand will 
certainly be. 
14. The major problem \Vill arise for non-representative products which are nevertheless commonly 
available. Quite a lot of prices can be collected for these products. However, it depends on the 
relative importance of these products and the number of them within a basic heading whether all 
or only some of them will get an asterisk. Mostly this will be a subjective choice of the country 
involved. 
Attribution of asterisks · 
IS. All this means that there are three stages in the process of attributing asterisks: 
during ~he preparation phase of the survey: the representative products of a country 
are its asterisk products; 
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after the survey and based upon the collected numbers of prices; 
during the analysing process, based upon the resulting parities. Indicators which are helpful in 
this stage are average prices in relation to other countries and to similar products. 
16. Because of the reasons mentioned earlier (see paragraph. S) it will be clear that the number of 
asterisk products must not be too small. On the other hand it is unlikely to expect that 90-100% 
of the articles within a basic heading become asterisk products for a certain country. When 
prices can be found for all products of a basic heading it does not mean that all these products 
have the same representativity. 
17. Apart from articles with a unique price it is not to be expected that articles with only one price 
observation should have an asterisk. Asterisk products should have an above average number of 
price quotations. 
18. The calculation procedure - described above - that is used to establish equi-representativity 
requires, in order to give the desired result, that the criteria of representative products are 
understood and applied in the same way. In practice it seems that most countries have given 
asterisks to enough articles to guarantee equi-representativity jn principle. The number of 
asterisk products can be observed to vary between countries. In general, central countries have 
higher numbers of asterisk products than peripheral countries. This is quite natural and reflects 
expected differences between the markets for consumer goods. It appears, however, that there 
are also unexpected and unexplained differences in the numbers of asterisks. 
19. It is obvious that the attribution of asterisks involves subjective judgements to a large extent. 
The persons who are to attribute the asterisks may not interpret the criteria in the same way or 
may have different notions of how representative an article must be to justify an asterisk. It 
should be clear from what has been said above that it is necessary to establish a barmonised 
approach in order to eliminate differing practices. The following measures are recommended: 
Summary 
Countries should always check whether asterisks are attributed according to the 
above-mentioned principles. 
Countries should adjust the number of asterisks towards the average as represented by 
the results from the previous survey if they notice that they often lie below or above 
the numbers of most other countries. 
Before the final presentation of each survey Eurostat will compare the number of 
asterisks, repon the results to the countries and draw their attention to those cases 
where deviations from the normal practice have been observed. The observations 
should normally apply to basic -headings or larger aggregates. Countries should 
consider changes (i.e. increases or reductions of the number of asterisks) in those 
cases or they should explain why a deviating number of asterisks are justified. This 
procedure should be regarded as a necessary element of the analysis of the data. 
20. Summarising, the following guidelines have to be kept in mind during the process of attributing 
asterisks (numbers refer to paragraphs in this chapter). 
• All products a country has introduced in the basket get an asterisk (4, 7). 
• Asterisks should be given according to the relative representativity of a product within the 
basic heading {10, 14). 
• A product with many price quotations (relative to the target number) and easy to find should 
usually have an asterisk. The final decision depends on the relative volume of sales of the 
article within the basic heading {8, 17). 
. Fl- ts. 
• 
• Products of a national brand usually gei an asterisk. 
• When products are defined by brand and model, the brand should prevail over the model. as 
far as asterisks are concerned (9). 
• A product with an extreme price level index with respect to the price level of the basic 
heading should usually not have an asterisk. (12). 
• The total number of asterisks should not deviate consistendy from the general level (18-19). 
Despite this guideline's subjectivity and common sense will play an important role in practical work. 
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·~nnex 
Chapter 5 
A proposal to attribute asterisks within a basic heading with a few national and many foreign 
products for a certain country. This situation mainly applies for peripheral countries. 
Example is based on average prices for France and Greece eollected during the' 1988 survey on 
"Food, beverages and tobacco". 
Basic heading 11441, Cheese 
Article Name France Greece 
(FF) (ORA) (DRAIFF) 
11441A Camembert de Nonnandie 38.9 2093 53.8 
11441B Cheese Brie 42.0 1356 32.2 
11441E Cheese Gouda from Holland 43.0 706 16.4 
11441F Cheese Gouda type 41.3 665 16.1 
11441G Cheese Edam from Holland 38.4 671 17.5 
11441K Cheese Emmenthal .60.5 J.a42 22.2 
11441N Cheese Cheddar type 65.1 1137 17.5 
114410 Cheese Grated Pannesan 77.1 1804 23.4 
11441Q Cheese Feta (from cowmilk) 69.5 462 6.6 
114418 Cheese Mozzarella 57.~ 1245 21.7 
11441V Processed cheese 39.8 987 24.8 
Market shares are known for Greece: 213 of total cheese consumption are for Greek products (Feta 
and Gouda type) and 1/3 is consumption of foreign cheese. 
France had given asterisks to .all products . 
. Greece could follow one of the three following procedures: 
1. Consider that only the two Greek products are representative and give asterisks only to these two 
products. 
2. The resulting parity Greece base France will be 14.53. 
3. Consider that the foreign products are nevertheless found everywhere which means that they have 
a certain representativity and give equal representativity to all the less expensive foreign products 
(i.e. Gouda, Edam and processed cheese). · 
4. The resulting parity Greece base France will be 17.52. 
5. Follow the same reasoning as above but respect the market shares of 1/3 and 213 and give only 
one asterisk to the less expensive of the foreign products (i.e. Edam). 
The resulting parity Greece base France will be 15.87. 
The conclusion seems to be that the correct attitude must be the one considered in case 3. In a 
situation like the one described relative representativity can be expressed by keeping a known 
proportion between consumption of national and foreign products. · 
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6 DIMENSIONS OF THE PRICE COLLECTION 
Coverage or basic headings 
1. Coverage means the number of items in a basic heading for which prices are recorded relative to 
the total number of items within that basic heading. 
2. In practice there is an enormous difference in the number of items per basic heading. This can 
differ from 2 to more than SO. A high number of articles usually occur when articles are specified 
by brand and model. For comparable items a smaller number of articles are usually sufficient. It is 
.not to be expected that for all these articles the price relatives between countries will be equal. 
The consequence is that a PPP based upon only a small number of articles might have a big 
margin of error or can be biased. 
3. Unfortunately, it is not possible to give strict rules for coverage. The number of items to be priced 
for a certain basic heading can vary between countries. Important elements for the decision on the 
degree of coverage are the weight the basic heading has for a specific country (paragraph 4), the 
principle of equi-representativity (paragraph S) and the homogeneity of the basic heading 
(paragraph 6). The main rule is that the products selected for a basic heading should represent the 
_national accounts value of that basic heading in a satisfactory way. However, also non-
representative products (i.e. products representative of the partner countries) need to be priced in 
order to improve the comparison. 
4. It goes without saying that the weight of a basic heading is ·important for the decision on the 
number of items for which prices have to be collected. A basic heading with a high weight will . 
have greater influence on the overall parity and in the overall volume comparison than a heading 
with a lower weight. It is important therefore that prices for enough articles will be observed in 
the case of headings with high weights. In the other extreme case where a certain group of articles 
does not exist in a country - weight is zero - no prices can be collected and need to be collected. · 
5. There is a close relation between coverage and equi-representativity. Both are important elements 
for an equilibrious volume comparison. When the basket of articles is not or too less 
representative of a certain country it will be difficult to attain a high degree of coverage. It is also 
not recommendable because in that situation the country will be pricing items which are 
representative of other countries. This will probably overestimate the price relatives of the first 
country with respect to countries for which the basket is representative. Consequently, the 
country's volume will be underestimated. So, it is important that for each basic heading the basket 
of goods contains enough representative articles for each ~..ountry. When under representativity 
occur the country involved must actively participate in the preparation phase of the survey to have 
more representative articles introduced. 
6. Another important aspect as regards coverage can be the homogeneity of the basic heading. 
However one should be carefu I. Homogeneity in this exercise means those price rel~tives for 
different products within a basic heading are homogeneous between countries. The problem 
however is that this is not to be judged by one country on its own. A basic heading can be 
homogeneous with respect to the kind of articles, but this is no guarantee that price relatives 
between countries are homogeneous as well. Unfortunately, in most cases this can only be 
observed after a survey. One should be' careful as well with the results of a previous suavey 
because of the great time lag between the surveys, three years in most cases . 
... Preparation or the list of products 
• 
... 
7. A useful instrument· in the preparation phase is the following classification of articles. In practice, 
the starting point of a survey is the basket of articles observed in the· previous survey. Cl1S$ify 
these articles in the following way : 
A:. Articles which are representative of the country. 
These ate the articles which have been proposed by the country in the past or could 
have been proposed by the country. These articles are easy to find and sold in big 
quantities. Often, these articles. are included in the CPl. 
B: Articles which are not· representative, but commonly available. 
For articles of this kind, although they are not representative, it is quite easy to find 
prices. 
An example may clarify this type. For Brie cheese it is easy to find many prices in the 
Netherlands. Looking at volumes sold, however, and comparing these with the sales 
of Gouda cheese, Brie is of minor importance, in other words ·not representative of 
Dutch cheese consumption. 
C: Articles which are not representative and difficult to find. 
These are articles which do not or hardly exist (reindeer meat outside the No(dic 
countries), but also articles for which an uncommon quantity is asked. Sometimes an 
article is asked for in 3 or 4 quantities, like cornflakes. The usual quantity can be 
classified in category A, the other quantities in category. C. 
It may not be obvious to which category some articles ought to belong. Advice on this matter or 
data to shed light on it, such as market shares, etc., can sometimes be supplied by the CPI 
specialists or by manufacturers or importers. Useful infonnation may . be obtained from 
observations in shops during the pre-survey stage. (See also the chapters on representativity and 
on pre-survey ~ork.) 
8. Articles in categories B and Care in principle proposed by other countries. When category B 
appears to be very small for a· specific cquntry it might be useful nevertheless to propose some 
articles for this category or to support proposals of other countries. 
9. For each survey country should take care that category A contains enough articles. As said 
e8rner, no strict rules are available to define how many are enough.. It depends on the 
importance of the basic heading and the number of articles already in the heading. Two to five 
articles seems a reasonable minimum demand. 
When all countries have participated· actively in the preparation phase, the basket of goods for 
each basic heading should be equi-representative for each country. 
Selection of products for the price collection · 
1 0. During the actual survey all couotries should collect prices for each of their· representative items. 
These items form the basis for the Laspeyres'-type index in the calculations, which is based upon 
the representative items of a country. Subsequently, a Paasche-type index is calculated based 
upon the representative anicles of the other country. To guarantee that the latter index has a 
solid base prices have to be collected for at least some of the representative articles of that other 
country. In practice these \viii be the articles of category B, but this is not necessary. 
Neighbouring countries often have a lot of common representative articles. Nevertheless, it is 
important that category B contains enough articles for each country . 
11. Whether prices will be collected for articles of category C will depend on the budgetary means a 
country has and on the coverage the country can already achieve with categories A and B. When 
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a country expects to collect prices for enough articles of category B it can drop the articles of 
category C at the start of the survey. It can even have a disturbing effect on the results when 
prices are collected for really uncommon articles .. The price relatives for these articles will 
probably quite differ from those of the more common articles and will not be relevant at all for 
the National Accounts values to be deflated. 
Rates of coverage 
12. The observed rate of coverage is above SOOA» on average for the PPP price surveys. However, 
the rate of coverage must be regarded in the context of. the product list. As said in paragraph 2 
the number of products differs signifiCantly ·between basic headings. It is quite natural that the 
rate of coverage will be lower for headings with many products. This situation usually occurs 
when brands and models are specified. Furniture. household appliances and beers are typical 
examples of this. 
13. Reasons for lower rates of coverage of some countries can be twofold: 
The article list was not well fit for the countries' situation. It looks as if this is the case 
for the furniture survey. When preparing this survey each country should try to 
propose articles which are representative or commonly available in their .country. 
Too less time was spent on the survey. Each country has to decide this for. 
themselves. It is of course dependent on the possibilities a country has. 
14. When the number of countries involved in the surveys is growing it is to be expected that the 
number of articles will grow. Each country wants to include items which are representative of 
their country. Therefore it is probably unavoidable that.the degree of coverage as a percentage 
of the total number of articles will decline in the future. The number of articles priced by 
countries should remain up to par. 
Summary of cov~rage 
15. To summarise, it is difficult to give strict rules for coverage. Nevertheless, a lower limit ofJ0-
50% for the degree of coverage-per basic heading depencfmg on the weight of the heading and 
the number of articles seems reasonable keeping in mind the realised degrees of coverage in past ). 
surveys. For basic headings with only a few items (like drinking water) the lower limit should be 
50%, for headings with a high number of items the lower limit can tall down to 30010. 
There are no principal restrictions to an upper limit. lower than 100%. A 100% degree of 
coverage can occur for certain basic headings with a small number of items which refer to goods 
or services with a common appearance in the whole of the EU. The sulVey on services is u 
example of this phenomenon. 
• The representative articles should be priced always. 
• Price collection for non-representative articles which are commonly available should not be a 
big problem . 
• Non-representative articles which are not commonly available can be deleted from the survey 
when enough commonly available articles are priced. 
When all countries succeed in this the resulting parities will have a solid base. 
16. In the preparation phase of each survey Eurostat will provide tables with the results on coverage 
for each ~asic heading of the previous survey and also specific guidelines on coverage to be 
achieved. This infonnation can focus countries involved on specific problems with specific basic 
headings. 
Number, of price quotations 
"' 
17 , It will be clear· that the number of price quotations necessary for a reliable estimate of the 
" average price of an article depends on the dispersion of prices for that article. When the 
dispersion is wide many prices will have to be collected in order to get a reliable average price. 
In the case of no dispersion, i.e. when an article has a unique price in a specific country, one 
price will be enough. On the other hand there is the practical problem of the availability of the 
pro~uct. For representative products it will be easy to find many prices, for articles ·which are 
less common this will be more difficult. But it is necessary to find at least some pri~s for at least 
some non-representative products to allow for a comparison with other countries where that 
product might be common. 
Recommendations as regards the number of quotations are given in the Annex. 
18. For the numb~r of quotations to be collected there will always be a discrepancy between the 
ideal situation and the practical possibilities. In an ideal situation, one uses statistical methods to 
establish the number of quotations to be collected in order to have an e.s~imate of the average 
price which has a margin of error within certain prescnoed boundaries. The number of 
quotations is dependent on the required accuracy and the latest available known dispersion of 
prices. 
Some statistical offices apply these methods for their CPl. The number of quotations to be 
collected that follows from these procedures are often quite high. When for instance the required 
accuracy, i.e. the relative standard error, is set on 5%, the following numbers of price quotations 
are needed depending on the variation coefficients mentioned as a measure of dispersion. 
var coeff n 
10% 4 
20% 16 
30% 36 
40% 64 
With a standard error of 3% we get the following table 
var coeff n 
10% 11 
20% 44 
30% 100 
40% 178 
19. Variation coefficients realised at previous sur"Veys can be an indication for the number of 
quotations to be collected in the next survey. One should be very careful however, because for 
most countries the samples of outlets and prices have not been random. The realised variation 
coefficients are mostly based upon a rather small number of price quotations and will·probably 
have a downward bias. For articles which are defined by brand and model the variation of prices 
will usually be smaller than for articles with a general definition. This means that the required 
number of quotations for the first category can be smaller than for the second category. 
20. The practical situation, however, varies between countries and within product groups as well. 
For a specific a~icle there can be a unique price in one country while there is a wide price 
dispersion in another country" An example is tobacco products for which prices are fixed in most 
countries but not in the UK. The same goes for articles specified by br~nd and model. While 
price variation for these articles is very small in some countries, it can be remarkably high in 
other countries. It is the responsibility of the countries to collect as many prices as necessary for 
a reliable average price. · 
21. Because price variation depends on the specific situation in the different ~untries and on the 
definitions given, the guidelines (in the Annex) for specific product groups should be regarded as 
rather rough applications of the more general rules given in the table below. Minimum numbers 
of price quotations are given for three kinds of articles: 
·-
• 
I 
n 
III 
Articles with a unique price 
Articles with a small price variation 
Articles with a large price variation 
Minimum number 
of price quotations 
1 (also maximum) 
5-10 
15-20 
- . . 
The decision to which category a specific article belongs has to be taken by the country itself. 
The decision will be based upon the realised variation in past surveys, variations for these and 
similar articles in the countries' CPI and on market knowledge within the national statistical 
office. The Annex should give some rough indications. As a general rule, articles defined by 
brand and models do not need as many as 15 obseavations and can be classified among category 
n. On the other hand, as the price variation will reflect also differences in quality, it follows that 
articles with relatively wide definitions will need a larger number of price quotations. This latter 
fact shows,- from another point of view, the importance of observing strictly the principle of 
product identity or comparability. See the chapter on general principles. 
22. Besides the number of prices another aspect is equally important. The sample of articles for 
which prices are recorded should be based upon the population of all articles that meet the 
definition, whatever brand or point of sale, and prices should be weighted according to sales. 
This- means that the price quotations should reflect the retail market in each country. Countries 
must avoid concentrating on specific kinds of shops, like very 'expensive or very cheap shops. 
See also the chapter on selection of outlets. 
23. From common practice it is clear that for the PPP price surveys it is not possible to collect as 
many prices as for the national CPl. To realise J!evertheless a reliable estimate for the average 
price it might be better to concentrate on the medium range articles in the medium range shops. 
• When turnover figures are known, shops with high turnover figures for the asked articles 
must be visited during the survey. 
• When two or more articles in a shop meet the (general) definition the article which sells best 
must be chosen. 
24. What is said so far applies to the necessary number of prices. In practice, the number of 
quotations will vary by the degree of availability of the articles. If an article is commonly 
available in a country or is representative for the country it will be easily found and the number ~ 
of price quotations can be high. 
On the other hand, the article list does also contain products which are less commonly available 
in countries. In this case the number of price quotations will be lower. In order to . make the 
comparison procedure a successful one it is necessary to collect prices for at least some of the 
articles of the last category as well. See the section on coverage {paragraphs' 10-11) for more 
infonnation. 
25. Before each survey Eurostat \\ill produce tables with realised numbers of quotations of the 
previous survey. If necessary, Eurostat will indicate problematic areas . 
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Current guidelines for. number. of price quotations 
Code Product gr.oup 
(table 7 - ESA) 
1 Food (excluding seasonal pr.oducts) 
1 Beverages 
1 Tobacco 
2 Clothing and footwear. 
31 Housing maintenance (excluding rent) 
32 Fuel and power. · 
41 Furniture and floor coverings 
42 Household textiles and other furnishings 
43 Heating and cooking appliances, refrigerators, etc. 
44 Glasswar.e and tablewar.e 
45 Maintenance goods and services 
46 Domestic services 
6 Transport and communication (excluding 61) 
61 Personal transport equipment 
7 Recreation, entertainment, education (excluding 71) 
71 Acoustic and recreational equipment 
8 Miscellaneous goods and services 
812 Dur.able goods for. personal care 
Number of 
quotations 
10 
s 
1 
15-20 
10 
1 
15-20 
15-20 
10 
10 
10 
3 
10 (or. 1) 
s 
1 (or 3) 
10 
10 (or3) 
10 
Annex 
Chapter 6 
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7 TYPES OF OUTLETS 
General definitions 
The outlet classification provided in document PPA 256 "Synthesis" was as follows: 
1. Department stores; 
2. Supennarket, hypermarket, supennarket type food sections of department stores; 
3. Self service wholesale stores, discount shops, •v erbrauchennarkt"; 
4. Minimarkets, non specialised shops selling mostly food products, service station shops, 
kiosks; neighbourhood shops; 
5. Specialised shops; 
6. Markets; 
7. Private service companies 
8. Public or semi-public service companies 
9. Other kinds of trade 
The following contains definitions of goods outlets (categories 1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6). The main 
criterion used for this classification is the level of service connected to the sale of tbe product. 
Examples with specific characteristics are given for each category. In desCending order in terms 
of the service provided, these outlets are 5,1,4,2,3. Type 6 (markets) is an atypical category. 
1YPE5 
Complete sales service (no self-service) including advice, the possibility of ordering other products, 
after-sales service, repairs, etc. 
a) Traditional shops 
- specialised outlet 
- variety: large (including the pos~ibility of ordering) 
- sales area: small 
- place: city centres or suburbs 
• parking: not provided 
- situation: shops normally grouped together ( eg in shopping streets and centres); sometimes 
isolated 
- supplies: small quantities 
TYPE I 
Self-service with sales assistants~ possibility of ordering some products; some after-sales service 
and repairs. · 
a) department stores 
- multispecialist outlet 
- variety: large; usually high quality products 
- sales area: large 
- place: normally in city centres 
-parking usually not provided 
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- situation: grouped together by definition 
- supplies: medium quantities, by product line 
b) "popular department stores" 
the same as department stores except 
- less service to customers 
- smaller variety 
-poorer quality products 
TYPE4 
Usually self-service. Because of the limited size of the shop, a certain amount of service can be 
offered. 
a) mini-markets and other non-specialized shops selling mostly food products 
- non specialised outlet selling mostly food products with a certain amount of variety 
- sales area: small 
- place: city centres or suburbs 
- parking not provided 
- situation: grouped together or isolated shop 
- supplies: usually small quantities, by product line. 
b) Neighbourhood shops 
Like (a) but 
- with smaller variety and 
- longer hours (eg Sundays, bank holidays, nights). 
c) Service station shops 
Like (a) but 
- with assortment normally ,containing specific products for motoring. 
- longer hours 
- situation: attached to a filling station. 
TYPE2 
Essentially self-service. The role of the staff is basically to fill the shelves and work the tills. 
a) Supermarket 
-non specialised outlet selling mostly food products (nonnally including fresh produce); 
other products also sold (cleaning products, household goods, personal hygiene products, 
cosmetics, hardware products; sometimes clothes, electrical goods, ... ) 
- variety: large 
- sales area: large 
-place: more often in city centres than in suburbs 
-parking normally not pro,ided 
-situation: shops normally grouped together (eg in shopping streets and centres) 
-supplies: large quantities. 
b) Hypermarkets 
- rion specialised outlet 
- large variety of food and non-food products 
- sales area: very large 
- place: normally on the edge of town 
- parking: large carpark 
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-situation: isolated or grouped (eg shopping centres) 
- supplies: very large quantities. 
c) The supermarket type rood sections or department or stores and "popular department stores" 
the same as for supennarkets except: 
- specialised outlet 
- situation: grouped together by definition. 
TYPE3 
Self service. 
SerVice to customers reduced to a minimum to keep prices low: stafF only work at cash desks; 
very simple display of goods (no fixed place for the various types of products· like a warehouse). 
Discount principle 
(Sometimes) wholesale purchase principle (customers must purchase upwards of a certain 
quantity of each product). 
a) Large cash & carry outlets 
- specialised or non-specialised outlet 
- variety: usually limited; non-branded goods available; not all products are available all the time 
~ sales area: large 
- place: on the edge of towns 
- parking provided 
- situation: isolated 
-supplies: very large quantities 
b) Small cash & carry outlets 
- specialised shop 
- variety: limited; non-branded products available; not all products are available all the time 
- sales area: small/medium 
- place: in towns 
- parking not provided 
- situation: usually in a shopping area 
- supplies: very' large quantities. 
TYPE 6 (markets) 
Traditional outlet characterised by its location in a public place. It can be open-air or covered. It 
can be open every day or not ( eg once a week).· It can consist of professional traders and/or 
producers. Itinerant shops are excluded from this category. · 
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8 THE SELECTION OF OUTLETS • 
The purpose of the sample of outlets 
1. The sample of outlets for the PPP surveys is to be used primarily for price comparisons which 
refer to total national consumption. Average prices calculated from the selected shops should in 
principle be national average prices. 
2. A superior rule is, however, that the average prices calculated for a specified product must be 
comparable among the countries. This is fundamental for the selection of products but it is 
important also for the selection of outlets, as it can be applied on the differing quantity and 
quality of the services given to customers by various types of shops. This implies that national 
average prices are not automatically comparable. See the chapter on general principles. 
3. If prices are collected only in a part of the countty, e.g. only in the capital, in order to be 
adjusted to the national price level, it is evident that the outlets selected for price collection must 
represent the price level of the capital. The price collection in the capital must in such a case 
refer to the same geographical area as constitutes the base for the adjustment to the national 
average price. The coverage of the sample for the price comparisons has to be consistent with 
the adjustment to the national price level. 
4. Another important use of the price data is for the correction coefficients intended for salary 
adjustments. For this purpose the pricing should refer to the consumption of the employees 
whose salaries are to be adjusted. It means that the price collection should include the ci~ies in 
which the employees are stationed. 
Outlet-specific quality differences 
5. It was said above that the sample of outlets is to be used for the calculation of a national average 
price for each of the selected products. The national average prices that have been estimated for 
an identical product can, however; - although· the estimation as such may have been correct - be 
lacking in comparability because the prices have been collected in various types of shops with 
higher or lower service levels. The price of an article bought in a shop that has a weD-developed 
customer service in every respect is not really comparable with the price of an identical article 
from a shop without the same facilities. A conclusion would seem to be that a specified service 
level ought to be included in the product definitions. 
6. Differences in the service level among shops are, however, most often a reflection of different 
outlet types, or one would rather say that the service level is one characteristic of the outlet 
type. Obviously, the comparability with regard to service level will be improved when the prices 
are collected from similar types of outlets. This aspect has reference to the selection of outlets as 
well as to the definition of products and should be borne in mind on both occasions. 
7. An alternative way to meet the requirement of comparable service levels might be to ·calculate 
price ratios for the combination of product x outlet type, i.e. separate price comparisons for each 
outlet type. Studies of such an outlet type approach have been made but the methods have not 
been considered ready for practical use so far. , 
Sample size 
8. The number of price observations that is required for different groups of products - and 
accordingly the size of the sample of outlets - will be discussed in the chapter on dimensions of 
the price collection, paragraphs' 17-25. For the kind of articles for which prices are collected in 
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ordinary shops 5-20 price observations are usually required. The number of shops in the.sample 
must, in practice, be somewhat larger than the required number of prices in order to compensate 
for missing price observations, chiefly because many articles cannot be found everywhere. It may 
also happen, especially if the sample ·is drawn from a register or a directory, that entire shops 
must be omitted for various reasons: they have closed down, changed their line of trade, refuse · 
to participate, etc. Checks along with pre-surveys can give information that can make the sample 
more effective, e.g. which products are for sale. 
Need for specific sa~ples for groups of products 
9. Each semi-annual price survey comprises several different commodity. groups, each group 
requiring a specific sample of outlets. This is perhaps most evident in the case of the Services 
Survey, which includes motor fuels, theatre tickets, books, restaurant services, etc., but is true 
also of the other price surveys. In the Clothing Survey, for instance, one sample of shops is 
· needed for clothes and another one for footwear. 
Criteria for the selection 
10. The two most important criteria for the selection of shops are outlet tme and geggrapbical 
situation. The price policy and relative price level of a shop are, as a rule, directly related to both 
types of outlet and location. Also the service level of a shop has a relation to the outlet type in 
particular. The outlet type of each selected shop is to be determined according to a common 
classification. This classification is based on the criterion of the service level offered in 
connection with the sale of a product. The code number of the outlet type is to be indicated for 
each reported price in the material transmitted to Eurostat. The common classification· for 
reporting to Eurostat should not prevent countries from using national classifications for 
sampling purposes, especially if additional infonnation is available for such subdivisions, e.g. on 
turnover. 
11. Other criteria could be type of owner and :whether the outlet is a multiple store or independent. 
These characteristics, as well as the geographical data, can be used as sampling variables but 
need not be reported to Eurostat. If these latter data on type of owner, 'etc. should be used as 
stratification variables, as auxiliary information only, or not at all, is a question that must be 
decided by national circumstances. 
Outlet types 
12. The definition of outlet types was revised in 1995 and a new classification into nine categories of 
outlets was adopted. The main criterion for the claSsification is the level of service offered by the 
ret~l shops. The nine categories that are to be reported in the price data are as follows: 
Type 1 a) department stores 
b) "popular department stores" 
c) specialist superstores 
Type 2 a) slipennarkets 
b) hypennarkets 
c) supennarket type food sections of 1 a) and 1 b) 
Type 3 a) large "hard discount" outlets 
b) small "hard discount" outlets 
Type4 a) mini-markets 
b) neighbourhood shops 
c) service station shops 
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Type S a). . traditional shops 
Type 6 a) markets 
Type 7 a) private service companies 
Type 8 a) public service companies 
Type 9 a) other (e.g. mail order, sales at the customer's premises, mobile shops) 
Definitions of these types and subcategories are given in the Chapter 7. Types 2, 3 and 4 are 
self-service shops; type S excludes self-service shops. Outlets of the types "Verbrauchennarkt" 
and "SB-Warenhaus" are to be classified according to type 2 above. The subcategories will be · 
used in a flexible way in order to meet the requirements of each survey and according to specific 
instructions which will be issued by Eurostat. 
Allocation or sample to outlet types 
13. The sample of shops in which an article is to be priced must represent the various outlet types so 
correctly that the average price of the product will not be distoned. When the sample for a price 
survey is to be planned, one of the first steps should be to go through the list of products in 
order to decide in which outlet types each product group are to be priced. Which outlet types 
are relevant will usually ditfer from group to group among the products. The number of shops to 
be selected from each outlet type for a given product should be proportional to the quantities 
sold of the product in that outlet type. (Theoretically, one should also take account of the price 
variation, but it can be disregarded pretty safely, especially as infonnation on coefficients of 
variation for combinations of products and outlet types is belieyed to be rare.) It is to be noted 
that approximate proportions should be quite sufficient. Even very rough estimates are valuable 
if no other infonnation can be obtained, e.g. estimates by trade experts like: "Our experience is 
that 2/3 of the products of type X are being sold by specialised shops and 1/3 by department 
stores." 
14. It can be very useful to draw up a table u follows. 
Number of price observations by outlet ty,pe · 
Product Departm. Supennarket•s 
group stores City centre Suburbs C.c. 
1. .. 
2 .. . 
3 .. . 
etc. 
Specialised shops. Etc. · Total 
Suburbs 
The table is completed by allocating the total number of prices required in each product group 
(at the extreme right) to outlet types according to the indicated criteria. By reading the table 
vertically one can see· at a glance e.g. that a sample of, say, 15 shops of type X is needed for 
product groups A and B but only S shops of the same type for the remaining product ·groups: 
This arrangement of data \\ill prove very helpful, as it will quickly give an overall view of the 
optimal composition of the sample of outlets needed for a price survey. 
15. This kind ofinfonnation can also be used to adapt one's own fonns to the range of products of 
the selected outlets. This means that only fonns containing the relevant products need to be 
brought along to the shops that are to be visited. 
Location 
16. It was stated above that the location is a very important factor for the selection of outlets. It may 
be tempting to concentrate the collection of prices to centrally situated shops in the city centre 
and it may perhaps even seem to be efficient to do so. We must, however, warn strongly against 
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such a procedure. There is a substantial risk that the. estimates of average prices will be distoned 
(they will probably be overestimated). The number of shops that are to be selected &om the city 
centre, from more peripheral parts of the city, and &om the suburbs, ought to be proportional to 
the actual distribution of sales in those areas. These proportions are likely to be different among 
the various product groups, suburban outlets having a larger relative share of the sales of food, 
whereas more centrally situated outlets may have a larger relative share of the sales of products 
like clothes and books. Considering that only a very limited number· of outlets can be. selected 
for the price collection, it is certainly advisable to avoid the inclusion of expensive shops in 
fashionable locations as being non-representative. Instead, medium-range shops should be 
preferred in order to get closer to the average price level. · 
Other criteria 
17. Whether multiple or independent is another aiterion for the selection. If multiple stores apply 
the same prices in all affiliated shops, it should actually be suflicient to observe the prices in only 
one of these shops. That shop should in such a case be entitled to a weight representing the sales 
of all the multiple stores belonging to that chain. This can be brought about by duplicating.the 
prices or in some other way._ Some degree of carefulness in these situations is advisable, 
however. Although there may be assurances that the prices are uniform, experience shows that 
varying prices are not uncommon. Such difFerences can be explained by individual pricing of part 
of the goods, which may be due to local competition. Also, the shops need not have exactly the 
same articles for sale: some shops .may have a limited assortment of articles, or individual shops . 
. may have a certain freedom to adapt their range of products to local conditions. 
Sampling method: Random or non-random sampling 
18. As a matter of principle, the sampling of oudets for the price surveys ought to be in accordance 
with established statistical theory and its app&cations. It means in this case that the sampling 
procedure is dependent on a random process which makes it possible to obtain unbiased 
estimates (and preferably also to detennine ·the precision of these estimates). However, the 
special nature of the price surveys has the result that the conditions of random sampling cannot 
often be satisfied or would call for unreasonable efforts. 
19. One requirement of random sampling, is the access to a· sampling frame of the population of 
outlets, preferably in the fonn of a register of outlets with information on type of outlet, range of 
products and turnover. The data contained in such a register will very soon get out of date. 
Newly established enterprises or outlets will not be in the register, of course, but there are alSo 
other instances of under coverage. Outlets having large sales of a certain type of product can be 
missing from the sampling fr~e of that product group because the register infonnation on line 
of trade, etc. fail to correspond with the actual state of things. It will seem that rather frequent 
updatings will be necessary. l\1ore current information can usually be found in a telephone 
directory, which can be very useful as a substitute for a specialised register or to supplement it. 
20. The number of quotations for each article and accordingly the number of outlets in which the 
article is to be priced, is as a rule very small, for many products only ten shops or fewer. 
Experience shows that so small random samples are very often seen to be composed in a way 
that is far from being representative. Such extreme effects are easier to avoid with non-random 
sampling. This implies tha~ rules of thumb might be needed as to how much your random sample 
should be allowed to deviate from a "nonnal" sample in order to be accepted·. That is to say ~hat 
the random sampling very often, in practice, has to be supplemented with non-random 
procedures based on personal judgements. 
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21. The sample of outlets for the CPI can sometimes be used. One should be aware, however, that 
the CPI-sample is designed basically for estimating price changes and that it may not be equally 
suited for estimating average prices. 
22. A fact deserving attention in this context is that the average prices of each country are computed 
centrally at Eurostat according to a formula common to all countries, i.e. as unweighted 
arithmetic averages. The sampling method has to comply with these calculations and must not 
require a different estimation formula. This must be borne in mind when contemplating a 
sampling method that may require weighting, such as disproportionate stratified sampling. PPS-
sampling with probabilities proportionate to turnover, which requires harmonic averages, cannot 
be used for this reason. 
Control or non-random sampling 
23. It need hardly be said that the sample- of outlets is of vital importance for the estimation of the 
average prices and has to be designed with great care. The selection of the shops should 
therefore be under the control of the central staff, so that they are in a position to detennine the 
composition of the sample. The price collectors should on no account be pennitted to select 
outlets at their own discretion. If the central staff is prevented by local circumstances ftom 
selecting individual outlets, they should give very clear and detailed instructions to the field stafF 
regarding the desired characteristics of the outlets that are to be selected: outlet type and 
location in the first place, organisation (multiple/independent), and possibly also an indication of 
the price/quality profile of the shop. 
24. Even if purely random samples are not practicable, it is nevertheless desirable to include random 
elements where it can be done. One example could· be that the final sample for a survey or for a 
product group is drawn at random from a somewhat larger non-random sample which has been 
constructed in a subjective way in order to include representative outlets of various types in 
fixed proportions. 
25. Information obtained from pre-surveys, e.g. which product groups are offered for sale, can 
prove invaluable at the final selection of outlets. See the chapter on pre-survey work. 
Summary 
26. The existing differences in retail market conditions and other institutional circumstances prevent 
the application of unifonn procedures for the selection of outlets. Identical routines are not 
really necessary, however, provided that a few basic principles are observed in order to avoid 
biased results due to the composition of the sample of outlets. The following principles and 
guidelines should be applied (numbers refer to paragraphs in this chapter): 
• The sample of outlets should enable the calculation of a national average -price for each 
selected product ( 1 ). · · 
• If spatial coefficients are used to convert prices of the capital city to national averages, the 
sample has to be in confonnity with this adjustment (3). 
• The selection of outlets should be proportional to the share each type of outlet has of the 
quantities sold of the product concerned (13). 
• The selection of outlets should also be proportional to tlie actual distribution of sales in 
different areas (city centre, suburban, etc.). Do not concentrate the collection of prices to 
centrally situated shops in the city centre-(16). 
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• The selection should comply with accepted statistical practice. The poss~le use or registers, 
directories, etc. should be found out Information obtained ftom pre-surveys can be utilised 
at the final selection or outlets (18-19). · 
• The shops should be selected by the central staff or according to detailed instructions ftom 
the central staft: The price collectors should on no account be pennitted to select outlets at 
their own discretion (23). 
• Considering the very small number of outlets in the sample, it will be wise to avoid expensive 
shops in fashionable locations and instead prefer medium-range shops (16). 
• The specific conditions of multiple stores should be taken into account in the plans for the 
selection and for the price collection (17). 
• The type of outlet that is to be indicated for each reported price should be clasSified 
according to the categories listed in paragraph 12, -the definitions given in the &Mex and the 
instructions issued by Eurostat for each survey. 
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9 TYPES OF PRICES 
Definition of price 
1. The objective of PPP surveys is to obtain national average prices for items which are 
representative of spending within each basic heading. Prices should be market prices, and pricing 
practices should be consistent with those used in the national accounts and in the national 
consumer 'price index. (See the chapter on general principles, paragraphs' 3-4.) 
2. ·Consistency with national accounts pricing conventions is important because annual average 
prices are combined to provide indices which are used to convert countries' expenditure 
components of GDP to a common price basis. Observance of the consistency with national 
accounts has priority over the rule of market prices. 
3. In practice, in order to keep costs do~ most countries carry out price surveys in the capital or in 
a few cities only, and use prices collected within a short period of time. Conversion to an annual 
average price is carried out using national consumer price indices, hence the importance of 
consistency with pricing practices used in the national index. Prices obtained in the capital or any 
other part of the country and not representative of the national price level should be converted to 
national prices by regional coefficients. Such coefficients, when needed, can be determined .from 
regional price surveys. 
Use of centrally collected prices 
4. For some goods, the same prices hold throughout the country. Examples are prices of postal 
charges, newspapers, and some utilities; the list will vary from country to country. A number of 
different cases of central pricing can be distinguished, but in each case: the principle is the same: 
if there is good evidence that prices are unifonn either nationally, (or in the cue of capital city 
surveys, throughout the city) it is clearly more efficient to collect prices once, usitally direct 
from the provider. 
5. Utilities such as electricity or gas are often provided by one supplier at a unifonn price, usually 
collected directly from the supplier. This procedure may be extended to cases where the number 
of suppliers is small and appropriate weights can be obtained to calculate average prices. An 
example would be telecommunications which in some countries have recently ceased to be a 
monopoly. 
6. Other kinds of goods may be sold by many suppliers, but at regulated prices - for instance 
books, newspapers, pharmaceuticals. Again, this will vary between countri~. In some countries 
recent trends towards deregulation have reduced the list of goods priced in this way~ For 
instance in the United Kingdom, both books and pharmaceuticals may now be priced differently 
in different outlets. Price statisticians should ensure that recent developments are taken account 
of when deciding which items are suitable for central collection. 
7. Some retailers (for instance some supermarkets) adopt a uniform pricing policy throughout the 
country, or within the region of the capital. Where the approximate market share is known, it 
may be more efficient to obtain prices direct from the supplier. The prices can then be weighted 
. together with others collected from surveys, to give average prices. However price .statisticians 
need to satisfy themse~ves that claims of a uniform pricing policy are well founded before 
adopting this approach. (See also the ctftlpter on selection of outlets, paragraph 17) 
Catalogue prices 
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8. Catalogues may be useful in obtaining prices. Two cases can be ;dentified: 
i) catalogues designed to sell goods through mail order: these may be used where a 
significant proportion of sales within the basic heading are by mail order. Here prices 
can be used in the same· way as prices collected in stores. However collectors should 
, ensure that the goods are still in stock and prices are unchanged. Delivery charges 
should be· included in the price. 
ii) catalogues used primarily for sales promotion rather than mail order: these are often 
found for furniture - an example is the IKEA catalogue. Again collectors should 
check on the price and availability of the goods. Delivery chatges should not be 
included if sales take place mainly through stores. 
Catalogue prices can be reported provided it is known for certain that the prices are applied 
without exception, i.e. that they are real market prices. Such catalogue prices must be 
distinguished ftom the list prices issued by some manufacturers or wholesalers for the guidance 
of retailers. List prices cannot be accepted for the PPP surveys as they do not reflect the actual 
price level on a competitive Dwtet. The only exception from this rule occurs if the list price is 
consistent with the valuation of the national accounts aggregates, see paragraph 2. 
Delivery costs 
9. Delivery costs should be excluded where possible. For goods which cannot be conveniently 
transported by the purchaser, prices quoted may include "free" delivery, for which the true cost 
cannot be separately identified. For these items' collectors should note whether the price is 
inclusive or exclusive of delivery charges, and any conditions for "free" delivery. 
Taxes and other charges 
10. The reported prices should include the VAT and other indirect taxes imposed on the goods or. 
services. The prices of some services may vary according to whether the supplier is charging for 
taxes or other government charges. Generally, the specification will state whether or not certain 
taxes and charges should be included, or examples of both prices will be asked for. If the 
specification includes taxes, etc., problems in 'bbtaining realistic price quotations may arise 
where it is com~on for some suppliers to avoid these payments. It is not for the price collector 
to make judgements about which is the "correct" price, but to collect the prices usually charged 
in the, market place, and to make a note of the basis on which the prices have been est~mated. 
Sale goods and reduced prices 
11. The prices to be collected for purchasing power p~rities' price suiVeys are market prices, that is, 
the prices at which the products are actually sold. Thus, for products which are permanently 
discounted below the "list" price, the discounted price should be used. However temporary 
reductions in price, \vhether in seasonal "sales" or as "special offers", should be disregarded, and 
the undiscounted price taken. The reason for disregarding temporarily reduced prices is a 
practical one: ideally, all prices should be taken account of. The omission of temporary 
reductions implies an assumption that the relative discounts in sale prices are the same between 
different countries. The case \Vhere reductions are extensive enough to affect the estimate of 
annual average prices is considered later. · 
12. Listed below are the main types of price reductions and promotional offers: 
seasonal sales: regular periods during which shops temporarily reduce prices both of 
regular goods and end-of-line or substandard products; 
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discount days, when there are reductions either on all merchandise or selected lines; 
reductions available to selected groups, e.g. account holders, or holders of particular 
credit cards; 
extra goods offered free, e.g. "three for the price of two", "IS% extra free"; 
store vouchers or other offers for purchases over a given amount (typically found at , 
furniture stores); 
pennanently discounted products: some products may always appear labelled as 
"redu~ed"; .others may appear at "list" price but are generally subject to negotiation 
(the most common example oftbis is automobiles); 
"cash-back" - a promise of a return of cash on completion of purchase, for instance in 
return for vouchers collected with the goods. 
13. In corning to a decision about whether any type .of reduced price should be taken in a price 
survey for purchasing power parities, three principles should be considered: 
• the price recorded should be the market price; 
• practices should be consistent with those used in compiling national accounts values; 
• practices should be consistent with those used in compiling the national consumer price 
index. 
14. It can readily be seen that many of the types of price reduction listed above should be 
disregarded for purchasing power parity price surveys for exactly the same reason as for 
consumer prices surveys, namely that they are not available to all purchasers at all times, or that 
they are of little value to some purchasers. Thus, temporary promotion, or discounts available to. 
selected groups should be disregarded. However there are some special situations, discussed 
below, in which extra. guidance is necessary. 
Seasonal sales 
1 S. The period for pricing should be chosen to avQid temporary price reductions or seasonal sales. 
However. if sales last for much more than four weeks, and a good choice of articles is available 
throughout the period of the sale, there may be a case for including these prices in the survey. 
The decision should be guided by the pricing conventions used in the national consumer price 
index, as this index is used to convert the average prices obtained from the price surveys to the 
annual average prices for the calculation of the purchasing power parities. 
Goods which are mainly bought in seasonal sales 
16. There may be some cases where a substantial proportion of sales of a particular product takes 
place during the sales season at reduced prices. For example, in some countries large electrical 
goods such as refrigerators or washing machines are typically bought during sales. Here the 
standard method of pricing would lead to a distorted price parity. This is in effect an example of 
a seasonal product, and will be dealt with in that section. 
17. The decision about whether such products should be treated as seasonal products are the 
responsibility of the price statistician rather than the price collector. Information about variation 
in price levels and the volume of sales should be used to determine whether the effect on 
average price levels over the year is likely to differ by S per cent or more from the normal price. , 
· For instance, if 50 per cent of sales of washing machines take place during seasonal sales at 20 
• per cent below "nonnal" prices, then the average annual price is 10 per cent below the •normal" 
price, and so the item should be treated as a seasonal product. 
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End-of-line goods 
18. Items no longer in demand which will not be re-stocked are descnoed as •end..of-Hne goods. 
Examples are consumer·durables which have been (or are about to.be) replaced by more up-to-
date models and "fashion" or seasonal items which are no longer in demand. A good test is to 
ask whether the item is likely to remain' in stock, or in the case of clothing, to ascertain whether 
· there is a good range of sizes available. Often end-of-line goods will be marked as such and sold 
at reduced prices. However even if prices are not reduced, they may not be representative of 
prices of goods currently in demand. For this reason, collectors should avoid taking the prices of 
end-of-line goods. 
19. Where the item in question is a model specified in the survey, the ·collector should ascertain the 
nearest equivalent model currently being stocked, and price that instead. Full details of the 
substitute should be provided to Eurostat. 
Extra size and similar offers 
· 20. Among the many devices used by manufacturers to persuade purchasers to buy their goods is 
frequ~ntly found the "extra 15% free• otrer on long-running lines such as instant coffee or 
toothpaste. There are· many variants on this: "free• trial size, another prod~ct packaged "free" 
with the specified product. The correct procedure in this case is: 
• if possible, price the standard size; 
• if this is temporarily unavailable, price at a later date if practicable (within four weeks of the 
survey date); if it is still unavailable, price the special offer size, but make a note of the 
temporarily increased size (or any other "free" offer). 
Permanently discounted prices 
21. Some kinds of goods (or goods sold in some kinds of stores) may be subject to pennanent 
"discounts". In these cases the reductions from list price are openly stated; usually the goods 
have never been sold at the higher price. In these cases it is the discounted price which is the 
market price, and should be taken by the collector. · 
Negotiated discounts 
.22. For some products, notably automobiles, discounts are generally available but not openly stated . 
. In these cases, "list" prices \viii be available and buyers will attempt to negotiate a price below 
that level. The level of discount will vary between countries and between manufacturers. 
23. The price requir~ for the survey is that for a cash purchase, with no trade-in on a used car, and 
no "free" extras beyond the given specification. Countries will have to decide, in the light of 
their national circumstances, how this is obtained. Ideally the average level of prices actually 
paid in the period concerned should be obtained from a survey of individual dealers,· but it is 
recognised that this may not be possible, or inay be excessively costly. An alternative is to 
approach dealers' organisations, consumer organisations or manufacturers to obtain estimates of 
average levels of discount. 
"Cash-back" 
24. Manufacturers sometimes offer "cash-back1' - a cash sum given to the purchaser typically in 
exchange for vouchers available with the product. In general these should be disregarded; often 
they impose some c~ndition on the purchaser, and the proportion taken up is small. However 
where the. value of the cash returned is large, and available to all purchasers without condition, 
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so that virtually all purchasers are likely to benefit, there may be a case for taking it into account. 
Countries should provide the price before .. cash .. back", the value of the "cash-back" and details 
of any restrictions which apply, e.g. period of application, ranges and models included. The 
treatment of such discounts in the national index should also be taken into account. 
Summary 
25. ·In summary, the principles to be applied in respect to discounts and seasonal sales are as follows 
(numbers refer to paragraphs in this chapter): 
• the price to be collected is that at which the product is actually sold (11); 
• in general, all types of short period reduction should be ignored (15, 18, 20); 
• discounted prices should be taken for goods which are pennanently reduced (or found in 
stores which offer pennanent discounts) (21); 
• where a substantial proportion of annual sales of a particular product take place during the 
"sale" period, the procedure to be adopted should be that for seasonal products; such 
products should be treated as seasonal if the effect on average price levels is S per cent or 
· more (16-17); 
• details of "cash-back" offers which are available to all purchasers and give cash rather than 
vouchers should be provided, if they amount to 5 per cent or more of the sales price, and in 
such a form that all purchasers benefit (24); 
• for products such as cars, where the market price is· commonly arrived at by negotiation, an 
estimate of actual transaction prices is required (23). 
-Prices of seasonal products 
26. Special procedures are_ needed for those products for which both prices and volume of sales vary 
substantially through the year. As well as ·the traditional examples of seasonal fiuit and 
vegetables, there may be other products which have a seasonal pattern in the movement of 
prices and volume of sales. It is for countries' price statisticians to determine which products 
require special treatments because of seasonality. 
27. Two principles should be adhered to: the survey should be timed so that the products are priced 
during the main season (periods of scarcity should be avoided), and in order to obtain aMual 
prices, monthly price indices should be weighted by monthly volume of sales. 
28. The procedures to be adopted in practice vary according to whether the product is identical with 
one included in the national price index; this may be the case for some seasonal fiuit and 
vegetables. If there is good correspondence between specifications, then there will be no need to 
collect prices for the survey; the weighted annual price from the national price index may be 
used. 
29. However in many cases the national average price may not be appropriate. The product 
specification used . in the national index may not be closely comparable with that of the 
international price survey: it may be less precise than that required for international comparisons, 
or may differ in important resp,ects. Alternatively, the product may not appear in the national 
index. Two cases may be distinguished: 
i) there is a sufficiently representative monthly price index in the national survey: in this 
case collect prices at the survey date and apply the weighted annual average index to 
give an estimated annual average price~ 
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ii) if no appropriate price index is available from the national index it wui oe necessary to 
: carry out a special survey of prices, at several times during the year, covering the 
period when the product is available. Again, these prices should be weighted· together 
to obtain an aMual average price. 
Goods mainly bought in seasonal sales 
30. There may be some products which are predominantly sold at reduced prices during "sales", 
although they are available throughout the year. This is simply another example of a seasonal 
pattern in prices and sales, requiring a weighted aMual average to be calculated. The method to 
be adopted for calculating annual prices should be one of those described above, as appropriate. 
Summary 
31. The following principles are to be applied to products where both volume and 'prices vary during 
the year: 
• ·where there is close correspondence with the specification of a product in the national index, 
take the weighted average annual price; 
• where thete is a representative monthly price index in the national index, obtain the product 
· prices during the appropriate season, and use this index to obtain a weighted annual average 
price; 
• otherwise, obtain prices· at several periods during the season, and use information about the 
volume of sales to obtain a weighted annual average price. 
43 
... ~- .. ···--·-----..-.., 
10 GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR TH.E FIELD WORK 
The use of this chapter 
1. The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Programme is based on the principle of comparability. 
However, comparable results cannot be expected iftwo different survey methods are used. The 
methods applie4 for the PPP surveys in different countries do not have to be identical, but a certain 
degree of unifonnity is required, nevertheless. The instructions guiding the field staff can and should 
be an instrument to harmonise methods in order to increase comparability. 
2. This chapter contains two kinds of information intended for the price collectors: 
basic infonnation about the PPP surveys; and 
hints and directions. for the price collection. 
Only the specific aspects relating to the PPP price surveys have been treated, not recommendations 
concerning the general behaviour of interviewers. Countries could use the chapter as a basis for the 
compilation or revision of their own detailed instructions. 
3. The complete instructions for the price collectors in a country must also include all such 
directions as are needed in that country with respect to specific national circumstances and which 
cannot be incorporated in a universal edition. Such national circumstances may refer to the way of 
organising the surveys, the qualifications and experience of the field staff: administrative regulations, 
contacts with the statistical office, conditions governing the selection of outlets, how to deal with or 
classify special types of outlets, contacts with the establishments, special market conditions, 
timetables for the field work and for returning the completed fonns, etc. It is the responsibility of the 
national statistical institutes (NSis) to supply their price collectors with such a set of complete 
instructions. 
Purpose and use of PPP-surveys 
4. The price collectors must be able to explain to shop managers or others who are to authorise 
the price collection what the PPP surveys are and why the prices are needed. 
5. International comparisons ~f economic quantities are being discussed or referred to every day 
in newspapers or other media. Such comparisons are required for many kinds of economic and 
political decisions by governments as well as by private enterprises. They are also of great interest to 
person's doing research and, not in the least, to the general public. The object of the Purchasing 
Power Parity Programme, which is organised jointly by the Statistical Office of the European Union 
(Eurostat) and the OECD, is to enable international price and volume comparisons, e.g. of the gross 
domestic product or of the consumption of households. The calculations for the comparisons require 
a set of national prices from each country. These prices are collected in price surveys which are 
carried out by the national statistical offices. 
Coverage and organisation of PPP surveys 
6. The PPP surveys comprise all goods and services included in the gross domestic product, i.e. 
goods and services consumed by households, government services, capital goods such as machinery 
and transport equipment, and construction projects. The price data are obtained from selected shops, 
from special enquiries, or from the calculation of construction costs. The price collection in the ~hops 
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refers to consumer goods and services. It is organised as six price surveys undertaken over a period 
of three years. There are two surveys each year. The six suiVeys cover the following product groups: 
1.1 Major household appliances; recreational equipment; 
1.2 Clothing and footwear; textiles; 
2.1 Food, beverages and tobacco; 
2.2 · House repairs; water, fuel and power; operation of transport equipment; transport and 
communication services; recreational services; · 
3.1 Furniture and floor coverings; glassware, tableware and utensils; · 
3·.2 Transport equipment; household operation; personal care; restaurants and hotels; 
remaining services. 
7. The national statistical institutes are responsible for the price collections in their countries. It 
is also their duty to ensure that the consumption pattern of the country is well represented among the 
products for which prices are to be collected. This means that an adequate number of representative 
consumer goods (goods that are commonly available and sold in relatively large quantities) should be 
included in each product group. The price suiVeys are co-ordinated by Eurostat and the OECD. The 
data processing is done by Eurostat. · 
The stages of a price survey 
8. For each of the six different price surveys during the three-year period the following 
operations are. carried out (the description refers to the most common procedures; some countries 
may follow a somewhat different course of action): 
1 The list of products from the previous survey of the same kind-is reviewed and proposals 
for the updating of the list are prepared by each country and by Eurostat Information on 
current products will be required and may be obtained from shops or from other sources. 
· These preparations are very important ·for the final result. The proposals are then 
compiled by Eurostat and submitted to the working party in which all participating 
countries are represented. 
2 The new or modified product specifications which have been approved by the working 
party are included in the list of products for the new survey and the updated list is 
distributed to the countries. Each country draws up the plans for its price collection. 
3 The outlets from which prices ·are. to be collected are selected by the NSis. The selection 
, must be representative of actual buying patterns. 
4 Instructions are sent out to the price collectors together with the pricing forms and other 
relevant material. The instructions and the product list are discussed at a meeting 
between the price collectors and the central staff. Products that are not easily available in 
the country are in most cases excluded from the pricing fonns. 
5 The price collection takes place during the suJVey period that has been decided. 
6 The completed forms are inspected at the NSis. Missing information has to be completed 
and certain prices have to be checked in the shops by the price collectors. 
... ;,. ,, . :· . . ... , 
7 The data input is usually carried out at the NSis. Price averages are computed by s~eral 
countries. Prices are compared between the shops. Comparisons are also made with the 
previous survey. New checks may be necessary. The data is then transmitted to Burostat, 
usually on diskettes or by electronic mail. I? 
8 The data processing begins at Eurostat. Analytical tables are produced and studied. 
Observations of inconsistencies and remarkable deviations, such as extreme price level 
indexes or very high price variation, are .reported to the countries. 
9 The NSis examine the analytical tables and consider the observations made by Eurostat. 
Again, supplementary information may have to be obtained from shops or other sources. 
Corrections and verifications are reported to Eurostat. 
10 FinaJ data processing and presentation of results. 
The list of products 
9. The expenditures on GOP, the gross domestic product, are broken down into categories on 
different levels, the lowest level being 220 commodity groups referred to as "basic headings". The 
calculation of the purchasing power parities is undertaken on the basic heading level. Basic headings 
may be categories such as Fresh bread, Cheese, Mineral water, Men's footwear, Kitchen furniture. 
Radio sets, or Restaurant services, to take just a few examples. The product list is arranged 
according to basic headings. 
10. A number of goods or services have been selected for pricing in each basic heading. The 
number can differ from two up to SO or more, depending on the type of commodities in the basic 
heading. What is imponant about this selection is that each participating coun~ must have its 
representative products included. All products selected for a basic heading are representative of one 
country or another but they are not necessarily representative of all countries. From the point of view 
of a certain country several products may be representative, while others may not be. 
11. Now it is not necessary for a country to price all products within a basic 'heading. The 
calculation of purchasing power parities requires only that a country records the prices of its own 
representative products and also some of the non-representative products {because they are 
representative of other countries). The NSI of a country will decide which products need not be 
priced in that country. 
12. There is in the list of products an exact and detailed definition of each product. In the case of · 
many branded products, such as \vashing machines, cars, or TV -sets, brand and model are often 
specified in the definition. If the product cannot be identified by brand and model, the definition will 
specify a set of characteristics, such as material, size, design, quantity, packaging, etc. This is to 
make sure that only products of equal quality are compared. 
13. Comparisons of products that differ in quality (or quantity) will have the result that quality 
differences (or ·quantity differences) will be mistaken for price differences. This means that errors will 
enter into both the international comparisons of prices and the international comparison of volumes. 
Selecting outlets. 
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14. The sample of outlets for the PPP suavey will be used to calculate a national average price for 
· each product. We want the average price that is based on the sample to be a correct, unbiased 
estimate of the average price of all shops. The sample should therefore be a miniature representation 
of the total number of shops. The proportions of the sample should correspond to those found in the 
total population in at least two important respects: 
Outlet t_me: the selection of outlets should be proportional to the share each type of 
outlet has of the quantities· sold of the product concerned. 
Location: the selection of outlets should ~so be proportional to the actual distributi9n of 
sales in different areas (city centre, suburban, etc.). 
Other characteristics of the total population of outlets may also have to be reflected in the sample. 
1 S. In most countries the outlets are selected by the central staff at the NSI and a list of the 
selected shops is given to each price collector. If, for some reasons, the outlets cannot be selected by 
a central procedure, the price collectors ~emselves will have to make the selection in the field. The 
selection must in such cases adhere strictly to the detailed directions provided by the NSI. These 
directions will specify: 
the type of outlet (supennarket, department store, traditional shop, market, etc.); 
in which part of the city the outlet is to be selected (centre, off-centre, suburb); 
type of city area (shopping street, shopping precinct, residential'quarter); 
price/quality profile of shops. 
16. It is generally advisable to avoid expensive shops in fashionable quarters as being non-
representative of the average consumer pattern, and instead select medium-range shops. This 
strategy is an application of the rule that the selection should be proportional to the shares of 
quantities sold in different outlet types and types of areas. 
Contacting the selected shops 
17. Obviously, routines for the field work must be elaborated by the NSI and a4apted to the ·local 
conditions. The experience of price collectors should be utilised; their views are clearly of great 
value. The recommendations which follow are of a general nature. 
18. It is recommended to prepare a short letter to infonn shopkeepers and shop managers of the 
price survey. Such an official letter of introduction can either be sent to the selected shops before the 
price collecto(s contact or be presented by the price collector, whichever is considered most 
appropriate. The letter might contain the following information: 
background and purpose of the PPP price surveys; 
in which period the price collection is to take place; 
status of the price collector and way of identification; 
that the prices of indi\idual shops will be kept confidential and used only for statistical 
purposes; 
whether the participation is compulsory by law; 
references to relevant statutes relating to confidentiality and to compulsoriness; 
the name and telephone connection of a person at the NSI who can be contacted about 
the survey. 
Some brief information on the use or publication of the results might possibly also be included in the 
letter. 
19. It goes without saying that an indication of the suavey period requires that it can be observed. 
It may be enough to indicate the survey month. If possible, one should prefer a day and hour for the 
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visit to the shop when the number of customers is comparatively low. However, if there are price 
reductions on certain days of the week one should take care that such days will not be over 
represented. Whether an appointment should be made before the visit must be considered in view of 
local practice or what is generally appropriate. Ordinarily, the person to contact is the shopkeeper or 
manager or similar person who is in a position to accept the price collector and deliver the 
information or offer the assistance of the staff. 
20. A copy of the introductory letter should be brought along when visiting the shops. It may be 
preferable or even necessary to present the letter at the visit as it appears that the people who meet 
the price collector have not usually seen it; the posted letter having been sent to some office and left 
there or not reached the shop staff for some other reason. A few copies of the, latest press release 
with PPP results may also come in handy. People are often curious to learn about the results of the 
survey and informative graphs or charts presenting price level comparisons are especially rewarding. 
The shop staff should be offered a copy if they take an interest. Needless to say, the price collector 
should always present an identity card issued by the NSI to prove his authorisation. The price 
· collector may also find it proper to make it clear to the people who meet him that the assistance of 
the shop staff will not be required or required to a limited extent only (if this is so). 
2.1. The price collector should be aware that the shop may have been visited during the PPP pre-
survey in order to ascertain the type of outlet and the line of goods offered for sale. An additional 
visit may be required after the price collection in order to check the prices or other data. It can also 
happen that the shop is visited regularly by the price collectors for the Consumer Price Index. 
22. It is extremely important to preserve the confidentiality of the data. Prices already collected 
. in other shops must on no account be disclosed. This must be explained to the shop staff, if they ask 
questions, and the price collector must also take care to hold the documents in such a way that the 
prices cannot be observed during the work in the shop. 
Finding an article according to the product definition 
23. The basic document for the pricing is the list of products with its definitions. There are also 
annexes containing samples of textiles and pictures of some types of products, e.g. furnitu_re, which 
will.make it easier to identify these products. There are two types of definitions: (i) those in which 
brand and model are specified and (ii) the generic ones in which a number of technical characteristics 
are specified. 
24. It is of vital importance that the product selected for pricing in the shop is the same as the 
one described in the product list. It has to adhere strictly to the product specification. If none of the 
products for sale coincides with the definition, one should price the nearest equivalent (the most 
similar product) provided that the differences are insignificant or can be related to the price, e.g. as 
small weight differences can. The price. collector must always report all such deviations under 
.. Observations ... A different model number, or weight, or composition of a textile fabric, or types of 
packaging, are examples. It is then up to Eurostat or the person in charge of the survey at the NSI to 
decide whether the comparability is acceptable, whether some adjustment should be made, or 
whether the price has to be rejected. 
- 25. It is advisable to get a first general view of the shop in order to see how the goods are 
arranged. This applies in the first place to clothing and household articles. Clothing articles, for 
instance, are frequently arranged by brands so that trousers- and jackets and whatever of the same 
brand will be found together, instead of jackets among all other jackets, etc. irrespective of brand. 
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26. When trying to find articles according to the specifications of a certain basic heading, price 
collectors have found it practical to start with those art:cles that are defined by brand and after that 
goes on with the articles for which no brand is specified. One should ask the shop stafF for brands 
which have not been found. 
27. It is sometimes difficult to identify the specified item or an equivalent one. Clothing and TV 
and audio articles can be taken as examples but there are many more. The specifications of some 
clothing articles can be very detailed and it may seem almost impossible to find, an equivalent item 
among the multitude of articles. Then one must give first priority to the most important 
characteristics such as type of gannent and material, and pay less attention to details such as buttons 
and pockets. The details can then be used to select one of several items that matched the primary 
components. 
28. If there are more than one article that matches a certain specification one shoUld select the 
one which sells best, as it is likely to be the most representative one. The shop stafF should know 
about this. The number of exposed units of each article can be an indication. · · 
' . 
29. It happens very often that a specified model of a washing machine or a TV -set, etc. has been 
replaced by a new model after the product list was prepared. In that case the new model should be 
priced although it is not on the list. The new model is likely to be found also in some other countries 
which allows comparisons to be made. It will usually pay to make a central check-up with some 
producers or importers before the price collection start so as to keep up-to-date regarding products 
like TV and radio sets, computers, etc. 
I 
30. Another type of problem appears in the case of end-of-line goods which should generally be 
avoided. The procedure in the latter case is discussed below in the section on •sates and other 
temporary price reductions". 
31. When pricing foods in tins or jars' one must check whether it is the weight or the volume that 
has been indicated on the label. The quantity can sometimes be measured in grammes, sometimes in 
millilitres, and the two measures must not be mixed up, as a matter of course. The observed quantity 
will be used for transforming the observed price into a price per standard unit. 
32. The product definition will sometimes specify "internationally well known brand" or "locally 
well known brand". The first expression should not create difficulties but the second one may give 
rise to some hesitation. Locally well known brands should exclude products with unknown origin. 
Fancy brands of imports from low-wage countries, e.g. of clothing articles, should most likely also 
be excluded. The very cheap products as well as the very expensive ones had also better be excluded. 
Sub-standard products should not be accepted. Locally well known brands are supposed to imply a 
medium quality. Multiple stores often have their own brands which can be affixed to clothi~g articles 
of various origins. These brands are certainly "locally well known" and should generally be accepted 
as such, provided the quality is not below standard. It . should be possible to decide already at the 
selection of outlets which brands of this type cannot be accepted. One should always report the 
brand and, if possible, the country of origin when the specification asks for a locally well known 
brand . 
.33. There should be some way .to communicate observations made by one price collector to the 
'others. It happens quite often that a price collector learns something about a product- where to find 
it, what to avoid, an equivalent brand, etc. - that would save the other's work and trouble. Usually 
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the price collectors are so few that it would not mean a great deal of work to circulate such 
observations. 
The prices to be recorded 
34. The prices to be collected are market prices, that are the prices at which the products are 
actually sold. Hence, list prices issued by manufacturers or wholesalers cannot be accepted as they 
do not reflecf the actual price level. 
35. The value-added tax (VAT) and other indirect taxes imposed on the goods and services 
should be included. Delivery costs should be excluded where possible. For goods which cannot be 
conveniently transported by the purchaser, prices quoted may include "free" delivery, for which the 
true cost cannot be separately identified. For these items' collectors should note whether the price is 
inclusive or exclusive of delivery charges, and any conditions for •free" delivery. 
36. For products which art pennaneotly discounted below the "list" price, the discounted price 
should be used. Some kinds of goods (or goods sold in some kinds of stores) may always appear 
labelled as "reduced"; usually the goods have never been sold at the higher price. Consequently, it is 
the discounted price which is the market price, and should be taken by the collector. The reductions 
from list price are openly stated in these cases. 
Sales and other temporary price reductions 
3 7. There are several different types of temporary price reductions and promotional ofFers. The 
main types are listed below: 
seasonal sales: regular periods during which shops temporarily reduce prices both of regular 
goods and end-of-line or substandard products; 
discount days, when there are reductions either on all merchandise or selected lines; 
reductions available to selected groups, .e.g. account holders, or holders of particular credit . 
cards; 
extra goods offered free, e.g. "three for the price of two", "15% extra free"; 
store vouchers or other offers for purchases over a given amount (typically found at furniture 
stores) 
Temporary reductions in price, whether in seasonal "sales" or as "special ofFers", should be 
disregarded, and the undiscounted price taken. Discounts not· available to all purchasers, only to 
selected groups, should also be disregarded. Some advice could be added, however: 
3 8. Seasonal sales: The period for pricing should be chosen to avoid temporary price reductions 
or seasonal sales. However, if sales last for much more than four weeks, and a good choice of 
articles is available throughout the period of the sale, there may be a case for including these prices in 
the survey. If in doubt, collect both types of prices and note the relevant details. 
39. End-of-line goods: Items no longer in demand which will not be re-stocked are described as 
"end-of-line goods". Examples are consurner durables which have been (or are about t'-"" be) replaced 
by more up-to-date models and "fashion'' or seasonal items which are no longer in der ·nd. A goof~ 
test is to ask whether the item is likely to remain in stock, or in the case of clothinl-. ') ascertain/ 
whether there ·is a good. range of sizes available. Often end-of-line g~ods will be. markc such anf 
sold at reduced prices. However, even if prices are not reduced, they may not be rer ..:sentative / ;..-
prices of goods currently in demand. For this reason, collectors should avoid tak;,ag the price/' 
end-of-line goods. Where the item in question is a model specified in the survev. the collec7or ~·'
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ascertain the nearest equivalent model currently being stocked, and price that instead. Full details of 
the substitute should be provided. 
40. Extra size and similar offer: Among the many devices used by manufacturers to persuade 
purchasers to buy their goods is frequently found the "extra 15% free" offer on long-running lines 
such as instant coffee or toothpaste. There are many variants on this: "three for the price of two", 
"free" trial size, another produd packaged "free" with the specified product. The correct procedure 
in this case is: if possible, price the standard size; if this is temporarily unavailable, price at a later 
date if practicable (within four weeks of the suiVey date); if it is still unavailable, price the special 
offer size, but make a note of the temporarily increased size (or any other "free" ofFer). 
Checking the prices 
41. It should be clear from the description above of the stages of a price survey that th~ price 
data are checked· consecutively. The completed questioMaires are nonnally inspected when they 
reach the NSI. Missing infonnation. can then be completed and other corrections be made. The 
analytical tables produced by Eurostat during the processing of the data will draw the· attention to 
unexpected price variation, suspicious-looking price levels or other inconsistencies which ought to be 
checked. Several countries make compilations of the price data, e.g. by means of a spreadsheet 
programme. Differing prices or quantities are easy to see when the prices are arranged item by item 
and compared between the shops. The choice of articles can also be compared in this way. This 
inspection will result in a large number of obseiVations which have to be checked and verified or 
corrected. Contacts with the shops will be required in many cases to check some of these prices or to 
obtain supplementary information. 
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SURVEY E 95-11 ON SERVICES 
t 
ITEM • OUT~ CON· PRICE ARITH· MAX. % DIFF. MIN. % DIFF. YARI· 
CODE LET VERTED QUOTES METIC PRICE FROM PRICE FROM AnON 
CODE PRICE AVERAGE AVER. AVER. COEFF. 
311.31R • 7 4 725 
311:.31R • '7 3828 
311.31R • 7 4200 
311.31R • 7 4176 
311.31R • 7 3683 
311.31R • 7 3 828 
311.31R • 7 4292 7 4105 4 725 15% 3683 ·1K 
311.32AA • 1 470 
311.32AA • 2 374 
311.32AA • 1 399 
311.32AA • 5 336 
311.32AA • 5 338 
311.32M • 2 423 
311.32AA • 2 374 
311.32AA • 1 399 
311.32AA • 5 354 
311.32AA • 5 388 
311.32AA • 5 388 
311.32AA • 5 356 
311.32AA • 5 363 
311.32AA • 5 358 
311.32AA • 5 348 15 378 470 24% 338 -11% 
311.32AB • 1 437 
311.32AB • 2 349 
311.32AB * 1 368 
311.32AB * 5 340 
311.32AB • 5 345 
311.32AB • 2 465 
311.32AB • 2 370 
311.32AB * 1 369 
311.32AB • 5 354 
311.32AB • 5 370 
311.32AB • 5 405 
311.32AB • 5 393 
311.32AB • 5 343 
311.32AB . 5 345 
311.32AB • 5 399 15 377 465 23o/o 340 -10% 9" 
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ANNEX 3 
Chapter 10 
DATA TRANS MIS S.I 0 N 0 N D I S K E T T E S 
A large variety of software programs are being used by national statisticians to input and process 
data ftom PPP surveys; this variety is·of course being reflected in the data transmitted from National 
Statistical Offices to EUROSTAT; nevertheless some rules should be respected in order to keep the 
burden for EUROSTAT within reasonable limits; here are the essential ones: 
1 ) Physical devices: 3.5 inches 
5.25 inches HD 
The best support is the nowadays very common 3.5 inches' diskette; both Single Density (720 
Kbytes) and High Density (1.44 Mbytes are OK; old 5.25 inches floppy disks are still accepted, 
but we have sometimes problems reading the Single Density ones ( 360 Kbytes ) 
2 ) Disk formatting : DOS 
Microsoft PC-DOS or OS2; i.e. files from any so called "Compatible"; Apple Mackintosh fonnat is 
not standard. 
3 ) Type of file : ASCU print-file 
AScn delimited 
Spreadsheets 
Best formats are ASCII print-file and ASCII delimited file; an ASCII print-file (also known as flat 
file) is a file containing only clear, printable characters, with a fixed column structure; the columns 
are separated by spaces. Most software's can produce such files which typically have the extension 
".PRT "; for instance an ASCII print file will be produced by Symphony if you redirect a print to 
disk. 
An ASCII delimited file is quite similar, except that the spaces between the columns are substituted 
by a single separator; so the file's structure is more compact; a clever separator is the Tabular 
character, because it helps reading the file in DOS; another typical (and less clever) separator is the • 
, " ( Comma delimited ) . 
An example of Tabular delimited file is the Text (" .TXT") file. produced via EXCEL. 
Other accepted formats are Spreadsheets from Symphony or Excel. 
Data formatted Dbasell, Dbaselll can also be translated. 
I 
.J I 
r- I 
~ I 
._ I 
For any other format please contact EUROST AT so that the best way .of ~ransfening data can be found. 
4 ) General organisation of data : Clearly separated columns 
A line per priced· item 
No ornaments I 
Every column should be clearly separated; for instance: unit or quantity and price columns mixed 
together (Ex. 0.51t=5.4 llt=l0.80 ) can be very confusing to a computer-software. 
Every line should contain one item with its price and attributes (brand, type of outlet ... ) ; files 
containing several prices per Article-code on the same line are not convenient at all. 
The files (Text-file, Print-file or Spreadsheet) sho~ld be in the most possibly plane layout: no 
omements, no fonnulas in the cells; no imbedded fonnatting commands, no imbellished numeric 
formats like currencies or commas between thousands, etc. etc.; the reason for that is that all 
ornaments "'ust be removed to process the files and create price matrices, and removing takes extra 
time. 
Zeros (0) and Os are not the same thing to a computer, mixing the two unluckily happens more often 
than one could expect. 
5) Fields: 
1. Article code 
2. Asterisk 
3. Type of shop 
4. Observed quantity 
S. Observed price 
6. Type of unit 
7. Unit quantity 
8. Unit price 
9. Brand 
10. Remarks 
Other optional fields: 
• Date of survey: 
The fields should be (at least) the following ones: 
numeric plus alpha chars, according to the survey book. 
a single " • " character ( YIN ) 
numeric; it is a code according to the well known rules. 
numeric; it is the pure quantity, expressed in the type of unit 
mentioned at 6. 
numeric. 
alpha; it is a descriptive datum, like Mt., CC, etc. 
numeric; it is expressed in the type of unit mentioned at 6; it is the 
quantity given in the definition, that can of course differ from the unit 
itself like 1 kg, 1 gr, l 1 
· numeric; it is the price converted to the unit quantity. 
alpha. 
alpha. 
not really necessary if the date is reminded in the title or in the accompanying letter. 
• · Country code: not necessary at all. 
• Second type of unit: some times the observed quantity and the unit quantity could be expressed 
in different units: for instance in ounces and grams, or in volume and weight units, like liters and 
kilos. In this case a second column "type of unit .. is necessary. 
ss 
.. 
. . 
'. 
: JC:. . .·:,~. ..•c 
Titles, heading or footing lines: in reasonable quantity these lines can only help. 
~e is an example of a •standard •presentation of a survey: 
CODE· AST TYPE OBS OBS. MEAS UNIT UNIT BRAND SHOP PRICE ·UNIT QTY PRICE 
1103.41e • 2 185 9.90 ML. 250 Pro mas 
1103.4le • 2 200 12.90 MI... 250 13.38 4 Diamanten 
1103.41f • 2 300 23.90 ML. 250 Ozean 
II03.41f • 2 240 24.90 ML. 250 16.13· Elfin 
1103.41f • 2 225 19.90 ML . 250 Warhanek 
1103.41f • 2 ISO 18.90 ML. 250 19.92 Glyngore 
1104.41f • 2 400 29.90 MI... 250 Warhanek 
1104.41b • 2 0.125 13.90 KG. I 25.94 Prepaclted 
1104.41b • 2 0.125 14.90 KG. I Prepackecl 
1104.41b • 2 1 129.00 KG. I 22.12 Loose 
1104.4Is 2 0.125 I9.90 KG. 1 Prepacked 
1104.41s 2 I 179.00 KG. 1 31.50 Prepacked 
1104.4ls., 4 1 219.00 KG. 1 Loose 
1104.41s 4 I 199.00 KG. 1 18.69 Loose 
44111g • I I 1300.00 PC. 1 OXFORD capienza 0,23 
44111g • 1 1 1730.00 PC . 1 111.20 CAPITOL capienza 0.25 
4411lg • 4 1 800.00 PC . 1 
44111g • 4 1 1650.00 PC . 1 119.20 CAPITOL 
44111g • 1 1 1800.00 PC . 1 CAPITOL BORNIOU 
44lllg • 1 1 2000.00 PC . 1 129.00 CASAeTU ROCCO 
44lllga • 1 5 5000.00 PC . I CASAeTU serieGEO 
44111ga • I 4 8000.00 PC . 1 159.20 CERVE SERlE SOFIA 
44I11ga • 1 4 2900.00 PC. . 1 VETRAVIR 
44111ga • 4 4 4000.00 PC . 1 179.00 CASAeTU 
-
44111ga • 4 4 4200.00 PC. 1 SERIESOPIA 
219.00 
199.00 
1300.00 
I730.00 
800.00 
I650.00 
I800.00 
2000.00 
1000.00 
2000.00 
725.00 
1000.00 
1050.00 
" 
Ftr- s6 
11 REVIEW DATA BEFORE TRANSMISSION TO EUROSTAT 
1. The National Statistical Institutes are responsible for collecting prices, using their own 
surveyors for the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), specialist surveyors for the Purchasing 
Power Parities Project or by sub-contracting the price collection to private finns. Given that 
the price collection is the most important stage of the process, it is therefore fundamental to 
make the most of the experience of stable teams of sutveyors to make for consistent anilysis 
in time and space. 
Data collection and recording 
2. Prices are nonnally collected during personal visits to establishments (that are selected 
following the rules set up in these guidelines) when the tailor-made questionnaires are 
completed. The special traits required of a surveyor are a serious attitude, discretion, the 
ability to adapt to different personal situations and a sense of responsibility. Only accurate 
and correct data enable indices to be calculated which match the reality which we are 
attempting to evaluate. 
3. The design of the questionnaire used in collecting data must meet the following objectives, 
as a minimum: 
4. 
S. 
i) it should ease the sutveyors' tasks of collecting and checking prices; 
ii) it should meet the basic requirements of Eurostat's data transmission standards (see 
circular o£07/10/94 "Data t_ransmission on diskette•- Annex 3). · 
For most articles, therefore, the questioMaire used should have the following basic structure: 
at the top, it should state the code, name, specification of the article and its 
representativeness; it should have sufficient lines to include the information corresponding to 
the majority or ~ of the occasions on which each article is surveyed (an individual price 
quotation); the infonnation on each such price quotation should include the following fields, 
at least: the numerical order of price quotation (first, second, third, ... ),type and name of the 
establishment (by the latest type classification adopted), price observed, unit of observation 
(for ex.: 200 g, 1 kg, 11, ... ),price converted to the con-version unit, brand and observations. 
The data referring to the address of the establishment and i~entifying the declarants may be 
included in a different document (Register or Establishments), which will be extremely . 
useful for the corresponding verification checks on lhe data to be. conducted by personal 
visits or by requesting information over the telephone, fax, etc. 
It is very important that every country should record and transmit the data with a common 
structure, to which end Eurostat bas already compiled data transmission standards. Of 
these, the fields mentioned in the aforementioned document should be clearly in~icated, 
bearing the following observations in mind: 
i) the unit of observation for prices should be as close as possible to the requisite unit, 
as indicated in the specification; 
ii) the convened prices should be calculated on the basis of the prices and units observed 
and of the conversion unit; 
iii) the observations should briefly and clearly state all the characteristics of the 
specification for the articles which influence their pnces and which differ from those 
indicated in the specification. 
51 
A more detailed explanation of the characteristics and the calculation of specific 
prices may be set out in a separate document. 
6. Clearly structuring the above infonnation will enable Eurostat to reach decisions on the 
necessary subdivision of articles or the withdrawal of certain prices. Thus, for each price, the 
unit of observation should be stated, along with the brand and the main differences vis-a-vis 
the characteristics indicated in the specification. 
Tables and indicators us~d in data analysis 
7. Data analysis should begin on receipt of the first data, i.e. as of the first three or four prices 
for most articles, and it should be exhaustive and detailed by the time the process of 
recording is complete. According to the information collected, a distinction could be made 
between the following kinds of analysis: 
a) . variability and detection of outliners 
b) the distribution of establishments by type; 
c) analysis of price levels over time; 
d) coverage and representativeness; 
8. The first two analyses may be pursued in a report at article level in which, taking the 
establishment codes and the converted prices, a series of indicators are obtained which enable 
us to analyse the distribution of establishments by type, price variability and identify extreme 
values, i.e. the coefficient of variation of the prices plus the maximum and minimum prices in 
absolute values and the percentage by which these differ from the average prices (See Annex 
1}. 
9. Analysis of coverage and representativeness at the level of each article and basic heading, and 
time analysis of prices in the last two surveys may be dealt with in a new report (See Annex 
2). 
To complement the report of prices over time for the PPP Project, it will be necessary to 
consider changes in the course of time iri price levels for basic headings and for the articles 
included in the CPI purchasing basket. 
These controls will principally be aimed at detecting potential problems of coverage or 
representativeness and at uncovering errors arising in data collection or processing. They 
should also be more exhaustive and detailed on those basic headings which justify this by 
their weight or relative weight. 
Controls, corrections and adjustments 
10. The necessary controls on data represent one of the most significant stages in any statistical 
project, and this is panicularly so in this project, given that a reduced number of prices have 
to support an international spatial analysis which is significantly more complex than any study 
at national level. 
11. The first data controls are to be conducted before data collection is complete, Thus, after the 
visits to the main establishments, a meeting should be held to follow up the surveys with the 
. following objectives: 
i) solving practical problems on the correct identifi~ation of articles. 
ii) time analysis of prices at the level of articles and of coverage and representativeness 
at the level of elementary positions. 
;o . 
f2 ~ 58 
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Successfully achieving the above objectives will enable problems to be identified and 
remedied before proceeding to the next stage of the process. Correcting these problems at 
the right time will enable the subsequent stages of the process to be trimmed down and faster, 
and to obtain more accurate data . 
12. The correct identification of the articles is one of the general underlying principles of the 
project, as is the principle of comparability or equivalence. With particular reference to those 
generally defined products, the experience of the surveyors and the national and international 
co-ordinators will ensure that the price ratios are calculated on comparable articles defined by 
those of their characteristics which most influence prices. 
13. Price analysis over time, based on changes in average prices between two subsequent 
surveys, may be conducted mainly on those areas for which there are no significant time 
changes in the definition of the articles: food; services; health care costs; clothing and 
footwear; other goods and services. 
The objective of this analysis is not to measure how prices change in time, but to check the 
consistency of the data while avoiding conversion errors and the miss-identification of 
articles. Thus, abnormally high or low changes in prices when compared with changes for 
identical or similar articles from the CPI or with other articles with very close specifications 
.from the parities survey should also be explained in some way: errors in some survey data, 
significant changes in brands, establishments, forms of presentation, etc. 
14. Outlinen are_ to be analysed in the light of the full infonnation included in the questioMaires 
and by consulting surveyors or cross-checking with declarants. In the light of such -
consultations, the following may ·be considered sufficient grounds for correcting or 
withdrawing some: 
i) recording or conversion errors, etc. to be attributed to any stage of the statistical 
process; 
· ii) low representative value due to the type of establishment or characteristics of the 
article since this is an isolated value. 
The importance of such analysis of representativeness is determined by the extent to 
which withdrawing a value influences the average price for an article. 
Converting observed prices to the convenion unit 
15. In certain areas of expenditure (food, services, etc.), the observed prices for a substantial 
number of goods and services have to be converted to the conversion unit, as set up in the 
product specification. 
Avoiding recording the converted price, but obtaining this from the observed price and from 
the conversion and observed units will not only avoid the corresponding errors in data 
processing, but \Vill also reduce the surveyors' and recorders' workload. 
Provisionally, ho,vever, the surveyors are to convert the first prices on the questionnaire (see 
.11) in order to obtain a first average price comparable to that of the previous survey. 
Allocating asterisks 
16. Equi-representativity is a fundamental principle in calculating parities. To comply with this 
principle, therefore, the basket of goods. and s.ervices used in calculating parities at their 
various levels of breakdown should be equally representative of all the countries to be 
compared. 
S9 
The active involvement of the co-ordination body and of the participant countries in choosing 
the basket of articles concerned will enable a balanced basket to be obtained for all the 
countries to be compared. At the same time, this should correctly represent the structures of 
consumption in these countries. 
In view of the exhaustive detail in which the principle of representativeness is underlined in 
the corresponding section of these guidelines, to the extent that even the practical principles 
of allocating asterisks in the various stages of the survey are analysed, we will dwell no 
further on this principle. . 
Summary 
These guidelines on the control of data could be summarised as follows: · 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Maintaining fixed teams of sutveyors to make for greater consistency of analysis in time and 
space ( 1 above) 
Adapting the structure of the questionnaire and recording file to the data transmission 
standards (3) 
Conducting a first control on data at a monitoring meeting when the main establishments 
have been visited (II) 
Avoiding recording the converted price, obtaining this from the obsezved price, the observed 
quantity/unit and the conversion quantity/unit (15) · 
Scrutiny and analysis of results after recording must be exhaustive, particularly with regard to 
those articles and basic headings whose relative ·weighting justifies this. The corresponding 
reports should be based on the following analyses: 
distribution of establishments by type 
coverage and representativeness of basic headings 
detection of outliners and variability of prices 
evaluation of prices in time against ihose from the preceding survey, taking changes in 
identical or comparable articles in the CPI as a reference. 
• 
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(S[k) 
~ Centraal Bureau ,voor de Statistiek 
Division Socioeconomic Statistics St·atis!ics Netherlands 
Mr. John Astin 
Eurostat 
Division B3 
BaDmeat Jean Monnet 
L-2920 LUXEMBOURG 
Luxemburg 
COC'\~ 
..... t.r.t W.B. Camp 
doomanummer · 
ffir«tlill£ (+31) 70 337 4438 
uwbric:fvan 
ywr lttrrr of 
ONb.Nne.rk 
cJUr trftrtr~a 03430-96-SCP 
bijlAs.!{n) 
md.t::urt:(::J 
onduw~ Follow-up of 1994 review of the methodology {draft report to the Council A64/96/20) 
Voorburg. 19 November 1996 · ,,.,. .. 
Dear Mr. Astin, 
On several occasions, Statistics Netherlands expressed its conrems on the housing parity 
methodology. A lot of efforts have been put in improving scvcrcd aspects of the method. Still we 
have doubts whether this has led to getting closer to reality. As far as the Netherlands are 
COD.CCIDed. we are still of the opinion that the method of the rent swvcy is inadequate when the 
aim of the method is to compensate EU-officials for their housing costs. For bread, meat, 
clothiDg, etc. representative items can be chosen as a basis foe price comparisons: no matter 
what kind of bread or meat the official corisumes in reality. Housing is a different matter as far 
as we are concerned . 
. In the Petten case special arra.ogemcms have been made fur the officials. A special quarter bas 
beeo built where hundreds of officials live. It seems to us that one should t.ake the ac1Ually paid 
raJ.ts iDtD consideration. Removing housing costs from the parity aod dealing with these costs 
separately might be a way to improve things in this rapect. 
The introduction of a new Brussels expenditure structure (with a higher weight for rents) 
prompted me to draw your intention once more to this problem. 
Yours sincerely, 
(W.B. Camp) 
cas :-roomut~ Head of Department ConsLUner Prices 
'\lies Beatrixllan428 
r·,.-itt~ .ct.rJn 
2270 JM V(W1naurs 
:L 31 (0)70 337 38 ()() 
'. ) 1 (0)70 387 74 :!9 
CBS Heed~n 
Klo...st~rw~ 1 
1',.-;thu'l- .J.4i(l 
WO 1 CZ Hecrlen 
l. 31 (CI)II:'i S7U 6(1 llll 
~ 31 (0)45 572 74 40 
.. 1:·-::- . 
. : w6ik;~~-.p~:·ibid~ Article .64 of the StaffRePi~tio~; 
.: m)ectfircally: its meeting in Lwc:embourg on 29 October 1996 
~: .. ·· ~eport_to the Col!llcii on th~ revision of the c'Method" in the light of the 1994 
document A'-64i96/20 · · · · · 
. . . •'. ·.·: .. ' 
.~ 
. 4 ..... 
~·Mr··~·. 
.:· · · .'· ·.>-/.:~}·~;-~_~age·.~·. 
·.~~i·:~:\~.: ·: .; . 
results.(Wor~ng .. 
At the abOve-mentioned meeting it was agreed that the Member StateS have the opportunity to submit to 
you, by ·1 S ~ovember 1996, any comments they may have on the .above-mentioned report to the Council. 
~r ~nsulting Mr Szenzenstein, I am ~vailing myself of this offer to send you the following comments. I 
sbbwd be 'irateful if you would incorporate them into the report to the Council or draw attention to them in 
an appropriate fashion. . 
. . 
. The discussion of poSsible weak:Ttesses in the present "Metb:od" has led to a nwnber of improvemeqts.from . 
. the statistical point of view. nus has also _meant, ho~ever, that in most cases the cost of gathering the 
statistical data: on purchasing power has further increased. The effo~ to achieve as accurate ·a method as 
.possible once again show the consequences of contin~ly refining the techniques with the resultant · 
·increases~ Cost, whereby it is stilJ not possible to eliminate a certain'range of statistical·errors 1bis 
confums the~.ted demands by a number of Member S~tes·to limit, in terms of both ~and money, the· 
expel\(titure:on c:Ollecting and processing the data, while accepting certain limitations in the accuracy of the 
data. We thcrefo~·maintain our well-known political objectiops to various components of the "Method". In 
-the political decision-making bodies, the German delegation will continue to press for a change in the 
"Method" .witli the aim of making .it considerably simp~er and more transparent for the data users, and this is 
also in the .. interests of those affected by it. · 
Yours· sincerely, 
Dr Riegel 
.. l 
1 
